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ABSTRACT  
 
Flow is a mental state characterised by a feeling of energised focus, complete involvement 
and success when fully immersed in an activity. The dimensions of and the conditions 
required for flow to occur have been explored in a broad spectrum of situational contexts. 
The close relationship between flow and peak performance sparked an interest in ways to 
induce flow. However, any process of flow induction requires a measure to trace the degree 
to which flow is in fact occurring. Self-reports of the flow experience are subjective and 
provide ad hoc information. Psycho-physiological measures, such as EEG, can provide 
objective and continuous indications of the degree to which flow is occurring. Unfortunately 
few studies have explored the relationships between psycho-physiological measures and 
flow. The present study was an attempt to determine the EEG correlates of flow under 
conditions of peak performance.   
 
Twenty participants were asked to perform a continuous visuomotor task 10 times. Time 
taken per task was used as an indicator of task performance. EEG recordings were done 
concurrently. Participants completed an Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire (AFQ) after each 
task and a Game Flow Inventory (GFI) after having finished all 10 tasks. On completion, 
performance times and associated flow scores were standardised where after the sample was 
segmented into a high flow - peak performance and a low flow - low performance level.  
Multi-variate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the performance, flow and 
EEG data to establish that a significant difference existed between the two levels. In addition, 
a one-way analysis of variance between high and low flow data was conducted for all 
variables and main effects were established.  Inter-correlations of all EEG data at both levels 
were then conducted across four brain sites (F3, C3, P3, O1).  In high flow only, results 
indicated increased lobeta power in the sensorimotor cortex together with a unique EEG 
pattern showing beta band synchronisation between the prefrontal and sensori-motor areas 
and de-synchronisation between all other areas, while all other frequencies (delta, theta, 
alpha, lobeta, hibeta, and gamma) remained synchronised across all scalp locations. These 
findings supported a theoretical neuropsychological model of flow.   
 
Key words 
Psycho-physiological; Flow; Performance; Power; Synchrony; De-synchronisation; EEG 
correlates; EEG marker; Visuomotor task. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION   
 
Peak performance is often associated with an optimal state of mind which in sporting 
terms is better known as ‘the zone’ or ‘the groove’.  In this mind state body and mind are 
working together in a super-efficient manner. In psychological terms, this phenomenon is 
called ‘flow’. In sport psychology, flow is associated with high intensity, strong focus, 
superior performance (Young, 2000), and peak experience (Murphy & White, 1995), 
which are accompanied by heightened awareness and intrinsic motivation (Frederick-
Recascino & Morris, 2004).  Young and Pain (1999) reported that ‘the zone’ or flow state 
is a universal phenomenon associated with peak performance across sporting codes. Flow 
is associated not only with sport performance but also with performance in general, and so 
is an important aspect of coaching, training, and consulting at the individual and group 
level. It applies to sport and to the commercial and leisure environments.  
 
Flow theory, developed by Csikszentmihalyi (1975), has been studied for more than 30 
years, mostly from a positivistic paradigm, in many situational contexts, such as 
computing (Trevino & Webster, 1992; Webster, Trevino, & Ryan, 1993; Chen, Wigand, & 
Nilan, 1999); occupational therapy (Jacobs, 1994; Emerson, 1998); family interaction 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1993); leisure (Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre, 1989; Graef, 
Csikszentmihalyi & Gianinno, 1983); schooling (Carli, Delle Fave & Massimini, 1988; 
Clarke & Haworth, 1994; Moneta & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996); sports (Jackson & Roberts, 
1992; Stein, Kimiecik, Daniels, & Jackson, 1995; Kowal & Fortier, 1999;); and video 
gaming (Cowley, Charles, Black & Hickey, 2008). The body of evidence from the above 
research indicates a strong positive relationship between flow and peak performance.  
 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) defined flow as the mental state of operation in which the person 
is fully immersed in what he or she is doing, characterised by a feeling of energised focus, 
 2 
full involvement, and success in the processing of the activity. He also defined it as an 
experience of being completely immersed in an activity such that heart, will and mind are 
in harmony. According to him, the value of flow is that it pushes people to increasingly 
higher levels of performance. Following flow people report subjective experiences of 
challenge-skills balance, concentration on the task at hand, action-awareness merging, 
sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, transformation of time, and autotelic 
experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). 
 
Peak performance is defined as “behaviour which exceeds one’s average performance” 
(Privette, 1982, p. 242) or as “superior functioning” (Privette, 1983, p. 1361), whilst 
Jackson and Roberts (1992, p. 156) viewed it as a “prototype of superior use of human 
potential”, including physical and mental involvement. Performance is also closely related 
to learning or practice, and follows an identifiable “S” curve which expresses the 
relationship between performance (as learning output) and efficiency. Fitts and Posner 
(1967) found that the learning process is sequential and that the learned skill eventually 
becomes automatic, involving little or no conscious thought or attention, but displaying the 
ability to self-correct and make minute adjustments. This autonomous phase of skill 
acquisition mirrors action-awareness merging, also described as absorption or immersion, 
characteristic of flow and considered one of the clearest indications that someone is 
experiencing it (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Jackson & Wrigley, 2004).  
 
Contrasting flow and peak performance, Jackson and Wrigley (2004, p. 426) postulate that 
peak performance refers to an outcome or achievement of superior functioning rather than 
to an internal experience of optimal feelings and perceptions. Optimal experience (flow) 
describes an inner psychological state while engaged in an effortful and challenging 
activity, whereas peak performance refers to outcome or accomplishment as a consequence 
of a person’s effort and sustained concentration. In summary, ‘peak performance’ refers to 
an outcome rather than an experience, whilst ‘flow’ refers to the psychological experience 
accompanying the peak performance. The flow experience motivates people to re-engage 
the same activity, but in order to re-experience flow, performance has to be raised to a 
new, higher level.  
 
Flow is measured by means of post-hoc questionnaires drawing on the subjective 
experience of behaviours during performances. It cannot be directly evaluated or observed 
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by others, whereas peak performance is objectively quantifiable by observations through 
direct measurement and comparison to previous or other performances. Reflecting on the 
above comparison, Kimiecik and Stein (1992) argued that peak experience and flow are 
subjective in nature, whereas peak performance is about objective results. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1993) postulated that flow is tangentially related to peak performance, 
indicating that both phenomena can occur at the same time, or perhaps as two sides of the 
same coin. 
 
Since flow is so closely associated with peak performance it becomes an important aspect 
of performance, irrespective of activity, and an attractive concept for utilisation by 
coaches, trainers and supervisors in pursuit of consistent, top-level performance with the 
added advantage of experiencing enjoyment and satisfaction from the performance.  
 
However, the dilemma for the consultant or coach is that since flow is invisible to direct 
objective observation or measurement it is extremely difficult to teach people to enter it, to 
know how long they have been in it, or whether they were in it at all. It is therefore 
important to find a mechanism through which flow can be observed in real/humanly 
measured chronological time, objectively and accurately. If this is possible it will facilitate 
clearer links between flow, behaviour, and performance and thus improvements in the 
design of empirical, measurable behavioural/psychological skills to induce, sustain, and 
tap its value. 
 
Having an objective measure of flow will also enable researchers to provide answers to 
questions such as:  
 
(1) Is the occurrence of flow limited to peak performances only or is it also possible 
during lower levels of performance?  
(2) Is flow influenced by learning and experience?  
(3) Is there a neuropsychological correlate for peak performance and, by implication, 
for flow?  
 
In search of an objective measure for flow, the author reverted to neurophysiological 
measures, such as the electroencephalogram (EEG), to determine a set of EEG correlates 
that can be used as a neurophysiological marker and objective measure of flow. Since 
 4 
technology has evolved to such a level that EEGs are being recorded using laptop 
computers, wireless applications and headsets with electrodes, EEG technology can be 
used in the consulting and coaching environment as an indicator of flow. 
 
However, using neurophysiological means to measure behavioural aspects has its own 
challenges. According to Chalmers (1995), there is an explanatory gap between matter and 
sensation that has not yet been satisfactorily bridged, whether by neuroscience, cognitive 
science, neuropsychology, phenomenology, or systems theory. Chalmers states that “the 
hard problem [is] the question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to 
subjective experience”, that is, how the physical and mental faculties interact.  
 
Werner (2008) proposed that a ‘state space’ approach be adopted in viewing the brain’s 
states as neural patterns in a two-dimensional space. In state space, reconfiguration of the 
neurological system is expressed as a change in the correlation function between micro-
system elements. Flow is purported as an altered, heightened state of consciousness, which 
implies that, from a cognitive- and neuropsychological perspective, it is possible to 
identify a unique network of neural structures and processes under conditions of peak 
performance that represent the flow state.   
 
From a neuropsychological perspective, consciousness is considered hierarchically 
ordered, with the pre-frontal cortex at the top of the hierarchy, representing the neural 
basis of higher order cognitive functions, supported by the temporal, occipital, and parietal 
cortices (TOP), and limbic structures, which together provide the lower order or primary 
neural circuitry for consciousness (Dietrich, 2003). The dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex 
(DLPFC) is considered the higher order seat, and the thalamus the lower order seat of 
central processing (Fuster, 2000; Dietrich, 2003). Sensory information is fed into the 
thalamus and distributed to other centres (including memory) for encoding, then to the 
DLPFC for higher order processing, which then returns the information to the thalamus for 
action responses. The thalamus processes information, presumably in ‘bottom-up’ fashion, 
through a two-track circuit, one for cognitive processing, via the hippocampal formation 
and TOP cortices, which are mainly linked to perception and long-term memory; and one 
for emotional processing, via the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex and the ventromedial 
pre-frontal cortex (Damasio, 1994). Emotional processing involves the computation of 
information in a non-algorithmic, skilled-based manner associated with self-discipline, 
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achievement, self-esteem and confidence (Churchland, 2002). Each system keeps a record 
of its activity so that emotional memory is part of the emotional circuitry and perceptual 
and conceptual memory is part of the cognitive circuitry.  
 
Although there are multiple connections at various levels between the two information 
processing systems, full reintegration of emotional and cognitive information does not 
appear to happen until both types of computations converge back on the DLPFC (LeDoux, 
1996). In addition to the type of information (emotional or cognitive), the brain also 
operates two distinct information processing systems to acquire, memorise, and represent 
knowledge. Once information has entered the sensory system and is coded with a cognitive 
and/or emotive tag it is further processed, presumably by the DLPFC in ‘top-down’ 
fashion, by either or both the explicit or implicit information processing system that 
contains both cognitive and emotional information. The explicit system is rule-based, with 
its content able to be expressed by verbal communication, and it is tied to conscious 
awareness (Dietrich, 2004). In contrast, the implicit system is skill or experience-based, 
with its content not able to be verbalised but only conveyable through task performance. It 
is inaccessible to conscious awareness (Ashby & Casale, 2002; Dienes & Perner, 1999).  
 
The process of skill acquisition starts as a conscious process during which attention is 
focussed on the goal of acquiring explicit knowledge regarding the composition and 
execution of the skill (Fitts & Posner, 1967). The pre-frontal cortex (PFC) and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) are strongly engaged early in the learning cycle, when stimulus-
response mappings are actively being established (Jenkins, Brooks, Nixon, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham, 1994). During this phase performance is low and conscious effort is put into 
learning. As learning progresses through repetition, explicit knowledge becomes 
entrenched and transformed into implicit knowledge, whilst performance improves 
because fewer errors are made and therefore conscious attention is progressively freed up 
for other use. In later stages of learning, once contingency mappings have become 
consolidated, the frontal structures (PFC and dorsal ACC) exhibit a reduction in activity, 
while the posterior regions (basal ganglia circuit, including parietal, posterior cingulated, 
and parahippocampal cortices) demonstrate and increase in activity (Chein & Schneider, 
2005; Luu, Tucker & Stripling, 2007; Toni & Passingham, 1999). An internalised (skilled) 
motor pattern is controlled entirely by this basal ganglia circuit and little pre-frontal 
activity is required; unconscious, effortless execution of the skill is achieved, which is 
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characterised by a perception of ‘automaticity’. However, Toates (2006) argues that the 
link between conscious (explicit) and unconscious (implicit) processes is not entirely 
functionally severed following the progression to automaticity. Automatic processes are 
thus modulated by conscious intentions (such as goals, objectives or strategies), pointing to 
joint control and thereby integration between implicit and explicit controls, which 
highlights the importance of goal setting as a precondition for flow, linking focussed 
conscious attention and unconscious intrinsic motivation to peak performance.  
 
It is postulated that during peak performance skill execution is implicitly controlled by 
posterior structures through the application of repertoires of automated reflexes and 
skilfully tweaked by input from explicit conscious adjustments by the fronto-limbic 
structures made in response to dynamic external changes in the task environment. This 
joint implicit/explicit control is supported or maintained by unambiguous dynamic 
feedback from the sensory system. When task efficiency is achieved by little or no 
correction from the explicit system, a perception of being controlled by ‘auto-pilot’ (a flow 
trait) is experienced. Since attention is fully and consciously invested (by the PFC) in the 
task environment, loss of self-consciousness (a flow trait) is experienced. Also, since the 
implicit system contains both cognitive and emotional information processing, the 
achievement of flow will include not only logical, time and spatial motor responses, but 
also emotional responses (for example, joy, happiness) associated with motivational and 
task behaviour. 
 
A neuropsychological model for peak performance, and thus flow, is characterised by a 
neurological pattern representing a change in motor functioning from explicit to implicit 
control, as indicated by a shift in neural activity from the frontal networks to the posterior 
networks during peak performance. This neurological pattern is supported by neurological 
studies using EEG technology which suggest that superior performance is marked by 
mental economy, particularly of analytical associative processes, and that pruning of 
excessive cortico-cortical communication between such processes and motor regions 
underlies enhancement and consistency of psychomotor performance (Hatfield & Hillman, 
2001).  
 
Recent experimental evidence indicates that in later stages of skill acquisition or 
visuomotor performance, once contingency mappings have become consolidated, frontal 
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structures (as indexed by F3/F4) exhibit a reduction in activity, while posterior regions (as 
indexed by P3/P4) demonstrate increased activity. Shifts in neural control occur as a 
function of practice so that the details of a motor task become gradually controlled by the 
basal ganglia circuit, which includes the supplementary motor cortex, the motor thalamus, 
and the hippocampus (indexed by P3/P4). Beta de-synchronisation and phase lags between 
different cortical areas are reported once a motor skill is completely internalised and 
controlled entirely by this basal ganglia circuit (indexed by P3/P4), and little pre-frontal 
activity is required, freeing up working memory and allowing executive attention (indexed 
by F3/F4) to fill its premium computational space with other environmentally relevant 
content that requires higher order processing (Logar et al., 2008). 
 
Individuals performing at peak levels will therefore exhibit improved executive control 
over the fronto-limbic circuit through modulation by the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex 
(F3). Consequently, individuals will experience decreased activation of the amygdala (less 
anxiety) and increased activation of the hippocampus (smoother motor control) in the 
limbic system (P3) (Janelle & Hatfield, 2008). In terms of EEG data, theta oscillations 
have been reported to represent a basic resonance phenomenon mediating the information 
flow through the hippocampus, thalamus, and frontal/temporal neocortex. Theta power is 
expected to decrease in the frontal region (F3). The resultant emotional reactivity, in turn, 
will lead to alpha synchrony, particularly in the left temporal (T3) and parietal (P3) 
regions, along with decreased cortico-cortical communication between these regions and 
the motor planning centres (Fz) (Deeny, Hillman, Janelle & Hatfield, 2003). Decreases in 
power in the lower alpha band have been linked to higher task demands and attentional 
processing. The EEG at T3 will thus show higher levels of alpha power (8–12 Hz) (lower 
task demand) as well as lower levels of beta and gamma power at Fz, implying less 
explicit (conscious) and more implicit (unconscious) attention to task execution (Haufler, 
Spalding, Santa Maria & Hatfield, 2000; 2002). This interpretation is consistent with the 
well-established notion of ‘automaticity’ during skilled motor performance in which 
advanced performers are unconscious of the details of their performance as they execute 
“in the moment” (Fitts & Posner, 1967; Schneider & Chein, 2003). The above regulation 
of the cerebral cortex will lead to consistent input to the motor loop, resulting in consistent 
cortico-spinal output and motor performance. 
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Synchronous gamma activity, associated with organising the brain, promoting learning, 
and allowing for mental sharpness, will occur in the thalamus and frontal (F3/F4), auditory 
(T3/T4), visual (O1/O2), and motor (C3/C4) and association (P3/P4) cortices, and likely 
contribute to the ‘binding’ of diverse information into a single coherent percept. All of 
these may well be associated with selective attention, transient binding of cognitive 
features, and conscious perception of visual objects (Hughes, 2008). Synchronous gamma 
activity is expected in all regions during peak performance. 
 
Using the above model, it is hypothesised that individuals performing at peak levels, and 
thus experiencing flow, exhibit increased frontal (F3) and parietal (P3) theta power, 
increased sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) alpha power, and decreased frontal beta and 
gamma power, as well as increased alpha synchrony between the sensori-motor (C3) and 
parietal (P3) regions along with beta rhythm de-synchronisation between the frontal (F3), 
sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) areas.  
 
Following the state space approach, peak performance and accompanying flow, can be 
investigated through the observation of changes in correlation between the various areas of 
the brain during task performance. The EEG correlates of peak performance can be used as 
objective measure of flow during a motor task. These correlates can be used as input for 
neurofeedback training or monitoring of flow in a consulting situation. 
 
In light of the above, this study was undertaken to add to the body of research on flow and 
the neuropsychological properties of flow under conditions of peak performance, using 
EEG technology. An objective measure of flow is deemed to be valuable in coaching, 
training, and self-development because flow is associated with peak performance and flow 
induction may increase performance in the workplace, sports field and leisure activities.  
An objective measure of flow, such as EEG, can be used to monitor flow during 
performance since it provides more accurate information than subjective behavioural 
measures.
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1.2 THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This study aims to determine the EEG correlates of flow under conditions of peak 
performance in order to establish an objective measure, or neurophysiological marker, for 
flow.  
 
1.3 THE HYPOTHESES  
 
Based on these postulations, the following hypotheses were formulated and tested in the 
study: 
 
H1:  There is a relationship between peak performance and psychological flow. 
H2:  There is an increase in PFC (F3) EEG Theta power in high flow. 
H3:  There is an increase in PPC (P3) EEG Theta power in high flow. 
H4:  There is an increase in PPC (P3) EEG Alpha power in high flow.  
H5:  There is an increase in SMC (C3) EEG Alpha power in high flow.  
H6:   There is a decrease in PFC (F3) EEG Beta power in high flow. 
H7:   There is a decrease in PFC (F3) EEG Gamma power in high flow. 
H8:   There is an increase in Alpha synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow. 
H9:   There is a decrease in Beta synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow. 
H10: There is a decrease in Beta synchrony between F3 and P3 in high flow. 
H11: There is a decrease in Beta synchrony between F3 and C3 in high flow.   
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1.4 THE RESEARCH  
 
The research is broken down into the following components.      
 
1.4.1 Literature study              
 
In-depth literature study was conducted into flow theory and its relationship with 
performance.  With regards to EEG studies of flow and performance, only two limited 
flow related studies were found (Holcomb, 1976; Kramer, 2007), an indication that this 
study contributes towards filling a gap in the psychological literature on flow.  Following a 
brief overview of brain anatomy, flow and performance were explored from a 
neuropsychological perspective leading to a proposed neuropsychological model for flow. 
Thereafter, neurological functioning and EEG technology were reviewed, followed by 
EEG studies of visuomotor functioning under peak performance conditions. Finally, a 
neurophysiological model for flow under conditions of peak performance was proposed. 
                  
1.4.2 Research methodology and techniques used     
              
Following an extensive review of the literature and the subsequent formulation of a 
theoretical neurophysiological model for flow under conditions of peak performance, a 
laboratory-type study was designed to collect both behavioural and EEG data within a 
cross-sectional timeframe, from 20 male respondents over the age of 16. A computer-
based visuomotor task was set and subjects were given 10 trials to enable them to reach 
their peak performance at some stage during the session. Each subject provided feedback 
on their experience, or otherwise, of flow after each race by completing a short 
questionnaire (AFQ). On completion, performance times and associated flow scores were 
standardised, after which the sample was segmented into two sub-samples reflecting two 
levels of the flow variable per subject, namely a high flow - peak performance level and a 
low flow - low performance level. The first race completed by each participant was used as 
a ‘baseline’ (and indicative of a low flow state) for comparison with their own personal 
fastest race/highest flow score combination, indicative of the high flow state. This was 
required to extract the EEG data associated with each level for further statistical analysis 
and interpretation. 
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The relationship between flow and EEG was expressed in terms of the difference between 
the two levels.  EEG power scores were compared (mean differences) by site and 
frequency, as well as the EEG patterns (correlates) between sites and by frequency. It was 
expected that the EEG patterns on the lower end of the flow measure (low flow - low 
performance condition) should differ from the EEG patterns on the higher end (high flow - 
peak performance) of the flow measure. The EEG patterns on the high end were 
qualitatively compared with the patterns on the low end, as well as the predictions from the 
theoretical model.  
 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE   
 
The thesis is arranged into the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 1: General orientation 
Chapter 2: Theoretical conceptualisation of flow and performance 
Chapter 3: The neuropsychology of flow and performance 
Chapter 4: EEG research findings on flow and performance during visuomotor tasks 
Chapter 5: Research design and methodology 
Chapter 6: Research results and findings 
Chapter 7: Conclusions, limitations, and recommendations. 
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1.6 TERMINOLOGY  
 
The following key terms are clarified here as they are understood during the thesis:  
  
           
EEG – An electroencephalogram (EEG) is a visible record of the amplified electrical 
activity generated by the nerve cells of the brain. According to its Greek etymological 
roots the word means electro (electrical) encephalo (brain) gram(ma) (picture) (Tyner, 
Knott & Mayer, 1983).  
 
EEG biofeedback, or neurofeedback, is a sophisticated form of biofeedback based on 
specific aspects of cortical activity. It requires the individual to learn to modify some 
aspect of his/her cortical activity. This may include learning to change the amplitude, 
frequency and/or coherence of distinct electrophysiological components of one’s own 
brain. The goal of neurofeedback training is to teach the individual what specific states of 
cortical arousal feel like, and how to activate such states voluntarily. For example, during 
neurofeedback training the EEG is recorded and the relevant components are extracted and 
fed back to the individual using an online feedback loop in the form of audio, visual or 
combined audio-visual information (Vernon, 2005). 
 
1.7 CONCLUSION   
 
This chapter outlined the aim of the study and the research hypotheses under investigation. 
Key terms were explained, and a brief overview of the chosen research methodology was 
given. The following chapter presents a historical overview of the flow phenomenon and 
its relation to performance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF FLOW AND 
PERFORMANCE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION         
             
This chapter reviews the origin, establishment, conceptualisation, and theoretical 
underpinnings of the flow phenomenon and its relationship to performance.  
             
2.2 BIRTH OF THE FLOW CONCEPT      
             
The concept of flow, or the “flow experience” was coined by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, 
who conceptualised the phenomenon during the early 1970s. He first observed it while 
researching motivational aspects of work with a group of artists in the late 1960s, as a state 
of immersion and total absorption in the act of painting, without any clear motivation for 
doing so, and then questioned what could probably account for the deep fascination that 
painting had for the artists (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975).  
 
Observing the artists’ efforts, Csikszentmihalyi found that their work was characterised by 
intense involvement, which he described as “enthralled” and “trancelike”. At that time, 
motivational theories advocated external rewards as impetus for this kind of behaviour. 
Observations of the artists’ involvement revealed that they were not propelled to complete 
their work to satisfy any external need, but by their connection to and enjoyment of the 
activity. These experiences subsided as soon as their work was completed. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) concluded that the activity was self-contained and became an end 
in itself, with no need for any additional rewards.  
 
Csikszentmihalyi came to the conclusion that the motivation for their total dedication 
might be within the activity, in other words, intrinsically the creation of the painting was 
the reward for their efforts and not some external motive or driver. The end product 
(creation) was assessed by the creator in terms of his own goals and standards 
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(performance criteria) and would lead to a subjective experience (emotion) of happiness 
(satisfaction), pride, disappointment (dissatisfaction), frustration or failure. 
 
In his search for explanations, especially in the line of intrinsic motivation, he investigated 
Abraham Maslow’s (1968) desire for “self-actualisation” in “peak experiences”, the 
“enjoyment” factor in play from researchers such as Piaget (1952), Sutton-Smith (1997), 
and others; the “optimal arousal hypothesis” by Daniel Berlyne (1960), and others; and 
autonomy and self-determination by Deci and Ryan (1985), and Lepper and Green (1978). 
Following the above research, he argued that it was mostly laboratory oriented and did not 
account for the quality of the subjective experience (feeling) that made a behaviour 
intrinsically rewarding.         
            
2.3  FLOW THEORY         
           
Csikszentmihalyi started to conceptualise a flow theory.     
             
2.3.1 Defining flow          
            
Continuing his search for an acceptable explanation, in the early 1970s Csikszentmihalyi 
initiated studies about the quality of subjective experience in intrinsically motivated 
behaviour by investigating athletes, chess masters, rock climbers, dancers, basketball 
players, and composers of music. The main conclusion from the latter study indicated that 
respondents felt an autotelic, or self-rewarding (happy and satisfied), experience after their 
expectations were met during an activity.  
 
Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) observed that when people from all walks 
of life describe their experiences after doing something worth doing “for its own sake” 
they use terms that were interchangeable in the smallest detail. He argued that this 
unanimity suggests order in consciousness, which produces a very specific experiential 
state, so desirable that one wishes to replicate it as often as possible. This state he termed 
“flow” since it was the term that many respondents used in their interviews to describe 
what the optimal experience felt like. 
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Csikszentmihalyi (1990, p. xi and p. 1) states that the concept of flow was borne out of 
“decades of research on the positive aspects of human experience – joy, creativity, the 
process of total involvement with life I call flow.” He goes on to suggest that, as Aristotle 
concluded about 2,300 years ago, more than anything else, men and women seek 
happiness and that all goals are pursued with the expectation that it will lead to happiness. 
He postulates that, like success, happiness cannot be pursued, it is a by-product of effort, 
and is achieved by a “circuitous path that begins with achieving control over the contents 
of our consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 2).” He links happiness to a feeling of 
exhilaration and enjoyment, which he calls “optimal experience” and which people 
experience after taking control of their actions.       
             
2.3.2 Consciousness and contents of consciousness     
                      
In his book, Finding flow – the psychology of engagement with everyday life, 
Csikszentmihalyi (1997) describes the contents of consciousness by virtue of emotions, 
intentions, and thoughts. He states that psychologists have identified up to nine basic 
emotions that can reliably be identified by facial expressions among people living in very 
different cultures.  According to him, all emotions share in a basic duality: they are either, 
positive and attractive, or they are negative and repulsive.      
             
2.3.2.1 Emotion          
            
According to Csikszentmihalyi (1997), emotions refer to the internal states of 
consciousness. Negative emotions, such as sadness, fear, anxiety or boredom, produce 
“psychic entropy” in the mind, that is, a state in which attention cannot be used effectively 
to deal with external tasks, because it is needed to restore an inner subjective order. 
Positive emotions such as happiness, strength, or alertness are states of “psychic 
negentropy”, as attention is not needed to ruminate and feel sorry for oneself, and psychic 
energy can flow freely into whatever thought or task one chooses to invest it in. In other 
words, emotions are linked to producing either positive or negative energy, which in turn 
will produce a positive or negative attitude that will influence the economy of attention 
utilisation.           
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2.3.2.2 Attention          
           
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) argues that information enters consciousness either because the 
intention is to focus attention on it or it is the result of attentional habits based on 
biological or social instructions. It is attention that selects the relevant bits of information 
from the potential millions of bits available, references it with memory, evaluates it and 
then makes an appropriate decision. Control of consciousness, because of the mind’s 
limited processing capacity, constitutes the ability to focus attention at will, to be oblivious 
to distractions, to concentrate for as long as it takes to achieve a goal, and not longer. The 
multiple involvement and functions of attention liken it to psychic energy. Further, he 
argues, that attention to a task, for example, leads to the forming of an intention or set goal 
and that the intensity of the effort to achieve it is a function of motivation. Intentions, goals 
and motivations are, therefore, also manifestations of psychic negentropy, in that they 
focus psychic energy, or attention, establish priorities and thus create order in 
consciousness. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) argues that psychic entropy is at its highest when people feel that 
what they do is motivated by not having anything else to do. Thus, both intrinsic 
motivation (wanting to do something) and extrinsic motivation (having to do something) 
are preferable to the state in which one acts without having any kind of goal to focus 
attention. Intentions focus psychic energy in the short run, whereas goals tend to be longer 
term. 
 
The third content of consciousness involves cognitive mental operations, such as thinking, 
whereby psychic energy is ordered by linking cause and effect into logical causal 
sequences. This also refers to the ability to make rational decisions through the use of 
intelligence. Without focus (attention) or concentration (focussed attention), consciousness 
is in a state of chaos. Conflicting desires or motives, intentions, and thoughts, jostle each 
other in consciousness and cause distraction, anxiety and erratic behaviour. Optimal 
experience depends on the ability to control what happens in consciousness, based on 
individual efforts and creativity, and requires concentration. When attention is focussed on 
information (stimuli) that are congruent with the achievement of set goals, psychic energy 
will flow effortlessly.          
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2.3.2.3 Control          
             
The notion of control is centred in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1997, p. 117) construct of autotelic 
personality. The word ‘autotelic’ is composed of two Greek roots: auto (self) and telos 
(goal). Reflecting on the meaning of the word, flow theory defines an autotelic individual 
as one who does things for his or her own sake, rather than in order to achieve some 
external goal, that is a person who controls attention by focusing on significant activities 
with the intention or expectation of achieving self-reward. An autotelic person has a strong 
tendency to find intrinsic motivation and flow in daily activities. 
 
According to Csikszentmihalyi (1997), following a flow experience, the organisation of 
the self becomes more complex, in other words, growth has taken place. Complexity is the 
result of differentiation and integration, the former implying a movement toward 
uniqueness or separation (individuality), the latter referring to the opposite, a union with 
other people, feeling part of the social network (communality) or experiencing harmony. A 
complex self is one that succeeds in combining these two opposites. Investing equal 
amounts of psychic energy into differentiation and integration, while avoiding both 
selfishness and conformity, leads to increasing complexity, or growth, and self-
actualisation.           
   
2.3.3 The flow zone         
            
Literature generally portrays flow as providing people with a sense of discovery and 
personal growth, pushing them to higher levels of performance and leading them to 
“previously undreamed of states of consciousness” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). In an effort 
to “contextualise” the flow experience, Csikszentmihalyi (1975) initially illustrated flow as 
a corridor within various mental states in which optimal experience is more likely to occur. 
He referred to this zone of optimal experience and arousal as the “flow channel” (see 
Figure 1), with entry requiring individuals to perceive a balance between their personal 
skills and the challenges posed by their situation. As a function of the challenge-skill 
balance, being in this zone is reflected by the absence of the mental states of anxiety, 
boredom and relaxation. 
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Figure 1. The flow channel (adapted from Csikszentmihalyi, 1990)    
           
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) further concluded that although flow can be experienced in any 
activity it can only be sustained if the challenges and skills continuously increase in 
complexity, that is, self-growth or development has to take place. Alternatively, apathy, 
when challenge and skill requirements are very low; anxiety, when challenge exceeds skill; 
or boredom, when skill exceeds challenge, will set in.   
 
Csikszentmihalyi (1997) refined the above model by introducing more detail regarding the 
relationship between challenges and skills and its influence on the quality of the flow 
experience. The skill/challenge dynamic is illustrated below. 
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Figure 2. Challenge versus skill (adapted from Csikszentmihalyi, 1997)   
              
The figure above illustrates the following dynamics:  
 
(1) Flow tends to occur when a person’s skills are fully involved in overcoming a 
challenge which is just about manageable, in other words, skills are stretched well 
above the personal mean (aggregate of skill level relevant to the situation), making 
the situation a challenge to successfully negotiate.  
(2) A person will be aroused or frustrated when the situation is perceived as very 
challenging at the skill level (level of competency), and may lead to worry and 
eventually anxiety. 
(3) A person will feel in control when the skill level is perceived to supersede the 
challenge and the challenge is above the person’s own mean. 
(4) Worry and anxiety will set in when challenge is perceived as being above the 
personal mean and skill is below. 
(5) Boredom and relaxation occur when skill is perceived as being above the    
personal mean and challenge is below. 
(6) Apathy occurs when both challenge and skill are below the personal mean. 
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According to flow theory, to remain in or re-experience flow one must increase the 
complexity of the activity by developing new skills and taking on new, tougher challenges. 
This implies that learning and practising are essential to enabling the flow experience. 
According to Ellen Langer (1997), the clever approach to any activity involves continuous 
creation of new ways of organising experience, openness to new information and 
awareness of different perspectives. From this cognitive viewpoint, finding flow entails 
engaging in activities that are challenging enough to require new perceptions, perspectives 
and behaviours without being overwhelmed. According to Pates and Maynard (2000), in 
flow the subjective or intrinsic experience when achieving the desired performance is the 
primary reward. 
 
Once flow is experienced, the skill/challenge match is confirmed and the standard has to 
be raised by setting new goals or standards.   Therefore, in order to re-experience flow one 
has to improve or expand one’s skill level(s). The remaining question however is how to 
enter the flow state.  
 
2.3.4  Dimensions of flow         
           
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) initially identified four flow components, namely, control, 
attention, curiosity, and intrinsic motivation. He later replaced them with nine dimensions 
or general conditions that purportedly facilitate flow experiences (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). 
Not all are needed for flow to be experienced. 
 
The nine dimensions are: 
(1) Clear goals. Expectations and rules are discernible. 
(2) Concentrating and focusing. A high degree of concentration on a limited field of 
attention, a person engaged in the activity will have the opportunity to focus and to 
delve deeply into it.  
(3) A loss of the feeling of self-consciousness, the merging of action and awareness.  
(4) A distorted sense of time – the subjective experience of time is altered.  
 21 
(5) Direct and immediate feedback. Successes and failures in the course of the activity 
are apparent, so that behaviour can be adjusted as needed.  
(6) Balance between ability level and challenge. The activity is neither too easy nor too 
difficult.  
(7) Sense of personal control over the situation or activity.  
(8) The activity is intrinsically rewarding (autotelic), so there is an effortlessness of 
action.  
(9) Action awareness merging. When in the flow state, people become absorbed in 
their activity, and focus of awareness is narrowed down to the activity itself. 
 
Amongst authors who have re-worked Csikszentmihalyi’s version of the flow dimensions, 
David Farmer (1999) summarises the flow experience as follows:  
(1) Completely involved, focused, concentrating - due to innate curiosity or as the 
result of training.  
(2) Sense of ecstasy - of being outside everyday reality.  
(3) Great inner clarity - knowing what needs to be done and how well it is going. 
(4) Knowing the activity is doable - that the skills are adequate, and the person is 
neither anxious nor bored.  
(5) Sense of serenity - no worries about self, feeling of growing beyond the boundaries 
of ego. Afterwards a feeling of transcending ego in ways not thought possible. 
(6) Timeliness - thoroughly focused on present, not noticing time passing. 
(7) Intrinsic motivation - whatever produces flow becomes its own reward.  
 22 
 
The nine flow dimensions of Csikszentmihalyi (1997) are discussed in more detail below. 
            
2.3.4.1 Challenge versus skills balance 
           
The challenge-skills balance is probably the pivotal dimension of the flow experience, 
epitomising the main pre-condition to get into flow. The experience of a balance of 
challenges and skills is based on individuals’ perceptions and their confidence that they 
can meet the various challenges. Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi (1999) described the 
interplay of the two dimensions of situational challenges and personal skills on a 
continuum from high to low, and stipulated that the challenge-skills balance needs to be 
above average, that is, it occurs in situations of high challenge that require high skill. 
             
If the perception of a match of challenges and skills deviates on either side of the equation 
the flow state converts into states of boredom, relaxation, apathy, or anxiety. Hence, 
according to Csikszentmihalyi (2002), low-challenge/high-skill situations, in which 
performers’ skills exceed perceived challenges, lead to states of relaxation or boredom. 
Those situations lack stimulation, because the demands are relatively low, easy to master, 
and increase distractibility. Low-challenge/low-skill situations induce feelings of apathy. 
These situations are not stimulating and the individual lacks the skills or expertise to 
master them, creating little or no interest. High challenge/low-skill situations provoke 
states of anxiety, and are perceived as threatening, or, at least, not enjoyable. This is 
because challenges go beyond personal skills, which are inadequate or insufficient to 
successfully manage them.         
            
Csikszentmihalyi (1997) illustrated flow as a positive relationship between challenge and 
skill, which he called the “flow channel”. As illustrated in Figure 2 (above), with very high 
levels of challenge and skill, flow is more likely to occur. If individuals drop out of the 
flow channel there are two ways to re-attain flow. To get back into flow, individuals can 
aim for lower challenges that match and stimulate their current skills, or they can seek 
training in their skill level to meet them.  
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2.3.4.2 Clear goals          
             
To become involved in an activity, individuals need to have a clear goal of what they wish 
to pursue (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975).  Csikszentmihalyi (2002) maintains that setting goals 
of low difficulty hardly lead to enjoyment, because the goals are too easy to achieve. 
Enjoyment and flow will not occur in an activity unless individuals are able to set 
challenging and attainable goals. Goals also create order in consciousness, providing 
direction, setting expectations, facilitating structure in terms of execution, and focussing 
one’s intentions. Process goals enhance awareness of what to do next and facilitate 
concentration and focus on the present, whereas performance goals, such as levels of 
performance, winning, or outperforming, can increase motivation.  
 
On the other hand, becoming aware of not being able to reach performance-related goals 
might prevent or decrease flow. To achieve flow, a clearly defined, process-related goal is 
important to set a specific challenge to strive for, and on which to focus attention (Jackson 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).         
         
2.3.4.3 Concentration and focussing        
           
Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) proposed that the most general 
characteristic of flow is concentration on a limited stimulus field on the task at hand, and 
referred to attention as a limited resource (1988, 1993). Attention and focus can involve 
relevant or irrelevant information processing. During flow, which is signified by episodes 
of total focus on imminent tasks, only selected, task-relevant information is processed 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Moran (1996) asserted that a strong task focus would 
simultaneously block out performance-debilitating thoughts, such as distractions and 
preoccupations. Therefore, individuals who direct all their focus onto task-relevant 
information are more likely to experience flow than individuals who lack focus. In 
addition, Csikszentmihalyi (1993) proposed that total focus on a limited field of stimuli is 
likely to lead to a merging of body and mind.       
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Nideffer (1993) proposed that, depending on the sport, attention can vary on a narrow-
broad dimension and on an internal-external dimension. For instance, athletes in sports, 
such as tennis and cricket, players requiring open skills need to shift their attention, more 
or less rapidly, from a broad-external focus that assesses the situation to a narrow-external 
focus on performing in the situation. Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi (1999) proposed that 
athletes’ concentration when they are in flow is signified by a rapid, effortless and precise 
shift in attentional demands, to detect cue information most relevant in the situation.  
 
2.3.4.4 Action-awareness merging 
 
Action-awareness merging signifies that awareness of the self changes through the course 
of action. During periods of flow, the body and mind are perceived as one unit, with the 
individual becoming deeply absorbed in the activity. One of the most distinguishing 
features of this state is that worries, doubts and thoughts concerning the self fade out of 
awareness. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) advocated action-awareness merging as one of the 
clearest indications that someone is experiencing flow. Actions appear to be happening 
spontaneously, effortlessly and automatically, with the individual being on “autopilot”. 
The individual or athlete is mentally and physically at one with their performance. 
Concentration is fully directed to the activity, while there is a lack of conscious reflection 
and evaluation of one’s actions. The merging of action and awareness on one occasion, as 
an integrated whole, could be described as ‘absorption’ or ‘immersion’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975; Jackson & Wrigley, 2004).  
 
Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) proposed that the unity of body and mind is 
likely to be the result of another flow antecedent, which he referred to as “concentration on 
the task at hand”. The total focus on one single activity keeps dysfunctional thought 
processes, such as preoccupations and distractions, out of consciousness and enables 
individuals to perform at their best. 
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2.3.4.5 Direct and unambiguous feedback 
 
Besides knowing what to do next, individuals in flow receive immediate and unambiguous 
feedback on how well actions were executed. There are two distinct ways of evaluating 
how successfully a person has performed, based on internal and external feedback 
respectively (Jackson & Wrigley, 2004).  
 
Internal feedback refers to information about bodily movements, including tactile and 
kinesthetic feedback. External feedback stems from sources outside the body, which are 
processed as visual, auditory, gustatory, or olfactory. In most activities, internal and 
external feedback is evaluated in a convergent fashion, providing an overall impression of 
the performance and results. Progress scores, such as the score on a board, running 
statistics, lap times, and pulse rates, are sources of direct external feedback. Both internal 
and external feedback appear to be important in providing information about the quality of 
performance, which in turn affects the quality of the experience, such as flow.  
 
2.3.4.6 Sense of control 
 
Perceiving a sense of control is accompanied by feelings of comfort, security, relaxation, 
wellbeing, power, dominance, and predictability. Simultaneously, the absence of a sense of 
worry and fear of failure is experienced (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Jackson & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).  Csikszentmihalyi (2002) stated that in situations with uncertain 
outcomes, as the possibility of winning or losing, the ability to influence the outcome in 
their favour will result in athletes experiencing feelings of control. A crucial point is less 
being in control and more the ability to exercise it in any given situation. 
 
Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi (1999) asserted that the feeling of control is a finely 
balanced state. Similar to the challenge-skills balance, perceiving a minor sense of control 
may lead to states of anxiety, whereas the perception of highest levels of control indicates 
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dominance and superior skills over situational challenges, which might induce boredom or 
relaxation. 
 
2.3.4.7 Loss of self-consciousness 
 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 2002) outlined the importance of the self being able to coordinate 
and integrate its action with other individuals, who are frequently preoccupied with self-
reflection and self-analysis of thoughts, as well as with worries and self-doubts. 
Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p. 64) contended that “loss of self-consciousness does not involve 
a loss of self, and certainly not a loss of consciousness, but rather, only a loss of 
consciousness of the self”.  
 
With regard to sport, Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi (1999) asserted that through flow 
experiences the self expands, by gaining new skills, leading to a more positive self-
concept.  Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988, p. 370) added that “the strength of 
the self depends on the cumulative history of positive feedback one gets in high challenge, 
high-skill interactions”.  
 
2.3.4.8 Time transformation 
 
The transformation of time refers to the aspect of flow that the perception of time within 
an activity seems to alter, either speeding up or slowing down. Depending on the sport, it 
might be that athletes experience time passing faster, as during a marathon, or slower, as 
during a 100-meter sprint. Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) indicates that 
time transformation is the consequence of a very deep flow experience and might not be 
experienced as frequently as other flow dimensions.  
 
Less intense flow states will not have the characteristic of time transformation, and it is 
possible that the experience of time could vary on the basis of whether performance is only 
loosely dependent on time measurement, such as in tennis or cricket, or closely dependent 
on time measurement, such as running, swimming and motor sport. 
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2.3.4.9 Autotelic experience 
 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975, p. 23) introduced the term ‘autotelic’ to signify that a person can 
engage fully in an activity and be involved in it for intrinsic reasons, which are inherent in 
the activity. He defined autotelic experience as a “psychological state, based on concrete 
feedback, which acts as a reward in that it produces continuing behaviour in the absence of 
other rewards.”  
 
Intrinsic rewards, for instance, are personal achievement, joy and enjoyment that emerge 
from an activity. Csikszentmihalyi (1993) proposed that the presence of the other eight 
flow dimensions turns an individual’s perception into an autotelic experience, meaning 
that the activity being undertaken becomes self-contained and a goal in itself. The activity 
is intrinsically motivating, self-rewarding, and a stimulus to participate in the activity for 
its own sake. The autotelic experience, therefore, could be viewed as a consequence of the 
other flow dimensions (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). With regard to all flow 
dimensions, Csikszentmihalyi (2000) reviewed their functions and proposed a distinction 
between “flow conditions” and “flow characteristics”, the former as crucial to get into 
flow, the latter dimensions reflecting the phenomenological experience during flow.  
 
According to Csikszentmihalyi (1997), general conditions conducive to flow are based on 
experiences related to dimensions of challenge-skills balance, clear goals and 
unambiguous feedback. Characteristics of flow experienced while being in it are 
dimensions of concentration on the task at hand, action-awareness merging, sense of 
control, loss of self-consciousness, transformation of time and autotelic experience. 
Csikszentmihalyi’s distinction between flow conditions and flow characteristics is 
important for the development of interventions to induce flow.  
 
According to Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988), the ability to enjoy 
challenges and then master them is a fundamental meta-skill that is essential to individual 
development and to cultural evolution, yet many obstacles prevent individuals from 
experiencing flow. These range from inherited genetic malfunctions to forms of social 
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oppression that reduce personal freedom and prevent the acquisition of skills. 
Understanding how flow works is essential for social scientists interested in improving the 
quality of life at either the subjective or objective level.     
             
2.3.5 Flow and other theories        
           
Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow is closely related to Maslow’s concepts of self-
actualisation and peak experiences. Maslow (1962, 1968) developed the concept of self-
actualisation as a main component in the humanistic theory of personality. It reflects a 
drive in human beings with the purpose of realising personal capacities and striving for 
self-fulfilment. Maslow (1968) introduced a hierarchy of needs model that conceptualises 
lower and higher-level needs, the former including sleep, hunger, and safety, which are 
homeostatic in nature. These basic needs have to be satisfied before importance is attached 
to higher level needs, and a person firstly has to survive physically before he or she can 
grow psychologically. The latter, higher-level needs, include self-worth, competence, and 
self-fulfilment. Maslow deemed self-actualisation to be the highest human need, 
characterised by discovering and extending individual potentialities. In contrast to basic 
needs, self-actualisation is not subject to homeostatic satisfaction but reflects a continuing 
need for personal development and growth.  
 
Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) advocated that flow, like self-actualisation, 
is detached from homeostatic influences. The purpose of flow is to enable individuals to 
grow, fully function and make use of one’s potentialities. With regard to homeostasis, 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) distinguished between enjoyment and pleasure, not 
universally but with pleasure relating to homeostatic needs, which can arise from 
satisfying physical needs. Enjoyment and the experience of flow, on the other hand, go 
beyond homeostasis and include activities such as the active involvement in reading a 
book, and athletic or artistic performances, which increase individuals’ capacities. 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000, p. 12) added that “enjoyment, rather than pleasure, 
is what leads to personal growth and long-term happiness”.  
 
As well as the assessment of self-actualisation, Maslow (1968) examined individuals’ peak 
experiences. Based on qualitative analysis, he found a number of characteristics common 
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to the cognition of people’s peak moments during interpersonal, creative, mystic, 
intellectual, and athletic experiences. He described peak experiences as transcending, 
unifying, fulfilling, desirable, and egoless, having their own value, achieved in 
circumstances in which the perception of time is distorted or lost. Furthermore, during 
episodes of peak experiences, individuals perceived the experience as complete, but 
detached from expedience, requiring the person’s whole attention, and adding to his or her 
knowledge and growth. 
 
Maslow (1968) concluded that characteristics of peak experience reveal similarities to the 
experiences of individuals high in self-actualisation. Based on the findings of peak 
experience, Maslow (1968, p. 97) defined self-actualisation as: 
 
… an episode, or a spurt in which the powers of the person come together in a 
particularly efficient and intensely enjoyable way, and in which he is more 
integrated and less split, more open for experience, more idiosyncratic, more 
perfectly expressive or spontaneous, or fully functioning, more creative, more 
humorous, more ego-transcending, more independent of his lower needs. 
 
The phenomenology of Maslow’s (1962, 1968) description of self-actualisation and peak 
experience resembles the experiences that Csikszentmihalyi found in artists. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) reported that his research interest was spurred by trying to 
understand artists’ motivation underlying the extraordinary experiences in their activities. 
Csikszentmihalyi’s work was aimed at exploring how personal and situational 
characteristics affect these experiences, such as individuals’ propensity to have peak 
experiences, and the intrinsic rewards, such as enjoyment and personal growth, gained 
from the various activities. This is probably the most obvious differentiation of 
Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow from that of Maslow’s description of self-actualisation 
and peak experience. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi’s notions of expectation and control (autotelic personality) as applied in 
his concept of flow and optimal experience is closely related to Rotter’s concept of 
attribution and locus of control. Rotter (1972), whose social learning theory of personality 
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adopts an attribution theory point of view, postulated that people who were more likely to 
display typical expectancy shifts were those who were more likely to attribute their 
outcomes to ability, whereas those who displayed atypical expectancy would be more 
likely to attribute their outcomes to chance.  ‘Internals’ tend to attribute outcomes of 
events to their own control, which is strongly related to the concept of autonomy, whilst 
‘externals’ attribute outcomes of events to external circumstances, such as luck, fate, or 
significant others. In a study regarding locus of control in relation to flow, Taylor, 
Schepers and Crous (2006) reported that internally oriented individuals are better able to 
reach higher levels of performance within a shorter space of time, in turn being better able 
to accelerate the fulfilment of higher-order needs necessary for self-actualisation. Internals 
reported significantly higher incidents of flow experiences than did externals. Asakawa, 
(2004), who investigated flow experience and autotelic personality in Japanese College 
Students, found that the autotelic students reported significantly more positive experiences 
than their non-autotelic counterparts. Moreover, the autotelic students were significantly 
more “concentrated” (focused), felt more in control of the situation, and felt more 
importance for the future than the non-autotelic students, even when watching television 
and engaging in maintenance activities, which are typically considered unimportant and 
unworthy of much attention. The above indicates that autotelic persons and persons with 
an internal locus of control share several commonalities. 
 
The notion of “own choice” (autotelic trait) is also captured in self-determination theory, 
which relates to the examination of how external factors influence intrinsic motivation. 
Deci and Ryan (1985, p. 38) defined self-determination as the “capacity to choose and to 
have those choices, rather than reinforcement contingencies, drives, or any other forces or 
pressures, be the determinants of one’s actions.” Self-determination theory is based on the 
notion that human behaviour is motivated by three psychological needs: (i) autonomy, as 
individuals’ perceptions that they are the source of their own actions and behaviours. 
Autonomous behaviour characterises the expression of the self, with individuals perceiving 
value and initiation as part of their actions; (ii) competence, which refers to individuals’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of their skills and capacities with regard to meeting action 
opportunities; and (iii) relatedness, which refers to individuals’ perceptions of 
connectedness and belongingness to other individuals and the community. This need 
 31 
relates to the security aspect in being with others in the here and now, and does not 
emphasise the attainment of any future outcome (Deci & Ryan 2002).  
 
According to Ryan and Deci (2000), self-determined actions lead to more intrinsically 
motivated results, with intrinsic motivation indicating the interest in participating in an 
activity for its own sake, which offers inherent satisfaction, in other words autotelic 
behaviour.  
 
From a self-determination perspective, the connection between intrinsic motivation and 
flow in sport was researched by Frederick-Recascino (2002), and reported that when 
individuals are in a state of intrinsic motivation they experience “choicefullness” in their 
behaviour, thereby fulfilling their need for autonomy. Additionally, they are at a level of 
optimal challenge, which fulfils their competence need. A state of intrinsic motivation is 
associated with feelings of satisfaction, enjoyment, competence, and the desire to persist at 
the activity. The above description largely overlaps with the characteristics of flow. 
 
Experiencing flow or being ‘in the zone’, as widely discussed in athletic experience 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990 and 1975), is understood in self-determination theory as 
representing the heightened awareness and the feeling of wellbeing associated with 
intrinsic motivation. Frederick-Recascino (2002) noted that intrinsic motivation, the 
experience of “choicefulness”, and challenge are important factors for positive 
experiences. One of the key concepts in self-determination theory, as well as flow, is 
‘optimal challenge’.   
 
Deci and Ryan (1985) proposed that within an optimally challenging activity, the level of 
intrinsic motivation underlies the perceived competency. More particularly, feedback that 
reinforces one’s perceived competency will increase the level of intrinsic motivation, in 
which perceived competency plays a pivotal part. Motivation is specific to each demand 
and the level of motivation, whether higher or lower, depends on what is of interest and 
importance to individuals and what they determine is achievable (Vieira, 2003). In order to 
maintain a healthy self-esteem (ego), individuals tend to accept tasks that they think they 
can successfully complete. Logically, when there is a perceived low level of probable 
success associated with a task there is a reduced motivation to engage in the activity or 
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even to set a goal. The motivational process energises, maintains, and directs behaviour 
toward goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). The perceived expectation of successful 
completion of a task, behaviour based on beliefs, and the importance ascribed to the task 
behaviour in pursuance of a goal based on values, determine if motivational activation or 
behaviour takes place. It also determines the intensity and persistence of the task behaviour 
(Grantham & Vieira, 2008). It is evident that perceived competency, optimal challenge, 
and intrinsic motivation are at the heart of both self-determination theory and flow theory.  
 
The descriptions above imply that persons who experience flow achieve it while 
performing an activity of their own choice (self-determination), motivated by intrinsic 
factors (self-reward), which produce a desirable (positive/enjoyable) mental state (optimal 
experience) and outcome (goal achievement) that serve as motivation 
(reward/reinforcement) to re-engage the activity repeatedly. However, in terms of flow 
theory, once the above process has completed successfully and the flow experienced, the 
challenge has to be increased and skill improved, through learning and/or training, before 
flow can be re-experienced. This implies that flow is intrinsically linked to continuous 
performance improvement.         
       
2.4. FLOW AND PERFORMANCE       
             
Flow and performance are intertwined.  This relationship is discussed below.  
             
2.4.1. Manifestations of flow in performance      
             
For decades, sport psychology has ascertained that mental states can lead to improved 
performance, but several other areas of human performance, such as music and problem-
solving, have also shown optimal psychological states for participants (Kraus, 2003; 
Lindsay, Maynard & Thomas, 2005). High levels of both mental and physical performance 
usually depend on goal-directed attention produced by specific challenges and clear 
feedback (Locke, Shaw, Saari & Latham, 1981), therefore it is not surprising that a host of 
studies have found a strong positive relationship between flow and performance.  
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Flow experiences were reported in a variety settings, such as schooling (Carli, et al., 1988; 
Clarke & Haworth, 1994; Moneta & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996); computing (Trevino & 
Webster, 1992; Webster, et al., 1993; Chen, et al., 1999); family interaction 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1993); leisure (Graef, et al., 1983; Csikszentmihalyi & 
LeFevre, 1989); occupational therapy (Jacobs, 1994; Emerson, 1998) and competitive and 
recreational sports (Jackson, 1992; Jackson & Roberts, 1992; Stein, et al., 1995; Catley & 
Duda, 1997; Kowal & Fortier, 1999) and video gaming (Cowley, et al, 2008).  
 
Flow is also correlated with a heightened sense of playfulness (Webster & 
Martocchio,1992); self-control (Ghani & Deshpande,1994); increased learning (Canter, 
Rivers & Storrs, 1985) and increased positive subjective experiences (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1997).  Eisenberger et al. (2005), who examined the relationships of employees’ perceived 
skill and challenge at work and need for achievement, found that among achievement-
oriented employees only, high skill and challenge were associated with greater positive 
mood, task interest, and performance than other skill/challenge combinations. They also 
found that positive mood mediated the interactive relationship of skill/challenge and need 
for achievement with performance. Flow was found to be positively correlated with 
personality characteristics such as autonomy and internal locus of control (Taylor, et al., 
2006), as well as autotelic personality and extroversion (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Asakawa, 
2004). 
 
Flow is reported by teenagers who like studying, by workers who are satisfied with their 
jobs, and by drivers who enjoy driving. Activities such as reading a good book, completing 
a crossword, or finishing a writing assignment can induce high levels of absorption 
associated with flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997).  
 
The description of flow is similar to the one of a player immersed in a video game, during 
which he or she loses track of time and forgets external pressures. It is evident that gamers 
value video games based on whether or not they can provide flow experiences (Holt, 
2000). Numerous authors have applied flow to human-computer interactions (Webster et 
al., 1993; Sharafi, Hedman & Montgomery, 2006) and to internet usage (Hoffman & 
Novak, 1996; Chen et al., 1999; Pace, 2004; Wan & Chiou, 2006; Chen, 2007). Hoffman 
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and Novak (1996) and Chen (2007) have argued that qualities of the Internet and World 
Wide Web, such as control, ease of use, immediate feedback, interactivity, and access to 
entertainment, would inherently make them open to flow experiences.  
 
Chen (2007) found that most web users experience positive moods while online, while 
Wan and Chiou (2006) have argued that the interactive and engaging properties of online 
games offer users the opportunity for optimal (flow) experiences. Chen et al. (1999) found 
that some of the most flow-inducing activities were information retrieval, reading and 
writing e-mails, creating web pages, playing online games, and chatting online. Using the 
components of flow, Chen (2007) encourages designers of computer and video games to 
provide an enjoyable interactive experience for the widest variety and number of users, by 
mixing and matching the components of flow; keeping the user’s experience within the 
user’s ‘flow zone’; offering adaptive choices to allow different users to enjoy the flow 
experience in their own way; and embedding choices inside the core activities to ensure 
the flow experience is not interrupted.  
 
Sherry (2004) asserts: “Some might comment that Csikszentmihalyi seemed to have video 
games in mind when he developed the concept of flow’’ (p. 339), noting that ‘‘[video] 
games possess ideal characteristics to create and maintain flow experiences in that the flow 
experience of video games is brought on when the skills of the player match the difficulty 
of the game’’ (p. 340). These conditions are similar to those found in media experiences 
labelled as ‘entertainment’. 
 
Research suggests that the psychological experience of gaming is consistent with the 
dimensions of the flow experience as outlined by Csikszentmihalyi. Thus, the concept of 
flow forms the basis of the psychological presence of gamers within the game and 
provides a useful framework for game design (Bryce & Rutter, 2001). Hoffman and Novak 
(1996) proposed that creating a commercially compelling website depends on facilitating a 
state of flow.  
 
Flow experiences occur especially while playing computer and video games, as they “… 
possess ideal characteristics to create and maintain flow experiences in that the flow 
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experience of video games is brought on when the skills of the player match the difficulty 
of the game” (Sherry, 2004, p. 328). Voiskounsky, Mitina & Avetisova (2004), as well as 
Rheinberg and Vollmeyer (2003), demonstrated experimentally that players of so-called 
MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons, or Multi-User Dimensions) experience flow.  
 
From the above literature it is evident that enjoyment and ‘skill-challenge balance’ are 
important factors related to the flow experience.      
             
2.4.2.  The flow - performance relationship      
             
The term ‘the zone’ is frequently used in the literature of sport psychology, outlining a 
state of high intensity, strong focus, superior performance (Young, 2000), and peak 
experience (Murphy & White, 1995), which is indicated by heightened awareness and 
intrinsic motivation (Frederick-Recascino & Morris, 2004).  Tolson (2000, p. 38) 
described playing in the zone as “when the body is brought to peak condition and the mind 
is completely focused, even unaware of what it’s doing, an individual can achieve the 
extraordinary”.   
 
A sport journalist reported that elite athletes talk about ‘being in the zone’, a supposedly 
magical place in which mind and body work in synchronisation and movements seem to 
flow without conscious effort (Park, 2006). According to Park, major-league pitchers, 
National Basketball Association (NBA) stars, professional golfers and Olympic hopefuls 
dedicate their careers to the search for this elusive feeling, devoting hours of training to 
‘listening to their body’ and ‘reading their muscles’, trying to construct a bridge between 
mind and body sturdy enough to lead them straight to ‘athletic nirvana’. Loehr (1995) 
wrote in an article on tennis that top tennis players, after achieving “ideal performance 
[mental] states” during peak performances, would say they “zoned” or “flowed” or 
“tranced”. They talked about time standing still, profound inner stillness and puzzling 
feelings of joy, power and control. 
 
The relationship between flow and performance appears to be reciprocal, in which flow 
influences performance and vice versa, however, at this point the research results are too 
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vague to invite conclusions on whether there is a one-directional connection between them, 
either way. More research is needed to untangle the relationship and to further examine 
directional or reciprocal links. Even though there is no strong evidence on the directional 
effects, aiming to increase both would be preferable, so that one or both variables will 
enhance the other.  Even if flow does not have a direct effect on performance it would be 
worthwhile to enhance flow, because of the benefits for intrinsic motivation and 
enjoyment, and hence continued effort and persistence.  
 
Privette and Bundrick (1987, 1997) proposed an experience model, consisting of two 
dimensions that were termed ‘feeling’ and ‘performance’. As shown in Figure 2.3, both 
dimensions consist of seven different states, which gradually increase from lowest (total 
failure) to highest (personal best) performance, and from lowest to highest feeling states, 
with neutrality as the centre point. According to Privette and Bundrick (1997), feeling 
states below neutrality are specified as boredom, worry, depression / misery, and are called 
‘negative feeling states’. States above neutrality are labelled as enjoyment, joy, ecstasy / 
highest happiness, and are called ‘positive feeling states’. According to the experience 
model, feelings of worry and boredom are counterproductive to superior performances. 
Both experiences are related to performances that are below average. Enjoyment, on the 
other hand, which is a key aspect of flow, would signify performances that are above 
standard.   
 
Testing the experience model, Privette and Bundrick (1997) examined 123 adults on their 
perceptions in various activities, such as sports, arts, and social services, to compare their 
feeling states in failure, average, and peak performance. The results showed that peak 
performances were characterised by factors of fulfilment, focus, play, and self in progress. 
In contrast, average performance revealed a lack of fulfilment, focus, and significance, 
whereas factors of play and sociability were reported as more important. Failing 
performances demonstrate most strongly an absence of fulfilment, focus, sociability, and 
self in progress. 
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Figure 3. Experience model of feeling and performance (Privette & Bundrick, 1997) 
 
The results, as indicated in Figure 3 above, showed distinct differences in athletes’ 
experience that were related to the various performance levels, indicating that the stronger 
the performance the more positive the experience. Privette (1983) proposed several factors, 
such as absorption, joy, involvement, spontaneity, awareness, loss of time, and 
temporality, to be reflections of communal aspects of peak performance and flow. 
According to Privette, experiences of flow and peak performance are characterised by 
active processes, indicating interactivity and responsiveness between athletes and their 
environments. Similar to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) flow experience, Privette (1983) 
proposed that peak performance manifests in a holistic experience, as indicated by a clear 
focus and strong awareness of one’s action and self.  
 
Young and Pain (1999) researched the notion of a universal zone in sport by contrasting 
the flow experiences of professional tennis players with Jackson's (1996) elite athletes. 
Using qualitative analyses on narratives of flow, they found support for flow theory's 
posited structure consisting of eight flow dimensions. Also, no significant differences were 
found between tennis players and elite athletes on the Privette’s Experience Questionnaire 
(Privette, 1984), concluding that the analyses suggest that the zone or flow state is a 
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universal phenomenon across sports, although intra-sport and inter-athlete differences are 
evident. 
 
Jackson and Roberts (1992) found a positive relationship between ratings of flow and 
perceptions of peak performance.  Jackson, Thomas, Marsh & Smethurst (2001), in a study 
researching the relationships between flow, self-concept, psychological skills, and 
performance among athletes, found that four dimensions of flow stood out as most 
predictive across performance measures, namely challenge-skill balance; clear goals; 
autotelic (intrinsic reward) experience; and action-awareness merging (absorption). The 
first two were also strongly correlated to self-concept and psychological skills (activation, 
emotional control, relaxation, and elimination of negative thoughts), while the latter two 
demonstrated the link between enjoyment of the experience, becoming absorbed in the 
activity, and quality of performance. 
 
According to Kimiecik and Stein (1992), peak (optimal) experience and flow are distinctly 
subjective states experienced internally within the individual during a contest, whereas 
peak performance pertains more to the objective outcome of that contest. Privette (1981, 
1983) discriminates between peak experiences and flow, arguing that there are differences 
with regard to individuals’ involvement (for example, active or passive), level of intensity, 
motivation, and goal characteristics.  Privette proposed that peak experiences do not 
necessarily arise as a result of participation in a specific activity. Individuals could be in a 
passive mode, characterised by receptive and perceptual experiences, such as reading a 
book, whilst peak experiences could be triggered spontaneously, occurring in inactive or 
non-motivated states in everyday life, for instance, by listening to radio or music, watching 
television, reading a book, dream scenarios, or forms of intoxication. In contrast, flow is 
highlighted by a strong active physical or mental involvement in a planned and structured 
activity, in which challenges match individuals’ skills, including experiences of joy and 
enjoyment. 
 
Several definitions have been proposed for peak performance, for instance by Privette,  as 
“behaviour which exceeds one’s average performance” (1982, p. 242), or as “superior 
functioning” (1983, p. 1361); and by Jackson and Roberts (1992, p. 156) as a “prototype of 
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superior use of human potential”, including physical as well as mental involvement. On a 
conceptual level, Jackson and Wrigley (2004, p. 426) define it as referring to:  
 
… an outcome or achievement of superior functioning rather than to an internal 
experience of optimal feelings and perceptions. Optimal experience (flow) 
describes an inner psychological state while engaged in an effortful and 
challenging activity, whereas peak performance refers to the outcome or 
accomplishment as a consequence of that person’s effort and sustained 
concentration. Simply put, peak performance refers to an outcome rather than an 
experience. 
 
Based on Jackson and Wrigley’s contention of the relationship between flow and peak 
performance, flow has a strong subjective component that cannot be directly evaluated by 
others, whereas the result of a peak performance may be objectively quantifiable by 
observations and comparing previous performances.   
 
In a similar vein, Kimiecik and Stein (1992) argued that peak experience and flow are 
rather subjective in nature, whereas peak performance is about objective results. Even 
though there are conceptual differences, Csikszentmihalyi (1993) reported that flow is 
tangentially related to peak performance, indicating that both states can occur at the same 
time.            
         
2.4.3. Measurement of flow        
            
Commonly, the flow state is measured by means of post-hoc questionnaires that measure 
performance or experience. In order to measure people’s flow experiences, 
Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989) developed a technique they called the ‘experience 
sampling method’ (ESM) to capture behaviours, thoughts, and feelings as they occur in 
real time. This involved the random (electronic) sampling of participants during their daily 
lives. Questionnaires, such as their ‘experience sampling form’ (ESF), are then used to 
structure and record their experiences in real time. The ESF usually contains items asking 
participants to rate their levels of concentration, involvement, enjoyment, skill, and the 
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challenge of the activity. Building on one of Delle-Fave and Massimini's (1988) findings, 
Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989) found that flow type situations occurred three times 
more often during work than in leisure.  
 
Jackson and Marsh designed the ‘Flow State Scale’ in 1996, to assess flow on a scale of 
nine factors using a total of 36 items, derived from the work of Csikszentmihalyi (1990) 
and comprising: challenge-skill balance, action awareness merging, clear goals, 
unambiguous feedback, concentration on the task at hand, sense of control, loss of self-
consciousness, transformation of time, and autotelic experience. Other studies have 
employed similar questionnaires or measures of flow based on subjective self-assessment 
(Jackson & Eklund, 2002).  
 
Another adaptation of Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow relates to specific experiences of 
computer users. Rheinberg, Vollmeyer, and Engeser developed a Flow Short Scale in 2003 
(Engeser & Rheinberg, 2008) which measures all components of the flow experience with 
ten items using a 7-point scale. The scale also contains three additional items to measure 
the perceived importance of the activity.  The experienced difficulty of the task, perceived 
skill and perceived balance are measured on a 9-point scale. Using a factor analytical 
approach, it was found that the flow construct contains two dimensions namely, smooth 
and automatic running and absorption. The first factor refers to the feeling of utmost 
concentration and focusing, control over the activity, clarity of the operations, and smooth 
and automatic cogitations. The second factor refers to the feeling of full involvement, a 
distorted sense of time, optimal challenge, and absent-mindedness.  
 
Building on the findings of Delle-Fave and Massimini's (1988) and Csikszentmihalyi and 
LeFevre (1989), Bakker (2008) developed a 13 item work-flow questionnaire, the WOrk-
reLated Flow inventory (WOLF), to measure employees’ experience of flow in the 
workplace. Bakker found that when flow is applied to the work situation it can be defined 
as a short-term peak experience at work which is characterised by three factors, i.e., 
absorption, work enjoyment and intrinsic work motivation (Bakker, 2005). Absorption 
refers to a state of total concentration (totally immersed in work); work enjoyment refers to 
positive judgments (happiness) about work; and intrinsic motivation refers to performing a 
certain work-related activity with the aim of experiencing the inherent pleasure and 
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satisfaction in the activity (Bakker, 2008).       
             
2.4.4 Measurement of performance       
             
Flow and performance are measured by different instruments and in different units of 
measurement, the former a subjective state measured by reflective instruments such as 
questionnaires, reports and interviews, the latter associated with objective measurements, 
expressed in standardised units of measurement and often expressed in relation to a 
performance standard. According to the Collins Essential English Dictionary (2nd Edition, 
2006), performance can be described as, inter alia, “the manner or quality of functioning”, 
which implies that an action is measured and compared to a standard of excellence or rate-
of-error.  
 
Performance is also closely related to learning or practice and follows an identifiable 
curve, known as ‘learning curve’ or ‘experience curve’. The learning curve effect and 
closely related experience (or performance) curve effect express the relationship between 
experience (performance) and efficiency. As individuals and/or organisations become 
more experienced in a task they usually become more efficient at it.  
 
The experience curve effect is broader in scope than the learning curve effect, reflecting 
efficiencies such as cost, production and effort. It assumes that the more often a task is 
performed the lower will be the cost (effort) of doing it.  
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Figure 4.  Experience curve (http://en.wikipedia.org) 
 
Figure 4 (above) shows the learning or experience effect for a simple task plotted both on 
linear and log-log coordinates. The pattern is a rapid improvement followed by ever lesser 
improvements with further practice. Such negatively accelerated learning curves are 
typically described well by power functions, thus, learning is often said to follow the 
"power law of practice" (http://en.wikipedia.org). 
 
Learning, progress, and performance also display a decrease in variance, as the behaviour 
reaches an apparent plateau on a linear plot. This plateau masks continuous small 
improvements with extensive practice that may only be visible on a log-log plot, on which 
months or years of practice can be seen. The longest measurements suggest that for some 
tasks improvement continues for over 100,000 trials (Rabbit & Banerji, 1989).   
 
The power law of practice is ubiquitous. From short perceptual tasks to team-based longer 
term tasks, such as building ships, the rate that people improve with practice appears to 
follow a similar pattern. It has been seen in pressing buttons, reading inverted text, rolling 
cigars, generating geometry proofs and manufacturing machine tools (Newell & 
Rosenbloom, 1981), performing mental arithmetic on both large and small tasks (Delaney, 
Reder, Staszewski & Ritter, 1998), performing a scheduling task (Nerb, Ritter & Krems, 
1999), and performance errors (Ohlsson, 1996).   
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The learning curve is visible with enough aggregation of dissimilar tasks or across similar 
tasks down to the level of individual subject's strategies.  Fitts and Posner (1967) 
suggested that the learning process is sequential and that one moves through specific 
phases or stages as one learns: 
 
(1) Cognitive phase - Identification and development of the component parts of the 
skill involving the formation of a mental picture of the skill. The learner tries to 
define the goal and general methods for achievement. He or she knows when the 
movement is not the desired one but does not know how to correct it. Frequent 
errors make the performance quite variable. The learner discovers dimensions of 
time, space, force and flow.  
(2) Associative phase - Linking the component parts into a smooth action. It involves 
practicing the skill and using feedback to perfect the skill. The learner 
comprehends how parts of the movement relate to one another, and becomes more 
bio-mechanically efficient. Errors are less numerous. Quality practice produces 
refinement of the skill and the learner begins to recognise inappropriate 
performances.  
(3) Autonomous phase - Developing the learned skill so that it becomes automatic. It 
involves little or no conscious thought or attention whilst performing the skill. The 
learner has acquired the ability to focus attention on other details of the 
environment, including the ability to self-correct and make minute adjustments. 
Not all performers reach this stage. 
 
Fitts and Posner (1967) found gradual improvement with practice in most motor skills, and 
that learning follows an S-shaped learning curve, evident when someone learns a highly 
complex task. The initial part (cognitive phase) of the curve rises slowly as a person 
becomes familiar with basic components of a skill. The steep ascending phase (associative 
phase) occurs when there is enough experience with rudiments or simple components to 
start "putting it all together." Rapid progress follows until the skill "hits a ceiling" 
(autonomous phase) or stabilises at a high level. The S – curve is illustrated below. 
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Figure 5.  The S-shaped "learning curve" typical of complex learning (Fitts & Posner, 
1967)            
 
Gentile (2000) suggests that the first stage of learning involves explicit processes in 
which the learner matches the body's morphology to the environment's regulatory 
conditions and learns to manipulate parameters that scale the movement to different task 
demands. Later, during stages in which learning is less conscious, the learner improves 
in intrinsic processes, such as regulating inter-segmental or motion-dependent forces. 
Eventually, the skill is executed by implicit and unconscious processes.  
 
Acquiring the skill of typing is a good example to illustrate the above phases of learning 
(skill acquisition). During the first, cognitive phase, attention is mostly consumed by 
concentration and thought regarding keyboard layout, finger movement and 
coordination, processing and transformation of visual input into motor output and 
correcting errors. During the second, associative phase, with repetition (practice), the 
keyboard layout becomes learned knowledge and less attention is spent on finger 
placement, therefore attention starts shifting away from the fingers and onto the text that 
has to be typed, together with feedback on accuracy (lack of error correction). Typing 
speed increases progressively as errors decrease. During the final, autonomous phase, 
attention is focussed mainly on the text that has to be typed and almost no attention is 
given to finger placement on the keyboard (motor skill). When no errors are made and 
typing speed is at the optimum, typing efficiency (performance) has become a function 
 45 
of errorless functioning, thus the longer the period of continuous errorless typing the 
higher the efficiency and better the performance.  
 
Understanding the process of skill acquisition has been a major challenge in sports 
performance for decades. Once the process behind motor behaviour is understood, 
intervention programmes may be clarified to optimise skill acquisition. To examine 
differences in skill levels, beginners and experts are often compared on a specific task. 
According to Wrisberg (2001), the novice state is characterised by stimulus 
identification which involves mostly perceptual processes to find the relevant internal 
and external information for the motor task, whereas experts can already filter 
information and focus on decision and strategy processes. This processing of different 
information involves the handling of external and internal information as well as 
attentional resources which are fundamental in this process (Abernathy 2001). These 
processes take place at the brain level, on which measuring during a motor task is 
difficult. 
 
From the above literature it is inferred that flow is likely to occur when skill reaches a 
certain level of competency and is most probable when the autonomous phase is 
reached, characterised by continuous errorless and seemingly effortless performance.
            
2.5. DISCUSSION         
            
Flow, although anchored in social, development and positive psychology, is depicted as 
a state of mind and thus also grounded in theories of consciousness, often referred to as 
an altered or heightened state of consciousness. Situating flow as a level of 
consciousness enters the debate surrounding the entity of consciousness. Consciousness 
theories are all but unified in understanding and place in nature, researched from various 
angles by different schools of thought, but none producing all the answers.  
 
Wilber (1997) provides a useful summary of the various theories on consciousness 
research. Cognitive Science views consciousness as anchored in functional schemas of the 
brain/mind, either in simple representational fashion or as hierarchically integrated 
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networks. Introspectionism maintains that consciousness is best understood in terms of 
intentionality, anchored in first-person accounts, i.e., inspection and interpretation of 
immediate awareness and lived experience. Neuropsychology views consciousness as 
anchored in neural systems, neurotransmitters, and organic brain mechanisms. Individual 
psychotherapy views consciousness as primarily anchored in an individual organism's 
adaptive capacities. Social psychology views consciousness as embedded in networks of 
cultural meaning or as a byproduct of the social system. Clinical psychiatry views 
consciousness in strictly neurophysiological and biological terms. Developmental 
psychology views consciousness as a developmentally unfolding process with a 
substantially different architecture at each of its stages of growth. Psychosomatic medicine 
views consciousness as strongly and intrinsically inter-active with organic bodily 
processes. Non-ordinary states of consciousness, from dreams to psychedelics. Eastern 
and contemplative traditions maintain that ordinary consciousness is but a narrow and 
restricted version of deeper or higher modes of awareness, and that specific injunctions 
(yoga, meditation) are necessary to evoke these higher and exceptional potentials). 
Quantum consciousness views consciousness as being intrinsically capable of interacting 
with, and altering, the physical world. Subtle energies are the subtler types of bio-energies 
beyond the four recognised forces of physics (strong and weak nuclear, electromagnetic, 
gravitational).  
 
Wilber (1997) made an in-depth study of all the above schools of thought and 
subsequently produced a `four quadrants' of existence consciousness model that draws on 
the strengths of each. The four quadrants model (FQM) integrates creature- and state-
consciousness, built on the premise that holons (from the holonic nature of the Kosmos) 
evolve along four dimensions or facets (the four quadrants), i.e., intentional, behavioural, 
cultural and social, to increasing levels of development. Each quadrant has a different 
architecture and thus a different type of validity claim through which the three strands of 
knowledge operate, i.e., propositional truth (Upper Right), subjective truthfulness (Upper 
Left), cultural meaning (Lower Left), and functional fit (Lower Right). All four validity 
claims follow the three strands of valid knowledge acquisition: injunction, apprehension, 
confirmation/rejection (or exemplar, evidence, falsifiability). These three strands operate 
in the generation of all valid knowledge, on any level, in any quadrant. There are at least 
ten major levels of development in each of the quadrants, ranging from the eye of flesh to 
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the eye of mind to the eye of contemplation, and thus the knowledge quest takes on 
different forms as movement goes through the various levels in each quadrant. The three 
strands and four claims are still fully operating in each case, but the specific contours vary. 
 
Figure 6 is a schematic illustration, without the levels of evolution in each quadrant, of the 
FQM. 
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Figure 6. Four quadrant model of existence (Adapted from Wilber, 1997)   
            
According to Wilber’s model, each quadrant represents a hierarchy consisting of holons, 
whole units that are simultaneously part of some other whole, for instance a whole atom is 
part of a whole molecule. The upper right quadrant consists of a hierarchy of holons of 
increasing complexity, each of which `transcends but includes' its predecessor in an 
irreversible fashion. However, individual holons always exist in communities of similar 
holons. These communities, collectives, or societies are summarised in the lower right 
quadrant. The two right hand quadrants both represent holons that all possess simple 
location, i.e., they can all be seen (observed), they are all empirical phenomena and exist in 
the sensori-motor world space. They are, in other words, objective and inter-objective 
realities, and are what individual and communal holons look like from the outside, in an 
exterior and objectifying fashion. However, every exterior has an interior. These are 
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summarised in the upper left and lower left quadrants. The upper left quadrant represents 
the interior of individual holons, such as prehension to irritability to sensation to 
perception to impulse to image to symbol to concept to rule. The lower left quadrant 
represents the collective forms of individual consciousness, i.e., the various cultural or 
communal forms of consciousness. 
 
Each of the quadrants is described in a different type of language. The upper left is 
described in `I' language; the lower left in `we' language; and the two right hand quadrants, 
since they are both objective, are described in `it' language. Each has a different `type of 
truth' or validity claim, that is, different types of knowledge with different types of 
evidence and validation procedures. Thus, propositions in the upper right are said to be 
true if they match a specific fact or objective state of affairs, so-called objective truth 
(representational truth). In the upper left quadrant, a statement is valid not if it represents 
an objective state of affairs but if it authentically expresses a subjective reality. The 
validity criterion here is not just truth but truthfulness or sincerity (integrity of 
information). In the lower right quadrant of inter-objective realities the validity claim is 
concerned with how individual holons fit together into interlocking systems. Truth in this 
quadrant concerns the elucidating of the networks of mutually reciprocal systems within 
systems of complex interaction. The validity claim, in other words, is grounded in inter-
objective fit, or simply functional fit. In the lower left quadrant the concern is not simply 
with how objects fit together in physical space but how subjects fit together in cultural 
space. The validity claim here concerns the way that individual subjective consciousness 
fits with collective subjective consciousness, and how people together decide upon cultural 
practices that allow them to inhabit the same cultural space. The validity claim, in other 
words, concerns the appropriateness or justness of statements and actions (ethics in the 
broadest sense). 
 
The figure below is a schematic illustration (with the levels of evolution in each quadrant) 
of the FQM. 
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Figure 7.  Four quadrant model of existence (Wilber, 1997)     
            
Integrating the model, each quadrant has correlates in all the others, that is, since every 
holon has these four facets (intentional, behavioural, cultural, and social), each of these has 
a very specific correlation with all the others. These can readily be seen in Figure 7.  For 
example, where one finds a holon with a limbic system one finds that it has an interior 
capacity for impulse/emotion, it lives in the collective of a group, herd, or family, and it 
shares an emotional-sexual worldview. Each quadrant causes, and is caused by, the others, 
in a circular and non-reducible fashion, which is why all four types of truth (and all four 
validity claims) are necessary to access the various dimensions of any holon.  
 
According to Wilber (1997), the two right hand validity claims, objective truth and 
functional fit, are grounded in empirical observation, and some sort of correspondence 
theory of truth, whereas the two left hand validity claims, subjective truthfulness and inter-
subjective meaning, require extensive interpretation or hermeneutics and some sort of 
coherence theory of truth. He argues that perhaps this is why the human knowledge quest 
has been divided into these two broad camps, empirical vs. hermeneutic, positivistic vs. 
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interpretive, scientific vs. intuitive, analytic vs. transcendental, Anglo-Saxon and 
continental, right hand and left hand. He postulates that the correct stance is that both are 
indispensable and that the one should not be reduced to the other.  
 
Wilber (1997) argues that the first step toward a genuine theory of consciousness is the 
realisation that consciousness is not located in the organism, rather it is a four-quadrant 
affair distributed across all and anchored equally in each. Consciousness is not located 
merely in the physical brain, in the physical organism, in the ecological system, or in the 
cultural context, nor does it emerge from any one of those domains. Rather, it is anchored 
in, and distributed across, all of those domains with all of their available levels. The upper 
left quadrant is simply the functional locus of a distributed phenomenon. All holons 
therefore have four fundamental and irreducible aspects, so that every ‘information state’ 
actually and simultaneously has an intentional, behavioural, cultural, and social aspect; 
with each of those having at least ten basic levels. 
 
Chalmers (1995) points out that all of the physicalist and reductionist approaches to 
consciousness only solve ‘the easy problems’, such as objective integration in brain 
processes, leaving the central mystery of consciousness untouched. Chalmers (1995, p 81) 
writes that “the hard problem [is] the question of how physical processes in the brain give 
rise to subjective experience”, that is, how physical and mental interact. According to 
Chalmers (1995) there is an explanatory gap between matter and sensation that has not yet 
been satisfactorily bridged, not by neuroscience, cognitive science, neuropsychology, 
phenomenology, or systems theory. 
 
Wilber (1997) concludes that the attempt to solve this dilemma of an explanatory gap by 
any sort of reductionism, i.e., attempting to reduce left to right or right to left, or any 
quadrant to any other, or any level to any other, is doomed to failure, because the four 
quadrants are apparently very real aspects of the human holon, aspects that aggressively 
resist being erased or reduced. From a flow point of view, the learning point from Wilber’s 
line of argument is that the flow phenomenon or state of consciousness should be 
researched covering all four facets (intentional, behavioural, cultural, and social), using all 
four validity claims and following the three strands of valid knowledge acquisition: 
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injunction, apprehension, confirmation/rejection (or exemplar, evidence, falsifiability) 
relevant to each facet.  
 
Flow theory, as reported by Csikszentmihalyi and associated researchers, mainly focus on 
left hand (subjective, individual and collective) intentional and cultural dimensions of 
flow. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) formulated a flow model (exemplar) through research using 
qualitative and quantitative techniques to gather and interpret peoples subjective 
experiences regarding a mental state in which there is order in consciousness, a match 
between challenge and skill, concentration on the task at hand, action-awareness merging, 
sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, transformation of time and autotelic 
experience, during which they experienced happiness, engagement and self-reward.  
 
As far as right hand (objective, individual and collective) research regarding the flow state 
is concerned, many questions are still unanswered. What are the neural processes, 
pathways, structures and systems, associated with flow that accompanies the intentions and 
behaviours described in flow theory? Is there an identifiable neurological pattern that is 
representative of the flow state and which can be used as objective evidence of being in 
flow? Do individuals performing the same task and experiencing flow present with the 
same neurological pattern? From literature reviews it seems that in terms of flow theory 
the right hand dimensions (objective-behavioural and -social) are still much under-
researched.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION          
             
From the literature reviewed above, it is evident that flow and peak performance are 
interlinked and are even seen to be co-existing. Peak performance is only achievable once 
skill acquisition has reached the autonomous stage. During this stage a person will 
experience balance between ability or skill level and the challenge of the moment, that is, 
the activity, task or event. Additionally, a clear goal (performance standard) for 
achievement is set; attention is focussed on the task (challenge) and not the skill; direct and 
immediate feedback (error tracking) is continuous; a sense of personal control and 
therefore confidence, is experienced (being in control of the situation), and a feeling of 
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automaticy (effortlessness); action awareness merging and loss of self-consciousness is 
experienced, creating an altered sense of time passing. 
 
However, the questions persist, given the above descriptions, how do we know if a person 
is in flow or not? Are we always going to rely on post hoc self-reports? As pointed out by 
Weber (2009): 
 
Undoubtedly, much of the confusion associated with observations of flow results from 
challenges associated with using self-report techniques to measure experience governed by 
activity in implicit systems that is inaccessible to conscious awareness. All of this has led 
to an amalgamation of models and operational procedures used to study flow in which the 
sequence of antecedents and consequences is often difficult to untangle. What is 
considered a precursor in one study is regarded as the flow state itself in another. 
 
Explaining flow in terms of the so-called right hand dimensions, especially the right upper 
quadrant, the schools of thought involving cognitive psychology, neurophysiology and 
neuropsychology are better suited than that of introspectionism and developmental 
psychology. As a matter of logic, one needs some bridging between concepts of the left 
upper-and the right upper quadrants, i.e., connecting propositions about flow with 
propositions of consciousness under conditions associated with flow, such as peak 
performance (Kim, 1998).  
 
From a neurophysiological and neuropsychological perspective, peak performance has 
been widely investigated by, amongst other techniques, studying electro-cortical changes 
or neurological patterns in various areas of the brain during task execution. Since flow is 
associated with peak performance it leads that neurological patterns in the brain recorded 
during peak performances can be linked to behavioural patterns associated with flow and 
then explained in neuropsychological terms. The neuropsychological properties of flow 
and performance are pursued in the next chapter. 
 53 
CHAPTER 3 
THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF FLOW AND PERFORMANCE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION          
             
Flow theory in its current state as mainly a motivational theory and its overlapping with 
other motivational theories was discussed above. However, flow as a so-called heightened 
state of consciousness and the neurological processes and systems underlying such a state 
have been largely ignored and left unanswered. 
 
Neural theories of consciousness, or neural correlates of consciousness, attempt to explain 
why or how relevant correlations between various areas in the brain exist, thereby 
explaining the state of consciousness (Metzinger, 2000). Such theories are diverse not only 
in the neural processes or properties to which they appeal but also in the aspects of 
consciousness they take as their respective explanations.     
 
Recent observations with brain imaging and the long standing evidence on oscillatory 
brain activity from Electroencephalography (EEG) and Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI), supports viewing the brain as a dynamic system of unprecedented 
complexity. Werner (2012) maintained that studying neural activity in terms of state space 
representations has proven of great heuristic value to account for the spatial and temporal 
dynamics of neural systems at micro-, meso- and macroscopic granularity.  Its merit lies in 
making conceptual tools of statistical mechanics available for neural data interpretation.  
Notable examples of applications of this principle are Wackermann’s (1999) assessment of 
EEG field changes as state space trajectories; Hobson, Pace-Schott & Stickhold’s (2000) 
view of different stages of wakefulness and sleep in terms of state space dynamics; the 
demonstration of global brain state transitions occurring simultaneously across multiple 
forebrain areas (Gervasoni et al., 2004); Fell et al. (2004) mappings between brain states 
and phenomenal experience, and Churchland’s (1989, 2006) longstanding explorations 
with comparing human phenomenological with neural-network activation spaces. 
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In state space a system’s dynamics can encounter singularities along its path, which trigger 
sudden phase transitions to new macroscopic configurations with distinctly novel 
properties.  Phase transitions consist of a change in the correlation function among the 
system’s elements, which characterises how the value at one point in the state space 
correlates with the value at another point (Werner, 2012). 
In line with the above methodology, research has indicated that the EEG correlates of 
expert sportsmen during peak performance exhibit distinct patterns of cortical activity, 
which will be discussed below. Since flow is associated with peak performance it follows 
that the manifestation of flow, as a heightened state of consciousness, in terms of state 
space dynamics, can be regarded as a critical point in state transition in which the system 
undergoes a profound reconfiguration (distinct neural pattern) that, among other features, 
is expressed by changes in the correlation function between various system elements 
(cortical areas). Crick and Koch (1990) describe this process as neuronal binding through 
neuronal oscillations.  
 
The change in correlations among the microscopic features at state transition can also be 
viewed as change to a coarser state space topology, with new neighbourhood relations 
among features and thus associated with novel physical or behavioural manifestations. The 
abrupt reconfiguration of neural state space may be the manifestation of global brain state 
transitions, that is, a qualitatively novel expression of functional brain organisation 
(Werner, 2008). Weber (2009) suggest that cognitive binding and network synchronisation 
are key to a better understanding of holistic, higher-order experiences that cannot be well 
explained by isolated traits of those experiences.       
 
Despite the rich descriptions of flow in the psychological literature, very little is known 
about the neurological mechanisms that give rise to the flow state. Following the state-
space argument, the suggestion is that flow, as a state, will be observable as a unique 
pattern of neural connectivity (neural network or state space topology), when various brain 
areas are recruited into synchronised activity (regions in state space become correlated) in 
order to achieve the objective underpinning the flow state. Flow can, therefore, be 
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investigated as a neurological pattern that evolves as a result of changes in correlation 
between system elements of neural state space at the functional level.  
 
In this chapter the anatomy of the brain will briefly be revisited, followed by 
consciousness and cognition as explored from a neuropsychological perspective. A 
plausible model for explaining the flow state during peak performance is then suggested.   
                 
3.2. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF BRAIN FUNCTIONING    
                        
Discussed below are some aspects of brain functioning that is relevant to the study.   
                       
3.2.1. Orientation            
                      
In order to describe the location of brain structures a variety of terms are used for different 
directions and planes of section in the nervous system. Since humans have an upright 
posture the nervous system makes a bend of nearly 90° somewhere between the forebrain 
and the spinal cord. By definition, this bend is said to occur in the region of the midbrain-
diencephalic junction, therefore, for structures above the midbrain the orientation of the 
nervous system is the same with respect to the ground, as in reptiles. At the midbrain and 
below, however, there is a rotation of 90°, since in the standing position the spinal cord is 
approximately perpendicular to the ground in humans. A set of terms that is often used for 
orientation in the nervous system that remains constant with respect to the environment 
both above and below the midbrain, are anterior, posterior, superior, and inferior.  Figure 
8 (below) depicts the terms as they apply to humans (Blumenfeld, 2002). 
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Figure 8.  Directions and planes of sections (Blumenfeld, 2002)     
                     
The terms are the following: 
(1) posterior - toward the rear of the head 
(2) anterior - toward the front of the head 
(3) vertex - central position on top of the head 
(4) dorsal - toward the top of the head 
(5) ventral - toward the bottom of the head 
(6) medial - midline of brain (as seen from above) 
(7) lateral - to the left or the right of the midline 
(8) superior - closer to the top (dorsal) 
(9) inferior - closer to the bottom (ventral).          
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3.2.2.   The brain    
 
The brain is the command centre of the body and controls it through the nervous system, 
the basic unit of which is the neuron, with billions of neuronal cells forming an intricate 
network of connections throughout. The nervous system has two parts: the central 
nervous system (CNS) and the peripheral nervous system (PNS). Information travels 
within and among these two divisions via neural tissue, transmission being dependent on 
electro-chemical activity within the nervous system. The CNS includes the brain and the 
spinal cord, whilst the PNS picks up much of its information from the spinal cord and 
makes connections with the rest of the body.         
                                    
3.2.3. Brain lateralisation   
 
The most prominent part of the brain is the cerebrum, divided into left and right 
hemispheres for which many differences have been observed. Brain function 
lateralisation is evident in the phenomena of right- or left-handedness and of right or left 
ear preference, but a person's preferred hand is not a clear indication of the location of 
brain function. Although 95% of right-handed people have left-hemisphere dominance 
for language function, only 18.8% of left-handed people have right-hemisphere 
dominance for language function. Additionally, 19.8% of the left-handed have bilateral 
language functions (Taylor & Taylor, 1990).    
 
Research conducted at the Australian National University (ANU) seems to back up earlier 
studies showing that left- or right-handedness is determined in the womb and that many 
left-handers process language using both hemispheres of the brain, as opposed to right-
handers, who seem to use primarily the left hemisphere for this purpose. The research 
adds to the slowly growing body of work supporting the hypothesis that people who 
favour their left hand for writing probably have brains that are more conducive to 
simultaneous, bi-hemispherical processing of information. From ANU tests designed 
specifically to measure the speed of information flow between the two sides of the brain, 
the left-handed subjects were found to be faster overall at this task (Cherbuin & 
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Brinkman, 2006).   
 
According to Demos (2005), the left hemisphere is the dominant hemisphere for most 
people, being responsible for logic, mathematics, and analytical reasoning. Verbal 
expression and understanding are linked to Broca's area and Wernicke's area of the left 
hemisphere, and are crucial for finding details whilst disseminating information and 
governing grammatical principles and spelling. Verbal memories are stored in the left 
hemisphere.   
 
The right hemisphere is usually the non-dominant one, responsible for activities on the 
left side of the body and governing emotions and music comprehension better than does 
the left hemisphere. The ‘sweet’ tones of singing and the ‘bitter’ sounds of swearwords 
all emanate from the right hemisphere, which knows why a joke is funny. Right 
hemisphere functions include creativity and perception, visual-spatial processing, 
orientation and recognising familiar places.  Logic may be on the left, but intuition and 
insight are on the right. Perhaps one of the most important features of the right 
hemisphere is its relationship with human qualities such as facial recognition, empathy, 
and early self-concept (Demos, 2005).  
 
Women and men differ in left-right hemisphere differences, as a women's brain has a 
thicker corpus callosum (the major connection between the two hemispheres) than a 
man's, and up to 30 percent more connections between left and right (Pease & Pease, 
2000). This means women have higher quality and stronger connections between the 
emotional right hemisphere and the logical left hemisphere. This difference may 
contribute to a woman's ability to express and understand interpersonal emotions better 
than men. Carter (1998, p. 71) noted other functional differences between the sexes, 
including a greater tendency for women to involve both sides of the brain when 
completing complex mental tasks. Men often use only the side more obviously suited to 
do it, a pattern of activity that suggests women in some ways take a broader view of life, 
bringing into play more aspects of the situation when making decisions, for example. 
Men, on the other hand, are more focused.    
 
Men use more of their brain, on both sides, than women when it comes to spatial abilities. 
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They are better at left-right recognition, determining which way is north, reading maps, 
and playing three-dimensional games or solving puzzles. Although there is much 
controversy about lateralisation of function and gender differences that may be due to, or 
exaggerated by, social roles, most engineers, pilots, and air traffic controllers are men. 
Contrary to popular opinion, male and female occupational differences may, however, not 
simply be a case of stereotyping or bias.      
                
The research on lateralisation of brain functioning is continuous and its implications 
tightly delineated. However, the pseudoscientific applications of lateralisation are often 
exaggerated and applied to a wide range of situations. In terms of brain lateralisation, 
handedness and gender are possible moderator variables to be considered in the 
neuropsychological research regarding flow and performance during a continuous 
visuomotor task.                
                 
 3.2.4. Lobe specialisation and functions           
                           
The outer layer of the cerebrum, the cerebral cortex, is responsible for higher mental 
functions. It has numerous crevices (sulci), and ridges (gyri), is about three millimetres 
thick and divided into four corresponding lobes in each hemisphere. The surface of the 
deep groove that divides the left and right hemispheres is known as the cingulate gyrus, 
which is considered to be the cortical portion of the limbic system.  Fissures are the long 
deep grooves in the cerebral cortex that follow the boundaries between lobes. The central 
fissure creates a dividing line between the somatosensory cortex and motor cortex that 
extends from the left lateral sulcus to the right lateral sulcus. As indicated in Figure 9 
(below), each lobe is named in conjunction with the cranial bones above it and is 
associated with specialised tasks. 
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Figure 9.  Primary sensory and motor cortical areas (Blumenfeld, 2002) 
 
Much of the understanding of lobe functions comes from brain imaging and from 
observations made by neurologists when a local brain lesion occurs. Neurologists have 
observed that lesions occurring in specific regions of the brain produce specific 
symptoms. Conversely, specific symptoms relate to specific regions in the brain. There 
follows a discussion of brain regions.                
                                            
3.2.4.1 Frontal lobes                               
                     
Frontal lobes are responsible for immediate and sustained attention, social skills, 
emotions, empathy, time management, working memory, moral fibre or character, 
executive planning, and initiative (Demos, 2005). They are typically sub-divided into 
three regions, each with two-way connections to different thalamic nuclei and other 
cortical and sub-cortical structures. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has a generic 
function of real-time processing of information or working memory in the service of a 
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wide range of cognitive functions, integrating attention, memory, motor, and affective 
dimensions of behaviour. The medial regions (cingulate or limbic cortex) are involved in 
moderating emotional and social behaviour, as well as drive and motivation. The orbital 
(basal, ventral) frontal cortex plays a key role in impulse control and in regulation and 
maintenance of set and continuous behaviour (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004): "The 
frontal cortex, that is responsible for the brain's most complex processing, has the 
heaviest projections to the amygdala, and the two work together as part of the network 
that is the social brain" (Ratey, 2001, p. 312.).          
                      
3.2.4.2 Parietal lobes           
                 
The parietal lobes are associated with mathematical reasoning, naming objects, complex 
grammar, and spatial awareness.  They solve problems that have been conceptualised by 
the frontal lobes and together with these are the main components of the association 
cortex. Complex grammar, the naming of objects, sentence construction, and 
mathematical processing are traceable to the left parietal lobe. Map orientation, knowing 
the difference between right and left, and spatial recognition are all functions of the right 
parietal lobe. However, specialisation has its limits, with, for example, PET scans having 
shown that the naming of objects involves several brain regions, including the posterior 
frontal cortex, the inferior parietal cortex, and the superior temporal cortex (Demos, 
2005).    
 
Sense of direction also encompasses more than one region: the inferior pre-frontal cortex, 
the posterior parietal cortex, and the inferior temporal cortex (Pinel & Edwards, 1998).  
Damage to the posterior parietal cortex can cause a classic deficit, known as Balint's 
syndrome, in which patients are unable to attend to multiple objects simultaneously, or 
figuratively, they ‘cannot see the forest for the trees’. The damage limits their ability to 
shift attention from one location to another and perhaps from one sensory modality to 
another (Ratey, 2001). People with parietal lobe problems may have more car accidents 
because they are not able to attend to both sides of the visual field. They might have 
trouble playing computer games such as solitaire, which require scanning from left to 
right. If they draw pictures and the left half of the picture seems incomplete this indicates 
 62 
a deficit in the right parietal lobe.  
The parietal lobe is the ‘where’ area of sensory perception. Studies in lesions in the right 
parietal lobe indicate that it is involved in attention, music, body image, body scheme, 
face recognition, and the physical act of dressing (Ratey, 2001).    
                      
3.2.4.3 Temporal lobes     
 
The temporal lobes are associated with verbal memories, verbal-analytic and language 
functions such as word recognition, reading, language, as well as emotion in the left 
hemisphere, while the temporal lobes in the right hemisphere are associated with music, 
facial recognition, social cues, object recognition, and visuo-spatial and integrative 
processing (Springer & Deutsch, 1998). The temporal lobes have proximity to the 
amygdala (emotion) and the hippocampus (memory).    
 
Luria (1973) indicated that lesions to the left mid-temporal zone interfere with verbal 
memory making. Damage to this zone prevents the storage of longer passages of 
information, although short phrases may be retained. Consequently, it becomes difficult 
to keep up with a conversation because information is being lost. Lesions to the right 
temporal lobe often result in the inability to recognise intricate rhythmic melodies.  
 
The temporal lobe houses the auditory cortex in close proximity to the hippocampus, and 
consequently is critical to the memory-making process, especially verbal memories. 
Springer and Deutsch's (1998) review of literature comparing cerebral blood flow and 
memory, explained that memory can be placed into three different categories: short-term, 
working, and long-term. Each activity tends to activate different parts of the brain, as 
shown in PET scans. Short-term memory, which includes recalling a seven-digit number 
such as a telephone number, activates Broca's area and the left inferior parietal cortex. If 
a short-term-memory task is visual or spatial in nature the right hemisphere is activated, 
including the right occipital, parietal, and prefrontal cortices. If a short-term-memory 
task is phonetic, the left posterior/inferior parietal lobe is activated. Phonological 
memory takes in the correct order and transmission of speech sounds, the phonetic pattern 
of a language.  
 63 
 
Long-term memory can be divided into two branches: semantic and episodic. The former 
includes the recall of objects and word understanding, especially in language, and is 
associated with left temporal lobe (Wernicke's area) problems. the latter involves 
functional tasks such as remembering to pay bills, filling the car’s tank, how to play base-
ball, and  where glasses and keys are placed. Deep lesions to the mid-temporal extending 
into the hippocampal lobes result in a dysfunctional episodic memory. Left prefrontal 
cortical regions are more involved in retrieval of information from semantic memory and 
in simultaneously encoding novel aspects of the retrieved information into episodic 
memory. The right prefrontal cortical regions, on the other hand, are involved in episodic 
memory retrieval (Springer & Deutsch, 1998, p. 215-216).   
 
Working memory is an example of short-term plus long-term memory joined in problem-
solving tasks associated with mathematics or reading. Studies show an activation of the 
frontal lobes in the case of verbal or mental tasks (Springer & Deutsch, 1998, p. 206), but 
for memory problems it is not possible to isolate them to the temporal lobes.   
 
The anterior left temporal lobe, due to its proximity to the amygdala, may also be 
implicated in depression. Davidson, Abercrombie, Nitschke & Putnam (1999, p. 230) 
reported that investigators found that blood flow in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
and the left anterior temporal cortex is negatively correlated with severity of negative 
symptoms, suggesting that these cortical zones play a role in generating positive affect, 
motivation and goal-setting, and that their inactivity leads to negative symptoms.       
              
3.2.4.4 Occipital lobes                
                                                     
The occipital lobes are associated with the visual field that helps to locate objects in the 
environment, see colours, recognise drawings, and correctly identify objects. Reading, 
writing, and spelling depend upon an accurate visual field. They are closely associated 
with the visual cortex and border the parietal and temporal lobes. There are two well-
identified visual systems with separate pathways, one running dorsally from the occipital 
to the parietal lobe and being involved with spatial analysis, providing ‘where’ 
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information. The temporo-occipital pathway, which takes a ventral route, conveys 
information about shape and patterns, the ‘what’ of visual perception behaviour (Lezak, 
et al., 2004).              
                
3.2.4.5 Sensory and motor (sensori-motor) cortex     
 
The sensory cortex and motor cortex run parallel to each other and are divided by the 
central sulcus, with the two cortices combined being known as the sensori-motor cortex. 
A key function of the primary motor cortex is conscious control of all skeletal muscle 
movements. Key functions of the primary somatosensory cortex are spatial 
discrimination and the ability to identify where bodily sensations originate.   
 
The sensori-motor cortex marks the division between the parietal lobes and the frontal 
lobes. The primary motor cortex is anterior and within the frontal lobes. The primary 
somatosensory cortex is posterior and within the parietal lobes. Together the sensory and 
motor cortices reach downward to both the left and right temporal lobes to the lateral 
sulcus. The close proximity of these two adjacent structures lends support to the notion 
that they not only divide the anterior from the posterior but they also serve as a junction 
that coordinates movement that is partly guided by sensation. Much of what people do 
and who they are translates into moving legs, hands, torso, or neck into action. From the 
Greek root soma, for body, the somatosensory system is responsible for both the external 
senses of touch, temperature, pain, and the internal senses of joint position, visceral state, 
and pain (Damasio, 1994, p. 65). 
 
The functions of the primary motor cortex have been associated with skilful movements 
and smooth repetitive operations such as typing, playing musical instruments, 
handwriting, the operation of complex machinery and fluid speaking. It is the hub and 
switching station between voluntary muscles of the body and the brain. Research into the 
sensori-motor cortex indicates discreet locations that correspond to actual movements in 
the hands, legs, mouth and jaw.  
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Sterman, Mann, Kaiser & Suyenobu (1994) relate the generation of EEG field potentials at 
scalp level to the influence on the thalamus of three integrative activities of the brain, 
which they call vigilance, sensori-motor integration and cognitive integration. The 
vigilance system involves diffuse networks and specific centres in the brainstem and their 
ascending influence on thalamic, sub-cortical and cortical centres. The sensori-motor 
system involves the ascending touch and proprioceptive pathways and their projections to 
the thalamus and on to the sensori-motor cortex and the efferents from this cortical area. 
This system generates the sensori-motor rhythm (SMR), the 12 - 14 Hz rhythm (also called 
the lobeta frequency range) over the sensori-motor strip. Cognitive integration involves a 
range of centres that process and integrate sensory inputs and motor responses.   
 
Sterman et al. (1994) relate the generation of SMR, alpha and theta rhythms to the 
presence or absence of input from these systems on the thalamic oscillatory generators. 
Specifically, the different oscillatory modes in the thalamus appear when influence of 
combinations from the three modalities is withdrawn from it. As noted above, the 
prototypic example involves initiation of alpha rhythms by the withdrawal of brainstem 
cholinergic activity from the thalamus. If sensori-motor inputs are withdrawn, the SMR 
rhythm appears. If cognitive processing is withdrawn (as in relaxed states without 
cognitive activity), alpha appears. If vigilance is withdrawn (as in states of inattentive 
drowsiness), theta appears. Thus the presence of these rhythms on the EEG indicates the 
underlying brain states of vigilance, cognitive processing, and sensori-motor integration.   
 
Ratey (2001, p.14) explains that the motor cortex helps the cerebral cortex to encode both 
physical and cognitive tasks, asserting that the brain circuits employed to order, sequence 
and time a mental act are the same ones used to order, sequence, and time a physical act. 
This means that the somatosensory cortex shares in orchestrating both physical and mental 
processes. It governs more than just sensory and motor functions.      
                                   
3.2.4.6 Cingulate gyrus          
                   
The anterior cingulate gyrus contributes to mental flexibility, cooperation, and attention. It 
helps the brain to “shift gears”, the young child to make transitions, the mind to let go of 
problems and concerns, and the body to stop ritualistic movements and tics. It contributes 
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to the brain circuitry that oversees attention, the social self, and personality, and is closely 
aligned with the amygdala. The posterior cingulate gyrus , meanwhile, is closely aligned 
with para-hippocampal cortices and shares in the memory-making process. It provides 
orientation in space, as well as eye and sensory monitoring services (Voght, Finch & 
Olson, 1992).            
                   
The entire cingulate gyrus (both anterior and posterior) divides the two hemispheres. The 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is closely associated with the anterior ventral medial site 
that is central to the prefrontal cortex. The anterior cingulate is in the frontal lobes and the 
posterior cingulate (PCC) is in the parietal lobes. The cingulate gyrus intersects the 
central sulcus at the vertex. The cingulate is referred to as the cortical portion of the 
amygdala. Damasio (1994, p. 71) summed up the operations of the cingulate by stating  
             
I would like to propose that there is a particular region in the human brain where 
the systems concerned with emotion/feeling, attention, and working memory 
interact so intimately that they constitute the source for the energy   of both external 
action (movement) and internal action (thought animation  reasoning). This 
‘fountain-head’ region is the anterior cingulate cortex, another piece of the limbic 
puzzle. 
 
The anterior cingulate cortex is known to monitor and control attention and impulse 
control, keeping one motivated and on task. It is in the home of the primary and secondary 
motor cortices that control movement and activity (Demos 2005).      
           
3.2.5. Deeper brain structures         
                       
Beneath the lobes of the cerebral cortex is a complex network of connections and 
structures.  
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Figure 10.  Medial view of right hemisphere (Blumenfeld, 2002) 
 
Beneath the layers of the cerebral cortex lie key supporting structures, a brief description 
of a few of which follows.     
 
3.2.5.1 The limbic system         
                 
The limbic system is thought to be the seat of emotion, even though the right cerebral 
hemisphere also is involved in processing emotions and feelings. Within it we find the 
hippocampus, amygdala, olfactory button, septum, a portion of the thalamus, and the 
fornix. The hypothalamus is included as part of the limbic system by some but not all 
researchers (Blumenfeld, 2002).  
 
The hippocampus stores conscious memories and orchestrates the process of making a 
memory permanent. Information that is combined with emotion may be stored faster 
because the hippocampus is contained within the limbic system, in proximity to the 
temporal lobes. The left temporal lobe seems to work closely with the hippocampus in 
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the memory-making process. The connections between the prefrontal cortex and the 
hippocampus serve to enlist the representation as a contextual cue that forms part of 
an episodic ensemble of information (Thierry, Gioanni, Degenetais & Glowinski, 
2000). The more salient the context the more important it becomes for enhancing the 
retrieval or recognition of episodic memories. Thus, the hippocampus also serves to 
help bind the activation of objects, words, faces, scenes, procedures and other 
information stored in posterior cortices and basal structures to representation-based 
contextual information, such as themes or plans. Furthermore, the hippocampus may 
be involved in the linkage of sequentially occurring events. The ability to explicitly 
predict a subsequent event requires conscious recollection of forthcoming events and 
should require the participation of a normally functioning hippocampus.  
 
The amygdala stores unconscious memories, which like the hippocampus has reciprocal 
connections with the prefrontal cortex. The former, in particular, has extensive 
connections with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Price, 1999; Zalla et aI., 2000). 
Its signals may provide a somatic marker or cue to the stored information ensemble 
in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex representing social attitudes, rules, and 
knowledge. The more salient the input provided by the somatic cue the more 
important the somatic marker becomes for biasing the activation of social knowledge 
and actions. Early childhood trauma may still govern adult behaviour. Sharp negative 
reactions may follow a simple trigger in the environment, such as a particular smell, 
facial expression, hair colour, or style of clothing. The reaction does not necessarily 
follow a clear memory of details, rather, it is inward-knowing, a memory that has been 
driven in by fear (Van der Kolk, McFarlane & Weisaeth, 1996, p. 230). The aggression of 
temporal lobe epilepsy may be in part driven by its proximity to the amygdala in the 
brain. There are many cerebral cortex connections to the amygdala, including the anterior 
ventral medial cortex, the visual cortex and the temporal lobes. The emotion of the 
amygdala is not always dark, but is also involved in positive feelings and emotions.  
 
The thalamus is an editor for sorting and directing sensory information and emotions, and 
moderates between sensory information and the cerebral cortex. Its influence over the 
cerebral cortex and the EEG were reported by Marieb (1995, pp. 393-395). In addition to 
sensory inputs, most inputs ascending to the cerebral cortex are funnelled through the 
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thalamic nuclei, thus the thalamus plays a key role in meditating sensation, motor 
activities, cortical arousal, and memory. It is the gateway to the cerebral cortex.    
 
The hypothalamus is just below the thalamus. A key player in the control of the 
endocrine system and the autonomic nervous system (ANS), it influences eating, body 
temperature, sleep, and emotional responses. It has the job of activating the fight-or-flight 
response, arouses the sympathetic nervous system and the endocrine system, and prepares 
the body to take action. It is also part of the chain of command that calms things down by 
activating the parasympathetic nervous system.  
 
3.2.5.2 Reticular formation   
 
The reticular formation sends a continuous flow of impulses toward the cerebral cortex, 
and keeps the brain alert, awake and ready to receive more information: "The outstanding 
feature of the reticular neurons is their far-flung axonal connections. Such wide spread 
connections make reticular neurons ideal for governing the arousal of the brain as a 
whole" (Marieb, 1995, p. 402). The reticular activating system (RAS) is an "arm of the 
reticular formation", and filters out sensory data. For example, it can shut out sensory 
data in noisy and crowded environments to prevent sensory overload. The hypothalamus 
and other neuronal circuitry shut it down when it is time for sleep (Marieb, 1995).   
                     
3.2.5.3 Cerebellum   
 
The word cerebellum literally means "little brain." It is beneath the occipital lobes and it 
protrudes beyond them, keeping the body erect and governing posture. The lobes of the 
cerebellum work in conjunction with the cerebral cortex to carry out voluntary muscle 
movements. It processes information coming from proprioceptors throughout the body 
then it becomes possible to direct and coordinate muscle movements smoothly and 
efficiently.  
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3.2.5.4 Basal ganglia   
 
Together with the cerebellum the basal ganglia act by modulating the output of the 
cortico-spinal and other descending motor systems. They receive direct connections from 
different regions of the prefrontal cortex and some of these connections may carry 
cognitive 'commands'. The basal ganglia, in turn, send back to the prefrontal cortex, via 
the thalamus, signals that reflect their own processing. Even if the basal ganglia work in 
concert with the prefrontal cortex, their exact role in cognitive processing is still 
debatable. It appears to play a role in the storage of visuomotor sequences (Pascual-
Leone, Grafman, Clark, Stewart, Massaquoi, Lou & Hallett, 1993; Pascual-Leone, 
Grafman & Hallett, 1995), in reward related behaviour (Zalla, Koechlin, Pietrini, Basso, 
Aquino, Sirigu & Grafman, 2000), and in automatic cognitive processing, such as over-
learned word retrieval. It is likely that the representations in the prefrontal cortex bind 
with the visuomotor representations stored in the basal ganglia to produce an integrated 
set of cognitive and visuomotor actions (Koechlin, Corrado, Pietrini & Grafman, 2000; 
Koechlin, Danek, Burnod & Grafman, 2001; Pascual-Leone, Wassermann, Grafman & 
Hallett, 1996).   
 
3.3.    THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF FLOW AND MOTOR PERFORMANCE  
 
The words “conscious” and “consciousness” are umbrella terms applied to both whole 
organisms (creature consciousness) and to particular mental states and processes (state 
consciousness) (Rosenthal, 1986; Carruthers 2000; Gennaro 2004). Following the state 
consciousness paradigm in cognitive and neuropsychology, consciousness is defined by 
integrative neural structures and processes, as discussed in the previous section, 
underlying various attributes of neurocognitive functioning, such as attention, awareness, 
arousal, pattern recognition, memory, perception, knowledge and reasoning. Flow, 
purported to be a heightened state of consciousness, will thus be defined by the same 
neural structures and processes, although organised in an altered, unique pattern under 
conditions of peak performance. This peculiar pattern of cognitive functioning will be 
explored below. 
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3.3.1 Cognitive functioning        
                        
In cognitive psychology, cognitive functioning is traditionally described from either an 
information processing point of view or from a connectionist approach. The latter 
emphasises cognition as a neuronally based, parallel-processing cognitive system that 
works as a unit and cannot be broken into parts. The information processing approach to 
cognition emphasises an abstract, serial analysis of cognitive processes, which implies that 
cognitive functioning is hierarchically ordered with a modular organisation, into 
identifiable sub-systems. In the next section, features of both approaches will be used, 
firstly to conceptualise a model for consciousness and cognitive functioning, and secondly, 
based on the first, to propose a model for flow as an optimal state of cognitive functioning. 
 
A probable hierarchy for consciousness and cognitive functioning, as illustrated below, is 
then discussed. 
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Figure 11.  Hierarchy of consciousness (adapted from Dietrich, 2003).  
 
The model illustrates the hierarchical organisational structure of consciousness, with the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as the higher order seat and the thalamus as the 
lower order seat of consciousness. It further illustrates that cognitive and emotional 
information processing follows different neural pathways that splits at the thalamic 
structures, and culminate in the DLPFC. The cognitive stream includes the hippocampal 
formation and the temporal, occipital and parietal areas (TOP), while the emotional 
stream includes the amygdale, cingulated cortex, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC).  
 
Dietrich (2003) describes consciousness as hierarchically ordered cognitive functioning, in 
which no single neural structure is necessary and sufficient to constitute consciousness. 
The cerebral cortex, in particular the prefrontal cortex, is at the top of the hierarchy, 
representing the neural basis of higher cognitive functions (Frith & Dolan, 1996; Fuster, 
2000). The limbic structures provide the lower order or primary neural circuitry for 
consciousness.   
 
According to Ulric Neisser (1967), cognition begins with sensory input. The senses bring 
energy, loaded with information, from the physical world outside the body into the neural 
and cognitive systems. Information processing is central to cognitive functioning and is the 
“data management system” of the brain.       
                      
3.3.2 Information processing: attention, cognition and emotion 
 
The cornerstone of conscious information processing is ‘attention’, which refers to both 
the preparedness for and selection of certain aspects of the physical environment, for 
example, objects, or some ideas in the mind that are stored in memory. Posner proposed 
and provided strong empirical evidence for a three-network view of attention involving 
alerting, orienting, and executive processes (Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich & Cohen, 1987).  
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‘Alerting’, also known as ‘sustained attention’, ‘vigilance’, and ‘alertness’, is the ability to 
strengthen and maintain response readiness in preparation for an impending stimulus (Raz 
& Buhle, 2006). ‘Orienting’, or ‘scanning/selection’, is the ability to choose between 
incoming sensory information (Lang, 2000; Lynn, 1966). ‘Executive attention’ is also 
described as ‘selective attention’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘focussed attention’. These 
computations involve planning or decision-making, error-detection, new or not well-
learned responses, conditions judged to be difficult or dangerous, regulation of thoughts 
and feelings, and the overcoming of habitual actions. Some consider any instance of top-
down control as executive attention, whereas others construe it as the monitoring and 
resolution of conflict between computations in different neural areas (Raz & Buhle, 2006).  
 
The next component in the information processing system is the sensory system, which 
generates a code to the incoming information before it is passed on to the memory. 
According to cognitive psychology, there are two types of memory, i.e., permanent 
memory and working memory. Permanent memory can be considered a vast depository of 
both declarative knowledge (storing facts) and procedural knowledge (skills and motor 
programmes). Working memory may be likened to the “scratch pad” of the brain, a kind of 
workbench for cognitive codes and the site in which goals are established (Best, 1999).   
 
When solving problems, a “central processor” allocates attention to the cognitive processes 
involved in code modification (matching and altering possible solutions and operations) 
and monitoring (tracking). It is also the centre from where the response system is 
controlled (Best, 1999). The concept of a central processor can be associated with the 
concept of “global workspace” propagated by Baars (1997). According to Global 
Workspace Theory (GWT), sensory information integrates in a “central space” on a 
conscious and unconscious level, whether cognitive or emotional, and serves as an 
exchange platform for input and output processes in order to assign limited attentional 
resources to selective stimuli. The “global workspace” can thus be seen as an “executive 
controller” of information flow in the brain and therefore requires a neural architecture to 
execute such functioning.          
                
Figure 12 (below) illustrates the working of the information processing system. 
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Figure 12.  The human information processing system (adapted from Best, 1999).   
             
As described above, the thalamus is regarded as an ‘editor’ for sorting and directing of 
sensory information, including emotion. It plays a key role in mediating sensation, motor 
activities, cortical arousal, and memory, and is considered the gateway to the cerebral 
cortex. With reference to the “central processor” or “executive controller”, the thalamus 
can probably be seen as the lower order seat of central processing or “global workspace”.  
 
According to LeDoux (1996), two distinct tracks of information processing start to 
diverge at the level of the thalamus. With the first track, initial processing of emotional 
content (see Figure 9 above) occurs in various limbic system structures such as the 
amygdala. The computational product of is used by the next levels of affective processing 
represented by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC) (Damasio, 1994).   
 
LeDoux (1996) postulated that the emotional brain is designed to attach a value tag to the 
incoming information that allows the organism to evaluate the biological significance of a 
given event. On the other hand, a separate and parallel line of information processing that 
is devoid of any salient information is designed to perform detailed feature analysis. This 
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perceptual evaluation of the environment is used to construct sophisticated 
representations that function as the basis for cognitive processing. Each line of 
information processing contains a functional hierarchy in which increasingly higher-order 
structures perform progressively more sophisticated computations. These two functional 
systems can be dissociated not only anatomically but also in the way they process 
information.  
 
Unlike the computational mode of the cognitive system, the emotional system appears to 
compute information in a non-algorithmic, skilled-based manner (Churchland, 2002). 
Each system keeps a record of its activity so that emotional memory is part of the 
emotional circuitry and perceptual and conceptual memory is part of the cognitive 
circuitry (LeDoux, 1996).  
 
Emotional control, which is associated with self-discipline and achievement, self- esteem 
and confidence, and closedness to new ideas, is linked to the middle frontal and superior 
frontal gyri extending medially to the ACC, and the inferior parietal cortex. Several 
studies investigating different aspects of emotional processing have also observed 
activation in similar regions of the prefrontal and parietal lobes (Cunningham, Johnson, 
Gatenby, Gore & Banaji, 2003; Heinzel et al., 2005; Paul et al., 2005). For example, it 
has been suggested that the medial prefrontal cortex has a general role in emotional 
processing, and the ACC in emotional recall and imagery (Phan, Wage, Taylor & 
Liberzon, 2002). These regions may provide the critical resources in the top-down control 
processes necessary for conscious emotional control, in response to incoming emotional 
information (Williams et al., 2006).  
 
According to LeDoux, (1996), the second tract is the cognitive system (see figure 3.4), 
which is represented by another set of limbic structures, primarily the hippocampal 
formation and the temporal, occipital, and parietal cortices, which will be collectively 
referred to as TOP, with TOP neurons devoted primarily to perception and long-term 
memory (Dietrich, 2003). The primary sensory cortices of all sense modalities are located 
in TOP and its association cortex further assembles and assimilates sensory information 
decoded initially in the primary cortex. The required level of selective attention to 
process the information is also supplied by these structures (Taylor, 2001). It is generally 
agreed that TOP is the site of long-term memory storage (Gilbert, 2001). Although there 
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are multiple connections at various levels between the two information processing 
systems, full reintegration of emotional and cognitive information does not appear to 
happen until both types of computations converge back on the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) (Fuster, 2000).  
 
In studies on monkeys it was found that the DLPFC has preferential connections with 
many motor system structures, and may be the primary regions by which the prefrontal 
cortex exerts control over behaviour. The DLPFC is interconnected with motor areas in 
the medial frontal lobe, such as the supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA, and the 
rostral cingulate, with the premotor cortex on the lateral frontal lobe, and with the 
cerebellum and superior colliculus (Goldman & Nauta, 1976; Bates & Goldman-Rakic, 
1993; Lu, Preston & Strick, 1994; Schmahmann & Pandya, 1997). The DLPFC also 
sends projections to the frontal eye fields, a region important for voluntary shifts of gaze. 
As with the sensory cortex there are no direct connections between the prefrontal cortex 
and primary motor cortex. Rather, it is connected with premotor areas that, in turn, send 
projections to the primary motor cortex and the spinal cord. Also important are the dense 
interconnections between the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia, a structure that is likely 
to be crucial for automating behaviour. The basal ganglia receive inputs from much of 
the cerebral cortex, but its major output, via the thalamus, is to the frontal cortex.  
 
By contrast, in humans, the DLPFC does not receive direct sensory input, is not involved 
in emotional computations, and does not store long-term memory. It is involved in 
executive function, that is, it further integrates already highly processed information, 
supplied by the TOP regions and VMPFC, to enable still higher cognitive functions such 
as self-construct, self-reflective consciousness, abstract thinking, cognitive flexibility, 
planning, willed action, and theory of mind (Dietrich, 2003). It formulates plans and 
strategies for appropriate behaviour in a given situation and instructs the adjacent motor 
cortices to execute its computational product. At all levels of the functional hierarchy, 
neural structures have direct access to activating the motor system, but behaviour that is 
based on prefrontal activation is more complex. 
 
Three other cognitive functions of the DLPFC, working memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1992; 
Baddeley, 1996; Fuster, 2000), temporal integration (e.g., Fuster, 1995; Knight & 
Grabowecky, 1999), and sustained and directed attention (e.g., Posner, 1994; Sarter, 
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Givens & Bruno, 2001) provide the infrastructure to compute these complex cognitive 
functions by actively attending to information, providing a buffer to hold that information 
in mind, and ordering it in space-time (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Duncan & Owen, 
2000). With reference to its role as “central processor” or “executive controller”, the 
DLPFC can probably be seen as the higher order seat of central processing.  
 
In line with the two-tract theory, Rowe et al. (2007) found that social cognitive function 
is underpinned by distinct structures and neural function, and often represents more 
automatic and unintentional processing, in contrast to effortful and intentional cognitive 
processing involved in general cognition. Core domains of general cognitive ability 
include information processing speed, memory (verbal and working), attention, sensory-
motor, verbal (such as fluency) and executive planning functions.  Social cognitive 
functions, on the other hand, include aspects of emotional intelligence, such as emotional 
regulation and control and the capacity for effective interpersonal interaction, and 
emotion processing biases, such as the “negativity bias” towards expecting and 
perceiving negative events. 
 
With regards to working memory, the view emerging from the cognitive and neuro-
scientific literature is that it contains the content of consciousness (Baddeley, 1996; 
Courtney, Petit, Haxby & Ungerleider, 1998). In other words, immediate conscious 
experience of the here and now is made possible by the sustained buffering of 
information in working memory. It is this ability to superimpose already highly complex 
mental constructs that dramatically increases cognitive flexibility. 
 
Bottom–up processes are complemented by top–down processes, as the DLPFC appears 
to exert inhibitory control over inappropriate or maladaptive emotional and cognitive 
behaviours. Francois Lhermitte documented this tendency by showing that frontal lobe 
patients are overly dependent on immediate cues. They tend to act on what they see 
without taking into account the wider context (Lhermitte, Pillon & Serdaru, 1986).  
 
Imaging studies have shown that the prefrontal cortex is activated during object and 
spatial tasks (Courtney, Petit, Maisog, Ungerleider & Haxby, 1998; Prabhakaran, 
Narayanan, Zhao & Gabrieli, 1999), one finding not only that overlapping regions of it 
were activated by ‘what’ and ‘where’ input, but also that the it was more activated when 
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subjects needed to integrate these attributes in working memory than when they could 
remember each separately. This suggests that the prefrontal cortex is particularly engaged 
in tasks that require integration, thus, the frontal lobe provides for cognitive flexibility and 
freedom, and it releases one from subjection to direct environmental triggers or the 
memory stored in the TOP regions (Dietrich, 2003).      
                               
3.3.3 Explicit and implicit systems       
            
According to Dietrich (2004), in addition to the type of information or knowledge, whether 
emotional or cognitive, the weight of evidence suggests that the brain also operates two 
distinct information processing systems to acquire, memorise, and represent knowledge. 
Once information has entered the sensory system and is coded with a cognitive and/or 
emotive tag it is further processed by either an explicit or implicit information processing 
system. The two systems are illustrated in Figure 13 (below) then discussed in more detail.  
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Figure 13.  Explicit vs implicit information processing 
 
The explicit system is characterised by conscious processing that requires broad-based 
attention with high demand on frontal lobe structures and working memory. The implicit 
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system is characterised by unconscious “automatic” processing that requires low demand 
for attention and working memory and is largely driven by posterior and limbic structures. 
 
With reference to Figure 3.6 (above), the explicit system is rule-based, its content 
expressible by verbal communication and tied to conscious awareness. In contrast, the 
implicit system is skill- or experience-based, its content not capable of being verbalised, 
only conveyable through task performance, and inaccessible to conscious awareness 
(Ashby & Casale, 2002; Dienes &| Perner, 1999). Similar distinctions, such as between 
conscious and unconscious, declarative and non-declarative, voluntary and automatic, or 
deliberate and spontaneous, have been made in other domains. Although probably 
uncommon, information can be acquired exclusively by either system. Implicit learning 
‘‘takes place largely independently of conscious attempts to learn and largely in the 
absence of explicit knowledge about what was acquired’’ (Reber, 1993, p. 5). A 
prototypical example is language acquisition in children.   
 
In contrast, explicit learning proceeds through the conscious application of rules. In this 
process, the explicit system forms a mental representation that includes not only the actual 
information but also knowledge, about what is acquired and the fact that it was acquired. A 
prototypical example might be learning a second language in adulthood.   
 
Most often, learning engages both systems simultaneously. Studies on neurological patient 
populations and health subjects suggest that a typical learning situation results in the 
formation of two distinct mental representations, one explicit and one implicit (Schacter, 
1987; Dienes & Perner, 2002). Because each system sub-serves different functions it is 
unlikely that either representation alone is a complete characterisation of the learned task. 
While some information may be represented in both systems, other information may reside 
in one but not the other.  
 
Learning to drive a car, for example, requires a variety of tasks that are exclusively 
explicit, such as the sequence of events and rules of driving, while a variety of other tasks, 
such as changing gears and turning, are largely implicit. The degree to which either system 
has a complete representation depends on the amount of practice and the nature of the task. 
Considering, for instance, language, a person’s native language is entirely learned and 
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largely represented in the implicit system, but with considerable study the explicit system 
can develop its own representation of the phonology, semantics, and grammar, which will 
enable a person to teach the language to others. On the other hand, a second language that 
is learned in adulthood is acquired painstakingly by the explicit system with no feeling or 
intuitive understanding for it. However, with extensive practice the knowledge can also 
become represented in the implicit system.   
 
Thus, knowledge can be explicit and/or implicit, but is mostly represented in varying, 
partially overlapping degrees of each. The nature of the task appears to determine the 
initial degree of explicitness and implicitness. Implicit knowledge can be thought of as 
task-specific, that is, it is inaccessible to other parts of the system and thus less versatile 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Explicit knowledge on the other hand can dramatically increase 
behavioural flexibility, because it can be broadcast to a so-called “global workspace” 
(Baars, 1997), which allows one to test conflicting hypotheses and to integrate seemingly 
counter-intuitive notions about the world.   
 
According to Toates (2006), with extensive repetition of flexible behaviour, a behavioural 
system can change its parameters to acquire some features of a reflex (Dickinson, 1985) or 
modal action pattern (Barlow, 1977). Behaviour becomes automatic, stereotyped, and 
under stimulus control. The adjustment points to the adaptive value of exploiting the 
benefits of speed and simplicity, as reflected by the term ‘automaticity’ (Baars, 1988; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).  
 
Neumann (1984, p. 258) notes that the course of an automatic process is determined by 
relatively permanent structural connections, either wired-in or acquired through practice. 
According to Wilhelm Wundt (in Neumann, 1984, p. 280), without automaticity, a sensory 
event and a motor action have to be linked by a conscious act. Automatisation occurs 
during practice if there is an invariant relationship between the sensory event and the 
subsequent motor action. This results in the establishment of direct neural connections 
between them, so that the sensory event can lead to the proper action without any 
conscious mediation.   
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The above ties in with the abovementioned theory of Fitts and Posner (1967), which posits 
that the learning process is sequential and that we move through specific phases or stages 
as we learn. There are three stages to learning a new skill, firstly, the cognitive, during 
which the learner discovers dimensions of time, space, force and flow (sequence) through 
the identification and development of the component parts of the skill. The second stage is 
associative, during which the component parts are linked into a smooth action and the skill 
is practised using feedback and error correction. The final stage is autonomous, during 
which the learned skill becomes automatic. It involves little or no conscious thought or 
attention and the learner acquires the ability to focus attention on other important details in 
the environment whilst performing the skill.     
 
Fitts and Posner (1967) also found that learning follows an S-shaped learning curve, which 
is most evident when someone learns a highly complex task. In the initial cognitive phase 
the curve rises slowly as a person becomes familiar with basic components of a skill. The 
steep ascending associative phase occurs when there is enough experience with rudiments 
or simple components to start putting it all together. Rapid progress follows until the 
autonomous phase, when the skill stabilises at a high level.        
 
Integrating the implicit/explicit theory, the Fitts and Posner learning process, and the 
automaticity principle of Wundt, together with the S – curve, the process of skill 
acquisition and optimisation, are illustrated as below. 
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Figure 14.  Skill acquisition and optimisation      
               
Figure 14 (above) indicates that the process of skill acquisition starts with a conscious 
process during which attention is focussed on the goal of acquiring explicit knowledge 
regarding the composition and execution of the skill. During this phase, performance is 
low and conscious effort is put into learning, hence the term cognitive phase. As learning 
progresses through repetition, explicit knowledge becomes entrenched and transforms into 
implicit knowledge, performance improves because fewer errors are made, and attention is 
freed up for other use. Once explicit knowledge has transformed into implicit knowledge, 
unconscious, effortless execution of the skill is achieved, which is characterised by a 
perception of automaticity. During this phase, performance is delivered at peak output and 
attention is mostly applied to focussing on essential environmental cues aligned with goal 
achievement behaviour. Automaticity implies that skill and challenge are balanced, 
attention is directed towards goal accomplishment, and flow is likely to occur. 
 
Toates (2006) argues that, considering conscious control to be a type of higher-order 
control, the link with unconscious processes does not become entirely functionally severed 
following a move to automaticity. The probability of engaging automatic processes 
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appears to be modulated by conscious intentions, pointing to joint responsibility and 
thereby integration between controls. Although the sequence of events is not mediated via 
conscious processing it usually only occurs if an appropriate conscious intention is present. 
The above executive process can be deductively linked to the executive control of the 
executive controller within the context of global workspace. 
 
In line with the above concepts of implicit and explicit information processing, global 
workspace theory, and the concept of automaticity, Luu et al. (2009) describe information 
processing in terms of a slow circuit and a fast circuit. Accordingly, the outcome of 
successful learning reflects the integrated function of self-regulatory processes, such as 
regulation of motives, action monitoring, memory encoding and retrieval, controlled by 
specific corticolimbic networks. According to Luu et al. (2009), the prefrontal lobes and 
anterior cingulate have been observed to be strongly engaged early in the learning cycle 
when stimulus-response mappings are actively being established (Toni, Krams, Turner & 
Passingham, 1998; Chein & Schneider, 2005; Luu et al., 2007). In later stages of learning, 
however, once contingency mappings have become consolidated, these frontal structures 
exhibit a reduction in activity. In contrast, posterior regions demonstrate increased activity 
during these later stages (Toni & Passingham, 1999; Chein & Schneider, 2005; Luu et al, 
2007). The reduction of activity observed in frontal structures in later stages of learning 
appear to represent reduced reliance on top-down control systems once learning has been 
established, while the increased activity observed in posterior structures may represent the 
establishment and automatisation of the learned action patterns as well as continued 
monitoring of performance (Toni & Passingham, 1999; Chein & Schneider, 2005). During 
a visuomotor learning task it was found that posterior cortical regions, including parietal, 
posterior cingulated cortex, and para-hippocampal cortices, as indexed by the P3 scalp 
position, became progressively engaged as participants discovered and learned stimulus–
response mappings (Luu et al., 2007).  
 
According to Luu et al. (2009), the evidence from neurophysiological activity in feedback 
processing indicates fronto-limbic response to feedback, indexing the functions of the fast 
learning system. This is strongest during early learning and declines as subjects 
consolidated the stimulus–response mappings during learning. Similarly, the index of 
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activity in the slow learning system (P3 – parietal lobe) supports the notion that the slow 
learning system decreases its activity in response to correct.   
 
As actions become more automated, contextual representation appears to transfer to 
posterior networks such as the posterior cingulated cortex (PCC) (Gabriel, Burhans, Talk 
& Scalf, 2002). Therefore, in a fully automated stage of learning and action control (as 
described above, representing the top end of the S-curve), it would be expected that 
activity in the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) decreases, unless an error is 
committed, in which case there will be a strong ACC response. In an fMRI study, Toni et 
al. (1998) found that learning a sequence of motor responses is associated with an initial 
rise in dorsal ACC activation, followed by sustained activity and then an eventual decline. 
By emphasising the ACC’s role in representing the context for action, the theoretical links 
between the context representation supported by other dorsal cortical networks, including 
the PCC and hippocampus, are recognised.   
 
The role of frontal and temporal regions in visuomotor learning has been attributed to 
memory operations, in which targets take on associative meaning (Toni, Ramnani, 
Josephs, Ashburner & Passingham, 2001; Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller & Wagner, 2003; 
Brovelli, Laksiri, Nazarian, Meunier & Boussaoud, 2007). Results from memory studies 
suggest that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in memory retrieval through its 
interaction with temporal lobe structures, including the hippocampus (Simons & Spiers, 
2003; Badre et al., 2005).   
 
Passingham, Toni & Rushworth (2000) noted that the ventral aspects of the prefrontal 
lobe, including the inferior frontal gyrus, have been shown to be involved in the 
representation of the stimulus, the responses made to the stimulus, and the feedback (i.e., 
outcome) of the action. These representations are central to acquiring visuomotor 
associations.  
 
Luu et al., (2009) concluded that as participants learn a task, representations of the task 
parameters (for example, stimulus–response mappings, feedback contingencies) that can 
be understood as forming rule-related expectancies, gradually develop within the slow 
learning system (Keng & Gabriel, 1998) and violations of the context (i.e. post-learned 
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errors) require template or contextual updating mechanisms (Donchin & Coles, 1988; 
Gonzalvez et al., 1999), perhaps supported by additional control processes, as reflected in 
the involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex.  
 
An alternative explanation for the observed increase of the P3 amplitude for error feedback 
after learning is that errors are rare and error feedback is more salient. This results in 
attention being allocated preferentially to error feedback, which would produce a large P3 
response.   
 
The above research infers that the explicit learning pathway of Dietrich and the fast 
learning system proposed by Luu, present with many commonalities and can be seen as a 
pre-dominantly PFC driven neural pathway, to deal with the cognitive/executive part of 
skill acquisition and mastery, while the implicit, slow learning systems, are responsible for 
skill automation, driven mainly by the so-called TOP and limbic structures. 
 
3.3.4  Flexibility versus efficiency    
 
As reviewed above, multi-dimensional tasks are more likely to be embedded implicitly, 
due to the capacity limit of working memory (Cowan, 2001). Controlled studies, in which 
subjects are prevented from rehearsing, or chunking, support a capacity limit of 4 ± 1 items 
that can be held in working memory at a time (Cowan, 2001). Alternatively, it has been 
suggested that ‘‘working memory limitations are best defined in terms of complexity of 
relations that can be processed in parallel’’ (Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998, p. 723). 
Halford et al. (1998) have argued that the number of dimensions one can manipulate 
concurrently is one quaternary relation. Information of greater complexity overloads the 
capacity limit and invokes executive processes that collapse dimensions into fewer chunks 
and/or process chunks in a serial manner. This course of action, however, makes some 
information temporarily inaccessible. Thus, it is evident that explicit learning cannot occur 
if the rules governing the task reach a complexity that exceeds the capacity limit.   
 
In contrast, the implicit system does not seem to be capacity-limited, for instance, a motor 
task such as a serve in tennis and what it would take to write a computer programme that 
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specifies each muscle twitch, in the correct order and intensity, to make a world-class 
tennis serve. The computational difficulty of complex motion is great and the amount of 
information that must be held concurrently in the focus of attention, and thus working 
memory, far surpasses the capacity limit.  
 
A complex motion, such as the tennis serve, is either learned by observation or, if learned 
through explicit instruction, by breaking it up into smaller components, each of which 
cannot contain more than four independent pieces of information. Once these are morphed 
into a single chunk, larger chunks can be combined to acquire intricate motion. To 
illustrate, using the example of learning to drive a car with the explicit instructions of the 
person in the passenger seat, the explicit system in the prefrontal cortex forms a mental 
representation of the task requirements and recruits the pre-motor cortex and primary 
motor cortex to execute it (Jenkins et al., 1994). This effortful process takes time because 
the capacity limit restricts the number of items that can be amalgamated at a time to 
smooth out motion.   
 
As a result of this working memory cap, the frontal attentional network is fully engaged, 
making it impossible to attend to anything else, such as sightseeing or daydreaming. 
Neuroimaging studies have shown that skill acquisition activates the prefrontal cortex, the 
pre-motor cortex, the parietal cortex as well as the cerebellum (Jenkins et al., 1994). 
Synchronised oscillations have been found to be a neural correlate of integration processes 
during conscious perception (Engel & Singer, 2001), attention (Niebur, 2002), working 
memory (Sarnthein, Petsche, Rappelsberger, Shaw & von Stein, 1998) and recollection of 
episodic information (Klimesch et al., 2001).  
 
Naghavi and Nyberg (2005) also found significant and consistent overlapping fronto-
parietal patterns in studies of attention, working memory, episodic retrieval, and conscious 
perception. Figure 15 (below) illustrates the peaks of activation in fronto-parietal areas 
associated with the above processes. The overlap was most pronounced in the bilateral 
parietal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  
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Figure 15.  Peaks of activation in fronto-parietal areas associated with the indicated 
processes (Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005).       
                                       
Although the above presentation clearly illustrates the high degree of anatomical overlap 
among activation patterns associated with the four mentioned functions, it does not 
confirm or suggest synchronous functioning, but merely simultaneous or parallel 
functioning. Studies have also shown that shifts in neural control occur as a function of 
practice so that the details of a motor task become gradually controlled by the basal 
ganglia (Mishkin, Malamut & Bachevalier, 1984) in a circuit that also includes the 
supplementary motor cortex, the motor thalamus, and the hippocampus (Jenkins et al., 
1994). The implicit system thus builds its own mental representation, which is the 
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equivalent of what is commonly, and misleadingly, known as ‘‘muscle memory.’’ An 
internalised, or skilled, motor pattern is controlled entirely by this basal ganglia circuit 
and little prefrontal activity is required during its routine execution. As the basal ganglia 
and supplementary motor cortex drives the car, aided by perceptual input from the parietal 
cortex, working memory is no longer tied up, allowing executive attention to fill its 
premium computational space with other content such as negotiating the traffic, listening 
to the radio, or daydreaming. This bypassing of consciousness by performance of implicit 
skill confirms on a neural level what has been known on a psychological level for some 
time, namely that to do two things at a time one has to be automatic, or implicit 
(Broadbent, 1958).  
 
Processes that involve dissociations between cognitive processes, and disconnections 
between brain regions, together with selective inhibition and enhancement of abilities and 
processes, are similar to those appearing during hypnosis (Gruzelier, 2000). In a study 
regarding frontal functions, connectivity and neural efficiency underpinning hypnosis and 
hypnotic susceptibility, Gruzelier (2006) found that during hypnosis there was no 
commensurate increase in blood oxygenation in the left frontal cortex (LFC), in the 
subjects most susceptible to being hypnotised, as had occurred in the anterior cingulated 
cortex (ACC). This result represents an uncoupling or dissociation between the ACC and 
LFC with hypnosis. This interpretation was borne out by EEG recordings during the same 
task (Stroop – conflict monitoring) in a separate session (Gruzelier, 2000). EEG coherence 
measures indicate that following instructions of hypnosis, reduction in connectivity 
between the anterior cingulated and the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (F3 scalp 
position), as reflected in the gamma rhythm coherence, was characteristic of highly 
susceptible subjects. There was none with the converse effect in those with low 
susceptibility. This evidence assists in clarifying the nature of the alteration in frontal 
functions with hypnosis. The left inferior frontal locus that was activated has been 
implicated in contention scheduling and contextual control processes, including 
associating external cues with appropriate actions (Passingham, et al., 2000). This 
underscores the disruption of executive functions with hypnosis through dis-connectivity. 
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3.3.5 Interaction between explicit and implicit motor control   
 
Anatomically, the medial prefrontal cortex is bilaterally interconnected to the cingulate 
and supplementary motor areas (Roullier, Liang, Babalian, Moret & Wiesendanger, 1994), 
which have strong bilateral connections to motor effectors (Penfield & Welch, 1949; 
Brinkman, 1984; Lim et al., 1994; Kazennikov et al., 1998) and to basal ganglia nuclei 
(Wiesendanger, Roullier, Kazennikov & Perrig, 1996). The putative specific role of these 
areas in the control of coordinated motor movement can be derived from recent 
neurophysiological evidence, indicating that medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate areas 
represent explicit processes (subject’s intention, awareness) associated with bilateral motor 
sequences, having an inhibitory effect on automatic or implicit processes (Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, 2001; Destrebecqz et al., 2005), whereas cingulate and supplementary motor 
areas may represent the automatic or implicit processes, subserving temporal and ordinal 
representation of the motor sequence (Deiber et al., 1991; Ashe, Lungu, Basford & Lu, 
2006). 
 
In terms of information processing, such as during the learning of a skill, if information is 
part of the explicit and implicit knowledge base (driving a car or making a golf putt) the 
neural control of its execution is transferred from one system to the other. However, a 
skilled behaviour that is largely acquired implicitly, such as a golf swing, would have to be 
explicated first. This must proceed through induction processes (Dienes & Perner, 2002). 
Naturally, a skill is performed by a conscious person and is thus accompanied by 
conscious experience. This allows the explicit system to buffer the event and engage in 
hypothesis testing that will eventually lead to the extraction of the skill’s critical elements. 
In similar fashion, a golfer has to use explicit knowledge to make a decision on club 
selection, taking into account implicit knowledge regarding what type of shot required. 
 
It is notable that fully implicit knowledge cannot cause explicit knowledge through a 
bottom–up process. The implicit system cannot label the information itself as knowledge 
and thus cannot broadcast it to the system, preventing its use by other parts within that 
system. Only through the circuitous route involving actual behaviour can the explicit 
system come to embody an implicitly learned skill. This is exemplified when trying to 
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retrieve a telephone number that is temporarily inaccessible. People typically solve that 
problem by dialling the number on an imaginary dial, using the execution of implicit 
knowledge to trigger explicit representation. That the implicit system cannot tell the 
explicit system directly what it does and why it does it, leading to the curious situation that 
one often cannot explain why one does what one does and leaving little choice but to 
explain that the behaviour was guided by intuition. This is a particularly common 
experience when trying to explain a motor skill to others.  
 
Two studies further illustrate the way the explicit and implicit systems interact in skill 
performance. In an experiment by Bridgeman and colleagues (1991) and Bridgeman, Peery 
and Anand (1997), the motion of a rectangular frame across a computer screen created the 
apparent motion of a stationary dot placed inside the frame moving in the opposite 
direction. Subjects were briefly exposed to the visual illusion and then asked either to 
indicate verbally which of five marked spots best described the last location of the dot, or 
to point to that location using their hands. The verbal condition would engage the explicit 
system while the implicit system would control the steering of the finger. The results show 
that all verbal subjects were highly susceptible to the illusion, whereas half the subjects in 
the pointing condition could accurately specify the location of the dot. These results 
indicate that procedural knowledge is not only fast and efficient but also more accurate in 
real time sensory-motor integration.   
 
The second piece of evidence is from an experiment by Castiello, Paulignan, and 
Jeannerod (1991). Subjects were seated in front of three candle-sized rods and were asked 
to grasp one as soon as it was illuminated. On some trials a rod was illuminated but after 
the subject had already started a visually guided movement to that target, the target was 
changed by illuminating a different rod. Not surprisingly, this resulted in a smooth and 
very rapid correction of the hand’s trajectory. The subjects were also asked to give a vocal 
indication as soon as they were aware of the switch. The experiment produced numerous 
instances in which a subject had already grasped the new target before they were aware of 
it. Such smooth feedback-driven sensory-motor integration can produce complex 
movement patterns that can serve an overall and/or higher goal, yet require no more than 
the reaction to immediately preceding input.  
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Because these are fluid situations occurring in real time they require, primarily, efficiency. 
A system is most efficient if it represents knowledge in a fully implicit manner; that is, it 
codes the application of the knowledge within the procedure and refrains from buffering 
any other property (for example, predication, pre-supposition, or time) of the information 
in a higher-order representation. On the other hand, this setup is the reason motor 
behaviour must progress stepwise from immediately preceding input. The lack of meta-
representation precludes the system from calculating hypothetical future scenarios that 
would enable it to anticipate several steps in advance. Framed in computational terms, it 
becomes clear why such meta-representation is unattainable for movement.  
 
Consequently, the explicit system is limited to representing tasks that can be solved 
outside real time and that can be broken up into chunks of complexity less than a 
quaternary (simultaneous, parallel processing of four pieces of information) relation. Since 
this is not the case for movement, the only viable solution is to increase the number of 
reflexive systems and/or the number of response patterns within a reflexive system. This 
does not change the system’s modularity, rather it is still a reflexive system, as output 
remains guided by the immediately preceding input. However, it now has an increased 
number of specialised and independent response patterns. 
 
Putting the above in perspective, an acquired skill such as playing tennis would require a 
limited number of reflexive systems, each responsible for a different basic stroke (for 
example, forehand, backhand, serve, volley) in addition to a number of specific and 
independent response loops within each system. A tennis match is a dynamic system with 
two moving targets. Although it might settle to one or more strange attractors, such as one 
player’s weak backhand, moment-to-moment events are unpredictable. Given the above 
analysis that such situations must be managed by the implicit system, it is proposed that 
initial practice of a skill leads to the establishment of broad reflexive systems (for example, 
forehand, backhand), while extensive practice results in an increase in the number of 
specific and independent response patterns within each system. Moreover, it is proposed 
that with thousands of hours of highly dedicated practice and match experience these 
patterns become automated (the plateau of the S – Curve in motor learning), that is, the 
application becomes part of the stimulus-response procedure.  
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Once the implicit system becomes “automated” through skill competence, it provides the 
explicit system with workspace capacity to devise strategies for goal attainment and 
improved performance.  
 
3.3.6  Towards a neuropsychological model of flow  
 
In terms of flow theory, Csikszentmihalyi draws a strong relationship between cognitive 
and emotional aspects of performance, claiming that the positive emotions, such as joy and 
happiness, that accompany flow are by-products of the act of achieving control (order) 
over the content of consciousness by virtue of controlling thought (cognition) through 
selective attention (focussed concentration) with the intention (intrinsic motivation) to 
achieve a certain goal (outcome). In order to achieve flow during a task (motor 
performance) there should be a perceived balance between the challenge (required 
outcome) presented by the task and the skills required to match (achieve outcome) the 
challenge, implying that the skills required are already acquired, and the person is 
confident of achieving success. 
 
Explaining flow in terms of neuropsychology, as a matter of logic, some bridging to 
connect propositions about flow behaviour with similar aspects in neuropsychology is 
necessary.   
 
In terms of neuropsychology, consciousness is considered to be ordered hierarchically, 
with the prefrontal cortex at the top of the hierarchy, representing the neural basis of 
higher order cognitive functions, supported by the temporal, occipital, and parietal 
cortices and limbic structures, which together provide the lower order, or primary neural 
circuitry, for consciousness. It was also the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
considered the higher order seat, and the thalamus as the lower order seat of central 
processing. In brief terms, sensory information is fed into the thalamus and distributed to 
other centres, including memory, for encoding before being sent to the DLPFC for higher 
order processing, which then returns the information to the thalamus for action response. 
The thalamus processes information, presumably in “bottom-up” fashion, through a two-
track circuit, one for cognitive processing (via the hippocampal formation and the 
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temporal, occipital, and parietal cortices, which are devoted primarily to perception and 
long-term memory) and one for emotional processing (via the amygdala, anterior 
cingulate cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which compute information in a 
non-algorithmic, skilled-based manner associated with self-discipline, achievement, self-
esteem and confidence). Each system retains a record of its activity so that emotional 
memory is part of the emotional circuitry and perceptual and conceptual memory is part of 
the cognitive circuitry. Although there are multiple connections at various levels between 
the two information processing systems, full reintegration of emotional and cognitive 
information does not appear to happen until both types of computations converge back on 
the DLPFC.  
 
In addition to the type of information or knowledge, emotional or cognitive, the brain also 
operates two distinct information processing systems to acquire, memorise, and represent 
knowledge. Once information has entered the sensory system and is coded with a 
cognitive/emotive tag, it is further processed, presumably by the DLPFC in “top-down” 
fashion by either or both explicit or implicit information processing systems that contain 
both cognitive and emotional information. The explicit system is rule-based, its content 
can be expressed by verbal communication and it is tied to conscious awareness. In 
contrast, the implicit system is skill or experience-based. Its content cannot be verbalised, 
only conveyed through task performance, and it is inaccessible to conscious awareness.  
 
The process of skill acquisition starts with a conscious process during which attention is 
focussed on the goal of acquiring explicit knowledge regarding the composition and 
execution of the skill. The prefrontal lobes and ACC have been observed to be strongly 
engaged early in the learning cycle when stimulus-response mappings are actively being 
established. During this phase performance is low and conscious effort is put into learning. 
As learning progresses through repetition, explicit knowledge becomes entrenched 
(transforms into implicit knowledge), and performance improves because fewer errors are 
made.  Attention is, therefore, freed up for other use. In later stages of learning, once 
contingency mappings have become consolidated, the frontal structures (PFC and dorsal 
ACC) exhibit a reduction, while the posterior regions (basal ganglia circuit including 
parietal, posterior cingulated cortex, and parahippocampal cortices, as indexed by the P3 
scalp position) demonstrate an increase in activity. An internalised (skilled) motor pattern 
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is eventually controlled entirely by this basal ganglia circuit and little prefrontal activity is 
required. Unconscious, effortless execution of the skill is achieved, which is characterised 
by a perception of “automaticity”.   
 
According to flow theory, characteristics of flow are dimensions of concentration on the 
task at hand (focussed attention), action-awareness merging (absorption or immersion), 
sense of (being able to take) control, loss of self-consciousness, transformation of time, 
and autotelic (self-rewarding) experience. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) labelled action-
awareness merging as one of the clearest indications that someone is experiencing flow, 
when all actions appear to be happening spontaneously, effortlessly, and automatically, 
and the individual being led as if by an autopilot. This implies that peak performance, and 
thus flow, is likely to occur once explicit skill knowledge has transformed into implicit 
knowledge so that unconscious, effortless execution of the skill is possible and when 
achieved will be characterised by a perception of “automaticity”.   
 
It was argued above that, considering conscious control (explicit information processing) 
to be a type of higher-order control, the link (with unconscious or implicit processes) does 
not become entirely functionally severed following a progression to automaticity. 
Therefore, automatic processes appear to be modulated by conscious intentions, such as 
goals, objectives or strategies, pointing to joint responsibility and thereby integration 
between implicit and explicit controls.  
 
These arguments imply that during flow, skill execution is implicitly and unconsciously 
controlled by posterior structures, through the application of repertoires of automated 
reflexes, skilfully tweaked by input from explicit conscious adjustments by the fronto-
limbic structures, made in response to dynamic external changes in the task environment. 
This joint implicit/explicit control is supported or maintained by unambiguous dynamic 
feedback from the sensory system. When task efficiency is achieved by little or no 
correction from the explicit system, a perception of being controlled by unconscious 
effortless automaticity of the implicit system is experienced. Since attention is fully and 
consciously invested, by the PFC, in the task environment, loss of self-consciousness is 
experienced. Also, since the implicit system contains both cognitive and emotional 
information processing, the achievement of flow will include not only logical, time and 
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spatial motor responses, but also emotional responses associated with motivational and 
task behaviour. 
 
It follows logically that during flow it is to be expected that the brain will function in a 
similar state, as during the autonomous phase of skill execution, perhaps with some added 
frontal lobe peculiarity, allowing for error correction. Figure 16 (below) illustrates the 
probable pattern of neural information processing during the flow state.  
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Figure 16.  A neuropsychological model of flow      
                    
The model illustrates the reduced flow of information from the fronto-limbic structures to 
the posterior-temporal structures and the almost autonomous functioning of the latter 
structures during peak performance and flow. 
 
A neuropsychological model for flow proposes that flow is a product of neural 
(information processing) productivity during which the brain attempts to optimise 
processing efficiency (speed versus energy consumption) by using the least quantity of 
resources necessary to achieve maximum task performance. Probably the most critical 
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resource in dynamic cognitive functioning is attention and its interaction with working 
memory. It not only plays a pivotal role in executive and frontal lobe functioning but is 
also a resource with limited capacity, and a key area for optimising during neurocognitive 
functioning.  
 
It is hypothesised that during the early phases of the learning cycle (skill acquisition), the 
frontal attentional network is fully engaged because of working memory capacity 
constraints. This makes it impossible to attend to anything else. During this period, the 
fronto-limbic networks and posterior cortico-limbic networks are strongly engaged in 
establishing stimulus-response mappings that will form a neural template (algorithm) for 
skill competence. Ventral aspects of the prefrontal lobe in association with temporal lobe 
structures, including the hippocampus, have been shown to be involved in the 
representation of the stimulus, the responses made to the stimulus and the feedback on the 
action.  
 
During these early phases, attentional resources are thus consumed by association 
processes, converting explicit information into implicit knowledge. As a result, 
representations are being gradually captured in permanent memory where they become 
implicitly entrenched for future use. Representations of task parameters thus gradually 
develop within the slow learning, or implicit knowledge system and violations of the 
context (i.e. post-learned errors) undergo template or contextual updating. The latter 
modifications require both frontal and posterior involvement.  
 
In later stages of learning, once contingency mappings have become consolidated, these 
frontal structures exhibit a reduction in activity. In contrast, posterior regions demonstrate 
increased activity during the later stages. Shifts in neural control occur as a function of 
practice so that the details of a motor task become gradually controlled by the basal 
ganglia in a circuit that also includes the supplementary motor cortex, the motor thalamus, 
and the hippocampus. Once internalised, a motor pattern is controlled entirely by the basal 
ganglia circuit and little prefrontal activity is required during its routine execution, freeing 
up working memory and allowing executive attention to fill its premium computational 
space with other environmentally relevant content that requires higher order processing.  
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Once task representations have transformed into implicit knowledge, unconscious, 
effortless execution of the skill is achieved, which is characterised by a perception of 
automaticity. During this phase, performance is delivered at peak output and attention is 
almost entirely applied in focussing on essential environmental cues aligned with goal 
achievement behaviour. The latter condition (automaticity) implies that skill and challenge 
are balanced, attention is directed towards goal accomplishment, and flow is likely to 
occur. 
 
The above argument supports Dietrich’s (2004) proposal that optimal performance or peak 
performance, involving a real-time sensori-motor integration task is associated with 
maximal implicitness of the task’s execution. Given that the explicit system is sub-served 
by prefrontal regions, it follows that a flow experience must occur during a state of 
transient hypofrontality that can bring about the inhibition of the explicit system.   
 
3.4 CONCLUSION          
 
In the following chapter research studies involving EEG technology and visuomotor 
response tasks are investigated to establish possible links to the above theoretical 
frameworks and its correlates to flow and performance. Considering the above theories, 
the research question is whether there is evidence of a neurological pattern suggesting a 
shift between the implicit and explicit systems, or a shift from the frontal networks to the 
posterior networks during peak performance.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EEG RESEARCH FINDINGS ON FLOW AND PERFORMANCE 
DURING VISUOMOTOR TASKS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION         
             
This chapter is divided into three main parts. Firstly, it provides a brief overview of EEG 
terminology and its applications to brain functioning and the measurement of electro-
cortical changes in the brain. Secondly, it covers recent research studies which investigate 
the neurological changes in the brain during tasks related to visuomotor performance. 
Thirdly, the expected EEG observations based on the model built in the previous chapter 
are provided. Assumptions are formulated regarding the expected neural changes that will 
take place in the brain during periods of peak performance, and therefore flow, during the 
execution of a visuomotor task and how these changes are reflected in EEG.  
 
4.2 BRAIN ACTIVITY AND ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPH  
 
Three types of neurons, sensory, motor, and association, form the basic units of nervous 
system communication and are responsible for all of the connections in the brain. Sensory 
neurons carry information from the skin or other organs upward toward the CNS. The 
impulse is received by the sensory cortex, the anterior portion of the parietal lobes. The 
motor neurons send information downward and away from the CNS to various muscles. 
The origin of the signal comes from the motor cortex, the posterior portion of the frontal 
lobes. The axons of most sensory and motor neurons travel inside the spinal column.  
 
Association neurons, or inter-neurons, help make the connection between sensory and 
motor neurons, as the most numerous kind of neurons in the CNS. Neuronal transmission 
is an electro-chemical event. A nerve impulse, also called an action potential, is an 
electrical charge that travels from the cell body toward the terminal buttons at the ends of 
the axons. A stimulated cell body sends a signal toward the terminal buttons. The impulse 
travels along the axon in “domino” fashion, each membrane having the job of stimulating 
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the next membrane down the line. The whole process resembles a chain reaction and is 
known as ‘de-polarisation’. At this point the terminal buttons release neurotransmitters 
into the synapse. Dendrites from adjacent neurons pick up the message and further 
transmit it from neuron to neuron, until the purpose for the initial impulse is accomplished. 
 
Brainwaves are formed by a dual action, a ‘push-pull’ process. A cycle begins when a 
neurotransmitter is released to excite an adjacent neuron and ends when the process 
reverses due to an inhibitory response. Two terms define the process of making 
brainwaves, i.e., excitatory post-synaptic potential (EPSP) and inhibitory post-synaptic 
potential (lPSP). Each dendrite of the adjacent neuron can be excited or depolarised by the 
release of an excitation neurotransmitter. The inhibitory process is invoked by the release 
of an inhibitory neurotransmitter (Blumenfeld, 2002).  
 
As a result of neural signals that move upward toward the cerebral cortex, then back 
downward to the thalamus, repeatedly, EEG rhythmic activity is created. The total rhythm 
caused by millions of communicating neurons can be recorded at the cortical level in 
microvolts (amplitude) and cycles per second (frequency). The electroencephalograph 
(EEG) is a graphical representation of the neuronal activities in the cerebrum, a uniquely 
powerful and revealing indicator of brain function, and one of the best methods available 
for assessing and monitoring neural activity in real time. It owes much of its value to its 
sensitivity to neuronal synchrony. The primary mechanism that produces measurable scalp 
EEG is the summation, through volume conduction, of post-synaptic potentials that occur 
in pyramidal cells within the cerebral cortex. When cells polarise, or depolarise, in unison 
the resulting potentials are added in the conducting media, leading to external fields that 
can be measured. This phenomenon is so pronounced that a mere 1% of cortical cells in a 
1 cm
2
 area of cortex, when acting in synchrony, are sufficient to account for more than 
96% of the EEG signal (Shaw, 2003). In other words, the very existence of an EEG 
potential implies some degree of local synchrony within a population of cells lying beneath 
the affected sensor. By an extension of this logic, if a mere 1% of cortical cells are 
coordinated in some way with 1% of the cells in some other location, then 96% of the 
connectivity might be accounted for in the EEG (Collura, 2008).  
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Connectivity metrics are intended to detect these connections and their function, as well as 
short-term and long-term changes in the dynamics of the interconnections. When 
neighbouring locations act in a synchronised manner, local amplitudes are increased, and 
manifest as the presence of a measurable EEG wave. The observed brainwave frequencies 
are epiphenomena, that is, by-products of normal brain function and not a brain signal in 
itself. EEG is a secondary measure, such as the temperature of an electronic circuit. EEG 
waves, for example alpha waves, are produced as a result of certain types of brain activity, 
recognisable by associated EEG waves or wave patterns. 
 
Brain states or states of mind are recognisable by EEG in the domains of time and space, 
notably mood, arousal, sleep, drowsiness, alertness, and relaxation. They also include 
flow. In EEG terms, time refers to frequency, and space indicates localisation of EEG 
activity in the brain. States of mind are recognisable in the range of 1 Hz to about 40 Hz. 
Sleep accompanies delta activity (1-3 Hz); drowsiness and seizure activity accompany 
theta activity (4-7 Hz); deep relaxation and meditative states accompany the alpha rhythm 
(8-12 Hz); sleep initiation and calm focus accompany SMR rhythms (13-15 HZ); and 
focused attention and alertness accompany the beta rhythm (15-18 Hz). High levels of 
concentration accompany the higher end of the beta spectrum (20-32 Hz). Information 
processing occurs at a higher frequency, approximately 40 Hz (gamma).  
 
Each bandwidth is associated with both positive and negative behavioural characteristics, 
described in greater detail, as follows. 
 
4.2.1 Delta (1 - 4 or 1 - 3.5 Hz)    
 
Delta oscillations are intrinsic neuronal rhythms with thalamocortical origins (Olejniczak, 
2006). Delta is associated with sleep and thus predominant in infants. High-amplitude 
rhythmic delta in adults is an indication of traumatic brain injury and other disorders, 
whereas arrhythmic delta has been observed in college students during problem-solving 
tasks (Lubar, Angelakis, Frederick & Stathopoulou, 2001). Vogel, Broverman, and Klaiber 
(1968) addressed this discrepancy by postulating two kinds of behavioural inhibition: (a) 
Class I inhibition, which refers to a gross inactivation of an entire excitatory process that 
results in a relaxed, less active state, such as sleep, and (b) Class II inhibition, which refers 
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to the selective suppression of inappropriate, or non-relevant, neural activity during mental 
task performance. An example of the latter type is found in the research by Harmony et al. 
(2009), which found that increased delta power and synchronisation in the frontal- and 
occipital areas related to inhibition of non-relevant stimuli during go/no-go tasks. 
Attention to internal processing during difficult tasks, such as calculation and 
memorisation, increases delta power (Harmony et al., 1996), while increases in 
synchronised delta power are associated with the moment of creative insight (Whitton, 
Modolfsky & Lue, 1978). Class I delta are associated with synaptic reorganisation, 
plasticity, and waking-state information consolidation (Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002).  
 
4.2.2 Theta (4 - 7, 4 - 7.5, or 4 - 8 Hz)  
 
Theta is associated with creativity and spontaneity, also with distractibility and inattention, 
daydreaming, depression, and anxiety. Theta that is excessive, or laterally asymmetrical, 
may reflect depression, anxiety, and other emotional disorders. Children have higher theta 
amplitudes than older adults (Blume & Kaibara, 1995). Numerous studies have indicated 
that theta is associated with attention in cognitive (Smith, McEvoy & Gevins, 1999), 
visuomotor (Slobounov, Fukada, Simon, Rearick & Ray, 2000; Grunwald et al., 2001) and 
sensori-motor tasks (Baumeister, Reinecke, Liesen & Weiss, 2008). Theta increases have 
also been linked to working memory (Gevins, Smith, McEvoy & Yu, 1997; Krause et al., 
2000; Onton, Delorme & Makeig, 2005). More specifically, increases in frontal theta 
power have been associated with working memory load in the maintenance interval 
(Gevins et al., 1997; Jensen & Tesche, 2002; Onton et al., 2005).  
 
Frontal theta is a prominent feature in EEG reported to increase in tasks that require 
attention or working memory (Gevins et al., 1997; Slobounov et al., 2000; Grunwald et al., 
2001; Baumeister et al., 2008). Both decreased and increased frontal theta activity have 
been linked to increased cognitive demands. Increased frontal theta is reported in a wide 
variety of tasks, such as mental arithmetic (Yoshii, 1972; Mizuki, Tanaka, Isozaki, 
Nishijima & Inanaga, 1980; Inouye et al., 1994; Sasaki, Tsujimoto, Nishikawa, Nishitani  
& Ishihara, 1996; Inanaga, 1998; Lazarev, 1998; Smith et al., 1999), error detection (Luu 
et al., 2003; Luu et al., 2004), language comprehension (Bastiaansen, Posthuma, Groot & 
de Geus, 2002; Hald, Bastiaansen  & Hagoort, 2006) and working memory tasks (Gevins 
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et al.,1997; Krause et al., 2000; Jensen & Tesche, 2002; Onton et al., 2005). Smith et al. 
(1999) reported increased frontal theta power associated with task complexity and 
focussed attention in a cognitive (3-back working memory task) and visuomotor task 
(video game ‘space fortress’). Fournier et al. (1999) found increased theta power in 
posterior brain areas with increased task complexity during a complex visuomotor task.  
 
With regards to theta synchronisation, Horan (2009) reported that there are two different 
types: (a) type-1: related to an increase in power over a broad range of frequencies and 
exhibiting irregular oscillatory epochs. Such theta dominates in slow wave or non-rapid 
eye movement sleep (non-REM); (b) type-2: a selective activation of working memory and 
related to an increase in power within a narrow frequency band of the peak theta frequency 
(Klimesche, 1996). 
 
Horan (2009) postulated that theta is correlated with scanning for visceral pleasure, 
enhanced artistic creativity, responses to novel situations and various forms of training. He 
argued that since theta activity reflects encoding of new information into memory, 
learning, and responding to task difficulty. It forms part of hypnogogic reverie, REM, and 
slow wave sleep; and seems to be related to emotional reward. It is assumed that the 
general function of theta (i.e., types 1 and 2) in relation to creativity is to effect 
neuropsychological closure (i.e., integration), both explicitly and implicitly, in response to 
new (or difficult to assimilate) information coupled with an affective orientation (i.e., 
transcendence) toward emotional satisfaction. Theta activity, whether selective or not, 
appears to reflect an innate intention to achieve greater levels of affective fulfilment, or 
joy, which may result from humans’ existential inclination to be free of informational 
limits (i.e., transcendence) as well as the ability to adapt to new environments (i.e., 
integration). 
 
4.2.3 Alpha (8 -12 Hz) 
 
Classic alpha looks like a rhythmic sinusoidal wave, normally ranging from 9 to 13 Hz 
during wakefulness and dropping to 7 to 8 Hz during drowsiness. Sometimes activity 
between 10 and 12 Hz is not true alpha activity when it resembles a series of 
interconnected arches, known as Rolandic mu or mu rhythm. Mu waves do not change 
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when the eyes change from closed to open, whereas normal alpha show a sharp decrease 
when the eyes open (referred to as ‘alpha blocking’). Alpha is prominent in the occipital, 
parietal, and posterior temporal lobes. Mu rhythms are found mainly in the sensori-motor 
cortex or occasionally in the parietal lobes (Blume & Kaibara, 1995, p. 39).  
 
The functional meaning of low- (alpha 1) and high-frequency alpha (alpha 2) rhythms is 
different. Alpha 1 rhythms sub-serve global attentive readiness. On the other hand, alpha 2 
rhythms reflect the task-related oscillation of specific neural systems for the elaboration of 
sensori-motor or semantic information (Klimesch, 1996, 1999; Klimesch et al., 1998).  
 
Globally, alpha activity reflects a relaxed wakefulness state, and decreases with 
concentration, stimulation or visual fixation (Stern & Engel, 2005). Rowe et al. (2007) 
postulated that the alpha rhythm is a measure of the strength and delay of signal transfer in 
cortico-thalamocortical loops. Increased alpha power, particularly in the eyes open state, 
suggests signals are being boosted through to specific areas of the cortex, while increased 
frequency suggests the propagation of neural activity through cortico-thalamocortical 
loops is faster. Collectively, this may increase the efficiency and accuracy of 
thalamocortical transfer. Consistent with this, alpha demonstrates positive correlations 
with information processing speed.  
 
Alpha is also involved in anticipatory attention, which involves top-down interactions 
between higher-order and primary areas of the visual cortex. These, in turn, have been 
linked to synchronisation in the alpha (and theta) frequency band (von Stein et al., 2000) 
and to dynamic cross-frequency interactions between alpha and gamma oscillations for 
integration across neuronal processes (Palva & Palva, 2007; von Stein et al., 2000). 
  
Alpha power increases have been linked to active inhibition of neuronal activity that could 
otherwise disturb the working memory (WM) process (Jokisch & Jensen, 2007; Klimesch 
et al., 2007). Differential alpha power effects can be seen in upper and lower sub-bands 
(Klimesch, 1999). Decreases in power in the lower alpha band have been linked to higher 
task demands and attentional processing, whereas decreases in power in the upper alpha 
band have been related to increased declarative memory performance. Klimesch et al. 
(1999) observed an increase during WM maintenance of character strings which suggest 
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that this is related to inhibition of memory activities that could otherwise disturb the 
working memory process.    
 
Various authors have linked parietal alpha-2 power to somatosensory information 
processing (Gevins et al., 1997; Slobounov et al., 2000; Grunwald et al., 2001; Baumeister 
et al., 2008).  Smith et al. (1999) reported decreased parietal alpha-2 values with increased 
information processing in a cognitive (3-back working memory task) and visuomotor task 
(video game ‘space fortress’). According to Williams and Krane (1998), general increase 
in event-related alpha power in the temporal regions implies widespread reduction in 
cortical activity and seems consistent with the phenomenological reports of highly skilled 
athletes that their actions or performance become effortless. Babiloni et al. (2008) 
postulated that alpha rhythms might represent a major physiological mechanism at the 
basis of ‘neural efficiency’ during the judgment of observed actions.    
 
Babiloni et al. (2008) reported that high baseline power of bilateral alpha rhythms in the 
sensori-motor area predicts good cognitive performance in both visual stimulus encoding 
and memory formation (Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 1995; Klimesch, 1999; Babiloni et al. 
2006), but not in successful performance of fine motor acts. They argue that it is still a 
matter of debate whether enhanced alpha power represents a general pattern of cortical 
neural inhibition common to all skilled and target sports Palva & Palva, 2007). If this is the 
case, hemispheric differences in preparatory alpha power among sporting gestures might 
reflect specific inhibitory versus excitatory processes associated with exogenous versus 
endogenous direction of attention, and with verbal versus spatial processes (Wertheim, 
1981; Klimesch, 1999).  
 
4.2.4 Sensori-motor rhythm or lobeta (12 -15 or 12 -16 Hz) 
 
Sensori-motor rhythm (SMR), also called low beta, or lobeta, may reflect a state of being 
internally oriented. True SMR predominates only in the sensori-motor cortex (sensori-
motor strip), and increases when the brain's motor circuitry is idle. Consequently, SMR 
amplitude increases with stillness and decreases with movement (Othmer, Othmer & 
Kaiser, 1999, p. 267).   
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4.2.5 Beta (15 - 18 Hz)  
 
Beta comprises fast wave activity, and has been associated with being focused, analytic, 
externally oriented, or in a state of relaxed thinking (Demos, 2005). Maximal beta 
amplitude is usually in the fronto-central regions, but it may be widespread. Increased beta 
activity has been related to the alertness level, and decreases during drowsiness (Eoh, 
Chung & Kim, 2005). Research by Gross et al. (2004) revealed that communication within 
the fronto-parieto-temporal attentional network proceeds via transient long-range phase 
synchronisation in the beta band. Changes in synchronisation reflect changes in the 
attentional demands of the task and are directly related to behavioural performance. The 
fronto-parieto-temporal attentional network is known to be involved in target detection, 
visual attention, and working memory, that is, processes that are required for the 
successful execution of any visually based task. They concluded that synchronisation and 
de-synchronisation appear to be candidate mechanisms for enhancing target processing 
while at the same time avoiding interference by suppressing the processing of non-targets, 
respectively. Such a mechanism may define an important aspect of what is commonly 
referred to as ‘‘attention.’’ 
 
Pfurtscheller, Woertz, Supp & Lopes da Silva, (2003) suggested that beta synchronisation 
or de-synchronisation plays an important role in motor control. Research indicated that 
beta-rhythm oscillations de-synchronise during automotoric movement and again become 
synchronised over a larger scale when attention to sensori-motor integration is required 
(Pfurtscheller & Andrew, 1999; Ivanitsky et al., 2001; Fingelkurts et al., 2005; Schnitzler 
& Gross, 2005). According to Logar et al. (2008), it seems that during the combined 
operation of multiple brain regions information transfer between the regions is the 
predominant contribution to the beta rhythms.   
 
Van Wijk, Daffertshofer, Roach and Praamstra (2009) reported that the role of beta 
synchrony in biasing response competition is related not only to a biasing role of alpha 
activity in the selection of visual information (Worden et al. 2000; Kelly et al. 2006; Thut 
et al. 2006; Rihs et al. 2007), but also to the concept of ‘‘focal desynchronisation/surround 
synchronisation’’ (Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva 1999).  
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According to research on the functional and anatomical loops connecting basal ganglia 
and cortex, it has been proposed that tuning of neural activity to different frequency bands 
may reflect a means of marking and segregating continuous processes in different cortical-
subcortical circuits (Fogelson et al., 2006).  At the level of the striatum, task-related beta 
de-synchronisation occurs very focally amidst widespread beta oscillatory activity, giving 
rise to the proposal that beta oscillatory synchrony operates as a spatiotemporal filter to 
sharpen action-selection by corticobasal ganglia networks (Courtemanche et al., 2003).  
 
4.2.6 High Beta (20-32 Hz)  
 
High beta is associated with peak performance, cognitive processing, worry, anxiety, over-
thinking, and ruminating. Excessive 20 - 32 Hz beta could be a marker for any one of a 
number of disorders, or it could imply that the brain is compensating for excessive theta 
activity (Demos, 2005).  
 
4.2.7 Gamma (40 or 38 - 42 Hz)   
 
Synchronous bursts of gamma band 40-Hz activity have been found during problem-
solving tasks for adults and children. It is often lacking when learning disorders or mental 
deficits are present. Gamma is found throughout the scalp rather than at one discreet 
location. Appearing to help organise the brain, promote learning and allow for mental 
sharpness, it is activated when the brain needs to be active and idle and no specialised task 
is at hand (Hammond, 2000).  
 
Gamma oscillations are observed in the thalamus and auditory, visual, and motor cortices. 
Gamma is prominent especially during high alertness and after sensory stimulation, likely 
contributing to the ‘‘binding” of diverse information into a single coherent percept. 
Gamma, high beta and beta waves seem to be associated with selective attention, transient 
binding of cognitive features, and conscious perception of visual objects (Hughes, 2008).  
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Increased gamma power has also been linked to working memory maintenance (Tallon-
Baudry et al., 1998; Lutzenberger et al., 2002; Kaiser et al., 2003; Jokisch & Jensen, 
2007).  
 
4.3  CONNECTIVITY MEASURES 
 
Insight into the neurobiology of motor performance can be attained by examination of the 
functional interconnectivity (or cortico-cortical communication) between specified 
topographical regions of the brain. In this manner, “networking” activity can be quantified 
by deriving coherence estimates between selected pairs of electrodes or recording sites 
(Busk & Galbraith, 1975).  
 
4.3.1 Coherence   
 
Oscillatory synchronisation is a prevalent property encountered among groups of neurons 
throughout the mammalian brain (Buzsáki & Draguhn, 2004; Kruse & Julicher, 2005). 
Despite its widespread occurrence only recent experimental evidence succeeded in 
showing that synchronised oscillatory activity (or coherence) among neuronal groups 
within and across cortical areas could be functionally relevant and support the dynamics of 
cognitive processes in a variety of tasks (Engel et al., 2001; Varela et al., 2001). The 
emerging view from these findings is that neuronal coherence sub-serves the selective and 
effective transmission of information among neuronal groups during the integration of 
sensory information to ultimately trigger adaptive motor performance (Salinas & 
Sejnowski, 2001; Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003; Fries, 2005; Sejnowski & Paulsen, 2006). 
 
Classical or “pure” coherence is a measure that is derived from the engineering field, and 
designed to reveal connectivity as reflected in a consistent phase relationship between two 
or more signals. It can be interpreted as a generalisation of the Pearson correlation 
coefficient to variables expressed in the complex frequency domain. It has widespread use 
in time-series analysis (Carter 1987).  A coherence value between 0.6 and 0.8 is considered 
significant. 
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Coherence is a specific quantitative measure of functional relations between paired 
locations. It is a squared correlation coefficient that measures phase consistency recorded 
at paired locations, for each frequency component in the EEG. For example, if two regions 
exhibit an EEG coherence of 0.36 at some frequency, a large-scale dynamic correlation 
coefficient of 0.6 is implied between these regions at this frequency. Paired locations in 
dynamical systems may exhibit high coherence in some frequency bands and, at the same 
time, low coherence in other bands in the same set of data. Such correlated neocortical 
activity can result from direct connections between the two regions, common input from 
the thalamus and other neocortical regions, or both (Nunez, 2000).  
 
4.3.2 Asymmetry  
 
Asymmetry may also be regarded as a connectivity metric, in that it reflects relative 
activation between the sites of interest. Asymmetry can be measured in any manner that 
reveals differences in signal amplitudes. This metric has the benefit of being independent 
of the individual signal amplitudes.  
 
EEG asymmetry is of particular value in working with inter-hemispheric EEG, in 
particular that of the frontal lobes. For example, it has been found to correlate with mood 
in general and depression in particular. The measurement and training of frontal EEG 
asymmetry has become an important avenue in clinical neuro-feedback when applied to 
depressed patients. It is also of potential value when used intra-hemispherically, 
particularly front-to-back, in which posterior amplitudes can be trained in relation to 
anterior amplitudes, to seek normal relationships (Collura, 2008). 
 
Where coherence is primarily a measure of phase consistency over time, asymmetry is a 
measure of magnitude difference between waves. Both coherence and asymmetry are 
viewed as indicators of synchrony or functional integration between two scalp positions, in 
other words, indicating the amount of coordinated connectivity between two streams of 
neural activity in different locations of the brain. Significant similarity is an indication of 
binding or synchronised functioning (Tononi et al., 1992).  
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4.4  ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPH TERMINOLOGY   
 
Specific terms are employed to locate brain structures and other anatomical features. 
Neurologists often describe brain regions with anatomical directional terms. The 
International 10-20 system assigns letters and numbers to 19 primary sites on the scalp. 
The International 10-20 System of Electrode Placement is the most widely used method to 
describe the location of scalp electrodes. The 10-20 system is based on the relationship 
between the location of an electrode and the underlying area of cerebral cortex. Each site 
has a letter, to identify the lobe, and a number or another letter to identify the 
hemispherical location.  
 
Figure 17.   Lateral view of the brain indicating the location of scalp electrodes according 
to the 10-20 system 
 
The letters used are: "F" - Frontal lobe, "T" - Temporal lobe, "C" - Central lobe, "P" - Parietal lobe, 
"O" - Occipital lobe. There is no central lobe in the cerebral cortex. "C" is used for identification 
purposes only. Even numbers (2, 4, 6, 8) refer to the right hemisphere and odd numbers (1, 3, 5, 7) 
refer to the left hemisphere. "Z" refers to an electrode placed on the mid line. The smaller the 
number the closer the position is to the mid line. "Fp" stands for Front polar. "Nasion" is the point 
between the forehead and nose. "Inion" is the bump at the back of the skull.   
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The "10" and "20" (10-20 system) refers to the 10% and 20% inter electrode distance.  The 
figure below illustrates the systems outlay. 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  View of the brain indicating the location of scalp electrodes according to the 
10-20 system.   
 
When recording a more detailed EEG with more electrodes, extra electrodes are added, 
utilising the spaces between the existing 10-20 system.  
 
Following the above overview of EEG technology and terminology, the following section 
will investigate EEG-related research regarding neurological changes in the brain during 
performance on visuomotor tasks and its possible relationships with the flow experience.  
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4.5 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPH STUDIES OF VISUOMOTOR 
PERFORMANCE TASKS   
 
 
Flow is mostly related to a diverse range of motor tasks, such as writing, athletics, sports, 
surgery, playing musical instruments or computer games. It most often involves a visual 
component associated with intense concentration and coordinated motor function.   
 
Several neurological studies, especially using EEG technology, have researched the neural 
changes taking place in the human brain during the execution of motor tasks, often related 
to differing levels of performance. Very few studies were found directly related to flow.  
 
4.5.1  Studies 
 
According to Csikszentmihalyi (1997), Jean Holcomb (changed from Hamilton) reported 
that in a set of experiments, students who did and who did not report frequent flow 
experiences were asked to pay attention to flashes of lights, or to tones, in a laboratory. 
While the subjects were involved in this attentional task, their cortical activation in 
response to the stimuli was measured by EEG evoked potentials and averaged separately 
for the visual and auditory conditions. Holcomb's findings showed that subjects who 
reported only rarely experiencing flow, behaved as expected, i.e., when responding to the 
flashing stimuli their activation increased significantly above their baseline level. The 
results from subjects who reported flow frequently were very surprising. Their activation 
decreased when they were concentrating. Instead of requiring more effort, investment of 
attention actually seemed to decrease mental effort. A separate behavioural measure of 
attention confirmed that this group was also more accurate in a sustained attentional task.  
 
Kramer (2007) studied the predictive power of lateralised cortico-electrical patterns 
(measured by EEG) and arousal (measured by Galvanic Skin Conductance) on 
performance during a visuo-spatial motor-response task. The task was a video game 
specifically designed to induce flow based on the criteria for flow state established by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1997). A regression analysis of the data found that greater left temporal 
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alpha activity, compared to that of the right temporal lobe, was a positive predictor of 
performance. No significant results were found regarding delta activity, however, skin 
conductance was found to positively correlate with performance. Theta activity (4-8Hz) 
and mid-beta activity (16-20Hz) were also found to have a main effect on performance. 
Kramer (2007) concluded that, during the trial, performance was aided by higher mid-
range beta in the left hemisphere.  
 
These two studies appear to be the only ones directly related to the flow experience. In the 
first study, flow was measured subjectively and performance-related neural activity was 
measured by evoked potentials. In the second study, no subjective measurement of flow 
was taken, and EEG was only recorded at two scalp positions (T3/T4). Both studies thus 
have very limited value in terms of the larger scope of neural changes happening in other 
parts of the brain. Since flow is closely associated with peak performance, studies 
involving EEG recordings during various levels of performance were investigated. 
 
According to Janelle and Hatfield (2008), the findings of recent investigations robustly 
support a so called “neural efficiency” hypothesis, which postulates more efficient cortical 
functioning in high than low performers, a refinement in the activity of the cerebral cortex 
with improved performance. In essence, it appears that experts alter the neurocognitive 
processes in a dynamic fashion such that analytical processes, important at the early stage 
of preparation, become non-essential activity that then drops out. Such a dynamic process 
may well represent the neural underpinnings of focused attention and ability to regulate 
“noise” that may disrupt the critical attention and motor processes associated with 
successful performance.    
 
Janelle and Hatfield (2008) argue that it may be that this basic pattern of cortical activation 
described above represents a broad principle such that superior performance in many 
psychomotor skills is dependent on refinement of neural activity to those essential 
responses to a given challenge. The details of brain activation may well differ depending 
on the nature of the task being performed, but the principle of regional economy within the 
cerebral cortex with expertise provides a testable model by which to compare experts and 
novices, to investigate the effects of practice over time, and, importantly, the impact of 
stress on the brain.  
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Overall, studies suggest that superior performance is marked by mental economy, 
particularly of analytical associative processes and that pruning of excessive cortico-
cortical communication between such processes and motor regions underlies enhancement 
and consistency of psychomotor performance (Hatfield & Hillman, 2001). Support for this 
principle has been provided by a number of studies ranging from preparation for karate 
moves in elite competitors (Collins, Powell & Davies, 1990), during the quiet eye period 
of target shooting (Janelle, Hillman, Apparies & Hatfield, 2000; Janelle, Hillman, 
Apparies, Murray et al., 2000), and other self-paced motor tasks such as dart-throwing, 
golf, and archery (Salazar et al., 1990; Crews & Landers, 1993; Landers et al. 1991, 1994; 
Radlo et al., 2001).    
 
Haufler et al. (2000, 2002) contrasted EEG activity (recorded from the frontal, central, 
temporal, parietal, and occipital regions) in novice and expert marksmen who were 
challenged with a target-shooting task as well as comparative verbal (i.e., word 
recognition) and spatial tasks (i.e., dot localisation). Lower activation in the cerebral 
cortex was observed in the experts during the aiming period. Comparative log-transformed 
gamma power (36–44 Hz), which is positively related to cortical activation, from the 
frontal and temporal regions. The entire EEG spectrum recorded at site T3 (averaged for 
both experts and novice groups) clearly showed that the experts exhibited higher levels of 
alpha power (8–12 Hz) at this site as well as lower levels of beta and gamma power. The 
group differences associated with the frontal region during the aiming period suggested 
that the experts were, indeed, less reliant on effortful executive processing (i.e., planning 
and coordinating processes) than were their novice counterparts, whereas the group 
differences in temporal activation during aiming imply a reduction in the reliance of 
verbal-analytic thinking with expertise.  
 
Baumeister et al. (2008) researched the cortical activity of skilled performance in a 
complex sports-related motor task using EEG recordings to demonstrate cortical changes 
in the brain during a golf putting performance in an expert-novice paradigm. The success 
in putting (score) and performance-related cortical activity showed significantly better 
performance in the expert golfers, associated with higher fronto-midline theta power and 
higher parietal alpha-2 power values than the novices. The findings suggest that with 
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increasing skill level, golfers have developed task solving strategies, including focussed 
attention and an economy in parietal sensory information processing which lead to more 
successful performance.  
 
Pfurtscheller and Berghold (1989) reported that alpha 2 event related de-synchronisation 
(ERD) showed a characteristic pattern before and during self-paced finger movement in a 
shooting simulation. Just prior to movement, there was a significant ERD prominent at 
sensori-motor area electrodes (C3 and C4) contralateral to actual movement, while during 
movement, there was a bilateral ERD pattern. In terms of alpha synchrony, Andrew and 
Pfurtscheller (1999) reported high levels of interhemispheric coherence for alpha 1 data 
and low interhemispheric coherence for alpha 2 data in a similar experiment. They 
concluded that the higher frequency EEG data was representative of Rolandic mu (12 Hz) 
activity and that left and right hemisphere Rolandic mu coupling was not affected by 
movement. The alpha 1 activity was said to represent coherent ‘classic alpha’ activity. 
Similar effects were also reported by Florian et al. (1998). However, they additionally 
demonstrated that alpha 1 coherence (synchrony) increased during movement, whilst alpha 
2 coherence showed no such effect. 
 
Babiloni et al. (2008), researching alpha and beta rhythms during golf putts, reported that 
alpha 2 ERD over the right primary sensori-motor cortex was at maximum during 
successful putts, suggesting that fine cortical control of the left arm and hand movements 
is crucial for winning performance.  
 
These results contribute to the debate on the functional significance and hemispheric 
distribution of alpha rhythms recorded during sporting performance. An inhibitory increase 
in broad alpha power (8–12 Hz) in the left hemisphere before the performance of skilled 
marksmen (Hatfield et al., 1984) and archers (Salazar et al. 1990; Landers et al. 1994; 
Shaw, 2003) has already been shown, which would favour visual–spatial processes in the 
right hemisphere. Furthermore, a correlation has been reported between the reduction in 
power of right parietal alpha (ERD) and skilled karate performance (Del Parcio et al., 
2007b). In contrast, other studies have pointed to a bilateral increase in alpha power during 
skilled karate performance (Collins et al., 1990), and an inhibitory increase in alpha power 
over the right hemisphere during skilled golf performance (Crews & Landers, 1993).  
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According to Babiloni et al. (2008), relationships between the topography of baseline 
alpha power and subsequent cognitive-motor processes are quite complex, possibly 
depending on the specific tasks to be performed. Previous evidence showed that high 
baseline power of bilateral alpha rhythms predicts good cognitive performance in both 
visual stimulus encoding and memory formation (Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 1995; 
Klimesch, 1999; Babiloni et al., 2006), but not in successful performance of fine motor 
acts. It was suggested that successful golf putting performances are characterised by 
excitatory de-synchronisation of frontal alpha rhythms during action execution, in line 
with the traditional model of alpha power modulation (Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 
1999; Palva & Palva, 2007).   
 
Babiloni et al. (2008) also reported that successful golf putts were additionally 
characterised by alpha 2 ERD over the medial prefrontal, cingulate and/or supplementary 
motor areas. These cortical areas play a pivotal role in the planning, selection and 
regulation of learned complex sequences performed with both arms and both hands, thanks 
to their bilateral anatomical connectivity (Rosenbaum, Vaughan, Barnes & Jorgensen, 
1992; Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek, Vaughan & Jansen, C. 2001; Ashe et al., 2006). 
 
Andrew and Pfurtscheller (1999) and Pfurtscheller et al. (2003) proposed that voluntary 
finger movement causes beta rhythm de-synchronisation. As observed by Murthy and Fetz 
(1996), volitional movements of the hand cause phase lags between different cortical 
areas, however, according to the same authors, as well as Andrew and Pfurtscheller (1999), 
the beta-rhythm oscillations again become synchronised over a larger scale when the 
attention to sensori-motor integration is required (Pfurtscheller & Andrew, 1999; Ivanitsky 
et al., 2001; Fingelkurts et al., 2005; Schnitzler & Gross, 2005).      
 
According to recent research it is inferred that synchronisation is probably how the brain 
achieves the large-scale integration (i.e., neural binding) of its many parallel processing 
activities, allowing coherent complex brain functioning, cognition and behaviour (Engel et 
al., 2001; Buzsáki & Draguhn, 2004). A study performed by Classen et al. (1998) showed 
increased coherence (synchronisation) during the performance of tasks that require 
visuomotoric integration, which means that two brain regions involved in a process, by 
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means of the synchronisation and de-synchronisation of a certain frequency and a constant 
change of signal phase, exchange the information needed. In other words, the phase 
characteristics of the emitted signals together with their oscillatory activity represent a 
possible mechanism of information coding in the brain (Hopfield, 1995).   
 
According to Logar et al. (2008), it seems that during the combined operation of multiple 
brain regions information transfer between the regions is the predominant contribution to 
the beta rhythms. Similar conclusions were made by Pfurtscheller et al. (2003), who also 
suggested that beta synchronisation and de-synchronisation play an important role in motor 
control. 
 
Edin et al. (2007) trace recent functional magnetic resonance imaging studies that 
demonstrate that increased task-related neural activity in the parietal and frontal cortex 
during development and training is positively correlated with improved visuo-spatial 
working memory (vsWM) performance. An integrative experimental and computational 
analysis was performed to determine the effective balance between the superior frontal 
sulcus (SFS) and intra-parietal sulcus (IPS) and their putative role(s) in protecting the 
attentional networks against distracters. EEG recordings during a visuo-spatial working 
memory task, together with a biophysically based computational cortical network model, 
were used to analyse the effects of different neural changes in the underlying cortical 
networks on the directed transfer function (DTF) and spiking activity. Combining a DTF 
analysis of the EEG data with the DTF analysis of the computational model, a directed 
strong SFS → IPS network was revealed 
 
It was found that the fronto-parietal network is more resistant to distraction than the 
symmetric or parieto-frontal networks. Thus, if the IPS were to be distracted, a low IPS → 
SFS connection strength protects the distraction of the SFS. Further, a strong SFS → IPS 
connection protects the IPS from being distracted in the first place. Conversely, if the IPS 
→ SFS connections are the strongest, then the network is even less resistant to distraction 
than the symmetric network. Therefore, this shows that SFS–IPS asymmetry affects 
working memory performance and indicates a way to redistribute inter-regional 
connections in order to increase the resistance to distraction. 
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A further assumption in this study was that the vsWM maintenance network consisted of 
only the IPS and the SFS (Rowe et al., 2000; Todd & Marois, 2004). Based on this, the 
DTF connectivity analysis was performed on the electrode pairs F3 ↔ P3 and F4 ↔ P4. 
However, several regions of the brain are active during the vsWM delay period, and they 
could affect the results by acting as hidden nodes leading to spurious connections in the 
experimental analysis. Most importantly, sub-cortical structures such as the medio-dorsal 
nucleus of the thalamus cannot be excluded from constituting a major pathway of crosstalk 
between the IPS and SFS. Such structures are especially likely to affect the results of the 
DTF in the lower part of the frequency spectrum. Other methods are needed to probe the 
effective connectivity to sub-cortical structures. 
 
Edin et al. (2007), remarked that in both the studies by Olesen et al. (2007) and Sakai et al. 
(2002), higher distracter resistance was associated with higher activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, which dynamically modulates interregional connection strength. It will 
be of great interest to understand the mechanisms whereby it exerts its influence on the 
SFS–IPS connection.    
 
With reference to the above study, there are some references which connect the findings in 
frontal theta power and parietal alpha-2 power to the load of the working memory and in 
more detail to focused attention and information processing. In a cognitive task, Sauseng et 
al. (2005) demonstrated that frontal theta and parietal alpha-2 power act in a fronto-
parietal network which represents functions in the concept of working memory.   
 
Fournier et al. (1999) found increased theta power in posterior brain areas with increased 
task complexity during a complex visuomotor task. The authors suggest that parietal theta 
activity was higher with higher cognitive and behavioural demands. This is supported by 
Dolce and Waldeier (1974), who found higher parieto-occipital theta power in a reading 
task than an easy mental task. However, the data suggests that higher parietal theta power 
is associated with higher skill level during a complex sports performance such as the golf 
putt. 
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Deeny et al. (2003) assessed inter-electrode coherence (synchrony) between motor 
planning (Fz) and association areas of the brain during skilled marksmanship in two 
groups of participants. Although both groups were highly experienced, approximately 18 
years of experience in each group, one consistently scored higher under the stress of 
competition and performed better under pressure. The investigators predicted a lower level 
of coherence or communication between the left temporal and central motor planning 
regions, thus simplifying the organisation of motor processes, resulting in more stable and 
consistent performance. As predicted, the superior competitors exhibited significantly 
lower values (coherence) between these regions (F3 - Fz), although no other differences 
were observed for either the left or right hemisphere. The results support the notion of 
refined networking in the cerebral cortex of those who consistently perform well in 
competition by reducing neuro-motor “noise” and interference with task-relevant motor 
functions. The reduction of such non-essential networking may stem from the control of 
emotional reactivity owing to limbic system processes (i.e. amygdala), resulting in a quiet 
cortex that, in turn, simplifies and stabilises motor processes.   
 
More specifically, there is evidence in support of an inverted-U relationship between 
cortical activity and performance as opposed to a monotonic relationship such that “more 
relaxation is better”. Heightened EEG alpha power was observed in expert marksmen prior 
to the decision to abort a shot, relative to that observed prior to trigger pull, suggesting that 
excessive relaxation, or a failure to regulate central arousal in an appropriate manner, may 
lead to dis-regulation of attention and reduce the quality of psychomotor performance. 
Similarly, Landers et al. (1994) also observed that the poorest shots during archery 
performance were associated with the highest levels of temporal EEG alpha power.  
 
Babiloni et al. (2008) reported that alpha rhythms might represent a major physiological 
mechanism at the basis of “neural efficiency” and that these rhythms reflect the functional 
modes of thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical loops that facilitate/inhibit the transmission 
and retrieval of both sensori-motor and cognitive information into the brain (Steriade & 
Llinas 1988; Brunia 1999; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva 1999). Compared to the brains 
of non-athletes, those of elite athletes require a quite selective engagement of thalamo-
cortical and cortico-cortical loops spanning the occipital and temporal cortex of ventral 
and dorsal pathways for a successful judgment of observed sporting actions. It can be 
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speculated that such modulation of alpha rhythms support both global attentional (low-
frequency alpha rhythms) and task-specific (high-frequency alpha rhythms) processes 
(Klimesch, 1996, 1999; Klimesch et al., 1998). This might be the same mechanism at the 
basis of a well-known phenomenon observable in healthy subjects: the progressive 
reduction of event-related cortical activity along learning phases. In this vein, it has been 
shown that training induces a decrease of activity in motor cortex from pre- to post-
training phase during motor tasks (Haufler et al., 2000; Koeneke et al, 2006). Furthermore, 
the trained motor tasks were performed with a suppression of cognitive processes (Kerick 
et al., 2001, 2004).  
 
According to Janelle and Hatfield (2008), neurophysiologically, the stress response is 
mediated by the limbic system but the central components of this emotional circuit are the 
two amygdalae. Multiple sensory pathways converge in the basal lateral nuclei of the 
amygdalae so that threatening environmental events are immediately processed (Pare, 
Quirk & LeDoux, 2004). The higher association regions of the cerebral cortex also 
communicate with the amygdalae so that worry and rumination can further stimulate these 
important sub-cortical structures. According to Bear, Connors, and Paradiso (2001), the 
lateral nuclei communicate with the central nucleus in each amygdala, which, in turn, 
affects critical forebrain, brainstem, autonomic, and endocrine processes that mediate the 
expression of emotion. More specifically, there are interconnections from the central 
nuclei to the hypothalamus, which results in sympathetic arousal and stimulation of stress 
hormones via the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis; to the periaqueductal 
grey, which mediates motor responses; and to the cingulate cortex, which could result in 
excessive cortico-cortical communication.  
 
Interconnections to the pontine nuclei in the reticular formation result in an increase in 
overall arousal. Such an orchestrated response underlies the mind-body connection that 
may be highly regulated to match task demands under conditions of confidence or dis-
regulated under conditions of fear, resulting in excessive and uncontrolled arousal. The 
efficiency of cerebral cortical activity would be compromised as part of this overall 
response, particularly affecting attention and fine motor control. Timing and coordination 
are then altered and likely reduced in quality while attentional resources intrude on the 
typical automatic programming of well-learned responses. In this manner, non-essential 
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cognitive processing in the cerebral cortex, as fear-related activity, can directly influence 
the limbic system and initiate a cascade of events disruptive to superior performance.   
 
In support of such an “over thinking” hypothesis, Chen and colleagues (2005) recently 
provided psychophysiological evidence of increased networking between the left temporal 
region and the motor planning regions of the brain under conditions of psychological 
stress. When compared to a practice-alone condition, EEG alpha coherence between T3 
and the motor planning region (Fz) was elevated when participants were asked to perform 
a dart-throwing task under the pressure of social evaluation. The increased ‘traffic’ in the 
brain was also accompanied by heightened reports of state anxiety and reductions in self-
reported confidence levels.   
 
As expected, the accuracy of performance was also reduced. The activation of the 
amygdalae serves as a pivotal event in the response to stress and the control of such 
activity would exact a powerful influence on the mental and physical states. A critical 
component in the management of fear is the executive control over limbic function and 
sub-cortical emotional circuits, which is housed anatomically in the frontal regions of the 
forebrain. It is well established that the prefrontal cortex has extensive anatomical 
connections with sub-cortical limbic structures, particularly the amygdalae, although the 
communication is indirectly achieved via the anterior cingulate region (Davidson, 2002; 
2004).  
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Figure 19.  Stress induced cortical dynamics model (Janelle & Hatfield, 2008.   
 
According to Janelle and Hatfield (2008), Figure 19 (above) illustrates the pivotal role of 
the prefrontal cortex in brain processes related to cognition, emotion, and, particularly, 
motor processes. According to this model, individuals under high stress will exhibit 
reductions in prefrontal asymmetry (box 1) compared to a low-stress condition, implying a 
lack of executive control over the fronto-meso-limbic circuit. Consequently, participants 
will experience heightened activation of the limbic region (amygdala in the limbic system; 
box 7). The resultant emotional reactivity, in turn, will lead to EEG alpha de-synchrony, 
particularly in the left temporal (T3) and parietal (P3) regions (box 8), along with 
increased cortico-cortical communication between these regions and the motor planning 
centres (box 4). Such deregulation of the cerebral cortex will be expressed as inconsistent 
input to the motor loop (boxes 2 – 5), resulting in inconsistent cortico-spinal output and 
shooting performance (motor unit activity, trigger pull, boxes 9 and 10). 
 
Unmanaged or uncontrolled fear can significantly alter brain, muscle, and metabolic 
activity in such a way as to concretely alter the quality of performance. Importantly, the 
magnitude of change specified in the model would be significantly related to degradation 
in shooting performance (i.e., slower and less accurate). In this manner, management of 
the limbic system and refinement of cortical activation from executive control would most 
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likely result in enhanced attention accompanied by smooth, fluid, graceful and efficient 
movement.   
 
Calhoun et al. (2002) reported, after researching different activation dynamics in multiple 
neural systems during a simulated driving experience, that driving is a complex behaviour 
that recruits multiple cognitive elements. Signal in the anterior cingulate cortex, an area 
often associated with error monitoring and inhibition, decreases exponentially with a rate 
proportional to driving speed, whereas decreases in fronto-parietal regions, implicated in 
vigilance, correlate with speed. Increases in cerebellar and occipital areas, presumably 
related to complex visuomotor integration, are activated during driving but are not 
associated with driving speed. 
 
Spiers and Maguire (2007), in a study to determine the neural substrates of driving 
behaviour, used an accurate interactive virtual simulation and a retrospective verbal report 
methodology. Different events that characterise the driving process on a second-by-second 
basis and the brain regions that underlie them, were identified. Prepared actions such as 
starting, turning, reversing and stopping were associated with a common network 
comprising premotor, parietal and cerebellar regions.  
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Figure 20.  The various brain regions associated with aspects of driving (Spiers & 
Maguire, 2007)          
            
Unexpected hazardous events, such as swerving and avoiding collisions, were found to be 
associated with activation of lateral occipital and parietal regions, the insula, as well as a 
more posterior region in the medial pre-motor cortex than is found with prepared actions. 
By contrast, planning future actions and monitoring other road users were associated with 
activity in superior parietal, lateral occipital cortices and the cerebellum. The anterior 
pre-sensori-motor area was also recruited during action planning. The right lateral pre-
frontal cortex was specifically engaged during the processing of road traffic rules.  
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Jap et al. (2009) assessed four EEG activities, delta (δ) (±0 to 4 Hz), theta (θ) (4–8 Hz), 
alpha (α) (8–13 Hz), and beta (β) (13–20 Hz), during a monotonous simulated driving 
session in order to assess algorithms for detecting fatigue in drivers. Results showed stable 
delta (frontal) and theta (frontal, central, parietal) activities over time, a slight decrease of 
alpha (temporal) activity, and a significant decrease of temporal beta activity. All four 
algorithms showed an increase in the ratio of slow wave to fast wave EEG activities over 
time. This implies that alertness will increase with decreasing slow wave to fast wave 
ratios.   
 
In summary, according to Janelle and Hatfield (2008), as a function of practice, the 
establishment of memory processes or an internal model to guide the performance as a 
function of practice would result in reduced activation in such regions. In addition, it 
seems likely that the novice would show increased frontal activation due to reliance on 
effortful executive processing such as explicit planning and response inhibition to 
distracting stimuli. Beyond such regional particular differences in activation one would 
also predict overall heightened cortical activation across a wide topographical distribution, 
relative to that observed in experts in light of the novelty of the task demands on the 
performer 
 
4.5.2 The electroencephalograph correlates of the neuropsychological model of flow  
 
From the above information, it is reasonable to assume flow is marked by mental economy 
under conditions of peak performance (Di Russo et al. 2005). This is achieved by the 
pruning of excessive cortico-cortical communication between attentional networks and 
motor regions, resulting in the enhancement and consistency of psychomotor performance 
(Hatfield & Hillman, 2001). It is also important to manage the stress response through the 
management of arousal level. Both improved performance and optimum arousal levels are 
influenced by training. 
 
In the previous chapter it was hypothesised that during the early phases of skill acquisition 
the fronto-limbic, or attentional networks and the posterior cortico-limbic networks are 
strongly engaged in establishing stimulus - response mappings. Attentional resources are 
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consumed by association processes converting explicit information into implicit 
knowledge. Representations of task parameters thus gradually develop within the slow 
learning or implicit knowledge system and violations of the context (i.e., post-learned 
errors) undergo template or contextual updating. The latter modifications require both 
frontal and posterior involvement.   
 
It was hypothesised that in later stages of learning, once contingency mappings have 
become consolidated, these frontal structures exhibit a reduction in activity, while 
posterior regions demonstrate increased activity. Shifts in neural control occur as a 
function of practice so that the details of a motor task become gradually controlled by the 
basal ganglia in a circuit that also includes the supplementary motor cortex, the motor 
thalamus, and the hippocampus. Once internalised, little prefrontal activity is required 
during routine skill execution, freeing up working memory and allowing executive 
attention to fill its premium computational space with other environmentally relevant 
content that requires higher order processing. 
 
Once task representations have transformed into implicit knowledge, unconscious, 
effortless execution of the skill is achieved, which is characterised by a perception of 
automaticity, and implies that flow is likely to occur.  
 
Recent experimental evidence succeeded in showing that synchronised oscillatory activity, 
or EEG coherence, sub-serves the selective and effective transmission of information 
among neuronal groups during the integration of sensory information to ultimately trigger 
adaptive motor performance (Salinas & Sejnowski, 2001; Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003; 
Fries, 2005; Sejnowski & Paulsen, 2006).   
 
In line with the above hypotheses, neuroimaging studies have shown that skill acquisition 
activates the prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex, parietal cortex and cerebellum. Therefore, 
during the early stages of skill acquisition, the prefrontal cortex (indexed by F3/F4) is 
involved in the construction of mental representations of implicit and explicit task 
requirements through the engagement of thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical loops 
spanning the occipital (indexed by O1/O2) cortex, temporal cortex (indexed by T3/T4) 
pre- and primary motor cortex (indexed by C3/C4), and parietal cortex (indexed by 
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P3/P4). Synchronised fronto-parietal (indexed by F3 - P3) oscillations have been found 
during conscious perception (Engel & Singer, 2001), attention (Niebur, 2002), working 
memory (Sarnthein et al., 1998), problem-solving tasks (Lubar, et al., 2001) and 
recollection of episodic information (Klimesch et al., 2001). It is therefore inferred that the 
early stages of skill acquisition are characterised by synchronised neural activity between 
the prefrontal-, parietal-, temporal-, occipital- and the motor cortices. Increased delta 
power and synchronisation in the frontal and occipital areas are involved in inhibition of 
non-relevant stimuli (Harmony et al., 2009). Increased frontal theta is reported in mental 
arithmetic (Sasaki et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1999); error detection (Luu et al., 2003; Luu et 
al., 2004); language comprehension (Bastiaansen et al., 2002; Hald et al., 2006); working 
memory tasks (Gevins et al.,1997; Jensen & Tesche, 2002; Krause et al., 2000; Onton et 
al., 2005); task complexity and focussed attention. Increased theta power in posterior brain 
areas are linked to increased task complexity during complex visuomotor tasks (Fournier 
et al., 1999). Alpha power increases have been linked to active inhibition of neuronal 
activity that could otherwise disturb the working memory process (Jokisch & Jensen, 
2007; Klimesch et al., 2007).   
 
Decreases in power in the lower alpha band have been linked to higher task demands and 
attentional processing, whereas decreases in power in the upper alpha band have been 
related to increased declarative memory performance. Beta synchronisation played an 
important role in motor control. Beta oscillations become synchronised over a larger scale 
when the attention to sensori-motor integration is required (Pfurtscheller & Andrew, 1999; 
Ivanitsky et al., 2001; Fingelkurts et al., 2005; Schnitzler & Gross, 2005). Gamma, high 
beta and beta waves are associated with selective attention, transient binding of cognitive 
features, and conscious perception of visual objects (Hughes, 2008). Increased gamma 
power has been linked to working memory maintenance (Tallon-Baudry et al., 1998; 
Lutzenberger et al., 2002; Kaiser et al., 2003; Jokisch & Jensen, 2007). 
 
In line with the “neural efficiency” hypothesis, in later stages of skill acquisition or motor 
performance, once contingency mappings have become consolidated, frontal structures 
(F3/F4) exhibit a reduction in activity, while posterior regions (P3/P4) demonstrate 
increased activity. Shifts in neural control occur as a function of practice so that the details 
of a motor task become gradually controlled by the basal ganglia circuit (P3/P4), which 
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includes the supplementary motor cortex, the motor thalamus, and the hippocampus 
(indexed by C3/C4). Beta de-synchronisation and phase lags between different cortical 
areas are reported once a motor skill is completely internalised and controlled entirely by 
the basal ganglia circuit and little prefrontal activity is required, freeing up working 
memory and allowing executive attention (indexed by F3/F4) to fill its premium 
computational space with other environmentally relevant content that requires higher order 
processing.   
 
Using the above information, a probable model to describe the neurophysiology of the 
flow state postulates that individuals performing at peak levels, and thus experiencing 
flow, exhibit improved executive control over the fronto-meso-limbic circuit through 
modulation by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (F3). Consequently, individuals will 
experience decreased activation of the amygdala (less anxiety) and increased activation of 
the hippocampus (smoother motor control) in the limbic system. In terms of EEG data, the 
above process will be characterised by decreased synchrony between F3 and C3, reducing 
neuromotor “noise” and interference with task-relevant motor functions. The resultant 
emotional reactivity (less anxiety), in turn, will lead to higher fronto-midline (F3) theta 
power, increased alpha power and synchrony in the left temporal (T3), sensori-motor (C3) 
and parietal (P3) regions along with decreased cortico-cortical communication (power) 
between these regions and the motor planning centres (Fz/F3). Higher parietal (P3) theta 
power (associated with higher skill level) is expected. The EEG at site T3 will show higher 
levels of alpha power (8–12 Hz) (lower task demand) as well as lower levels of beta and 
gamma power at Fz/F3, implying less explicit (conscious) and more implicit (unconscious) 
attention to task execution. Beta rhythm de-synchronisation and phase lags will occur 
between the various cortical areas involved in motor control. This interpretation is 
consistent with the well-established notion of “automaticity” during skilled motor 
performance in which advanced performers are unconscious of the details of their 
performance as they execute “in the moment” (Fitts & Posner, 1967; Schneider & Chein, 
2003). The above regulation of the cerebral cortex will lead to consistent input to the 
motor loop resulting in consistent cortico-spinal output and motor performance.   
             
The proposed neurophysiological model for flow is illustrated in Figure 21 (below): 
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Figure 21.  A neurophysiological (EEG) model for flow      
 
The model indicates the indexing of brain structures and other anatomical features 
according to the International 10-20 System of Electrode Placement. It also illustrates the 
reduction (indicated by dotted line arrows) in cortical activity in fronto-parietal-limbic 
structures in parallel to increased (indicated by solid line arrows) posterior activity 
producing consistent input to the motor loop resulting in consistent cortico-spinal output 
and motor performance characteristic to the perception of “automaticity” in effortless skill 
execution during peak performance and flow.   
 
In summary, it is hypothesised that the occurrence of flow, as a result of peak performance 
during a visuomotor task, will present the following EEG characteristics (excluding 
temporal): 
 
(1) higher frontal (F3) and parietal (P3) theta power 
(2) higher alpha power at sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) 
(3) lower beta and gamma power at F3 
(4) increased alpha synchrony between the sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) areas 
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(5) de-synchronisation of beta between the frontal (F3), sensori-motor (C3) and 
parietal (P3) areas          
   
4.6.    CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this study is to determine the EEG correlates of flow under conditions of peak 
performance. The EEG’s will be recorded only in the pre-frontal-, sensori-motor-, parietal-
, and occipital cortices.  No measurements will be done in the temporal regions. 
 
Given the above context, the proposed neurophysiological model for flow hypothesises 
that individuals performing at peak levels, and thus experiencing flow, exhibit increased 
frontal (F3) and parietal (P3) theta power, increased sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) 
alpha power, and decreased frontal beta and gamma power, as well as increased alpha 
synchrony between the sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) regions along with beta 
rhythm de-synchronisation between the frontal (F3), sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) 
areas.  
 
Based on the above postulations, the following hypotheses are formulated and tested in the 
study: 
 
H1:  There is a relationship between peak performance and psychological flow. 
H2:  There is an increase in PFC (F3) EEG Theta power in high flow. 
H3:  There is an increase in PPC (P3) EEG Theta power in high flow. 
H4:  There is an increase in PPC (P3) EEG Alpha power in high flow.  
H5:  There is an increase in SMC (C3) EEG Alpha power in high flow.  
H6:   There is a decrease in PFC (F3) EEG Beta power in high flow. 
H7:   There is a decrease in PFC (F3) EEG Gamma power in high flow. 
H8:   There is an increase in Alpha synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow. 
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H9:   There is a decrease in Beta synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow. 
H10: There is a decrease in Beta synchrony between F3 and P3 in high flow. 
H11: There is a decrease in Beta synchrony between F3 and C3 in high flow.  
 
The research design and methodology to test the above hypotheses will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The overall aim of this study is to establish an EEG marker for flow that can serve as an 
objective measure for this intangible phenomenon.  The previous chapter concluded with 
hypotheses to test assumptions regarding the expected pattern of the flow marker. This 
chapter focuses on the research design and methods used to operationalise the test 
variables and to organise, collect, analyse and interpret the data for testing the hypotheses 
that will provide valid and reliable evidence to an EEG marker for flow. 
 
A straightforward correlational design is not possible as the research requires collecting 
EEG signals from the brain whilst the participant is performing a flow inducing task, not 
knowing when the person is in flow.  Since an EEG marker for flow is unknown, the 
challenge is to know when flow occurs during a test session without interrupting the 
participant, causing the flow state to disappear.  Without an EEG marker for flow the most 
common way to establish whether someone experienced flow is by means of a post-hoc 
questionnaire, which provides subjective information.  Literature indicates that flow occurs 
under conditions of personal peak performance, however peak performance may not 
always accompany flow and thus may not assume the role of proxy variable for flow.  
Unlike flow, peak performance and the electrical activity in the brain may be observed, the 
former by a direct behavioural measure (such as time to complete a task) and the latter 
indirectly via EEG equipment. 
 
To this end 20 participants were subjected to a flow inducing task while their EEG’s were 
being monitored. The task is a visuomotor computer game, requiring participants to 
complete a two-lap race around a racing track. Participants were asked to complete 10 
races. The time taken per race is used as an indicator of task performance. Participants 
complete an Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire (AFQ) after each race and a Game Flow 
Inventory (GFI) after having finished all 10 races. These questionnaires were used, ad hoc, 
to obtain an indication of each participant’s conscious experience of flow during the task.  
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EEG recordings during task performance were monitored in four locations, namely the 
prefrontal, sensori-motor, parietal and occipital cortices. Seven frequency bands (alpha, 
theta, delta, lobeta, beta, hibeta and gamma) were recorded in each location, giving a total 
of 28 observations per participant per recording. 
 
5.1.1  General design outline 
 
Strictly speaking the study employs a time-series design consisting of 10 points of 
observation. However, this is simplified to a repeated measures format in which EEG’s 
during a high flow condition are compared with EEG’s during a low flow condition. 
 
Although the repeated measures format is straightforward the actual comparisons between 
the repeated EEG observations are not.  These comparisons do not merely entail the 
difference between an initial and a repeated measure of the 7 EEG frequencies at the same 
brain location (same location comparisons). It also involves cross-comparisons among 4 
brain locations, that is, the difference between an initial observation at one location and a 
repeated observation at another location (different location comparisons). Although the 
study does not call for all possible comparisons (28x28=784) the number of required 
comparisons is quite extensive. This calls for a large sample, which is impractical due to 
the time consuming testing procedure. It was decided, therefore, to conduct a qualitative 
analysis of the comparisons. This approach is not unreasonable as the observed frequency 
bands constituted patterns (i.e. qualities) that are expected to display variations anticipated 
by underpinning theory. 
 
A single group repeated measures design was used to collect data from the 20 subjects who 
were each required to repeat the dynamic task 10 times.  On completion, performance 
times and associated flow scores were standardised where after the sample was segmented 
into two sub-samples reflecting two levels of the flow variable per subject, namely a high 
flow - peak performance level and a low flow - low performance level.  The first race 
completed by each participant was used as a “baseline” (and indicative of a low flow state) 
for comparison with their own personal fastest race/highest flow score combination, 
indicative of a high flow state.  This was required to extract the EEG data associated with 
each level for further statistical analysis and interpretation.   
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The relationship between flow and EEG was expressed in terms of the difference between 
the two levels.   EEG power scores were compared (mean differences) by site and 
frequency, as well as the EEG patterns (correlates) between sites and by frequency.  It was 
expected that EEG patterns on the lower end of the flow measure (low flow - low 
performance condition) should differ from the EEG patterns on the higher end (high flow - 
peak performance) of the flow measure.  The EEG patterns on the high end were 
qualitatively compared with the patterns predicted by the theoretical model.   
 
5.1.2  A quasi-experimental approach 
 
The research design is quasi-experimental. It follows a formal, quantitative, laboratory-
type scientific method and investigates specific hypotheses based on assumptions made 
about brain activity and the accompanying subjective experiences of the subjects, during 
their performances on a visuomotor task.   
 
It was not possible, however, to have definitive experimental vs control groups for 
comparison as in strict experimental designs, since there was no intervention or 
manipulation of an independent variable for one group and not the other.  Rather, two sets 
of data representing the 20 highest flow/performance and 20 baseline flow/performance 
scores, for each individual, were assigned to separate sets of scores for comparison.  Each 
set of data included both the behavioural and EEG data.  
 
The table that follows provides a summarised view of the research process that unfolds 
from a consideration of the variables that were operationalised and tested, through data 
collection and processing, to the data output and hypotheses testing. 
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Table 1 
Summary of the research design and procedures 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
The 3 test 
variables  
Flow (intangible) 
                                ↓                    
Electrical activity           Peak                       Experience of 
of brain (EEG)               Performance          flow 
(Neurophysiological)     (Behavioural)         (Experiential)                                     
            ↓                               ↓                               ↓ 
Sample 
 
Subjects selected: 
20 adult, male, 
regular gamers, all 
right handed. 
T
h
e 
T
es
t 
The Task Visuomotor computer game (racing) 
Repeated Measures  
x 10 
Data 
Collected 
Simultaneous        Time in seconds        1. 5pt. ratings on 
EEG output             to complete each          AFQ after each 
in mV’s for              task                               task 
7 frequencies 
and 4 sites.                                               2. 7pt. ratings on 
                                                                      GFI  after all 
                                                                      10 tasks.     
200 sets of data 
 
 
 
20 measures 
D
a
ta
  
P
ro
c
es
si
n
g
 a
n
d
 A
n
a
ly
si
s 
Data Type Ratio                       Ratio                             Interval          
Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
Mean                    Total per task                1.Mean & sd for 
Frequencies (7)    ranked fastest                  total sample &                                                                    
by sites (4)            to slowest                        sub-groups for 
                                                                      each task (x10) 
                                                                       
                                                                   2.Mean & sd for   
                                                                      total sample &                                                      
                                                                      sub-groups  
                                                                      for all 10 tasks 
 
Standard- 
isation 
 None                 All 10 performance              All scores 
                           times per individual.  
Z-scores 
Bi-variate 
Statistics 
(probability 
CORRELATION OF BEHAVIOURAL DATA 
 
To indicate the strength and direction of the relationships 
All data from fastest   
and first task 
performances for 
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testing) existing between the various behavioural indicators, flow 
and performance, in order to establish that high 
performance is indeed associated with high flow and low 
performance with low flow. 
 
None                  All 20 subjects                       All 
 
each individual 
(x 20 subjects).  
Multi-
variate and 
Univariate 
Statistics 
(probability 
testing) 
 
 
MANOVA/ANOVA 
 
On the basis of the correlation findings in the previous step 
it was shown that it was statistically valid to segment the 
data into two main groups, “high” and “low” flow, for 
further comparison. A MANOVA was conducted to test for 
differences between means of all test variables, including 
EEG power scores, in a single statistical technique that 
brings together both neurophysiological and behavioural 
data at the two levels of flow in order to establish that the 
two levels differs significantly. A univariate report on 
differences between the means of each variable was also 
conducted, which include an effects size analysis to provide 
more detailed information of the magnitude and direction of 
the changes in the means between low and high flow states.  
Outcome: f ratios and p values to indicate differences and 
their statistical significance at a p ≤ 0.05 level and Eta2 for 
effect sizes. 
 
CORRELATION OF EEG DATA 
 
To determine the marker for flow, the EEG data from the 
two flow levels are correlated by frequency and scalp 
position.  
 
Outcome: the correlation coefficients r and p values 
indicate the strength of the relationships between the 7 EEG 
frequencies at each of the 4 brain sites, by flow level. The 
differences between the two sets of data, representing high 
and low flow will already have been established and the 
high flow condition now emerges as the EEG marker for 
flow in 4 brain-sites, under conditions of peak performance.  
This uses 2 flow 
datasets per subject 
for higher and lower 
flow conditions. ie 
total sample of 40 
observations in 2 
conditions. 
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In
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
 
Hypothesis 
testing. 
The hypotheses that were based on the literature review are 
tested. They are based on assumptions about the flow 
condition and its EEG and behavioural characteristics at 
peak performance. 
 
Outcome: Each hypothesis determines, with statistical 
verification, whether the assumptions made about flow are 
confirmed or not. 
 
 
 
5.2 DEFINITION OF THE RESEARCH VARIABLES 
 
Flow is operationalised in terms of performance level (the participant’s personal best 
performance, compared with initial performance time) and subjective experience 
(indicators of flow derived from the literature).   
 
Performance level, in turn, is operationalised in terms of time taken to complete the 
visuomotor task.  The performance time is then linked with a subjective flow score 
obtained via two questionnaires that tap into the personal experience of the performer 
during the task.   
 
EEG is operationalised in terms of measurements of potential differences between 
electrical locations on the scalp and these in turn are operationalised in terms of percent 
power displayed by location and synchrony patterns between scalp locations 
 
Figure 22 below illustrates the main research variables and how they were operationalised. 
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Figure 22. Main research variables and how they are operationalised 
 
5.2.1   The psychological and behavioural test variables 
 
The Game Flow Inventory (GFI) was derived from a validated flow questionnaire of 13 
items, and identified three main psychological factors that indicated flow, under task - 
absorption, enjoyment and intrinsic motivation.  
 
The Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire (AFQ) was derived from five critical flow related 
factors identified in the psychological literature. These were included as items for feedback 
after the completion of each race, as abbreviated indicators of flow, viz. perception of time 
passing, cognitive engagement, the match between skill and challenge, personal control 
and intrinsic reward or satisfaction. 
 
Performance time (in seconds) was recorded for each race and included as a variable to be 
tested in association with the AFQ flow score recorded for each. 
 
5.2.2  The neurophysiological (EEG) test variables  
 
The electrical activity of the brain was recorded by electrodes placed at four brain sites, i.e. 
F3-F4; C3-C4; P3-P4; and O1-O2 in a four channel bi-polar montage with both grounds at 
A1 (ear clips), as follows: 
 
Flow  
(assumed variable 
under task)  
 
 
Electrical Activity of the 
Brain 
(Objectively observed via 
EEG machine) 
  
 
 
Performance Time 
 
3
rd
 Variable  
 
 
 
 
Psychological experience of 
flow 
      (Subjectively rated) 
 
 
 
EEG Power Frequencies (7) 
from 4 brain sites.  
 
Game Flow Inventory 
& 
Abbreviated Flow  
Questionnaire Rating Scale 
Scores 
 
Measured in seconds 
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(1) Channel 1 (CH 1 – F3) or pre-frontal cortex 
(2) Channel 2 (CH 2 – C3) or sensori-motor cortex 
(3) Channel 3 (CH 3 – P3) or parietal cortex 
(4) Channel 4 (CH 4 – O1) or occipital cortex 
 
Each channel recorded data in frequency bands grouped into the following classification: 
 
(1) 1-3Hz (delta)  
(2) 4-7Hz (theta) 
(3) 8-12Hz (alpha) 
(4) 12-15Hz (lobeta) 
(5) 15-20Hz (beta) 
(6) 20-30Hz (hibeta)  
(7) 38-42Hz (gamma)  
 
The data is displayed in micro-volts or percent power, which is explained in more detail in 
section 5.7.3. 
 
5.2.3  Process variables 
 
In addition, the design identifies the following process variables that have the potential to 
influence the outcome of the study by acting as moderator variables. These were taken into 
consideration at the sample selection stage, to control for potential variance from these 
sources. 
 
(1) Gender – the human brain is lateralised for gender 
(2) Handedness - the human brain is lateralised for handedness 
(3) Level of computer gaming skill 
(4) Age – the human brain is only fully developed at the age of 16 years 
(5) Cultural background, which includes language background 
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5.3 THE SAMPLE 
 
A non-probability sample was chosen, given the special characteristics of the experimental 
task.  The sample was selected in a deliberative and non-random fashion to achieve the 
goal of eliciting flow during the execution of a computer based, visuomotor task.  The 
sample was a purposive sample as the subjects were selected for theoretical reasons.  
Selection took place according to age, handedness and gender to keep these moderator 
variables constant and minimise variance. The subjects were volunteers who complied 
with strata and consent requirements, the latter also for ethical reasons.  
 
5.3.1  The sample characteristics 
 
The sample characteristics take into cognisance the potential for bias listed in section 5.2.3 
(above). The cultural background was not considered to vary much in this sample that is 
from a mixed South African population in terms of cultural origin. The levels of education 
and computer skills were expected to minimise variance that might arise from cultural and 
language differences.  
 
All subjects volunteered to participate and signed consent forms. This willingness to 
participate was indicative of the level of co-operation and motivation of the individuals 
sampled to minimise variance that might arise from a general lack of interest in the test 
situation. 
 
5.3.2  The sample size 
 
A minimum sample of 30 subjects per sub-group is commonly recommended for small 
samples, because as the sample size decreases the ranges of the mean and standard 
deviation increase, thus increasing the risk of sample error (Allen, 1982). Given the above 
guideline, a very large sample would be required for this study (number of subgroups x 
30), which is impractical given that participants have to be observed individually, and each 
observation takes approximately one hour. Qualitative studies require smaller samples 
(around 10) and are based on the principle of level of saturation, when each participant no 
longer contributes new information. It was decided to settle on 20 because some inferential 
statistical tests were required in order to arrive at the qualities to be analysed.   
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5.4 TEST SESSIONS 
   
Test sessions were conducted in a laboratory-type setting, in which uninterrupted sessions 
could take place and with the equipment set up in preparation for each one. Attention was 
required to details that included: 
 
(1) adequate lighting 
(2) absence of loud noises 
(3) the removal of any potential sources of electrical interference  
(4) checking that the laptop computer (for data collection) and the BrainMaster were 
functioning correctly 
(5) the availability of conducting gel used for electrode placement 
(6) the availability of consent forms, AFQ and GFI questionnaires, and necessary 
stationery 
(7) Gaming skill rating form, using a 5-point scale of 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent).  
 
An hour-long appointment was made with pre-selected participants, to include preparation 
time for giving instructions and electrode placement, the 10 x test races and a cleaning up 
period for removal of the electrodes and cleaning the subject’s hair of conducting gel. 
 
A PC video game was chosen because of its propensity to induce flow and its 
comparability with work elements such as computyping, security video monitoring, 
driving vehicles and flying aircraft. The PC DVD version of “Need for Speed - Carbon” 
(collector’s edition) was chosen to provide a continuous visuomotor response task capable 
of producing flow. The video game consists of a virtual reality, driving scenario in which a 
car is driven through a pre-set street circuit for a specified distance. The game is supported 
with a game controller and video/audio feedback. The subject’s task is to record the fastest 
possible time for the chosen two-lap race, which was set at the medium-level of difficulty. 
The instructions, nature and design of the game are such that they conform to 
Csikszentmihalyi’s general conditions that purportedly facilitate flow experiences, as 
follows: 
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(1) Clear goals (record the fastest time).  
(2) Concentrating and focusing (negotiating track challenges and traffic in such a 
way that it produces the quickest lap time).  
(3) A loss of the feeling of self-consciousness (becoming immersed in racing). 
(4) Distorted sense of time (lose track of actual time).  
(5) Direct and immediate feedback (real-time visual and audio performance 
feedback).  
(6) Balance between ability level and challenge (medium difficulty level in 
conjunction with a very fast car).  
(7) A sense of personal control over the situation or activity (control through game 
controller together with sufficient skill to meet the challenge). 
(8) The activity is intrinsically rewarding (achieving faster times and meeting 
performance goals).  
(9) Action awareness merging (total absorption - becoming part of the game). 
 
This particular PC video game was chosen because of its superior video graphics, fluency, 
virtual experience, and time feedback it produces. All settings, such as the type of car, 
track, track conditions, and feedback, were used in the same way for all participants in 
order to produce consistent results and eliminate any performance variances other than the 
skill/challenge trade-off. The game controller was also standard for all participants. The 
PC game was run on an Acer Travelmate 6292 laptop computer attached to a 17-inch 
colour monitor using Windows XP Pro as operating system. The time, in seconds, taken 
the participant to complete the two-lap race was used as a measure of performance (time 
output). In order to allow for learning and skill refinement, as well as enough opportunity 
to get into flow, each participant was given 10 races to complete. 
 
5.5   DATA COLLECTION 
 
The intangible nature of the flow variable has already been mentioned and central to this 
design is the need to collect data under task and to set-up a testing situation accordingly. 
The need to repeat races up to 10 times allows for the potential effect of learning.  
However, given the subjects’ pre-existing gaming skill levels, it is unlikely that further 
repetition, in a single test session will result in any further increase in learning or 
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performance.  The session design thus gave all subjects sufficient opportunity to improve 
their performance to peak level.  Flow was expected to occur at some stage during the 10 
races. 
 
Figure 23 below provides a visual illustration of the data collection process. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Conceptual framework for data collection 
 
5.5.1  Data collection techniques and instruments 
 
A mixed methodological approach was followed and data collected through both 
observational (EEG recordings) and self-report (questionnaire-based) techniques in a 
controlled test situation, in a one-off session per subject. The measures provided by each 
instrument are now described, with the subjective and objective components of the study 
represented by their own specific test variables and appropriate measures for collection of 
the data. 
Flow Experience 
Performance measurement 
 (time) 
Continuous EEG measurement 
Subjective Flow  
Measurements 
(Questionnaires) Task (10 races per subject) 
 
  
EEG Data 
Peak 
Performance 
(Fastest Time) 
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5.5.1.1  The psychological experience of flow  
 
The subjective (conscious) experience of flow was measured by using two different paper-
based questionnaire techniques. These questionnaires were administered by the researcher 
during and immediately after the test sessions – an abbreviated flow questionnaire (the 
AFQ) administered after each run and the Game Flow Inventory (GFI) administered at the 
end of all 10 runs.  
 
a.  The abbreviated flow questionnaire (AFQ) 
 
In order to capture the experience of the subject after each race the participant was asked 
to rate his experience of the race using an Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire (AFQ) 
consisting of five questions measured on a five-point semantic differential scale (see 
Appendix E) to measure: 
 
(1) time perception 
(2) cognitive engagement 
(3) skill /challenge match  
(4) personal control 
(5) intrinsic reward 
 
These measures refer to the underlying dimensions that are considered crucial to achieve 
flow and that are labelled by Csikszentmihalyi (1990) as flow characteristics.  The AFQ is 
not a validated instrument.  Although there are other available flow questionnaires, they 
are all lengthy and not game play oriented.   One such scale is the Flow State Scale, 
developed by Jackson and Marsh in 1996, which assesses flow on a scale of 9 factors using 
a total of 36 items.  The factors were derived from the work of Csikszentmihalyi and 
include: challenge-skill balance, action awareness merging, clear goals, unambiguous 
feedback, concentration on the task at hand, sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, 
transformation of time, and autotelic experience. Another adaptation of Csikszentmihalyi’s 
concept of flow and relating to specific experiences of computer users, was produced by 
Rheinberg, Vollmeyer, and Engeser (Engeser & Rheinberg, 2008), using two factors.  The 
first factor refers to the feeling of utmost concentration and focusing, control over the 
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activity, clarity of the operations, and smooth and automatic cogitations.  The second 
factor refers to the feeling of full involvement, a distorted sense of time, optimal challenge, 
and absent-mindedness.  Both the above questionnaires were deemed unsuitable since it 
was too lengthy to complete ten times in-between races. 
 
As an alternative, the five-question AFQ was deemed by the author as a more suitable 
instrument to provide quick, accurate feedback regarding the flow experience directly after 
each race. The five questions were considered independent of each other and carried equal 
weight in the resulting AFQ score. In the final analysis the one scale measuring “perceived 
time” was dropped and the AFQ4 version used. This followed a judgement call made by 
the researcher who was not convinced that the experience of time passing was a truly 
subjective one, since all subjects were racing against time. A timer was clearly visible on 
the screen and they also received feedback about their performance in time. This time-
consciousness could result in misleading information about perceived time and the flow 
experience, where it is expected that there is a forgetting about time, as immersion in the 
task occurs. The function of the AFQ is to provide feedback, in a measured way, about the 
subject’s “symptoms” of flow and the strength of that experience. This information 
identifies the amount of perceived flow associated with each race.   
 
b.   The Game Flow Inventory (GFI) 
 
The WOrk-reLated Flow inventory (WOLF) was originally used to measure employees’ 
flow in the workplace. It was developed by Bakker (2008) and adapted by him to suit the 
gaming situation, subsequently known as the Game Flow Inventory (GFI).  As an index of 
the flow state (Bakker, 2005), the WOLF questionnaire, and thus the GFI (see Appendix 
D), measures (i) absorption, that is a state of total concentration, when a person is totally 
immersed in an activity. Time passes quickly and people forget everything around them; 
(ii) enjoyment or happiness, as the outcome of cognitive and affective evaluations of the 
flow experience. It has been shown that employees who enjoy their work and feel happy 
make positive judgments about the quality of their working life; and (iii) intrinsic 
motivation, that is performing a certain work-related activity with the aim of experiencing 
the inherent pleasure and satisfaction in the activity (Bakker, 2008). 
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Bakker (2008) reported that  
 
… the internal consistency or reliability of the scales for absorption, work 
enjoyment and intrinsic work motivation have been proved to be acceptable. In 
seven samples, the coefficients ranged between 0.75 and 0.85 for absorption, 0.88 
and 0.95 for work enjoyment, and 0.53 and 0.82 for intrinsic work motivation. 
Only the scale for the assessment of intrinsic work motivation performed somewhat 
unsatisfactorily in one of the seven samples (the agency for temporary work), with 
a coefficient of 0.53. Nevertheless, the test–retest reliability in this sample was very 
good for each of the scales, with stability coefficients of about 0.75. This means 
that flow can be measured reliably and that the answers of employees to questions 
about flow correlate strongly with their responses six weeks later.  
 
Construct validity and predictive validity of the WOLF were also satisfactory, however, in 
terms of the latter, absorption proved to be an unreliable predictor of performance during 
flow (Bakker, 2008).   
 
It was expected that the GFI would achieve similar results to the WOLF since it was 
mainly a matter of replacing the word “work” with “race”. The GFI was administered at 
the end of the entire session of all 10 races. This measurement of flow is thus retrospective 
and reflects on the total experience after all 10 races. 
5.5.1.2  EEG recordings 
The EEG’s are recorded and measured using BrainMaster equipment.  According to the 
manual, the BrainMaster is a scientifically sound and accurate instrument designed for the 
recording, analysis, and display of EEG signals (electroencephalograms). It performs 
functions similar to typical digital EEG systems and certain devices such as the Lexicor 
NRS-2D, Lexicor POD, BrainTracer, NeuroCybernetics, or ProComp. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Atlantis I (4+4) and data cable 
 146 
 
The data collection, or recording, takes place on a separate laptop computer loaded with 
BrainMaster 3.0 software using Atlantis I “4+4” design (4 EEG and 4 Bio-potential 
channels) performing 1024 samples per second (with continuous impedance monitoring) 
internal and 256 samples per second external (to laptop PC).  Electrodes used were 
moulded gold cup electrodes placed at F3-F4; C3-C4; P3-P4; and O1-O2 in a four channel 
bi-polar montage with both grounds at A1 using the international 10/20 referencing 
system.   
 
Impedance for each electrode placement is kept under 5000 ohms (Ω) in order to eliminate 
interference and optimise sensor sensitivity.  The raw EEG signal collects at a sampling 
rate of 256Hz, digitised and passed through a 60Hz notch filter to remove ambient 
electrical activity. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), separates the raw data (similar to how 
white light is separated into colours by a prism) into individual frequency bands.  
 
5.6  THE TEST SESSION 
 
The test sessions were conducted at two locations, one in the office of the researcher and 
the other in a computer room at the Industrial Engineering Department of the Durban 
University of Technology.  Both locations were prepared in such a way as to provide 
laboratory-type conditions, in particular, all other electrical appliances were switched off, 
so that minimal electrical interference would be experienced and to avoid artefacts during 
EEG recordings. Both rooms were well lit and free of outside interference from other 
people and loud noises.  
 
Each subject was seated and made comfortable, briefed regarding the nature, sensitivity 
and workings of EEG, and requested to remain as still as possible during recordings. They 
were requested not to blink their eyes excessively, grind their teeth, or move their heads.  
Each subject was briefed about the aim of the research without being informed about the 
meaning or characteristics of flow. Emphasis was placed on the recording of electrical 
activity in the brain during the playing of a PC video game. Following the briefing, 
informed consent was obtained in writing (signed form) from each subject. While a subject 
was busy completing the biographical questionnaire, electrodes were placed at F3-F4; C3-
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C4; P3-P4; and O1-O2 in a four channel bi-polar montage with both grounds at A1 (ear 
clips).    
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Electrode placements and channels 
 
Once the electrodes were attached, the following sequence of events took place: 
 
(1) Instructions on how to proceed with the game.  The subject is given instructions 
on how to play the game and how the session would unfold.  The objective is to 
complete the race in the quickest time possible.   
(2) Trial Run.  Each subject is allowed to perform a trial run to get familiarised with 
the game controller, the behaviour of the car, the track conditions and the layout 
of the circuit. 
(3) Repeated reminder of the goal.   Following the trial run the subject is asked to 
relax and reminded of the goal being to record the fastest possible time.   
(4) Test runs.  Each subject is given 10 races to produce a best result.  The game is 
started by the subject, but the race is started by a virtual female character in the 
game, that also set the clock rolling.  The subject races against five other virtual 
drivers in the game.  The race ends when the subject completed the second lap.   
(5) Feedback after the race.  Feedback is provided to the subject in terms of his race 
position and the time he took to complete the race.   
(6) Recording the time and starting the next race.  Following each race the time is 
recorded and the subject asked to rate his experience on each question of the 
AFQ. Thereafter the subject is instructed to relax.  His time on the previous race, 
as well as the goal, is repeated before he is instructed to engage the next race.  
Ground 
Channel 1 
Channel 2 
Channel 3 
Channel 4 
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(7) Completing the GFI.  Following the conclusion of the tenth race the subject is 
requested to complete the AFQ for the last race and the GFI for the whole session. 
(8) Ending the session.  The subject is cleaned (conductive paste is removed) and 
thanked for his participation. 
 
 
 
Figure 26.  Photo of subject during a test session 
 
Visible in the photograph above is the laptop computer running the PC video game and the 
screen displaying a scene from the driving experience.  Also visible are some of the 
electrodes attached to the subject’s head and the two sets of cables that feed the data via 
the Atlantis to the second laptop computer (not visible). 
 
5.7   THE DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This section examines the data and process of analysing it. 
 
5.7.1  Characteristics of the data 
 
Two different kinds of data, behavioural (performance time and perceived flow scores) and 
neurophysiological (EEG) were collected and recorded employing their own methods in a 
single test session, to provide evidence for both the conscious experiences of the subjects 
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and the accompanying electrical activity in the brain. The EEG data and performance time 
data was continuous and suitable for further statistical manipulation and interpretation by 
normal distribution methods. The data from both the GFI and AFQ, however, is 
categorical and not continuous ratio data.  
 
5.7.2   The behavioural raw data 
 
The subject’s conscious experience of flow was measured on five-point rating scales in a 
series of post hoc interviews following each test trial and a 13-item questionnaire 
following the whole session. The AFQ was used in the former and the GFI in the latter 
instance. Performance time was automatically recorded for each race, in seconds. 
 
An electronic record (Excel worksheet) was created for each subject to capture the raw 
data, as follows: 
 
(1) biographical data (age in years, population group, perceived gaming skill level, 
gender and dominant hand) 
(2) each raw score obtained for each item on the AFQ 
(3) each raw score obtained for each item on the GFI 
(4) performance time (in seconds). 
 
This record further enables data manipulation in Microsoft and NCSS software 
programmes (Hintz, 2001).  Descriptive statistics, consisting of mean (average) scores and 
standard deviations were calculated for the AFQ and GFI.  
 
5.7.3  The EEG output data 
 
EEG recordings produce a continuous stream of EEG scores that are summarised by 
customised software to produce statistical output information relating to the whole session. 
Consequently, there is no access to real-time changes that take place in the brain, only to 
the summarised statistical output per session. As an organ the brain produces activity that 
is orchestrated from moment to moment. It is the nature of the brainwaves and their inter-
relationships within and between specific sites, in particular, their synchrony or co-
variance that provides key measures for recording and interpreting brain behaviour. The 
data in each channel cover all frequency bands and ratios between frequencies, together 
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with the data from all the other channels. BrainMaster also provides inter-channel statistics 
but does not cover all inter-channel combinations. 
 
Since the BrainMaster provides data that have already been processed by its own internal 
statistical processes, the output data, in a bi-polar montage, consist of a set of summarised 
statistics, which reflect the amount of electrical activity measured between two electrodes 
in a channel, as F3 - F4, for example. 
 
The data from each recording (200 data sets) are saved as a MS Excel file in the format 
shown overpage.  
 
 
 
Figure 27.  Example of data file 
 
As demonstrated above, the following data are recorded in one-minute averages and 
reported by means of the following indicators: 
 
(1) Column A indicates the recording in minutes; B displays seconds, C are the 
various sites or scalp locations; D is the type of statistic; E – K are the frequency 
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bands; L is a frequency band defined by the user; M – P are ratios of frequencies 
relative to each other. 
(2) Statistics are displayed in digital (displaying amplitude data in micro-volts) or in 
percent power (displaying amplitude data from Fast Fourier Transformed data). 
(3) MEAN :  the average amplitude in micro-volts. 
(4) MEANF : the mean fraction of EEG energy in a band, also referred to as power or 
percent power, from FFT.  Power is a measure of wave strength. 
(5) STDDEV : the standard deviation from the MEAN. 
(6) MODFRQ : the modal frequency (dominant frequency) from FFT.  This is a 
measure of wave intensity. 
 
When 2 channels are gathered, the following inter-channel data are also provided by the 
BrainMaster system:  
 
(1) COHE : coherence value (in percent); displaying the degree of wave similarity 
between the two channels (using mean amplitude).  Coherence is synonymous to 
a Pearson correlation coefficient. 
(2) PHASE : phase value (in percent phase: 0 = in-phase, 100 = 180 degrees out of 
phase); displaying the degree of wave synchrony between the two channels (using 
mean amplitude). 
(3) ASYM : asymmetry, which is similar to COHE, but from a different source (using 
MEANF data). 
 
For the purpose of this study the main unit of measurement is from the FFT system using 
MeanF, the power score that indicates the percent power per frequency band.  Power is an 
indication of energy or neural activity represented in a frequency band.  More importantly, 
synchrony (coherence or asymmetry) is a measurement of synchronous neural activity 
between brain locations.  Synchrony was calculated by using Pearson correlations since the 
BrainMaster system provides insufficient data coverage in terms of inter-correlations 
between brain sites. 
 
Since each individual EEG recording produces millions of scores that are not accessible to 
the experimenter on a real time basis, use of these summary scores is essential. This has 
implications for the design of this research and the analyses conducted, as comparing pairs 
of summarised location data only is possible, rather than inter-correlations based on the 
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real-time scores of individuals. Ultimately, the intent is to confirm the hypothesised brain 
locations and activity involved in and associated with flow, and to bring this information 
together in an illustrative format with statistically relevant support.   
 
Alba, Marroquin, Arce-Santana and Harmony (2010) maintain that one of the challenges 
in EEG synchrony analysis lies in the design of an adequate visualisation system, allowing 
the exploration of synchronous dynamics across a wide time and frequency range versus 
fixed time illustrations in a matrix.   However, no matter how visually appealing and 
creative illustrations may be they need to be accurate and statistical analyses are required 
to supplement the illustrative information and prove the true significance of the 
observations.  The chosen illustrative format is discussed later in the chapter (see section 
5.8.6.2). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the EEG data were grouped into four Channels, ie. Channel 1 (CH 1 
– F3), or pre-frontal cortex; Channel 2 (CH 2 – C3), or sensori-motor cortex; Channel 3 
(CH 3 – P3), or parietal cortex, and Channel 4 (CH 4 – O1), or occipital cortex.   
  
5.8   DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The research study was based on a single group and repeated measures design collecting 
data from 20 subjects who were each required to repeat a dynamic task 10 times. The 
sample is then segmented into two sub-samples to set up two levels of the flow variable 
per subject, namely a high flow - peak performance level and a low flow - low 
performance level, in order to test whether these two levels (conditions) differed with 
regard to the EEG variable. Data analysis follows a six-step process which unfolds as 
follows. 
 
 Step 1. Total sample analyses 
 
Demographic and behavioural data from all 20 subjects are summarised using descriptive 
statistical techniques (means, standard deviations and range) to provide an overview of the 
sample characteristics and test scores, as a whole. The data, captured from all 10 races 
from all 20 subjects and focussing on the relationship between the experience of flow 
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(measured on the GFI and AFQ), and performance (race times), was organised into a 
single database.   
 
 Step 2. Addition of the EEG data  
 
The MeanF (power) scores across the seven frequencies at the four brain sites were added 
to the database, along with the behavioural data, by race number within subject. Each 
subject’s set of data per race was then ranked from lowest (fastest) to highest (slowest) 
performance time. 
 
 Step 3. Segmentation into higher and lower flow sub-samples 
 
It was expected that the EEG pattern presented by the 20 high flow races versus the 20 
initial/baseline (low flow) races would be a valid indicator of a “signature” pattern or 
marker for flow. This necessitated segmentation of the data into higher and lower flow 
sub-samples to extract peak performance data and a relevant set of baseline data for 
comparison. 
 
Using the rank-ordered data per subject, the sample was segmented into higher and lower 
flow sub-samples using the initial race as baseline/low flow and highest flow/fastest race 
data per subject for the high flow sub-set. The assumption was that, since it is not possible 
to know when a person experiences flow in real time, it is expected that flow will manifest 
during peak performance and that the EEG produced during such performance will 
represent a realistic marker for flow. A further assumption is that it is unlikely that flow 
will manifest during the first performance and that the EEG produced during such 
performance will differ from the EEG produced under conditions of peak performance and 
thus will not represent a realistic marker for flow. 
 
The data matrix below illustrates the main data groupings after segmentation. 
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Data Matrix for two flow conditions
CH 1
CH 2
CH 3
CH 4
AFQ
CH 1
CH 2
CH 3
CH 4
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
EEG
(% power)
Perform
(time)
Perform
(time)
EEG
(% power)
Race
Time
Race
Time
Flow 
(score)
Flow 
(score)
Higher Flow Condition
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
D,T,A,LB,B,HB,G
Lower Flow Condition
AFQ 
 
 
Figure 28. Data matrix indicating the data groupings for comparing the higher flow and 
the lower flow conditions 
 
5.8.4  Step 4. Standardisation of performance and flow scores 
 
Following segmentation, the data were standardised on an individual subject basis for 
performance and flow over all 10 races.  Because of the different skill levels amongst 
subjects, some peak performances were slower than the poorest ones of other subjects, 
therefore it was necessary to standardise the data so that, for every individual subject, each 
score is represented in terms of standard deviations from their individual means. Another 
reason for standardising the data was to transform it all to a common scale and to bring all 
of the variables into proportion with one another so as to eliminate unequal weights. 
Additionally, although not a normalising technique, by standardising the data it became 
more normally distributed with the added advantage that it allowed using a MANOVA that 
is based on the assumption that the data is normally distributed. 
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5.8.5  Step 5.  Test for significant behavioural and EEG differences between higher 
and lower flow conditions  
 
In order to establish a neurological pattern that is unique to high flow and a marker for 
flow, it was necessary to determine that the two levels of flow were indeed significantly 
different from each other. A one way repeated measures MANOVA (Multi-variate 
analysis of variance) was conducted on the behavioural (performance and flow) and EEG 
power data (seven EEG frequencies at four brain locations), which provided the key to 
determining that the two sets of data were different.  A univariate report on differences 
between the means of each variable was also produced, which included an effects size 
analysis to provide more detailed information of the magnitude and direction of the 
changes in the means of all data between low to high flow.  One of the main advantages of 
reporting effect sizes together with p-values is that they provide an answer to the “how 
much” question. 
 
The advantage of using the MANOVA is that it provides one overall test of equality of 
mean vectors for all groups simultaneously. The test statistic used in the MANOVA is the 
F-ratio, which indicates whether or not the variances in the two (high and low flow) 
samples are equal.  In this case it takes into account not only the variance between the two 
groups (as in ANOVA) but also variance within the groups.  A statistically significant F-
ratio will indicate that there is a significant level of variance between the two groups.   
 
When using the MANOVA the following assumptions have to be met as outlined in the 
SPSS Manual (IBM Software Group, 2013) : 
 
(1) Dependent variable data must be continuous.  
(2) Two or more independent variable categories must be used.  
(3) Independence. The group data should consist of independent sets of observations, 
that is the participants in each group should not be related to each other in any 
way so as to rule out variation patterns that are due to a familial effect rather than 
the main effect(s) being tested.  
(4) The sample size should be adequate.  
(5) Sample sizes should be equal. 
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(6) Outliers will compromise the analysis as MANOVA is particularly sensitive to 
them. 
(7) All data must be normally distributed. 
(8) A linear relationship between each pair of dependent variables for each group of 
the independent variable must exist. 
(9) Homogeneity of variance.  
(10) There is no multicollinearity 
 
With reference to this study, the data set included performance, flow and EEG data, which 
were all continuous data. Performance was measured as time in seconds (ratio); the flow 
data consisted of tests scores from interval rating scales and the EEG power scores also 
consisted of ratio data.  Two independent variable categories were used in the MANOVA 
analysis – the baseline (first race) and the fastest race (peak performance) of each 
individual subject from 9 other races was selected out. Independence of sample 
participants is important when testing for differences between means due the danger of 
Type 1 error (false positive) being committed, especially in the use of an ANOVA, if the 
participants are related in any way.  The MANOVA is an extension of the ANOVA and is 
considered to have the same problem with independence.  The ANOVA uses the mean 
sum of squares to indicate the amount of variance in the group data and dependent 
relationships may be responsible for violating circularity or sphericity (the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance between groups) on repeated measures and not taking into 
account the pattern of variance from within the source of the data. In the MANOVA test 
the f-ratio is the test statistic.  MANOVA is an alternative to a repeated measures ANOVA 
since repeated measures are treated as co-variates of each other.   
 
O'Brien and Kaiser (1985) contends that tests in repeated-measures designs based on 
MANOVA are free of sphericity assumptions, and with modern computing software, 
MANOVA is straightforward to use, even for complex designs and nontraditional 
hypotheses.  It may also be argued that since it is the intention of the researcher to reject 
the null hypothesis (that here is no significant difference between the two groups) in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis that the two groups (high and low flow) are in fact 
different, the MANOVA will treat the differences conservatively and, therefore, a 
significant difference will be a robust result. 
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In terms of the sample size, it is generally considered that the larger the sample size, the 
better. The question of an adequate sample size is relevant.   According to the NCSS 
manual (Hintz, 2007), 20 degrees of freedom in the univariate F-test is adequate to ensure 
robustness. In this study a sample of 20 participants was selected.  Strictly speaking this 
would result in 20-1 degrees of freedom but may be considered an adequate sample size 
for the use of the MANOVA.  The same size sample was used for both high and low flow 
data sets. At all times the total sample remained at 20 respondents and there were no 
missing values.   
 
Extremes of variation in raw scores would pose a threat to the analysis as MANOVA is 
particularly sensitive to outliers. Given the nature of the experimental task, it was expected 
that some extreme scores would occur due to participants making driving errors. However, 
the fact that only the baseline and peak performance races were used, the risk of outliers 
was reduced.  Figure 40, a scatterplot in the next chapter, indicates the clustering of scores 
around the regression line.  Further, the standardisation of the raw scores would have 
further reduced the outlier effect by having each respondent’s response set conform to a 
normal distribution of scores.  
 
All data must be normally distributed. A Type 1 (incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis) 
error is likely to occur if the data is not normally distributed because skewed data may 
distort the mean sum of squares resulting in higher variance. Donaldson (1966) showed, 
however, that that the F-Test is conservative in showing up variance and that it improves 
in this regard as sample size increases, so that the effect of non-normally distributed data is 
less severe than previously thought. Furthermore, the performance and flow (AFQ4) raw 
scores from each individual were standardised.   
 
With regards to the assumption of linearity, in this study the high flow and low flow group 
data for the dependent variables, peak performance and flow (AFQ4 total score and sub-
scores), were all linear. A side-by-side structure was observed in the database used for 
analysis.  According to the NCSS Manual, homogeneity of variance is assumed when an 
equal number of observations occur in each cell, which were the case in this study. 
Multicollinearity did not occur.  Ideally, the dependent variables should be moderately 
correlated, however if the correlation(s) are too high (greater than 0.9), multicollinearity 
may occur.  In this study the dependent variables were moderately intercorrelated. 
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With regards to the effect size analysis, the Eta
2 
effect size was used to further enhance the 
statistical analysis.  The univariate report that accompanied the MANOVA, included an 
Eta
2
 effects size analysis that provided information on the magnitude and direction of the 
changes in the means of all data between low to high flow. Eta
2 
is the proportion of 
variance that is explained by differences between the means of the groups (Tredoux & 
Durrheim, 2013).  The general rules of thumb given by Cohen (1988) for interpreting Eta
2
, 
i.e. small (0.01), medium (0.06), and large (0.14), were used. 
   
5.8.6  Step 6.   EEG analysis of power and synchrony as correlates of flow 
 
This step comprised two parts. 
 
5.8.6.1  Analysis of EEG power 
 
In terms of power spectrum analyses, the frequency spectrum Delta to Gamma was 
analysed in terms of power differences between the two conditions (sub-samples), by scalp 
location, in order to compare with the patterns predicted by the theoretical model.  The 
difference in power was established by a MANOVA test for differences between means of 
the two groups by frequency (7) and per scalp position (4).  The resultant F-ratios were 
further tested for significance to establish which differences were statistically significant or 
otherwise, in terms of the theory of probability. This was followed by a main effects 
analysis which provided further information on the direction and magnitude of changes 
between low and high flow, regardless of whether they were statistically significantly 
different or not. 
 
5.8.6.2  Analysis of EEG synchrony 
 
In terms of synchrony analyses, the frequency spectrum Delta to Gamma was analysed in 
terms of patterns of synchronous EEG activity among identified scalp locations (F3 x C3, 
F3 x P3, F3 x  01, C3 x  P3, C3 x 01, P3 x 01) for both flow conditions in order to compare 
with the patterns predicted by the theoretical model.  According to Alba, et al. (2010), 
synchronisation is typically measured between pairs of narrow-band EEG electrodes. 
Various measures are proposed in the literature, including coherence (Pearson correlation) 
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and measures based on certain statistics of the phase difference such as the circular 
variance, or the average magnitude.  Most of these measures yield values between 0 (no 
synchrony) and 1 (perfect synchrony) or -1 (perfect synchrony, but 180º out of phase). 
 
In this study, the EEG analysis was performed on the MeanF (power) data using the 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Test (r). All 7 EEG frequencies, across 4 brain-
locations, were correlated for each condition.  A test of significance was used to interpret 
the p-values that indicate the strength of the correlation, or association, in terms of its 
probability of co-occurrence.  The results of this test are computer generated using the 
NCSS programme. Significance was accepted at the 0.05% level, or below, meaning that 
the probability of the correlation being null is only 5 out of 100 and, therefore the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the alternative accepted. 
  
Alba, et al. (2010) maintains that when using EEG in cognitive experiments, interest is 
usually directed towards how inter-electrode couplings change over time and frequency.  
Such analysis may involve the computation of a relatively large data set, which specifies 
the degree of synchronisation for each electrode pair, at each time sample and each 
frequency band.  Therefore, one of the challenges in EEG synchrony analysis lies in the 
design of an adequate visualisation system, which allows the neuroscientist to explore the 
synchronisation dynamics across a wide time and frequency range. 
 
In this study, correlations were used to demonstrate synchronous EEG activity between 
two or more brain locations, indicating that such locations were involved in the same 
activity, which is associated with a particular neurological function.  According to the 
theoretical model, flow is characterised by a hypothesised set of EEG patterns associated 
with flow behaviour.  In state space dynamics, at a critical point of state transition, such as 
going into flow, the neural network undergoes a significant reconfiguration which, among 
other features, is expressed as change of the correlation function between locations.  The 
correlation function characterises how the value at one point in state space is correlated 
with the value at another point, reflecting the network’s structure (Werner, 2008).  
Therefore, the ‘test’ for difference between the higher-flow and lower-flow conditions is 
that the EEG patterns (correlates) of those on the lower end of the flow measure differ 
from the EEG patterns of those on the higher end of the flow measure.  The EEG patterns 
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of those on the high end were compared with the patterns predicted by the theoretical 
model.   
 
In order to illustrate synchronised vs de-synchronised EEG behaviour in various brain 
locations visually, the EEG data are presented graphically and topographically indicating 
neural bindings within a specified frequency band.  In the diagram below (Figure 29) solid 
lines indicate synchronous (correlated) bindings and dotted lines indicate de-
synchronisation.  The percentages indicate the strength of the binding as per the correlation 
coefficient (r) and the level of significance (p) indicates synchronisation (significant) or 
de-synchronisation (non-significant). 
 
Figure 29 illustrates an example of a topographic illustration of synchronous and de-
synchronised connections between locations, as they are presented in this study.   
 
 
Figure 29. Example of topographic illustration of neurological activity 
 
5.9   VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE STUDY    
 
In this section the validity and reliability of the study is discussed.  Validity is discussed in 
terms of internal validity and external validity.  Internal validity reflects the extent to 
which the confidence in the correctness of the research findings is enhanced by elimination 
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of systematic error or extraneous variables.  External validity has to do with the 
generalisability of the research findings.  The rule of thumb is to balance the measures 
deployed to enhance internal validity and external validity since enhancing the one 
normally causes a reduction in the other.  Reliability of the study is about repeatability or 
replicability of the study, the measures taken to ensure consistency in measurement and 
reliability and validity of instruments and statistical methods. 
 
5.9.1  Internal validity 
 
The internal validity of research designs requires that other factors be ruled out as rival 
explanations of the observed association between the variables under investigation.  In this 
study there are three variables under investigation in a quasi-experimental single sample 
repeated measures design.  Flow is investigated under conditions of peak performance 
while the accompanying EEG correlates are studied in order to identify a valid EEG 
marker for flow.  Although the relationships between the variables are studied, causality is 
not under investigation.  Nonetheless, possible biases that could influence the internal 
validity of the study are discussed below.  
 
5.9.1.1  Confounding variables 
 
Confounding variables in this research design may arise from the effect of individual 
differences in learning and in the subject’s own expectations of their performance. These 
variables have the potential to threaten the internal validity of the data by distorting the 
effect of flow.   
 
a. Individual differences in learning as confounding variable  
 
Subjects were selected for the sample on the basis of, inter alia, being experienced video 
gamers. In this study, each participant was given 10 repetitions to allow learning to take 
place, to produce a best performance, and allow flow to manifest. However, since all 
subjects had different pre-existing gaming skill levels they were likely to learn at varying 
tempos and achieve varying levels of performance. Therefore, a potential problem was that 
the raw scores attained between subjects fell within varying ranges, depending on 
individual differences in their response rates, so that the lowest score attained by one 
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subject might be the highest attained by another. Each subject had their own personal 
response rate leading to peak performance. To reduce the biasing effect of these individual 
differences and to allow a statistically appropriate comparison between subjects, it was 
necessary to transform the raw scores by adjusting the mean of each individual’s repertoire 
to 0 and re-distributing their scores around this mean in terms of a normal distribution.  
 
The interpretation of the adjusted scores was then the position of a specific individual’s 
response repertoire relative to the scores of all others in the sample. This process of 
standardisation, therefore, reduced the bias introduced by individual levels of response and 
the potential for skewed results within each subject’s set of scores as they moved to higher 
levels in pursuit of achieving peak performance on successive races. By expressing each 
individual’s set of scores as standard units a more statistically appropriate relationship 
between the group scores was established. 
 
b. Expectations of their own performance may bias the subjective ratings of 
participants  
 
At relatively high levels of performance, highly skilled performers may have greater 
expectations of their own performance and consequently rate themselves lower than lesser 
skilled performers.  This possible confounding variable is dealt with in the statistical 
treatment of the data through the use of standard scores, as discussed above, to establish a 
“personal” repertoire for each individual participant.  The within-subject standardised 
scores provide units of data that are better distributed over each individual’s response 
repertoire, providing more appropriate data input for further analysis. 
 
5.9.1.2  Other potential contaminating variables 
 
The potential sources of variation that are not applicable to this research are history, 
maturation and mortality (attrition). All subjects were required to attend a one-off test 
session, therefore they could not be influenced by history and had no time to mature over 
time or disappear completely from the sample. Nor were sources of variation related to 
studies with an intervention and a control group, such as diffusion of treatment or 
contamination of the control group, compensatory rivalry, resentful-demoralisation of the 
control group, and non-adherence to protocol, applicable to this study.   
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Discussed below are other sources of potential bias applicable to this study 
 
a. Sample selection 
 
Bias due to factors such as age, gender and brain laterality that could moderate responses 
and prove to be contaminating variables is controlled.  Subjects were selected from a 
volunteer group and only right handed males over the age of 16 years who are familiar 
with computer gaming were chosen.  These factors are thus held constant. 
 
b. Test instruments 
 
A number of instruments were used. 
 
(1) BrainMaster instrument 
 
The validity of the data collected from the BrainMaster instrumentation is without dispute 
as it is specifically designed for the purpose of collecting the electrical output of the brain 
as EEG’s. Impedance for each electrode placement is kept under 5000 ohms (Ω) in order 
to eliminate interference and optimise sensor sensitivity.  This level is the accepted 
standard for scientific research (Demos, 2005).  Other possible contaminating factors that 
could affect the accuracy and “pureness” of the EEG data, such as cable swing, blinking, 
and muscle movement in the facial area were limited by educating the subjects regarding 
the nature, sensitivity, and workings of EEG and requested to remain as still as possible 
during recordings.  They are requested not to blink their eyes excessively, grind their teeth, 
or move their heads. 
 
(2) The GFI (Game Flow Inventory) 
 
The GFI is a validated questionnaire. The WOrk-reLated Flow inventory (WOLF) that 
measures employees’ flow in the workplace, developed by Bakker (2008), was adapted to 
suit the gaming situation and is called the Game Flow Inventory (GFI). The WOLF, and 
thus the GFI, measures absorption, work enjoyment and intrinsic work motivation as an 
index of the flow state (Bakker, 2005). Absorption refers to a state of total concentration 
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(level of immersion in the game); enjoyment refers to positive judgments (happiness) 
regarding playing the game; and intrinsic motivation refers to performing a certain work-
related activity (the PC video game) with the aim of experiencing the inherent pleasure and 
satisfaction in the activity (Bakker, 2008).  Reliability and validity of this instrument were 
discussed in section 5.5.1.1 above.   
 
(3) The AFQ (Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire) 
 
The AFQ is not a validated questionnaire, nor have the items been formally tested on a 
larger sample or validated statistically against relevant criteria, but rather were constructed 
specifically to serve the needs of this research after a thorough research of the literature. 
The five test items were selected to provide immediate feedback after each race to indicate 
if, and how strongly, attributes of flow, as reflected in flow theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990) were experienced according to a five-point rating scale. Because of the once-off 
nature and duration of the test sessions it was impractical to pre-validate the test, so 
validation was carried out afterwards. 
 
The AFQ provides a useful and quick tool to test the subjects’ subjective experience of 
flow after each race in a repeated measures scenario.  It is important to capture each 
subject’s perception immediately after each race using as short as possible questionnaire in 
order to keep the subjects focussed on the main task of achieving a best performance.  It is 
a post hoc measure but less so than the GFI which is a longer test (more items) and refers 
to the entire session (the experience across all ten races).   
 
5.9.2  External validity  
 
External validity is concerned with the degree to which research findings can be applied to 
the real world, that is the issue of generalisability. The purpose of developing an EEG 
marker for flow stems from its intangible nature and the ability of modern technology to 
overcome that barrier. EEG technology has recently made immense strides, from being a 
medical instrument to being an instrument of multiple uses in everyday life, more so in the 
computer gaming environment (see discussion in Chapter 7). In recent years, also became 
a much talked about and desired mental state, which holds benefits to mental health and 
peak performance. Determining an EEG for flow will thus make a useful contribution to a 
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wide range of interest groups, from which the computer gaming population will probably 
gain the most. This study aims to provide an EEG marker for flow that is generalisable to 
the computer gaming population, with application across a wider population.   
 
Imposed controls to enhance internal validity often restrict the generalisability of the 
research results, therefore the sample was restricted to a group of right-handed, male 
computer gamers over the age of 16. As this is pioneering research and the intention is to 
determine an EEG marker for flow under conditions of peak performance, it is important 
to trade higher internal validity for a lesser degree of external validity. Once the EEG 
marker was established, future research can expand the generalisability and external 
validity of this initial research to a larger variety of tasks and populations. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the following design features were applied to limit potential 
biases: 
 
(1) An adequate sample size reduces potential sources of random error.  In this study both 
qualitative and quantitative methods were used to determine an EEG marker for flow.  
In quantitative studies a sample of at least 30 subjects is required to reduce random 
error in a single variable from a probability, or random, sample.  Qualitative studies 
require smaller samples (around 10) and are based on the principle of level of 
saturation.  It was decided to settle on a sample of 20 subjects because some inferential 
statistical tests are required in order to arrive at the qualities to be analysed.  The 
composition of the sample will further reduce the chance of error.  
 
(2) Individual differences are controlled by a repeated measures design.  In this research 
the 20 gamers are required to complete 10 races, each one under instruction to do 
produce a best performance.  The nature of flow is that it occurs when a peak 
performance is reached.  Once flow occurs it will only re-occur when a new peak 
performance is achieved. The way in which the gamers manage their own behaviour 
will include individual differences which cannot all be controlled.  Likewise, their 
exposure to other sources of random error is unknown. The single sample repeated 
measures design reduces the influence of individual differences compared to designs 
with more heterogeneous samples where the difference between inter-participant 
correspondence versus intra-participant comparisons are greater (i.e. more within 
group differences than between group differences). 
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5.9.3  Reliability 
   
Reliability is measured by the repeatability of the study and the extent to which it will 
obtain similar results to the first. To ensure that the EEG marker is a reliable indicator of 
flow for people performing a visuomotor task, carefully controlled conditions need be 
adhered to in order to ensure that not only are the results valid and measure what they are 
intended to measure, but also that the conditions under which they occur are understood 
and followed. The consistency, accuracy and predictability of the findings must be 
assessed by the use of instruments and statistical methods that reduce their chance of being 
influenced by random errors. To this end the following research protocols are applied: 
 
(1) Careful sample selection in accordance with the requirements for a valid sample. 
(2) Strict instructions followed so that the test conditions may be repeated in future 
studies.  
(3) Standardised test conditions. The experimental task is administered in the same 
consistent way for all subjects, in the same physical conditions, with the same 
instructions, using the same EEG equipment (with known reliability) and 
performing the same task.  
(4) Potential bias caused by electrical interference with the BrainMaster equipment is 
controlled by removing all possible sources of interference from the test 
environment.  
(5) EEG sampling consistency is ensured by the BrainMaster equipment. Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT) separates the raw data into individual frequency bands. 
Importantly, impedance for each electrode placement is kept under 5000 ohms 
(Ω) in order to eliminate interference and optimise sensor sensitivity.  
(6) Standardised instructions, instruments and procedures are followed and rapport 
established with the subject prior to the commencement of the tasks. 
(7) Experimenter bias is reduced by having a suitably skilled and experienced 
psychologist (the author of this thesis) administer all the test sessions.  
(8) All data records are checked for accuracy and completion before and after being 
transferred to Excel spreadsheets. 
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(9) Analyses are conducted using recognised data processing packages, in this case 
Excel and NCSS. 
(10) The choice of statistical analyses is appropriate for the type of data being analysed 
and conducted after the individual behavioural data is converted to standard 
scores.  
(11) Standardising the data within each subject’s own personal repertoire of results is 
required to compare data collected from the personal best and first race. 
Standardising the performance time and the AFQ data uses the formula Z = (x-
X)/sd for each individual’s unique set of results. 
 
5.10   CONCLUSION 
 
This study has introduced a new dimension to the measurement of flow behaviour, using 
EEG. It has not, however, included advanced statistical techniques using pattern 
recognition or artificial neural networks (ANNs) that are currently gaining more attention 
in the scientific literature. Pattern recognition software and accompanying EEG equipment 
are expensive and not easily obtainable, but rather the equipment and software used in this 
study are standard neurofeedback training equipment that is commonly used in everyday 
practice. The data gathered is compatible with other standard neurofeedback training 
equipment and applications.  
 
The data from this study can be used as input to the development of EEG measuring and 
monitoring devices for application during training, coaching, leisure or normal work 
performance feedback situations. The EEG flow marker can be used in neurofeedback 
training to enhance the propensity to assume flow and to monitor the time spent in flow. 
Inducing flow under normal working conditions should lead to improved work 
performance, work enjoyment and work motivation.   
 
In the next chapter the research results and findings are presented and discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results and findings of the empirical study.  
The overarching research design is a single group repeated measures design involving the 
collection of data from the 20 subjects who were each required to repeat the dynamic task 
10 times.  On completion, performance times and associated flow scores were standardised 
where after the sample was segmented into two sub-samples reflecting two levels of the 
flow variable per subject, namely a high flow - peak performance level and a low flow - 
low performance level.  The first race completed by each participant was used as a 
“baseline” (and indicative of a low flow state) for comparison with their own personal 
fastest race/highest flow score combination, indicative of the high flow state.  This was 
required to extract the EEG data associated with each level for further statistical analysis 
and interpretation.   
 
The relationship between flow and EEG was expressed in terms of EEG differences 
between two levels of flow, high and low flow.   EEG power scores were compared (mean 
differences) by site and frequency.  The EEG patterns (correlates) between sites were 
compared by frequency.  It was expected that the EEG patterns on the lower end of the 
flow measure (low flow - low performance condition) should differ from the EEG patterns 
on the higher end (high flow - peak performance) of the flow measure.  The EEG patterns 
on the high end were qualitatively compared with the patterns on the low end as well as 
with that predicted by the theoretical model.   
 
The findings of the study are discussed below.  The behavioural data are presented first, 
followed by the EEG data.  Lastly the set hypotheses were tested and the findings were 
compared with the theoretical model. 
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 6.2   SAMPLE STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
 
The sample for the study consisted of 20 male South African volunteers from diverse 
cultural backgrounds, between the ages of 16 and 50.  All participants were right-handed 
to ensure consistency of hemispheric differences.  Of the 20 participants, 10 rated their 
computer gaming skills as “good”, while 8 rated themselves as “moderate” and only 2 
rated themselves as “basic”.  Table 2 below summarises the sample details. 
 
Table 2 
Biographical data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sample was skewed in terms of age, with 75% of the subjects being between the ages 
of 16 and 24 years.  This was largely because computer games are technology driven and 
Biographical  Data Levels Frequency 
(n = 20)   Totals 
Age 16 9 
  20 6 
  25 1 
  30 1 
  35 1 
  40 1 
  45 1 
  50 0 
Gender Male 20 
  Female 0 
Population White 9 
  Coloured 0 
  Black 7 
  Indian 4 
  Other 0 
Gaming Skill Poor 0 
Level Basic 2 
  Moderate 8 
  Good 10 
  Excellent 0 
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evolved in the past 20 – 30 years.  However, the age skew was not considered relevant as 
the human brain matures by the age of 16 years (Demos, 2005).  Nor was there correlation 
between performance and age (r = 0.023; p= 0.53956). 
 
Prior to participation subjects rated their computer gaming skill on a five-point scale from 
1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). The following table summarises the subjects’ actual best 
performance times against their self-rating scores.   
 
Table 3 
Perceived gaming skill level 
   
 
Subject  no 
Gaming skill level 
(5-pt scale) 
Fastest race 
(Secs) 
Age 
(years) 
16 4 89 40 
2 4 90 16 
13 4 91 20 
15 4 91 45 
5 4 91 20 
3 4 92 16 
18 4 94 16 
1 3 96 16 
9 3 96 20 
17 4 98 20 
19 3 102 20 
8 3 108 20 
10 3 108 16 
12 4 115 16 
4 3 118 30 
6 4 120 16 
11 2 123 16 
7 3 134 16 
14 2 152 35 
20 3 166 25 
Range 2-4 89-166 16-45 
Mean 3.3 108.69 22 
SD 0.68 21.66 7.82 
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Each subject’s fastest race was identified and the whole sample averaged 108.69 seconds 
at peak performance. A correlation based on peak performance (fastest) time versus 
reported gaming skill level, for the total sample, had a correlation coefficient r = -0.62, 
indicating a moderately high inverse relationship, indicating that as performance time (in 
seconds) decreased the subjects’ perceived level of their gaming skills increased. This was 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The data are displayed below. 
 
Table 4  
Performance and perceived gaming skill level 
  
 
Correlation between perceived gaming skill level and fastest, baseline and average 
performance 
 
 
      Fastest           Baseline (1
st
)      Average        Gaming Skill Level 
 
Fastest Race  0.917373 0.987415 -0.619892 
  0.000000 0.000000 0.003552 
 
Baseline (1
st
 Race)   0.942642 -0.551619 
   0.000000 0.011690 
 
Average    -0.662558 
    0.001456 
 
 
 
Note. N = 20. Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.842897; Standardized Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.448386 
 
From the above data, the subjects’ self-rating of their own gaming skill level (average 
score = 3.4 on a 5-point scale) was also inversely and significantly correlated with their 
average performance over all 10 races (r = -0.66; p = 0.002).  This data suggests that 
subjects mostly performed according to their own expectations but that their perceived 
level of skill was more closely related to their average, than to their peak performance.  
Nor did they regard themselves as performing in line with their baseline performance to 
the same extent as they did with their average or fastest performance (r = -0.55; p = 0.012) 
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6.3   PERFORMANCE AND FLOW 
 
Performance was measured in seconds and the experience of flow by means of rating 
scales on two separate questionnaires. 
 
6.3.1   Performance 
 
Performance was measured as duration of a race. The resulting times taken over all 200 
races and averaged for each subject are summarised in Figure 30 (below).  The results are 
arranged in rank order from fastest to slowest. 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Average performance times and variance, per subject 
 
The shortest average time taken (the best overall performer’s score) was 93.1 seconds, 
whilst the subject who performed worst overall averaged 186.7 seconds over all 10 races.   
 
When all 200 races were analysed the range was extended, since averaging obscures the 
extreme scores within each subject’s repertoire of results. The slowest race overall took 
227 seconds and the fastest 89 seconds. The overall average time was 121.95 seconds. A 
summary of the data is presented below. 
Average race times (secs) over 10 races. 
  (fastest to slowest)  
(n = 20) 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Average 
SD 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics of overall, baseline and peak performance 
 
 
Total Sample  
(n = 20) 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Range 
 
Time in seconds 
over 200 races 
 
121.95 
 
29.79 
 
2.11 
 
89 
 
227 
 
138 
 
Baseline Time 
 
133.75 
 
38.13 
 
8.53 
 
99 
 
227 
 
128 
 
Fastest time   
 
108.7 
 
21.66 
 
4.84 
 
89 
 
166 
 
77 
 
 
The baseline (race 1) performance times ranged from 99 to 227 seconds and averaged 
133.75 seconds, which represents a higher (slower) average and a greater variation than 
was found over all 200 races or at peak performance.  When the shortest, or peak, times 
taken (fastest races) were analysed the average was 108.7 seconds with the slowest subject 
taking 166 seconds and the fastest subject 89 seconds.  The above data clearly indicate a 
substantial difference between the baseline results and the peak results.   
 
 
                              
Figure 31. Racing times over 200 races              Figure 32. Peak times (20 races)                                          
 
The two distributions compared in Figures 31 and 32 show that there is less variability but 
a chance of slightly more sampling error in the distribution for peak performance than in 
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the distribution for all 200 races. Both distributions show evidence of two main groups, a 
slow and a faster, either side of the average scores.   
 
6.3.1.1  Performance time over trials  
 
Subjects were given ten trials each to produce a best performance. The tabulated data 
shows that only two subjects (6 and 12) achieved their best performance, or fastest time, 
within the first five trials, while 75% (15 subjects) achieved their best performance in the 
last three trials.  
 
Two subjects who reached their peak early did so in more than the average time (120 and 
115 seconds compared with the group average of 108.69 seconds).  The other subject who 
reached peak early (89 seconds in race four) was the best performer and also the most 
consistent, showing a standard deviation of only 3.34 seconds.  He admitted being familiar 
with this particular game. 
 175 
 
Table 6  
Performance time (seconds) for all races 
 
Subject 
No. 
Race times in seconds (slowest times are shaded and fastest times are in bold).   
R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 5 R 6 R 7 R 8 R 9 R 10 Mean Std Dev 
1 116 108 111 106 102 103 101 97 103 96 104.3 6.15 
2 127 103 103 103 94 106 91 90 95 91 100.3 11.13 
3 112 106 99 93 99 96 94 94 95 92 98 5.95 
4 142 138 140 119 142 120 122 135 118 123 135.9 17.91 
5 115 105 107 96 94 111 99 91.6 91.1 91.9 100.5 8.59 
6 138 140 120 136 133 130 130 133 131 136 132.7 5.60 
7 227 184 196 142 144 170 155 134 140 135 162.7 31.08 
8 128 125 128 132 129 123 109 112 125 108 121.9 8.85 
9 109 103 123 119 118 100 96 113 101 118 110 9.51 
10 128 124 126 135 124 108 135 125 129 119 125.1 8.03 
11 141 138 170 139 135 154 131 128 135 123 139.3 13.60 
12 137 117 125 124 115 125 131 128 126 125 125.3 6.27 
13 101 101 98 106 96 118 98 91 105 103 101.7 7.24 
14 208 168 220 219 168 175 205 168 177 152 188 26.96 
15 105 105 100 95 98 116 91 91 96 120 101.7 9.91 
16 99 93 90 89 91 94 99 92 91 93 93.1 3.45 
17 110 119 118 105 112 100 112 116 98 106 109.6 7.25 
18 103 101 101 96 102 97 96 94 102 94 98.6 3.53 
19 115 112 118 113 104 109 116 114 113 102 111.6 5.15 
20 214 224 191 188 172 174 171 166 173 194 186.7 19.58 
 
 
6.3.1.2  Standardising the performance scores 
 
The performance scores show a clear tendency to cluster towards the lower end of the time 
continuum. This is inevitable given that the purpose of the task was to achieve peak 
performance.  Also, because of the different skill levels amongst subjects, some peak 
performances were slower than the poorest performances of others. It was, therefore, 
necessary to standardise the data so that, for every individual subject, each score is 
represented in terms of standard deviations from their individual means. Additionally, as a 
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consequence of the standardisation the data distribution approached normality.  Each 
subject’s set of 10 scores was standardised using the formula: 
 
where: 
x is a raw score to be standardized (individual per race score) 
μ is the mean of the population (overall individual total score)  
σ is the standard deviation of the population (per individual data set) 
 
The summary below is of descriptive statistics for all 200 races: 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for all 10 races (in seconds) and standardised race scores  
      
 
Illustrations of the performance data distributions of all 200 races before and after 
standardisation are shown in Figures 33 and 34 (below).  
 
 
Total Sample   
(n = 200) 
 
Mean 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Range 
 
Race times  
in seconds 
 
121.95 
 
29.79 
 
2.11 
 
89 
 
227 
 
138 
 
Race times 
standardised 
 
-0.00045 
 
0.95 
 
6.73 
 
-2.27 
 
2.4 
 
4.67 
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Figure 33. Time in seconds                        Figure 34. Standard race times 
 
 
Following standardisation, each subject’s performance data is now compared with that from other 
subjects and also with each subject’s accompanying standardised flow and EEG scores. 
 
6.3.2   The overall flow experience : the Game Flow Inventory (GFI) 
 
The overall flow experience was measured using the Game Flow Inventory (GFI), a 
validated measure of flow.  The questionnaire was used to provide evidence of what level 
of flow was experienced overall during the total session. The Game Flow Inventory (GFI) 
consists of 13 questions, rated on 7-point scales and was administered only once, at the end 
of the session, after the conclusion of all 10 races.   
 
 
Figure 35. Total sample average scores for each GFI item 
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The GFI poses, in question for rating form, the following statements (to be rated on a 7-
point scale): 
 
(1) When I was racing, I thought about nothing else                            
(2) I got carried away by the race  
(3) When I was racing, I forgot everything else around me  
(4) I was totally immersed in the race   
(5) The race gave me a good feeling  
(6) I was racing with a lot of enjoyment  
(7) I felt happy during the race  
(8) I felt cheerful during the race   
(9) I would still do this activity, even if I received less reward  
(10) I would like to continue racing, just for the fun of it  
(11) I raced because I enjoyed it  
(12) When I was racing, I was doing it for myself  
(13) I got my motivation from the race / activity itself, and not from the reward for it. 
 
The full questionnaire is to be found in Appendix D. 
 
The single GFI score, per subject, is the result of the summation and rendering as 
percentages of the three main factors that constitute the GFI, i.e. absorption (items 1-4), 
enjoyment (items 5-8), and intrinsic motivation (items 9-13). On average, the sample 
scored 75.03, with a minimum of 48, a maximum of 98 and a range of 50. The standard 
deviation was 13.5, showing a fair amount of variability within the GFI amongst the 
subjects. 
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Table 8   
GFI total sample distribution statistics (N = 20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is logical that the GFI will vary more than the AFQ in its measurement of flow as there 
is more opportunity for additional sources of variance to come between the experiences of 
flow and reporting on it. It is not possible to capture the “moment in time” and memory 
factors, such as recency, interference, and individual differences in overall expectations, 
self-esteem and self-evaluation are also likely to play a greater part in an “overview” 
situation than in an immediate response, after a fast-moving task. However, overall, the 
subjects indicated whether they had experienced flow during the 10 sessions, albeit the 
data cannot be linked to a specific race, other behavioural data, or the EEG’s in more 
precise time.   
 
The question arises as to what extent the AFQ and GFI results overlap, or differ? This is 
dealt with in this chapter after the AFQ results have been discussed. 
 
The results show the GFI as an instrument presented with a Standardised Cronbach’s 
Alpha of 0.91, revealing very high internal consistency. It is therefore, considered a 
reliable instrument for measuring perceived flow during the PC video game. The inter-
correlations for the items are tabulated below. 
                   Standard      Standard 
Mean           Deviation      Error             Minimum     Maximum        Range 
 
75.03             13.5               3.02               48                  98                    50 
 180 
 
Table 9   
Inter-correlation of all 13 GFI Items 
 
          
 
GFI                
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 
  
Q1 - 
          
  
    
          
  
Q2 0.64 
          
  
  *** 
          
  
Q3 0.41 0.7 
         
  
  - *** 
         
  
Q4 0.67 0.61 0.65 
        
  
  *** *** *** 
        
  
Q5 0.29 0.56 0.62 0.56 
       
  
  - ** *** ** 
       
  
Q6 0.64 0.68 0.65 0.39 0.47 
      
  
  *** *** *** - * 
      
  
Q7 0.37 0.31 0.55 0.39 0.18 0.56 
     
  
  - - ** - - **   
    
  
Q8 0.42 0.55 0.53 0.39 0.6 0.64 0.66 
    
  
  - ** ** - ** *** *** 
    
  
Q9 0.31 0.32 0.6 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.72 0.61 
   
  
  - - ** - - - *** *** 
   
  
Q10 0.12 0.39 0.57 0.18 0.25 0.44 0.66 0.41 0.56 
  
  
  - - ** - - * *** - ** 
  
  
Q11 0.41 0.35 0.64 0.39 0.45 0.59 0.41 0.24 0.42 0.62 
 
  
  - - *** - * ** - - - *** 
 
  
Q12 0.49 0.67 0.49 0.23 0.48 0.75 0.27 0.47 0.19 0.57 0.63   
  ** *** ** - ** *** - ** - ** ***   
Q13 0.44 0.45 0.31 0.21 0.31 0.3 0.1 0.23 0.31 0.09 0.21 0.37 
  * * - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Note. Cronbachs Alpha = 0.910203; Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = .913435 
 *** p ≤ .001; **  p ≤ .01; *   p ≤ .05  
 
 
When the 13 questions were reduced to the three component scores of Absorption, 
Enjoyment and Motivation they were also highly and significantly inter-correlated (Table 
10 below).  The data indicate that the GFI is a uni-factorial construct. The three 
underpinning constructs are highly inter-correlated, thus they are not separate constructs.  
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The data also confirms that the GFI is a reliable measure of flow and that the dimensions 
of Absorption, Enjoyment, and Intrinsic Motivation underpin the flow construct. 
 
Table 10  
Correlation matrix of the GFI main factors (N = 20) 
 
 
 
The results show that all component GFI factors have moderate to good inter-relationships. 
Enjoyment and Motivation and Enjoyment and Absorption are more closely correlated, 
both at r = 0.73 and both are highly significant. Also highly significant but slightly lower 
as a correlation (r = 0.64; p = 0.002) is that between Absorption and Motivation. However, 
since Motivation, in itself, is well associated with Enjoyment, the three are clearly well 
interrelated. 
 
 
 
Figure 36. GFI mean scores for main factors by total sample (N = 20)  
 GFI  
 
 
Performance 
Time (std) Absorption Enjoyment Motivation 
GFI Total    r =  
                   p = 
Absorption  r  = 
 0.26 
 0.27 
1     
                   p =  0     
Enjoyment  r  =  0.726905 1   
                   p =  0.000283 0   
Motivation   r  =  0.642962 0.727262 1 
                   p =  0.002229 0.00028 0 
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Intrinsic Motivation was the highest rated flow characteristic, perhaps influenced by the 
objective of obtaining the fastest possible race time. 
 
Table 11   
GFI Descriptive statistics by total sample (N = 20)   
 
 
 
A further breakdown of the GFI results by baseline and fastest race was not possible since 
the GFI rating applied to all races in retrospect.  
 
With regards to performance, an inspection of individual scores showed that the subject’s 
rank position at peak performance versus his competitors and the associated GFI rating are 
subject to individual interpretation. It was expected that the better their performance the 
higher their respective GFI scores would be, however, when the performance scores were 
arranged on a continuum from best to poorest the GFI result did not follow the same 
pattern along the continuum. The relationship was erratic across all the individual subjects, 
as shown in the following graph.  
 
 Standard Standard 
                       Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum Range 
 
Absorption     20.55     4.7   1.05      11      28    17 
 
Enjoyment      19.85      4    0.9      13      27    14 
 
Intrinsic  
Motivation       27.85     4.9    1.1      19      35    16 
 183 
 
 
Figure 37. GFI and peak performance (fastest to slowest) by individual subjects  
 
The correlation between overall performance and the GFI is weak (r = 0.26) and not 
significant (p = 0.27). The fastest performance time also has a low correlation, with the 
total GFI (r = 0.28; p = 0.23).  
 
Correlations were conducted in terms of fastest time and GFI score on the top 10 
performers compared to the bottom 10 performers. The results show that the top 10 
performers have a significant inverse relationship (r = -0.83, p = 0.003) between the GFI 
and their fastest time.  
 
Table 12  
Correlations of GFI and higher performers at their peak performance (N = 10) 
 
Correlations : GFI vs High Performers at Peak Performance 
 
 GFI               Absorption    Enjoyment  Intrinsic Motivation 
Performance -0.83 0.77 0.82 0.66 
p- 0.003* 0.009** 0.004** 0.040* 
GFI - 0.91 0.88 0.899 
p- - 0.000*** 0.001** 0.004** 
Absorption 
 
- 0.73 0.68 
p- 
 
- 0.016* 0.029* 
Enjoyment 
  
- 0.704 
p- 
  
- 0.023* 
 
Note.  *** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05  
GFI and peak performance 
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The lower performing group’s correlation, in comparison, was low and not significant (r = 
0.30, p = 0.42).  Flow therefore, as measured by the GFI (overall experience), was 
associated with peak performance only for the top performers.  This indicates that 
performance was a confounding variable within the flow-performance relationship as 
measured after all ten races were completed.  This was to be expected because the better 
performers (top 10) were better skilled drivers and achieved more fast races (made less 
mistakes, experienced less frustration) than the lesser skilled drivers (bottom 10).  The top 
10 thus experienced more enjoyment, were more absorbed in the game and experienced 
higher internal motivation (doing it for the pleasure) than the bottom 10 subjects.  
 
However, all subjects have high within GFI associations amongst the three main factors. 
Enjoyment was the main factor common to both groups, although the low performers 
enjoyed it less, were less absorbed and even less motivated. 
 
Table 13  
GFI and low performers at their peak performance (N = 10) 
 
Correlations : GFI vs Low Performers at Peak Performance 
 
GFI              Absorption    Enjoyment  Intrinsic Motivation 
Performance 0.3 0.34 0.4 0.09 
p- 0.42 0.34 0.25 0.813 
GFI  0.84 0.96 0.92 
p-  0.002** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Absorption   - 0.74 0.6 
p-    0.014* 0.065* 
Enjoyment    0.84 
p-    0.003* 
 
Note.  *** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05 
 
It was felt that the GFI is not a suitable instrument to measure flow on a short repetitive 
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activity since it takes too long to complete, becomes a distraction in-between activities, 
and gets boring to repeat.  The AFQ4 was recruited for this purpose. 
 
6.3.3  Immediate post-performance flow experience: the Abbreviated Flow 
Questionnaire (AFQ4) 
 
The AFQ4 measures flow indicators on five-point scales, where 1 represents a low flow 
state and 5 is associated with high flow. The questionnaire was administered after each of 
the 10 races per subject, resulting in 200 scores for each of the five flow attributes tested. 
The summed scores made up the AFQ score. Initially there were five items, but one was 
discarded during the analysis, hence the reference to AFQ4. 
 
In the final analysis the AFQ4 consists of four and not five items to measure the flow 
experience, covering the flow characteristics of Engagement, Skills-Challenge Match, 
sense of Control, and Accomplishment. It is not a standardised questionnaire and the 
questions were dealt with on an equal weight basis, that is, each variable scored on the 
five-point scale was treated as contributing equally to the total flow score. A single AFQ 
result per subject was originally intended to be based on the summation of the five scores 
for each subject per race. The item measuring a sense of “Time Passing Quickly” was 
included in the original test and produced a high score, similar to the other four. However, 
the researcher, who also administered the test, was concerned that some of the subjects’ 
interpretations of the experience of time passing quickly were influenced by potentially 
contaminating factors and subjects may have found that time went too quickly for reasons 
other than the possibility of their having experienced flow. A timer was visible on the 
computer screen as the subjects were racing and there was a strong deliberate focus on 
time throughout the races. The races, too, were over after a very short period, in the order 
of one to two minutes, therefore, this score was left out of further analyses that were based 
on the total summed AFQ score of the remaining four indicators of flow. 
 
The intention of this questionnaire was to provide brief (without much distraction) “top-of-
the-mind” post-performance feedback, to indicate the experience, or otherwise, of 
psychological flow immediately after each race. The instrument provided vital data for 
segmenting the database of all 200 races into those in which high and low/no flow was 
experienced. The AFQ4 provided a platform whereby the associated EEGs could be linked 
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to a flow score and a level of performance. The flow data collected between trials, together 
with the performance data, were used to segment the sample into two main groups, one 
indicating a lower level of flow (it was decided to use the first race, based on an 
assumption is that flow is unlikely to occur during the first attempt) and the other being the 
higher level of flow associated with peak performance (the fastest race - the assumption 
that flow is likely to occur after several practice attempts with the most likely during the 
best performance). Once these groups had been identified their EEGs were compared for 
differences that indicated a marker for flow.   
 
From a purely illustrative perspective, the graphs below display the dynamic interplay 
between performance and flow (using the AFQ) per individual subject across all ten races. 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Performance vs flow (AFQ) per individual subject across all ten races 
 
In the above illustration, subject 1 displays a “textbook” repertoire, showing a gradual 
build-up in performance and flow with a peak on both variables on the last race. In general 
it is observed that flow scores improved in line with performance. 
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From a statistical perspective, the discussion on the AFQ and performance follow. 
The mean AFQ component scores for the total sample are indicated below. 
 
  
Figure 39. AFQ4 mean scores for four items by total sample 
 
Table 14  
AFQ4 Descriptive statistics (N = 20) 
   
 
 
The Skills-Challenge match was the most important factor associated with the performance 
of the visuomotor task overall, followed by Engagement.  The feeling of Control was next 
and finally a sense of Accomplishment. In the latter case this is the person’s own 
perception of accomplishment against what they think, or feel, they are capable of, since 
no direct competition against each other was undertaken. The sessions were completely 
individual. It was evident that some subjects judge themselves more harshly than others 
and not only is the overall mean lower but also the standard deviation shows more 
 
AFQ4                           Mean         Std.Deviation     Std. Err       Minimum   Maximum  Range 
 
Engage 3.87 0.93 6.62            1              5             4 
 
Challenge  3.9 0.987 0.07            1              5     4 
 
Control  3.82 0.833 5.89            1              5     4 
 
Accomplishment 3.55 1.026 7.25            1              5     4 
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variability.   
 
Table 15   
Inter-correlation of AFQ4 items (N = 200) 
 
 
 
Note. Cronbachs Alpha = 0.751477;  Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = 0.756059 
*** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05 
 
The AFQ4 presented with a Standardised Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.756059 when all 4 
questions were inter-correlated showing adequate internal consistency, and therefore 
reliability, amongst the separate items.  It was kept in mind that there are only four 
questions since the Cronbach’s Alpha is sensitive to the number of items and tends to 
increase with larger number of test items. The above Cronbach’s Alpha also makes some 
contribution toward test validity since it meets the reliability criteria as pre-requisite for 
test validity. 
        
Inter-correlation report of AFQ Items for all 200 races 
  
  Engage   Challenge Control Accomplish 
  
    Engage 
 
0.42 0.41 0.39 
   0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
      
  Challenge 
 
0.42 0.37 
  
  
0.00*** 0.00*** 
   
   Control 
   
0.61 
  
   
0.00*** 
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6.3.4  The relationship between the AFQ and the GFI 
 
Table 16  
Correlation matrix for GFI and AFQ (N = 20) 
 
Correlation between AFQ and GFI  
 AFQ GFI 
AFQ   r  = 1 0.0340 
           p = 0 0.8868 
GFI     r  = 0.0340 1 
           p = 0.8868 0 
 
 
Table 16 displays the correlation between the GFI and AFQ for the total sample of 20 
subjects to be very low (r = 0.03) and insignificant (p = 0.88) and suggest they each 
measure different interpretations of flow.   
 
Table 17 shows the inter-item correlations between the GFI’s and AFQ’s components for 
the total sample. The GFI has strong within-item inter-correlations, as already noted, but 
the AFQ items are relatively independent items. 
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Table 17  
Correlation matrix AFQ and GFI items (N = 200) 
 
 
Note. *** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05 
 
As a result of these findings the GFI and AFQ results were used separately and for 
different analytical purposes. The AFQ provides feedback that gives a measure of flow per 
race, specifically for identifying those races where stronger versus weaker flow was 
experienced.  The GFI provides further insight into the total but less directly related 
experience of flow after all races had been completed.  
 
A single GFI score was repeated 10 times to match the individual AFQ scores as it was 
assessed only once in 10 races. The findings show that none of the GFI and AFQ 
individual items inter-correlate, yet highly significant inter-item agreement was found 
within both the GFI and AFQ, except for Time, which was discarded in any event as 
mentioned earlier.  The low correlation with the other four AFQ items was another reason 
to justify its exclusion. These high levels of internal consistency suggest that both 
 
Inter-Item correlations between the GFI and AFQ over all 200 races 
 
GFI/AFQ  Absorption Enjoyment Motivation Time Engage Challenge Control Accomplish 
Absorption    r  = 1        
                    p = 0          
Enjoyment    r  = 0.73 1        
                    p = 0.00*** 0        
Motivation    r  = 0.65 0.73 1      
                    p = 0.00*** 0.00*** 0      
Time              r  = -0.16 -0.291 -0.006 1     
                     p = 0.489 0.213  0.980 0     
Engagement  r  = 0.22 -0.03 -0.044 -0.018 1    
                     p = 0.002** 0.65  0.53 0.939 0    
Challenge      r  = -0.05 -0.25 -0.172 -0.022 0.42 1   
                     p =  0.50 0.000*** 0.015 0.927 0.00*** 0   
Control          r  = -0.06 -0.20 -0.104 0.125 0.41 0.42 1  
                     p = 0.41 0.004**  0.14 0.600 0.00*** 0.00*** 0  
Accomplish   r  = -0.02 -0.057   0.06 0.374 0.39 0.37 0.61 1 
                     p =  0.76  0.42  0.40 0.104 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0 
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instruments are reliable measures of flow.  Both instruments are also considered valid 
instruments for measuring flow, since the GFI is a validated instrument (Bakker, 2008) and 
the AFQ’s test items are directly grounded in the flow research published by 
Csikszentmihalyi and others. 
 
A factor analysis of the results from the total sample shows even more precisely that the 
two instruments are measuring different aspects of flow. This was based on the average 
AFQ (with 5 items) score and the GFI score per subject.  Table 18 (below) shows clearly 
that the AFQ and GFI loaded on two factors. The GFI loaded more heavily on factor 1 and 
the AFQ on factor 2.   
 
Table 18  
GFI and AFQ factor analysis 
 
 
Factor Analysis Report.  Communalities after Varimax Rotation 
 
Variables Factor1 Factor2 Communality 
AFQ Time 0.004206 0.186463 0.190669 
AFQ Engage 0.012891 0.163897 0.176787 
AFQ Challenge 0.081030 0.349762 0.430792 
AFQ Control 0.045167 0.668085 0.713252 
AFQ Accomplish 0.000087 0.576155 0.576242 
GFI Absorption 0.728532 0.017479 0.746011 
GFI Enjoyment 0.797914 0.037424 0.835338 
GFI Intrinsic Motivation 0.620769 0.000035 0.620804 
           
Bar Chart of Communalities after Varimax Rotation   
Variables Factor1 Factor2 Communality 
AFQ Time | |||| |||| 
AFQ Engage | |||| |||| 
AFQ Challenge || ||||||| ||||||||| 
AFQ Control | |||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| 
AFQ Accomplish | |||||||||||| |||||||||||| 
GFI Absorption ||||||||||||||| | ||||||||||||||| 
GFI Enjoyment |||||||||||||||| | ||||||||||||||||| 
GFI Intrinsic Motivation ||||||||||||| | ||||||||||||| 
 
 192 
 
Factor Structure Summary after Varimax Rotation 
               Factor1 Factor2 
GFI Enjoyment AFQ Control 
GFI Absorption AFQ Accomplish 
GFI Intrinsic Motivation                  AFQ Challenge 
 AFQ Time 
 AFQ Engage 
 
 
The reliability of the measures over time cannot be assessed since no repeat testing is 
conducted. However, it is clear from the available information that, on the whole, the two 
questionnaires measure different aspects of flow. The GFI is more behaviourally orientated 
and the AFQ more performance-based.   
 
The division into AFQ and GFI factors indicates the need to treat the two instruments 
separately in the interpretation of their findings. Although there is some overlap they are 
measuring aspects of the flow experience in two different contexts. The GFI score 
indicates that the subject experienced flow sometime during the ten races and he felt 
enjoyment (happy about result), internal motivation (doing the activity for the pleasure) 
and absorption (being immersed) in doing so, while the AFQ indicates that the subject 
experienced his highest level of flow on a particular race and he felt a sense of being in 
control, accomplished (satisfied with result), being up for the challenge (a perfect match of 
skill and challenge), and feeling totally engaged while performing the activity. 
 
The AFQ4 was therefore used as measure to segment the sample into two flow groups. 
 
6.4   SEGMENTATION OF THE SAMPLE INTO TWO FLOW GROUPS 
 
Central to the study was setting up two levels of the flow variable, namely a high-flow and 
a low-flow set of results, in order to test whether they differ with in both the experience of 
flow and the associated EEG profiles under task. This segmentation was achieved using 
the first race as baseline data set (Group 2) for low performance/low flow and 
accompanying EEG and the fastest race/highest flow score as data set (Group 1) for flow 
and EEG under peak performance condition.   
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The AFQ4 was used to provide the flow score that accompanied both the performance 
score and the EEG data for each race per subject.  The set of AFQ4 scores was 
standardised using the same formula as for the performance data. The need to standardise 
the data was discussed earlier in this chapter.  The resulting total sample distribution is 
summarised below and shows the proximity to normally distributed scores that was 
achieved by this process with the total sample data, that is for all subjects across all races 
(n = 200).  
 
Table 19  
Standardised AFQ based on the average AFQ over 10 races for all 20 subjects 
 
 
 
The data representing the high flow condition and designated as Group 1 was compared 
with the corresponding low flow condition and designated as Group 2, and the regression 
line, as illustrated in Figure 40 (below), clearly displays how differently the two groups 
were positioned relative to each other.   
 
 
                                                        Standard       Standard 
  Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum     Range 
 
AFQ Standardised      -0.07              1.51             0.19                -2.38                  2.17           4.55 
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Figure 40. The performance-flow relationship for fastest (blue) and baseline (red) races (N 
= 20)  
 
A correlation of -0.82 (p = 0.00) between the two sets of data shows that the less time 
taken to complete the race, the higher the flow. This is a strong correlation, in the predicted 
direction, and it is highly significant at the 0.001 level.   
 
The table below shows the average raw data and standard scores for the performance and 
AFQ4 flow variables.   
 
Table 20  
Performance and AFQ4 averages for high and low flow races 
 
N = 20 
Mean performance  
(in seconds) 
Mean flow AFQ4 
(Maximum 20) 
 
Higher flow races 
(Fastest race) 
 
Mean =108.7  
(std score = -1.385 ) 
Mean = 18.1 
(std score = 1.185) 
 
Low flow races 
(Baseline) 
 
Mean = 133.75  
(std score = 1.075)  
Mean = 13.9 
(std score = - 0.518)            
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The average time taken to complete races in high flow was 108.7 seconds, in contrast to 
133.75 seconds in low flow. This indicates that in terms of performance the high flow 
group, with a standard score of -1.385, was more than a standard deviation quicker than 
the low flow group, with a standard score of 1.075. The AFQ4 (with a maximum of 20 
points) has a mean of 18.1 in the higher flow condition and drops to 13.9 in the lower 
condition. The AFQ4 standard scores indicate that high flow races have a standard 
deviation of approximately 1.2 above the mean against a low flow score of -0.518 below 
the mean. In this instance the mean for the AFQ 4, converted to a standard score, was 0. 
 
When the AFQ scores for Group 1 and Group 2 are compared it is clear that on all four 
components the experience of flow is higher when they are performing at peak than when 
they are not. The differences are all significant at the 0.05 level of significance. Given that 
flow reportedly occurs when higher performance is demanded to move to the next level it 
is interesting that in the high flow races Challenge and Engagement are experienced 
slightly higher than Control and Accomplishment, and that the sense of being “in control” 
is reportedly higher than the other three attributes in the low flow situation, with a sense of 
Accomplishment being the least experienced. 
 
 
Figure 41.  AFQ4 mean scores for high and low flow races (N = 20)  
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Table 21  
AFQ4 items distribution statistics for high flow 
 
Group 1.  High Flow Group        
                                                                  Standard            Standard 
N=20                            Mean          Deviation            Error       Minimum      Maximum  
 
Engage 4.55  0.83 0.19  2 5 1 
 
Challenge 4.55  0.69 0.15  3 5 1 
 
Control 4.5  0.61 0.14  3 5 2 
 
Accomplish 4.5  0.61 0.14  3 5 2 
 
 
The results for individual AFQ4 items show clearly the higher reporting of flow in Group 
1 compared with Group 2.   
 
Table 22  
AFQ4 items distribution statistics for low flow 
 
Group 2. Low Flow Group 
                                                                     Standard         Standard 
n= 20                     Mean             Deviation        Error     Minimum     Maximum  
 
Engage 3.55                      0.95                  0.21                  2                         5 
 
Challenge 3.55                      0.99                  0.22                  1                         5 
 
Control 3.65                      0.93                  0.21                  1                         5             
 
Accomplish 3.15                      1.09                  0.25                  1                         5 
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The average AFQ4 scores for the two groups are z = 1.2 for high flow and z = -0.52 for the 
low flow. Once again this is in the predicted direction and there is a clear difference 
between the two sets of data in both performance and flow, as measured on the AFQ4.  
 
Table 23  
AFQ4 Standard score descriptive statistics for high and low flow (N = 20) 
     
 
Group 1  
AFQ4 High flow standard descriptive statistics. 
 
             Standard Standard 
Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum Range 
 
1.185 0.617333 0.1380398 -0.66 1.89 2.55 
 
Group 2  
AFQ4 Low flow standard descriptive statistics 
   
-0.518 0.6516344 0.1457099 -1.72 0.71 2.43 
 
 
 
When performance and flow were correlated within each group the results reported in 
Table 24 were obtained. 
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Table 24  
Correlation matrix for performance and flow (AFQ4) for Group 1 (high flow / high 
performance condition) 
 
Group 1 
High Flow 
Performance Engage Challenge Control Accomplish 
Performance  1.00 -0.04 -0.50 -0.76 -0.42 
p= 0.00 0.86 0.03 0.00 0.07 
Engage  1.00 0.27 0.16 0.16 
p=  0.00 0.24 0.51 0.51 
Challenge   1.00 0.57 0.19 
p=   0.00 0.01 0.42 
Control    1.00 0.57 
p=    0.00 0.01 
Accomplish     1.00 
p=     0.00 
AFQ4 -0.58 0.64 0.73 0.78 0.64 
p= 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Note. Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.281148;  Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = 0.515608 
 
In the high flow condition (Group 1) a moderate negative correlation was found between 
performance and flow measured on the AFQ (r = -0.58; p = 0.01), all the AFQ sub-items 
were also significantly correlated with the AFQ4. Challenge (r = 0.73) and Control (r = 
0.78) were more highly inter-related than Engagement (r = 0.64) and Accomplishment (r = 
0.64).  Performance was significantly correlated only to Challenge and Control. 
 
In contrast, the low flow group has a lower overall negative correlation (r = -0.47; p = 
0.04) indicating that as performance time increases so flow increases and vice versa but it 
is more variable than when flow is higher. All main flow indicators were significantly 
moderately correlated with the AFQ4 overall. Accomplishment was the more highly 
associated factor in the lower flow condition (r = 0.73), followed by Engagement (r = 
0.56), Control (r = 0.58) and then Challenge (r = 0.56).  
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Table 25  
Correlation matrix for performance and flow (AFQ4) for Group 2 (low flow / low 
performance condition) 
 
Group 2 
Low Flow 
Performance Engage Challenge Control Accomplish 
Performance  1.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.70 -0.46 
p= 0.00 0.93 0.97 0.00 0.04 
Engage  1.00 0.39 -0.07 0.22 
p=  0.00 0.09 0.77 0.35 
Challenge   1.00 -0.01 0.02 
p=   0.00 0.97 0.94 
Control    1.00 0.52 
p=    0.00 0.02 
Accomplish     1.00 
p=     0.00 
AFQ4 -0.47 0.61 0.56 0.58 0.73 
p= 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
Note. Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.164115;  Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = 0.491471  
 
A MANOVA was performed to indicate the differences in mean scores between Groups 1 
and 2.  The results are reflected in Table 26 (below). In addition, a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) for all variables was performed, including an effect size analysis, the 
results of which are reflected in Table 27 (below).  
 
Table 26  
MANOVA results for performance, flow (AFQ4) and EEG’s between low (Group 2) and 
high flow (Group 1) 
MANOVA 
 
 
Test Value DF1 DF2 F-Ratio  
(Critical value 
 F=4.098) 
Sig. of F Decision 
(≤0.05) 
Wilks' Lambda 0.02985 30 9 9.75 0.001 Reject 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 32.50179 30 9 9.75 0.001 Reject 
Pillai's Trace 0.97015 30 9 9.75 0.001 Reject 
Roy's Largest Root 0.97015      
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Table 27  
One-way ANOVA and effect size results between low to high flow 
One-way Analysis 
 
 
Test Value DF1 DF2 F-Ratio  
(Critical value 
 F=4.098) 
Sig. of F Decision 
(≤0.05) 
Effect 
Size. 
Eta
2
 
Performance (in secs) 
60.516 1 38 150.06 0.000 Reject .94 
AFQ4 (flow) 
29.002 1 38 71.99 0.000 Reject .89 
F3 Delta 
22.515 1 38 1.88 0.179 Accept .17 
F3 Theta  
5.264 1 38 0.2 0.657 Accept .02 
F3 Alpha 
1.905 1 38 0.28 0.602 Accept .03 
F3 Lobeta 
5.845 1 38 2.47 0.124 Accept .22 
F3 Beta 
57.840 1 38 3.65 0.064 Accept .29 
F3 Hibeta 
21.054 1 38 0.78 0.382 Accept .08 
F3 Gamma 
0.037 1 38 0.02 0.892 Accept .00 
C3Delta 
19.698 1 38 0.85 0.362 Accept .09 
C3Theta  
0.681 1 38 0.02 0.895 Accept .00 
C3Alpha 
17.332 1 38 2.8 0.103 Accept .24 
C3Lobeta 
7.912 1 38 4.38 0.043 Reject .33 
C3Beta 
44.394 1 38 2.48 0.124 Accept .22 
C3Hibeta 
7.327 1 38 0.19 0.663 Accept .02 
C3Gamma 
0.084 1 38 0.04 0.838 Accept .01 
P3Delta 
35.100 1 38 2.71 0.108 Accept .23 
P3Theta  
19.321 1 38 0.47 0.496 Accept .05 
P3Alpha 
6.889 1 38 0.35 0.555 Accept .04 
P3Lobeta 
1.414 1 38 0.23 0.635 Accept .03 
P3Beta 
52.235 1 38 3.73 0.061 Accept .29 
P3Hibeta 
40.040 1 38 0.51 0.479 Accept .05 
P3Gamma 
1.222 1 38 0.14 0.714 Accept .02 
01Delta 
45.946 1 38 1.11 0.300 Accept .11 
01Theta  
1.743 1 38 0.04 0.848 Accept .00 
01Alpha 
18.619 1 38 1.47 0.233 Accept .14 
01Lobeta 
7.048 1 38 1.27 0.267 Accept .12 
01Beta 
30.695 1 38 0.76 0.390 Accept .08 
01Hibeta 
75.653 1 38 0.69 0.412 Accept .07 
01Gamma 
0.927 1 38 0.12 0.728 Accept .01 
 
 201 
The F-ratio produced in this analysis is the ratio of the difference within and between the 
two flow groups. In this study, the critical value for F was 4.098. An F-ratio higher than 
the critical value indicates a significant difference at the 0.05 probability level. That is, 
there is at least a 95% chance that the differences observed between the two sets of scores 
were indicative of a real difference in behaviour which, given the same test conditions, 
may be repeated with the same, or very similar, results. An analysis of effect sizes is 
included with the one-way analysis of variance as it provides information about the size of 
change that took place in performance, perceived flow and EEG’s from low to high flow. 
 
The MANOVA results in Table 26 indicate clearly that the high and low flow data sets 
were from two significantly different levels of the flow condition, which justifies the 
segmentation of the data into high- and low flow groups. The F-ratio (F = 150.06) for the 
standardised group performance varied significantly between the high- and low flow 
conditions, showing that when each individual’s comparative performance was taken into 
account this difference (significant at the 0.00 level of probability) was further highlighted. 
The very large effect size (Eta
2
 = 0.94), as reported in Table 27, confirmed that the two 
levels differ by 94%.  Also highly significant (p = 0.000) was the difference in reported 
flow with the overall AFQ4 F-ratio being 71.99.  The very large effect size (Eta2 = 0.89) 
confirmed that the two levels differ by 89%.  The null hypotheses that indicate, 
respectively, that the performance and flow scores from Groups 1 (high flow) and 2 (low 
flow) are the same is rejected and it is accepted that they are significantly different levels 
of flow.  
 
The rest of the analyses for high- and low flow were based on these two groups of data, 
Group 1 and Group 2, where there was a clear relationship between flow and performance 
at two distinct levels, against which to examine and interpret the accompanying EEG data. 
 
6.5  ANALYSES OF NEUROLOGICAL (EEG) DATA 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the EEG data were recorded for the frequency spectrum 
covering 1 – 42 Hz.  Frequency bands were grouped into 1-3Hz (delta), 4-7Hz (theta), 8-
12Hz (alpha), 12-15Hz (lobeta), 15-20Hz (beta), 20-30Hz (hibeta) and 38-42Hz (gamma).  
Data were extracted using the MEANF (mean fraction of EEG energy in each band) and 
expressed as percent power as derived from Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).  Recordings 
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were made at four scalp locations with the channels (electrode pairs) F3 – F4 (frontal 
lobes); C3 – C4 (sensori-motor cortex); P3 – P4 (parietal lobes) and O1 – O2 (occipital 
lobes). 
 
Data from Groups 1 and 2 were compared in terms of EEG power and synchrony 
(correlations) and presented in a visual- and statistical way.   
 
Hypotheses were tested using the following significance levels as decision rules to reject 
the null hypothesis: 
 
(1) For testing difference (EEG power) f-ratios :  p ≤ 0.05 
(2) For testing similarity (Synchrony) correlations (r) :  p  ≤ 0.05 
 
The results are presented by channel (designated for the left hemisphere position only) and 
express the state of electrical activity between the two scalp positions bilaterally.  In line 
with the proposed neurophysiological model for flow, as presented in Chapter 4, the 
following electro-cortical changes in various areas of the brain were expected for the 
higher flow condition (Group 1). 
 
Table 28    
Expected model for flow at peak performance 
Brain Site (s) Expected brain activity. 
Pre-frontal cortex (F3) Decreased beta and gamma and increased theta power 
Parietal cortex (P3) Increased theta and alpha power. 
Sensori-motor (C3) Increased alpha.  
Between the sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) 
areas 
Increased alpha synchrony 
Between the pre-frontal and sensori-motor cortex 
(F3-C3), the pre-frontal and parietal (F3-P3) and 
the sensori-motor and parietal (C3 –P3). 
De-synchronisation in beta. 
 
 
To evaluate power changes, the power values for Group 2 were regarded as base values (as 
they were in the lowest flow state) and those of Group 1 as the high flow values.  The high 
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flow values were compared with the base values for each of the four locations by 
frequency. 
 
EEG power scores were analysed for inter-group differences by location, whereas 
synchrony changes were analysed in terms of patterns of inter-location synchrony 
(binding) or de-synchrony (no binding) within- and between groups.  The patterns of 
synchronous and non-synchronous bindings of the higher-flow data were compared to the 
patterns predicted by the theoretical model.   
 
6.5.1  EEG power data 
 
EEG power spectrum analysis is important in order to observe the dominant frequency 
band for the spectrum being measured in a particular area.  The frequency band with the 
highest power value is regarded as the dominant frequency and is associated with a 
particular state of mind in general or a particular function if more localised.  Functions of 
frequencies change according to locality.  In general: 
 
(1) Delta rhythm is associated with states of wakefulness;  
(2) Theta with creativity, spontaneity, integration, anxiety and inattention;  
(3) Alpha with relaxed wakefulness; 
(4) Lobeta with stillness and movement;  
(5) Beta with being focused, analytic, externally oriented, or in a state of relaxed 
thinking;  
(6) Hibeta is associated with peak performance;  
(7) Gamma is associated with selective attention, transient binding of cognitive 
features, and conscious perception of visual objects. 
 
A sample of 20 races per group was chosen as discussed earlier.   
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Figure 42.  EEG power scores (Mean F) across four sites and all EEG frequencies, in high 
and low flow     
 
A one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on these two groups of scores and 
their accompanying EEG power (Mean F) scores yielded the results reported in Table 27 
and are discussed below. 
 
The null hypotheses, that there were no differences between the two groups, were rejected 
only for the lobeta frequency in the sensori-motor cortex (C3), where significant 
differences between high and low flow conditions were found.  The differences for F3 and 
P3 in the beta frequency were at the 0.06 level of probability and fell just outside the 
significant range. All other frequencies in all other areas showed no significant differences 
between high and low flow.   
 
However, since there were changes in other EEG variables between high and low flow and 
these changes are of interest in this particular study where patterns of data were under 
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investigation.  Some of the non-significant differences had large effect sizes.  Figure 42 
(below) illustrates the changes between low and high flow estimated by the Eta
2
 statistic. 
 
 
Figure 43.  Effect size differences between low and high flow groups 
 
From Figure 43, it was evident that performance and the flow (AFQ4) accounted for the 
greatest amount of variability from low to high flow states.  C3 lobeta was next, and as 
mentioned earlier, the only significantly different EEG variable, followed by other 
(statistically non-significant) changes.  It was observed that the beta frequency produced 
large effects (Eta
2
 ≥ 0.14) across three of the four cortices while the effect in O1 was only 
medium (Eta
2 ≥ 0.06).  In the pre-frontal cortex, large effect sizes were also observed in 
delta and lobeta. In the sensori-motor cortex large effect sizes were evident in alpha, 
lobeta, and beta, while in the parietal cortex it was in delta and beta.  Alpha displayed a 
large effect size in the occipital cortex.  
 
6.5.2  The Pre-frontal cortex (F3)  
 
The PFC is the brain area associated with attention, logical reasoning, creativity, executive 
decision making, working memory and control.  The dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex (as 
indexed by F3) has a generic function of real-time processing of information or working 
memory in the service of a wide range of cognitive functions; integrating attention, 
memory, motor, and affective dimensions of behaviour. 
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Figure 44. Bar chart showing differences in mean power between high vs low flow across 
frequencies in the pre-frontal cortex 
 
Table 29  
Pre-frontal cortex and high vs low flow differences in mean power across frequencies 
                        
F3 Delta Theta Alpha Lobeta Beta Hibeta Gamma 
Hi Flow 12.49 21.05 12.66 8.86 21.22 8.75 0.92 
Low Flow 13.99 21.77 12.22 8.10 18.81 7.30 0.86 
Diff -1.50 -0.73 0.44 0.76 2.41 1.45 0.06 
F Ratio 1.88 0.2 0.28 2.47 3.65 0.78 0.02 
P -Value  0.1788 0.6571 0.6018 0.1243 0.0637 0.3819 0.8917 
Eta
2
 -0.17 -0.02 0.03 0.22 0.29 0.08 0 
 
 
From the above data, theta and beta were the most dominant power frequencies in both 
high and low flow conditions.  Higher flow seems to be associated with reduction in delta 
and theta power together with increased power in alpha, lobeta, beta, hibeta, and gamma.  
None of the differences in power values between the two groups were significant.  
However, the increase in beta was in the opposite of the hypothesised direction (it was 
expected to decrease) at the 0.06 level of significance (F = 3.65; p = 0.0637).  Although 
not statistically significant, the effect size for beta was large (Eta
2
 = 0.29).  Beta became 
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the dominant frequency in the high flow condition while theta was dominant for the low 
flow condition.  Lobeta showed a large increase (Eta
2
 = 0.22), while delta showed a large 
(Eta
2
 = -0.17) decrease as high flow was assumed. 
 
The combination of higher beta and lobeta and decreased delta power in the frontal area 
may indicate that subjects in the high flow condition were more focused, analytical, 
externally oriented, and/or relaxed compared to subjects in the low flow group.  It may 
also be an indication that executive processes have shifted from internal (implicit 
processes) to external (explicit processes) orientation.  The effects of each frequency will 
be discussed in more detail later. 
 
6.5.3  The Sensori-motor cortex (C3) 
 
The sensori-motor cortex is associated with motor functioning and thus ultimately with 
skill execution.  It shares in orchestrating both physical and mental processes and governs 
more than just sensory and motor functions.  
 
 
 
Figure 45. Bar chart showing differences in mean power between high vs low flow across 
frequencies in the sensori-motor cortex 
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Table 30  
Sensori-motor cortex and high vs low flow differences in mean power across frequencies 
 
C3 Delta Theta Alpha Lobeta Beta Hibeta Gamma 
Hi Flow 17.10 24.05 12.08 6.72 12.53 5.27 0.86 
Low Flow 18.51 23.78 10.76 5.83 10.42 4.41 0.76 
Diff -1.40 0.26 1.32 0.89 2.11 0.86 0.09 
F Ratio 0.85 0.02 2.8 4.38 2.48 0.19 0.04 
P -Value  0.3617 0.8950 0.1025 0.0432 0.1237 0.6627 0.8379 
Eta2 -0.09 0 0.24 0.33 0.22 0.02 0.01 
                           
 
The above data indicate that the only significant difference in power change between the 
high- and low flow groups was observed in the lobeta band (F = 4.38; p = 0.0432).  It also 
demonstrated the largest effect size (Eta
2
 = 0.33) of all the changes in power. Research 
indicates that lobeta amplitude increases with stillness and decreases with movement 
(Othmer, et al., 1999, p. 267), which may reflect a state of being internally oriented.  In 
other words, performance takes less effort since movement is fluent and automatic, which 
is a characteristic of the high flow condition.  The data also indicate that theta was the 
dominant frequency in the sensori-motor area for both high- and low flow conditions.  It 
showed an effect size of zero. This is probably because theta waves are generated in the 
limbic system and are prominent in the thalamus and hippocampus under conditions of 
alertness and arousal, and projects strongly in the sensori-motor cortex.  Theta waves 
underpin unconscious automotoric processes.   
 
The above data also indicated large effect sizes in alpha (Eta
2
 = 0.24) and beta (Eta
2
 = 
0.22). The effects of each frequency will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
6.5.4  The Parietal cortex (P3) 
 
The parietal lobes are associated with mathematical reasoning, naming objects, complex 
grammar, and spatial awareness.   Parietal lobes solve problems that have been 
conceptualised by the frontal lobes. They, together with the frontal lobes are the main 
components of the association cortex.   
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Figure 46. Bar chart showing differences in mean power between high vs low flow across 
frequencies in the parietal-motor cortex 
 
Table 31  
Parietal cortex and high vs low flow differences in mean power across frequencies 
 
P3 Delta Theta Alpha Lobeta Beta Hibeta Gamma 
Hi Flow 7.92 15.68 14.58 10.78 25.28 14.28 1.94 
Low Flow 9.80 17.07 13.75 10.40 23.00 12.28 1.59 
Diff -1.87 -1.39 0.83 0.38 2.29 2.00 0.35 
F Ratio 2.71 0.47 0.35 0.23 3.73 0.51 0.14 
P -Value  0.1083 0.4962 0.5550 0.6346 0.0608 0.4793 0.7135 
Eta
2
 -0.23 -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.29 0.05 0.02 
 
 
Beta was the dominant frequency in the parietal cortex for both high- and low flow 
conditions.  There were no significant differences between the two groups in power 
changes in any of the frequencies.  However, the increase in beta was at the 0.06 level of 
significance (F = 3.73; p = 0.0608) and has a large effect size (Eta
2
 = 0.29).  Beta plays an 
important role in the fronto-parieto-temporal attentional network and is known to be 
involved in target detection, visual attention, and working memory; processes that are 
required for the successful execution of any visually based task (Gross, et al., 2004).  Delta 
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displayed a large decreasing effect (Eta
2
 = -0.23) as high flow was assumed.  Decreasing 
delta will enhance alertness in support of increased attention. 
 
6.5.5  The Occipital cortex (O1)       
 
The occipital lobes are associated with the visual field that helps to locate objects in the 
environment, see colours, recognise drawings, and correctly identify objects.   
 
 
Figure 47. Bar chart showing differences in mean power between high vs low flow across 
frequencies in the occipital cortex 
 
Table 32  
Occipital cortex and high vs low flow differences in mean power across frequencies 
 
O1 Delta Theta Alpha Lobeta Beta Hibeta Gamma 
Hi Flow 11.15 16.89 12.76 8.35 18.15 14.55 1.87 
Low Flow 13.29 16.48 11.40 7.51 16.40 11.79 1.56 
Diff -2.14 0.42 1.36 0.84 1.75 2.75 0.30 
F Ratio 1.11 0.04 1.47 1.27 0.76 0.69 0.12 
P -Value  0.2997 0.8477 0.2326 0.2668 0.3898 0.4125 0.7275 
Eta
2
 -0.11 0 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.01 
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There were no significant differences in power between the two groups in any of the 
measured frequencies in the occipital region.  Beta seems to be the dominant frequency for 
the high flow condition while theta is dominant for the low flow group.  However, alpha 
displayed the largest effect size (Eta
2
 = 0.14) probably due to its involvement in top-down 
interactions between higher-order and primary areas of the visual cortex. 
 
6.5.6  Power analyses by frequency 
 
Although the above data revealed that the difference in power between the two flow 
conditions is only significant in lobeta at the sensori-motor area, it also revealed large 
effects in other frequencies and locations. These movement (change size and directions) 
trends will be further discussed by frequency band across scalp positions.   
 
 
 
Figure 48. Delta power shift for high vs low flow groups 
 
Figure 48 indicates that delta power reduced in all cortical areas in the high flow group.  
However, none was at a statistically significant level (F3 : p = 0.1788; C3 : p = 0.3617; P3 
: p = 0.1083; O1 : p = 0.2997).  However, large effect sizes were displayed in F3 (Eta
2
 = 
0.-17) and P3 (Eta
2
 = 0.-23), and medium size in C3 (Eta
2
 = -0.09) and O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.-11). 
Delta was the most dominant in the sensori-motor area (C3).  Vogel, et al. (1968) 
postulated two kinds of behavioural inhibition characterised by delta : (a) Class I inhibition 
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refers to a gross inactivation of an entire excitatory process resulting in a relaxed, less 
active state, such as sleep, and (b) Class II inhibition refers to the selective suppression of 
inappropriate, or non-relevant, neural activity during mental task performance.  The fact 
that delta decreased in all areas as flow increased may be a result of deactivation of Class 1 
inhibition and activation of Class II inhibition, especially in the PPC and PFC. 
 
 
 
Figure 49. Theta power shift for high vs low flow groups 
 
Figure 49 indicates that theta power remained fairly constant in all cortical areas, but 
reduced in the parietal area in the high flow group, however not at a significant level (P3 : 
p = 0.4962).  In addition, all effect sizes in theta were small (Eta
2
 < 0.06). Theta was the 
most dominant in the sensori-motor area.  Both decreased and increased frontal theta 
activity have been linked to increased cognitive demands. Increased frontal theta is 
reported in a wide variety of tasks, such as mental arithmetic (Mizuki et al., 1980; Sasaki 
et al., 1996; Inanaga, 1998; Lazarev, 1998; Ishii et al., 1999; Smith et al., 1999), error 
detection (Luu et al., 2003; Luu et al., 2004), language comprehension (Bastiaansen et al., 
2002; Hald et al., 2006) and working memory tasks (Gevins et al.,1997; Krause et al., 
2000; Jensen & Tesche, 2002; Onton et al., 2005). 
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Figure 50. Alpha power shift for high vs low flow groups 
 
Figure 50 indicates that alpha power increased in all cortical areas in the high flow group, 
especially in the sensori-motor and occipital areas.  However none was at a statistically 
significant level (F3 : p = 0.6018; C3 : p = 0.1025; P3 : p = 0.5550; O1 : p = 0.2326).  
However, alpha showed large effect sizes in C3 (Eta
2
 = 0.24) and O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.14).  Alpha 
was dominant in the parietal area.  Rowe et al. (2007) postulated that alpha demonstrates 
positive correlations with information processing speed.  Alpha is also involved in 
anticipatory attention, which involves top-down interactions between higher-order and 
primary areas of the visual cortex.  Alpha power increases have been linked to active 
inhibition of neuronal activity that could otherwise disturb the working memory (WM) 
process (Jokisch & Jensen, 2007; Klimesch et al., 2007).  Babiloni et al. (2008) postulated 
that alpha rhythms might represent a major physiological mechanism at the basis of 
“neural efficiency” during the judgment of observed actions.  Working memory, 
information processing speed, anticipatory attention, and neural efficiency are all essential 
to successful visuomotor performance. 
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Figure 51. Lobeta power shift for high vs low flow groups 
 
Figure 51 indicates that lobeta power increased in all cortical areas in the high flow group. 
The least increase was in the parietal area while the increase in the sensori-motor area was 
at a statistically significant level (C3 : p = 0.0432).  The largest effect was also at C3 (Eta
2
 
= 0.33).  However, a large effect was also observed at F3 (Eta
2
 = 0.22) and a medium 
effect at O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.12).  SMR or lobeta predominates only in the sensori-motor cortex 
(sensori-motor strip).  Lobeta increases with stillness and decreases with movement 
(Othmer, et al., 1999, p. 267).  The significant shift in power in the sensori-motor area may 
be an indication that motor movement have smoothed out into fluent and synchronised 
motion as flow increased. 
 
 
Figure 52. Beta power shift for high vs low flow groups 
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Figure 52 indicates that beta power increased substantially in all cortical areas in the high 
flow group. None was at a statistically significant level.  However F3 (p = 0.0637) and P3 
(p = 0.0608) were not only close to the significant range, it also demonstrated large effect 
sizes (F3 : Eta
2
 = 0.29; P3 : Eta
2
 = 0.29).  A large effect size was also indicated at C3 (Eta
2
 
= 0.22), while the effect was only medium size at O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.08).  Beta has been 
associated with being focused, analytic, externally oriented, or in a state of relaxed 
thinking (Demos, 2005).  Maximal beta amplitude is usually in the fronto-central regions, 
but it may be widespread.  Increased beta activity has been related to the alertness level 
(Eoh, et al., 2005).  Flow is characterised by being focused, externally oriented, and in a 
state of relaxed thinking. 
 
 
 
Figure 53. Hibeta power shift for high vs low flow groups 
 
Figure 53 indicates that hibeta power increased substantially in all cortical areas in the 
high flow group, with the least being in the sensori-motor area. However none was at a 
statistically significant level (F3 : p = 0.3819; C3 : p = 0.6627; P3 : p = 0.4793; O1 : p = 
0.4125). Medium effect sizes were demonstrated at F3 (Eta
2
 = 0.08) and O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.07). 
High beta is associated with peak performance, cognitive processing, worry, anxiety, over-
thinking, and ruminating (Demos, 2005).  The increase in hibeta power may be an 
indication of improved cognitive processing in lieu of peak performance. 
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Figure 54. Gamma power shift for high vs low flow groups 
 
Figure 54 indicates that gamma power increased in all cortical areas in the high flow 
group, especially in the parietal- and occipital areas.  However none was at a statistically 
significant level (P3 : p = 0.7135; O1 : p = 0.7275).  Effect sizes were also small at all 
locations. This indicates that gamma plays an equal role in both flow conditions.  Gamma 
is prominent especially during high alertness and after sensory stimulation, likely 
contributing to the ‘‘binding” of diverse information into a single coherent percept.  
Gamma, high beta and beta waves seem to be associated with selective attention, transient 
binding of cognitive features, and conscious perception of visual objects (Hughes, 2008).  
Increased gamma power has also been linked to working memory maintenance (Jokisch & 
Jensen, 2007; Kaiser et al., 2003; Lutzenberger et al., 2002; Tallon-Baudry et al., 1998).  
Selective attention, transient binding of cognitive features, conscious perception of visual 
objects and working memory maintenance are important aspects in performance 
improvement while performing a visuomotor task such as video gaming. 
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6.5.7  EEG synchrony data 
 
The proposed neurophysiological model for flow assumes that flow is marked by mental 
economy (Di Russo, et al., 2005), as it is in peak performance. This is achieved by the 
pruning of excessive cortico-cortical communication between analytical associative 
processes or attentional networks and motor regions resulting in enhancement and 
consistency of psychomotor performance (Hatfield & Hillman, 2001).  This argument 
logically implies that, in its quest for optimal performance, the brain will continue to prune 
or shape (condition) its neural structure for improved performance with every repetition of 
the same task.  This implies that flow will be underpinned by an optimal neural network.   
 
With reference to state space dynamics, Werner (2008) argues that at a critical point of 
state transition, the system undergoes a significant reconfiguration which, among other 
features, is expressed as change of the correlation function between system elements. The 
correlation function characterises how the value at one point in state space is correlated 
with the value at another point, reflecting the micro level’s fine structure.  
 
Adopting a state space approach in this analysis, the expectation was that high correlations 
(synchrony) between sites may be viewed as signs of neural bindings or interlocking, in 
other words, there is a similar amount of energy flowing in a similar pattern within the two 
correlated areas, indicating that they operate in synchrony and, therefore relate to the same 
task or function.  These bindings form operative neural networks through which essential 
areas of the brain perform their functions, in turn, providing the investigator with the 
opportunity to “view” the various pathways and to relate the observations to existing 
observations, theories and knowledge.   
 
In this study, the critical question was whether the neural system under investigation (i.e. 
the PFC-SMC-PPC-O1 network) underwent a significant reconfiguration when flow was 
assumed.  Even more critical was whether there was evidence of a neurological pattern 
suggesting a shift between the “implicit and explicit” systems, or a shift from the frontal 
networks to the posterior networks during peak performance.  If so, this neurological 
pattern was then considered the EEG correlate of flow, which can be used as an objective 
measure of flow. 
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In the following section the neural network will be investigated using site and frequency 
inter-correlations that indicate the level of binding between the various brain areas, by 
presenting the EEG data graphically and topographically. The coefficient of correlation 
can vary from positive one (indicating a perfect positive relationship), to negative one 
(indicating a perfect negative relationship).  Nought (0) signifies no correlation.  
Correlations were considered significant at probabilities equal or less than 0.05.  
Correlations were also interpreted in terms of the following power categories : between 
0.00 and 0.30 were considered weak, between 0.30 and 0.70 were moderate and between 
0.70 and 1.00 were high.  Correlations of 0.30 to 1.0 or -0.30 to -1.0 were used as 
sufficient strength for bindings to be considered synchronous.  This was the interpretation 
adopted in this analysis.  
 
6.5.7.1 Total sample inter-correlations between sites and frequencies  
 
Table 33  
Total sample inter-correlations between sites and frequencies 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
The total sample inter-correlations, by location, showed highly consistent results over all 
200 races, with the notable exception of beta between the sensori-motor and parietal, 
sensori-motor and occipital, and pre-frontal and parietal areas where very low correlations 
that were not significant were evident.  All other correlations were highly significant at the 
Total Sample 
Correlations 
N = 200 races F3 - C3 C3 -  P3 F3 -  P3 C3 -  01 P3 -  01 
 
F3 -  01 
Delta 0.93*** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.64*** 0.85*** 0.57*** 
Theta 0.90*** 0.78*** 0.82*** 0.66*** 0.82*** 0.67*** 
Alpha 0.79*** 0.59*** 0.80*** 0.63*** 0.76*** 0.70*** 
Lobeta 0.77*** 0.47*** 0.61*** 0.58*** 0.70*** 0.72*** 
Beta 0.77*** -0.03 0.22 0.19 0.44*** 0.33*** 
Hibeta 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.58*** 0.52*** 0.85*** 0.44*** 
Gamma 0.92*** 0.97*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 
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99% level.  This indicates that beta, which is associated with motor control and attention 
shifting, and characterised by synchronisation – de-synchronisation and phase switching 
(Pfurtscheller & Andrew, 1999; Ivanitsky et al., 2001; Fingelkurts et al., 2005; Schnitzler 
& Gross, 2005), plays a pivotal role in visuomotor performance. 
 
In terms of the strength of the bindings between the various sites and EEG frequencies, 
gamma was highly correlated across all sites for the total sample. 
 
6.5.7.2  High and low flow differences in synchrony between sites and frequencies 
 
From Table 34 it is evident that the patterns of inter-correlations between the high and low 
flow groups differed in only three instances.  In lobeta, for the low flow group only, the C3 
– P3 and C3 – O1 connections were de-synchronised and in beta the P3 – O1 connection 
was still synchronised compared to the high flow group.  These differences will be further 
discussed later.  
 
Table 34  
Summary of inter- correlations for high and low flow 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
Freq. 
Group  
(n= 20) F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Delta 
Group 1 0.92*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.65** 0.87*** 0.61** 
Group 2 0.95*** 0.76*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.82*** 0.55** 
Theta 
Group  1 0.90*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.57** 0.82*** 0.66** 
Group  2 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.60** 0.81*** 0.61** 
Alpha 
Group  1 0.78*** 0.56** 0.74*** 0.65** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
Group  2 0.78*** 0.58** 0.80*** 0.58** 0.71*** 0.56** 
Lobeta 
Group  1 0.80*** 0.54** 0.52** 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.78*** 
Group  2 0.65** 0.18 0.42** 0.27 0.52** 0.43 
Beta 
Group  1 0.84*** -0.09 0.16 0.17 0.40 0.29 
Group  2 0.73*** 0.003 0.10 0.27 0.41 0.18 
Hibeta 
Group  1 0.85*** 0.77*** 0.60** 0.53* 0.86*** 0.46* 
Group  2 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.62** 0.56** 0.84*** 0.47* 
Gamma 
Group  1 0.92*** 0.99*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 
Group  2 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 
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6.5.7.3  Delta synchrony in high and low flow 
 
Table 35  
Delta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55. All significant and weakened inter-site neural bindings for Groups 1 and 2 in 
delta frequency 
 
Delta synchrony was marked by the following characteristics: 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Delta 
Group 1 
n= 20 0.92*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.65** 0.87*** 0.61** 
   
Group 2 
n= 20 0.95*** 0.76*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.82*** 0.55** 
SMC 
C3 PPC 
P3 
OC 
O1 
PFC 
F3 
65% 
92% 
73% 
87% 
70% 
61% 
95% 
71% 
76% 
82% 
55% 
67% 
Key  : 
Group 1 
Group 2 
% level of synchrony (correlation) 
Synch    De-synch 
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(1) There were no significant differences in delta EEG synchrony between the brain sites 
tested, in both high and low flow conditions.   
(2) Consistency within high- and low flow groups was so strong that correlations are 
significant at the 99% level in all connections.  
 
 
 
Figure 56. Delta synchrony high vs low flow groups 
 
There were, however, differences in the levels of synchrony between sites.  
 
(1) The prefrontal-sensori-motor connection (F3-C3) had the strongest delta synchrony in 
both conditions, with r = 0.92 in the high- and r = 0.95 in the low flow groups 
respectively.   
(2) The parietal-occipital connection (P3-O1) was also highly correlated in both conditions 
(r = 0.87 in high flow and 0.82 in low flow). 
(3) The largest differences between the two conditions occurred in the parietal-occipital 
(P3-O1) and the prefrontal-occipital (F3-O1) connections with the high flow condition 
showing the stronger bind.  
(4) Increased delta synchronisation in the frontal- and occipital areas has been found to be 
related to inhibition of non-relevant stimuli during go/no-go tasks (Harmony et al., 
2009).   
 222 
 
6.5.7.4  Theta synchrony in high and low flow 
 
Table 36  
Theta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57.  All significant and weakened inter-site neural bindings for Groups 1 and 2 in 
theta frequency 
 
 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Theta 
Group  1 
n= 20 0.90*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.57** 0.82*** 0.66** 
  
Group  2 
n= 20 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.60** 0.81*** 0.61** 
SMC 
C3 PPC 
P3 
OC 
O1 
PFC 
F3 
90% 
57% 
66% 
75% 
82% 81% 
87% 
78% 
60% 
80% 
84% 
61% 
Key  : 
Group 1 
Group 2 
% level of synchrony (correlation) 
Synch    De-synch 
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Figure 58.  Theta synchrony high vs low flow groups 
 
Theta synchrony was marked by: 
 
(1) Consistency within high- and low flow groups was very strong across all sites and in 
all conditions.  Correlations were significant at the 99% level in all connections.  
(2) The strongest theta synchrony seemed to occur in the F3-C3, F3-P3 and P3-O1 
connections for both conditions. 
(3) The largest difference between the two conditions occured in the prefrontal-occipital 
(F3-O1) connection with the high flow condition showing the stronger bind.  
(4) Horan (2009) postulated that theta is correlated with scanning for visceral pleasure, 
enhanced artistic creativity, responses to novel situations and various forms of training.  
 
6.5.7.5  Alpha synchrony in high and low flow 
 
Table 37  
Alpha synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Alpha 
Group  1 
n= 20 0.78*** 0.56** 0.74*** 0.65** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
  
Group  2 
n= 20 0.78*** 0.58** 0.80*** 0.58** 0.71*** 0.56** 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
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Figure 59.  All significant and weakened inter-site neural bindings for Groups 1 and 2 in 
alpha frequency 
 
 
 
Figure 60.  Alpha synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
SMC 
C3 PPC 
P3 
OC 
O1 
PFC 
F3 
58% 
79% 
65% 77% 
56% 
74% 
78% 
78% 
58% 
71% 
80% 
56% 
Key  : 
Group 1 
Group 2 
% level of synchrony (correlation) 
Synch    De-synch 
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Alpha synchrony was marked by: 
 
(1) Alpha waves were moderately to strongly synchronised for both conditions across all 
sites. 
(2) High consistency of the synchrony scores was evidenced across all frequencies and 
sites with a 99% level of significance. 
(3) The strongest alpha synchrony seemed to occur in the F3-P3 connection for the low 
flow condition followed by the F3-C3 connection for both conditions. 
(4) The largest difference between the two conditions occured in the prefrontal-occipital 
(F3-O1) connection with the high flow condition showing the stronger bind.  
(5) Globally, alpha activity reflects a relaxed wakefulness state, and decreases with 
concentration, stimulation or visual fixation (Stern & Engel, 2005).  Rowe et al. (2007) 
postulated that the alpha rhythm is a measure of the strength and delay of signal 
transfer in cortico-thalamocortical loops.  Increased alpha activity (synchronisation) 
may increase the efficiency and accuracy of thalamocortical transfer. Consistent with 
this, alpha demonstrates positive correlations with information processing speed. 
(6) Alpha is also involved in anticipatory attention, which involves top-down interactions 
between higher-order and primary areas of the visual cortex.  These, in turn, have been 
linked to synchronisation in the alpha frequency band (von Stein & Sarnthein, 2000). 
 
6.5.7.6  Lobeta synchrony in high and low flow 
 
Table 38  
Lobeta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Lobeta 
Group  1 
n= 20 0.80*** 0.54** 0.52** 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.78*** 
  
Group  2 
n= 20 0.65** 0.18 0.42** 0.27 0.52** 0.43 
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Figure 61. All significant and weakened inter-site neural bindings for Groups 1 and 2 in 
lobeta frequency   
 
 
 
 
Figure 62.  Lobeta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
Lobeta synchrony was marked by: 
 
SMC 
C3 PPC 
P3 
OC 
O1 
PFC 
F3 
18% 
78% 
75% 70% 
54% 
52% 
80% 
65% 
27% 
52% 
42% 
43% 
Key  : 
Group 1 
Group 2 
% level of synchrony (correlation) 
Synch    De-synch 
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(1) Moderate to high synchrony levels for the high flow condition at all brain sites. 
(2) There was no synchrony (de-synchronised) between C3-P3, F3-O1 and C3-O1 for the 
low flow condition.  For C3 in this condition there was only synchronisation with F3. 
(3) There was very strong lobeta synchrony between F3-O1, F3-C3, C3-O1 and P3-O1 for 
the high flow condition. 
(4) The F3-C3 synchrony was the strongest, while O1 had strong bindings with all the 
other sites 
(5) Lobeta predominated only in the sensori-motor cortex (sensori-motor strip).  Lobeta 
amplitude increases with stillness and decreases with movement (Othmer, et al., 1999, 
p. 267).   
(6) Since lobeta is associated with motor functioning, it is suggested that lobeta synchrony 
is probably associated with enhanced quality (smoothness) in terms of motor 
functioning.  Synchronised lobeta connections between all cortical areas, such as 
displayed in the high flow condition, was probably an indication of balanced 
(harmonious) flow of neural information through-out the network ensuring smooth and 
accurate motor execution.  De-synchronisation between C3-P3, C3-O1 and F3-O1 for 
the low flow condition may have indicated that the sensori-motor cortex was still 
highly dependent on the pre-frontal cortex for motor input due to un-established skills 
and a high error rate. 
 
6.5.7.7  Beta synchrony in high and low flow 
 
Table 39   
Beta synchrony in high and low flow 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Beta 
Group  1 
n= 20 0.84*** -0.09 0.16 0.17 0.40 0.29 
  
Group  2 
n= 20 0.73*** 0.03 0.10 0.27 0.41 0.18 
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Figure 63. All significant and weakened inter-site neural bindings for Groups 1 and 2 in 
beta frequency 
 
 
 
Figure 64. Beta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
Beta synchrony was marked by: 
 
SMC 
C3 PPC 
P3 
OC 
O1 
PFC 
F3 
29% 
17% 40% 
-9% 
84% 
73% 
27% 
10% 
18% 
3% 
41% 
16% 
Key  : 
Group 1 
Group 2 
% level of synchrony (correlation) 
Synch    De-synch 
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(1) Predominance in the prefrontal-sensori-motor (F3-C3) connection where it was highly 
consistently represented in both conditions.  
(2) Apart from the F3-C3 connection, only weak non-significant correlations were found 
among all other sites in both conditions, showing evidence of de-synchronisation.  
(3) Only one connection, the sensori-motor-parietal connection (C3-P3), displayed a weak 
negative correlation (de-synchronised), indicating phase switching. 
(4) Research by Gross, et al. (2004) indicated that synchronisation/de-synchronisation 
appears to be a candidate mechanism for enhancing target processing while at the same 
time avoiding interference by suppressing the processing of non-targets, respectively.  
Such a mechanism may define an important aspect of what is commonly referred to as 
‘‘attention’’ or “selective attention”.   
(5) Pfurtscheller et al. (2003) suggested that beta synchronisation/de-synchronisation plays 
an important role in motor control.  Research indicated that beta-rhythm oscillations 
de-synchronise during automotoric movement and again become synchronised over a 
larger scale when attention to sensori-motor integration is required (Pfurtscheller & 
Andrew, 1999; Ivanitsky et al., 2001; Fingelkurts et al., 2005; Schnitzler & Gross, 
2005).   
(6) Van Wijk, et al. (2009) reported that the role of beta synchrony in biasing response 
competition appears not only related to a biasing role of alpha activity in the selection 
of visual information, but also to the concept of ‘‘focal de-synchronisation/surround 
synchronisation’’.  Beta oscillatory synchrony operates as a spatiotemporal filter to 
sharpen action-selection by cortico-basal ganglia networks (Courtemanche et al., 
2003). 
 
6.5.7.8  Hibeta synchrony in high and low flow 
 
Table 40  
Hibeta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Hibeta 
Group  1 
n= 20 0.85*** 0.77*** 0.60** 0.53* 0.86*** 0.46* 
  
Group  2 
n= 20 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.62** 0.56** 0.84*** 0.47* 
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Figure 65.  All significant and weakened inter-site neural bindings for Groups 1 and 2 in 
hibeta frequency  
 
 
 
 
Figure 66.  Hibeta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
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Hibeta synchrony was marked by: 
 
(1) Synchronous connections between all sites for both conditions. 
(2) Strong synchrony in the F3-C3, C3-P3 and P3-O1 connections for both conditions.  
(3) A similar synchrony pattern for both conditions. 
(4) Consistency within high- and low flow groups that was strong across all sites and in all 
conditions.  
(5) High beta is associated with peak performance, cognitive processing, worry, anxiety, 
over-thinking, and ruminating (Demos, 2005).  
 
6.5.7.9  Gamma synchrony in high and low flow 
 
Table 41  
Gamma synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Gamma 
Group  1 
n= 20 0.92*** 0.99*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 
  
Group  2 
n= 20 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 
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Figure 67.  All significant and weakened inter-site neural bindings for Groups 1 and 2 in 
gamma frequency  
 
 
 
Figure 68.  Gamma synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
Gamma synchrony was marked by: 
 
(1) Highly synchronous connections between all sites for both conditions. 
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(2) Consistency within high and low flow groups that was very strong across all sites and 
in all conditions. Correlations were significant at the 99.9% level in all connections.  
(3) Gamma seems to help organise the brain, promote learning and allow for mental 
sharpness.  It is activated when the brain needs to be active and idle when no 
specialised task is at hand (Hammond, 2000).   
(4) Gamma is prominent especially during high alertness and after sensory stimulation, 
likely contributing to the ‘‘binding” of diverse information into a single coherent 
percept.  Gamma, high beta and beta waves seem to be associated with selective 
attention, transient binding of cognitive features, and conscious perception of visual 
objects (Hughes, 2008). 
 
6.6  ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
 
The first hypothesis dealt with the relationship between peak performance and flow. This 
relationship was key to investigating the EEG data accompanying flow.  
 
Peak performance on a task is a necessary pre-condition for flow to occur. In this study it 
was expected that the faster the time taken to complete the task the higher the likelihood of 
the performer to have indicated the experience of flow.  
 
Hypothesis 1  
 
H10 : There is no relationship between peak performance and psychological flow.  
(p ≤ 0.05). 
H1A : There is a relationship between peak performance and psychological flow.  
(p ≤ 0.05). 
 
Perceived flow and peak performance were significantly correlated in the case of Group 1 
(r = -0.58; p = 0.01).  The negative sign follows from an inverse relationship (shorter time 
= higher performance).  Therefore the null hypothesis is rejected with p = 0.01. 
 
Further analyses of the relationship between performance and flow indicated that the low 
flow group (Group 2) had a lower overall negative correlation (r = -0.47; p = 0.04), still 
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significant at the 95% level, indicating that as performance time increases so also flow 
increases and vice versa, but it is more variable than when flow is higher.  
 
A correlation of -0.82 (p = 0.00) between Group 1 and Group 2 showed that the less time 
taken to complete the race, the higher the flow. This is a strong correlation, in the predicted 
direction, and it is highly significant at the 0.001 level.   
 
A Mulitvariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) indicated that the performance and flow 
levels of the two groups differed significantly with an F-ratio of 150.06 (p = 0.00) for 
performance and F-ratio of 71.99 (p = 0.00) for flow.  The critical value for F was 4.098. 
 
From the above analyses it is evident that there was a positive relationship between 
performance and flow and that the relationship strengthened and became more 
consistent with increasing performance. 
 
The following hypotheses dealt with the neurophysiological (EEG) correlates of flow.  
 
The theoretical model postulated that when flow occurs under conditions of peak 
performance, the following relationships and inter-relationships in EEG were likely to 
manifest in the areas of the brain indicated: 
 
Table 42    
Expected changes in EEG at high flow and peak performance 
 
Brain Site (s) Expected brain activity. 
Pre-frontal cortex (F3) Decreased beta and gamma and increased theta power 
Parietal cortex (P3) Increased theta and alpha power. 
Sensori-motor (C3) Increased alpha.  
Between the sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) 
areas 
Increased alpha synchrony 
Between the pre-frontal and sensori-motor cortex 
(F3-C3), the pre-frontal and parietal (F3-P3) and 
the sensori-motor and parietal (C3 –P3). 
De-synchronisation in beta. 
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MANOVA was used to test for differences (hypotheses 2 to 7). In this study the sample 
size was 20 and the critical value for F was 4.098 at the 0.05 level of significance.  
 
Formally stated the expectations were hypothesised as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2  
Research question : Is there an increase in Theta power in the PFC (F3) when flow occurs? 
 
H20:   There is no difference in PFC (F3) EEG Theta power between high- and low flow.  
µ1 = µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
H2A:  There is an increase in PFC (F3) EEG Theta power in high flow. 
µ1 > µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
An F-ratio of 0.20 (p = 0.657) was calculated for F3 Theta, which is lower than the critical 
value of 4.098 (p = 0.05), thus the null hypothesis is accepted.  A small effect size (Eta
2
) of 
0.02 was calculated which supports the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3  
Research question : Is there an increase in Theta power in the PPC (P3) when flow occurs? 
 
H30:   There is no difference in PPC (P3) EEG Theta power between high- and low flow.  
µ1 = µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
H3A:  There is an increase in PPC (P3) EEG Theta power in high flow. 
µ1 > µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
An F-ratio of 0.47 (p = 0.496) was calculated for P3 Theta, which is lower than the critical 
value of 4.098 (p = 0.05), thus the null hypothesis is accepted.  A small effect size (Eta
2
) of 
0.05 was calculated which supports the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
Hypotheses 4 
Research question : Is there an increase in Alpha power in the PPC (P3) when flow 
occurs? 
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H40: There is no difference in PPC (P3) EEG Alpha power between high- and low flow.  
µ1 = µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
H4A:  There is an increase in PPC (P3) EEG Alpha power in high flow.   
µ1 > µ2 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
An F-ratio of 0.35 (p = 0.555) was calculated for P3 Alpha, which is lower than the critical 
value of 4.098 (p = 0.05), thus the null hypothesis is accepted. A small effect size (Eta
2
) of 
0.04 was calculated which supports the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
Hypotheses 5 
Research question : Is there an increase in Alpha power in the SMC (C3) when flow 
occurs? 
 
H50: There is no difference in SMC (C3) EEG Alpha power between high- and low 
flow.  
µ1 = µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
H5A:  There is an increase in SMC (C3) EEG Alpha power in high flow.   
µ1 > µ2 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
An F-ratio of 2.8 (p = 0.103) was calculated for C3 Alpha, which is lower than the critical 
value of 4.098 (p = 0.05), thus the null hypothesis is accepted.  However, a large effect 
size (Eta
2
) of 0.24 was calculated which indicates a trend in high flow not present in low 
flow and that may become significant on re-testing. 
 
Hypotheses 6 
Research question : Is there a decrease in Beta power in the PFC (F3) when flow occurs? 
 
H60: There is no difference in PFC (F3) EEG Beta power between high- and low flow.  
µ1 = µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
H6A:  There is a decrease in PFC (F3) EEG Beta power in high flow.   
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µ1 < µ2 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
An F-ratio of 3.65 (p = 0.064) was calculated for F3 Beta, which is lower than the critical 
value of 4.098 (p = 0.05), thus the null hypothesis is accepted.  However, a large effect 
size (Eta
2
) of 0.29 was calculated which indicates a trend in high flow not present in low 
flow and that may become significant on re-testing. 
 
Hypotheses 7 
Research question : Is there a decrease in Gamma power in the PFC (F3) when flow 
occurs? 
 
H70: There is no difference in PFC (F3) EEG Gamma power between high- and low 
flow.  
µ1 = µ2 (p ≤ 0.05)  
 
H7A:  There is a decrease in PFC (F3) EEG Gamma power in high flow.   
µ1 < µ2 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
An F-ratio of 0.02 (p = 0.892) was calculated for F3 Gamma, which is lower than the 
critical value of 4.098 (p = 0.05), thus the null hypothesis is accepted. A small effect size 
(Eta
2
) of 0.00 was calculated which supports the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
Linear correlations (Pearson Product Moment Correlations) were calculated to test 
relationships among variables. Correlations (r) were considered significant at probabilities 
less than 0.05, but were also interpreted in terms of the following power categories: 0.00 to 
0.30, weak; 0.30 to 0.70, moderate; and 0.70 to 1.00, high or strong.  Correlations of 0.30 
to 1.0 or -0.30 to -1.0 were used as sufficient strength for bindings to be considered 
synchronous. 
 
Hypothesis 8 
Research question : Is there Alpha synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow? 
 
H80:  There is no Alpha synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow.  
 r < 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
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H8A: There is Alpha synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow.  
r ≥ 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
For Group 1 a correlation of r = 0.56 (p = 0.001) was calculated between C3 and P3 Alpha, 
indicating a moderate relationship which is significant (p ≤ 0.05). This implies that there 
was Alpha synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow, thus the null hypothesis is rejected.   
 
Hypothesis 9 
Research question : Is there Beta de-synchronisation between C3 and P3 in high flow? 
 
H90:  There is no Beta synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow.  
 r < 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
H9A: There is Beta synchrony between C3 and P3 in high flow.  
r ≥ 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
For Group 1 a correlation of r = -0.09 (p = 0.704) was calculated between C3 and P3 Beta, 
indicating a very weak negative relationship (r < 0.30) which is not significant (p > 0.05).  
Although the result is not statistically significant the level of synchrony between C3 and 
P3 is so low that it is unlikely even in repeated testing to approach the level of 
synchronicity.  Thus the null hypothesis is accepted.  Beta thus desynchronised between 
the SMC and the PPC as expected. 
 
Hypothesis 10 
Research question : Is there Beta de-synchronisation between F3 and P3 in high flow? 
 
H100:  There is no Beta synchrony between F3 and P3 in high flow.  
 r < 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
H10A: There is Beta synchrony between F3 and P3 in high flow.  
r ≥ 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
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For Group 1 a correlation of r = 0.16 (p = 0.498) was calculated between F3 and P3 Beta, 
indicating a weak relationship (r < 0.30) which is not significant (p > 0.05). Although the 
result is not statistically significant the level of synchrony between F3 and P3 is so low 
that it is unlikely even in repeated testing to approach the level of synchronicity.  Thus the 
null hypothesis is accepted.  Beta thus desynchronised between the PFC and the PPC as 
expected. 
 
Hypothesis 11 
Research question : Is there Beta de-synchronisation between F3 and C3 in high flow? 
 
H110:  There is no Beta synchrony between F3 and C3 in high flow.  
 r < 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
H11A: There is Beta synchrony between F3 and C3 in high flow.  
r ≥ 0.30 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 
For Group 1 a correlation of r = 0.84 (p = 0.000) was calculated between F3 and C3 Beta, 
indicating a strong (r > 0.70) positive relationship which is highly significant (p < 0.05), 
thus the null hypothesis is rejected.  Beta thus remained strongly synchronised between the 
PFC and the SMC. 
 
Interestingly, when the Group 2 data are subjected to the same hypotheses testing 
regarding synchrony (indicating neural binding), the outcome is similar.   
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The above results indicate that the assumptions formulated from the literature regarding 
the neural activity expected during flow under peak performance conditions largely did not 
manifested as expected. This leads to a more complete discussion of the contrasting neural 
patterns between the peak and baseline conditions, and to identify those patterns that do 
indicate differences over the areas tested which may provide a possible marker for flow 
while executing a visuomotor task.   
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In summary, Table 43 (below) illustrates the main findings with regard to observed neural 
connections under conditions of peak performance for Group 1, the high-flow group and 
Group 2, the low-flow group.  
 
Table 43   
Matrix of EEG correlates for both Groups 1 and 2 
 
 
From Table 43 it is evident that the high flow group presents with a distinctly different 
network of neurological connections than the low flow group.  The data indicate that the 
two groups differ only in the lobeta frequency band.  When the neural pathways or 
bindings are compared for the two groups it seems that the F3 – C3 connection is 
instrumental to visuomotor performance since all connections remained synchronised 
across all frequencies for both groups.  With regards to the other PFC connections, both 
groups show identical synchrony patterns, together with beta wave de-synchronisation in 
the F3 – P3 and F3 – O1 connections.  However, in the F3 – O1 connection there is de-
synchronisation in the Lobeta frequency for the low-flow group.  For this group, in Lobeta, 
O1 is also desynchronised with C3 and only bound with P3, while C3 is desynchronised 
with P3 and O1 and only bound with F3.  In other words, the only synchronised bindings 
in Lobeta are between F3 – C3 and F3 – P3 and P3 – O1.  Lobeta is associated with 
Freq. 
Group  
(n= 20) F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Delta 
Group 1 0.92*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.65** 0.87*** 0.61** 
Group 2 0.95*** 0.76*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.82*** 0.55** 
Theta 
Group  1 0.90*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.57** 0.82*** 0.66** 
Group  2 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.60** 0.81*** 0.61** 
Alpha 
Group  1 0.78*** 0.56** 0.74*** 0.65** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
Group  2 0.78*** 0.58** 0.80*** 0.58** 0.71*** 0.56** 
Lobeta 
Group  1 0.80*** 0.54** 0.52** 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.78*** 
Group  2 0.65** 0.18 0.42** 0.27 0.52** 0.43 
Beta 
Group  1 0.84*** -0.09 0.16 0.17 0.40 0.29 
Group  2 0.73*** 0.003 0.10 0.27 0.41 0.18 
Hibeta 
Group  1 0.85*** 0.77*** 0.60** 0.53* 0.86*** 0.46* 
Group  2 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.62** 0.56** 0.84*** 0.47* 
Gamma 
Group  1 0.92*** 0.99*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 
Group  2 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 
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stillness and smooth motor function.  This may indicate that in the low-flow group motor 
coordination and execution are still under-developed since the sensori-motor and parietal 
areas receive frequent input from the pre-frontal cortex (higher order executive input) but 
lacks feedback loops with each other and the occipital area.  Automotoric functioning is 
likely to occur only when all connections in Lobeta is synchronised. 
 
Figure 69 (below) is an illustrated summary of synchronised and desynchronised 
connections across all frequencies and locations for the high-flow group.  Dotted arrows 
indicate de-synchronised connections and solid arrows indicate synchronised connections.   
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Figure 69.  Illustrative summary of research findings for the high-flow group in terms of 
frequency and location. Delta (D), Theta (T), Alpha (A), Lobeta (L) and Gamma (G) are significantly 
synchronised across all localities.  Beta (B) is synchronised only in the PFC – SMC connection and has de-
synchronised in all other connections. 
 
Figure 69 indicates that for the high-flow group all frequencies, but Beta, are significantly 
synchronised across all localities.  Beta is synchronised only in the PFC – SMC connection 
and has de-synchronised in all other connections. 
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In the following chapter the above research results will be discussed fully and integrated 
into existing literature, research questions will be addressed, insights offered, limitations of 
the current study outlined, and recommendations offered.  Lastly, suggestions for future 
research are offered. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and integrate the findings of this study with 
existing literature, explore insights offered by the research process, outline the limitations 
of the current study, and make recommendations for possible future use.  Lastly, 
suggestions for future research are offered. 
 
The aim of the study was to determine the EEG correlates of flow (a particular state of 
consciousness) under conditions of peak performance.  The justification for doing this is to 
establish an objective measure of flow.  An objective measure of flow is deemed to be 
valuable in coaching, training, and self-development because flow is associated with peak 
performance and flow induction may increase performance in the workplace, sports field 
and leisure activities.  An objective measure of flow, such as EEG, can be used to monitor 
flow during performance since it provides more accurate information than subjective 
behavioural measures. 
 
7.2   CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
In this section the findings of the study will be discussed and linked to existing literature, 
where after the implications of the findings will be integrated into the earlier proposed 
neurophysiological model for flow. 
 
7.2.1  Flow and performance 
 
The first research question centred on the relationship between performance and flow.  
This relationship was key to investigating the EEG data accompanying flow in order to 
arrive at a probable marker for flow.  
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Pates and Maynard (2000) postulated that the subjective experience when achieving the 
desired performance is the primary reward in flow. Once flow is experienced, the standard 
has to be raised (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).   Therefore, in order to re-experience 
flow one has to improve or expand one’s skill level(s).  It was inferred that flow was likely 
to occur when skill reaches a certain level of competency, which was most probable when 
the autonomous phase (Fitts & Posner, 1967) in learning or skill execution was reached.  
This phase is characterised by continuous errorless and seemingly effortless performance, 
which is also a characteristic of flow. 
 
From the above literature peak performance was deemed a necessary pre-condition for 
flow to occur. In this study, 20 experienced video gamers were subjected to a continuous 
visuomotor task which they had to repeat 10 times in order to produce a best performance.  
It was expected that the faster the time taken to complete the task the higher the likelihood 
of the performer to experience flow.  
 
The sample was segmented into two sub-samples reflecting two levels of the flow variable.  
The first race completed by each participant was used as a “baseline” (and indicative of a 
low flow state – Group 2) for comparison with their own personal fastest race/highest flow 
score combination, indicative of the high flow state (Group 1).   
 
Results indicated that the high performance / high flow level (Group 1) presented with a 
significant negative correlation (r = -0.58; p = 0.01) between perceived flow and peak 
performance.  Since a decreasing value for performance (time) constituted improved 
performance, the negative r value indicated that the level of perceived flow increased with 
increasing performance.  Further analyses of the performance – flow relationship indicated 
that the low performance / low flow level (Group 2) had a lower overall negative 
correlation (r = -0.47; p = 0.04), but was still significant at the 95% level, indicating that as 
performance time increased so also flow increased and vice versa, but it was more variable 
than when flow was higher.  
 
Therefore the null hypothesis that there was no relationship between peak performance and 
psychological flow was rejected. 
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A correlation of -0.82 (p = 0.00) between the two flow levels showed that the less time 
taken to complete the race, the higher the flow.  This is a strong correlation, in the 
predicted direction, and highly significant at the 99% level.   
 
From the above analyses it was evident that there was a positive relationship between 
performance and flow and that the relationship strengthened and became more consistent 
with increasing performance. 
 
A Mulitvariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) indicated that the performance and flow 
levels of the two groups differed significantly with an F-ratio of 150.06 (p = 0.00) for 
performance and F-ratio of 71.99 (p = 0.00) for flow. A very large effect size (Eta
2
 = 0.94), 
for performance confirmed that the two levels differ by 94%.  Similarly, a very large effect 
size (Eta
2
 = 0.89) for flow confirmed that the two levels differ by 89%.  The above results 
justified the segmentation of the data into the high- and low flow groups on the basis of 
them being representative of significantly different levels of flow and performance.  This 
allowed the comparison of EEG data between the two levels. 
 
The accompanying EEG data for Group 1 and Group 2 were used to examine and interpret 
the neurophysiological findings of the study and in the final analysis to identify a probable 
EEG marker for flow. 
 
7.2.2  The EEG findings accompanying flow 
 
The findings will be covered by discussing the power indicators, synchronisation and de-
synchronisation patterns, linking the results to the proposed neurophysiological model for 
flow, re-configuration in brain processes and flow, a possible EEG marker for flow, 
integration of the findings with existing knowledge, and validity of findings emanating 
from the study. 
 
7.2.2.1  Power indicators 
 
With reference to the proposed neurophysiological model for flow, it was expected that 
theta power would increase and beta and gamma power decrease in the frontal (F3) region 
as the state of flow is assumed.  Also theta and alpha power were expected to increase in 
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the parietal (P3) region while alpha power was expected to also increase in the sensori-
motor (C3) area. 
 
MANOVA results indicated that there were no significant differences between the means 
of the two groups in any frequency but for lobeta in the sensori-motor cortex (C3).  Lobeta 
increased significantly (p = 0.0432) at C3 in the high flow condition.  The differences for 
F3 and P3 in the beta frequency were at the 0.06 level of probability and fell just outside 
the significant range.  In both areas beta power increased as flow increased. 
 
Although the research results revealed only significant change in lobeta in the sensori-
motor area, it was still useful to look at the movement (change size and directions) trends 
by frequency band for the measured scalp positions as flow was assumed.  It was evident 
that performance and the flow (AFQ4) accounted for the greatest amount of variability 
from low to high flow states.  C3 lobeta was next, and as mentioned earlier, the only 
significantly different EEG variable, followed by other (statistically non-significant) 
changes.  It was observed that the beta frequency produced large effects (Eta
2
 ≥ 0.14) 
across three of the four cortices while the effect in O1 was only medium (Eta
2
 ≥ 0.06).  In 
the pre-frontal cortex, large effect sizes were also observed in delta and lobeta. In the 
sensori-motor cortex large effect sizes were evident in alpha, lobeta, and beta, while in the 
parietal cortex it was in delta and beta.  Alpha displayed a large effect size in the occipital 
cortex. 
 
In this study, delta power reduced in all cortical areas in the high flow group.  Delta was 
most dominant in the sensori-motor area.  However, large effect sizes were displayed in F3 
(Eta
2
 = 0.-17) and P3 (Eta
2
 = 0.-23), and medium size in C3 (Eta
2
 = -0.09) and O1 (Eta
2
 = 
0.-11).  With regards to the role of delta, Vogel, et al. (1968) postulated that two kinds of 
behavioural inhibitions are characterised by delta.  Class I inhibition refers to the gross 
inactivation of an entire excitatory process resulting in a relaxed, less active state, such as 
sleep, while Class II inhibition refers to the selective suppression of inappropriate, or non-
relevant, neural activity during mental task performance.  The fact that delta power 
decreased in all areas as flow increased may be a result of deactivation of Class 1 
inhibition, thus enhancing general alertness and action orientation.  Also as concentration 
increased with increased performance and flow levels, Class II Delta inhibition was likely 
to reduce. 
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It was hypothesised that theta power would increase in F3 (H2) and P3 (H3) in the high 
flow condition.  However, theta power remained fairly constant in all cortical areas, but 
reduced somewhat in the parietal area in the high flow condition. In addition, all effect 
sizes in theta were small (Eta
2
 < 0.06), indicating that theta played a similar role in both 
flow conditions.  Increased frontal (F3) theta is reported in error detection (Luu et al., 
2003; Luu et al., 2004), working memory tasks (Gevins et al.,1997; Jensen & Tesche, 
2002; Krause et al., 2000; Onton et al., 2005), task complexity and focussed attention.  
Increased theta power in posterior (P3) brain areas are linked to increased task complexity 
during complex visuomotor tasks (Fournier et al., 1999).   
 
It was hypothesised that alpha power would increase in P3 (H4) and C3 (H5) in the high 
flow condition. However, alpha power increased in all cortical areas in the high flow 
condition, especially in the sensori-motor (C3) and occipital (O1) areas, but the increases 
were not significantly different from the low flow condition.  Alpha showed large effect 
sizes in C3 (Eta
2
 = 0.24) and O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.14).  The effect size in P3 was small (Eta
2
 = 
0.04).  Rowe et al. (2007) postulated that alpha demonstrates positive correlations with 
information processing speed.  Alpha is also involved in anticipatory attention, which 
involves top-down interactions between higher-order and primary areas of the visual 
cortex.  Alpha power increases have been linked to active inhibition of neuronal activity 
that could otherwise disturb the working memory (WM) process (Jokisch & Jensen, 2007; 
Klimesch et al., 2007).  Babiloni et al. (2008) postulated that alpha rhythms might 
represent a major physiological mechanism at the basis of “neural efficiency” during the 
judgment of observed actions.  Working memory, information processing speed, 
anticipatory attention, and neural efficiency are all essential to successful visuomotor 
performance. 
 
No hypothesis was set for lobeta.  Lobeta power increased in all cortical areas in the high 
flow group. The least increase was in the parietal area while the increase in the sensori-
motor area was at a statistically significant level (C3 : p = 0.0432).  The largest effect was 
also at C3 (Eta
2
 = 0.33).  However, a large effect was also observed at F3 (Eta
2
 = 0.22) and 
a medium effect at O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.12).  SMR or lobeta predominates only in the sensori-
motor cortex (sensori-motor strip).  Lobeta increases with stillness and decreases with 
movement (Othmer, Othmer & Kaiser, 1999, p. 267).  The significant shift in power in the 
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sensori-motor area may be an indication that motor movement have smoothed out into 
fluent and synchronised motion as flow increased.  Sterman et al. (1994) indicated that the 
sensori-motor system involves the ascending touch and proprioceptive pathways and their 
projections to the thalamus and on to the sensori-motor cortex and the efferents from this 
cortical area.  This system generates the sensori-motor rhythm (SMR), the 12 - 14 Hz 
rhythm (lobeta) over the sensori-motor strip.  Lobeta is seldom isolated (mostly included 
in a broader beta range) in neurophysiological research, thus little information is available 
regarding its role in behaviour.  However, lobeta or SMR is extensively used in 
neurofeedback training across the sensori-motor strip. 
 
Beta power was hypothesised (H6) to decrease in the frontal (F3) area in the high flow 
condition.  However, beta power increased substantially in all cortical areas in the high 
flow condition, especially for F3 (p = 0.0637) and P3 (p = 0.0608).  Also large effect sizes 
(F3 : Eta
2
 = 0.29; P3 : Eta
2
 = 0.29) were demonstrated at these two locations.  A large 
effect size was also indicated at C3 (Eta
2
 = 0.22), while the effect was only medium size at 
O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.08). Beta frequency is associated with concentration, analytical thinking, 
being externally oriented, or being in a state of relaxed thinking (Demos, 2005).  
According to Eoh, et al. (2005), increased beta activity has been related to heightened 
alertness.  Beta also plays an important role in the fronto-parieto-temporal attentional 
network and is known to be involved in target detection, visual attention, and working 
memory; processes that are required for the successful execution of any visually based task 
(Gross, et al., 2004).  In this study, although not significant at the 0.05 level, but with large 
effect, increased frontal and parietal beta power was probably related to the heightened 
level of alertness and concentration involved in high speed motor racing, requiring target 
detection (other cars, obstacles, and track conditions), visual attention, and working 
memory in order to set up peak performance and assuming the flow state. 
 
No hypothesis was set for hibeta. Hibeta power increased substantially in all cortical areas 
in the high flow group, with the least in the sensori-motor area. However none was at a 
statistically significant level.  Medium effect sizes were demonstrated at F3 (Eta
2
 = 0.08) 
and O1 (Eta
2
 = 0.07).  High beta is associated with peak performance, cognitive 
processing, worry, anxiety, over-thinking, and ruminating (Demos, 2005).  The increase in 
hibeta power may be an indication of improved cognitive processing in lieu of peak 
performance. 
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Gamma power was hypothesised (H7) to decrease in the frontal (F3) area in the high flow 
condition.  However, gamma power increased in all cortical areas in the high flow group, 
especially in the parietal- and occipital areas.  However none was at a statistically 
significant level. Effect sizes were also small at all locations. This indicated that gamma 
played an equal role in both flow conditions.  Gamma is prominent especially during high 
alertness and after sensory stimulation, likely contributing to the ‘‘binding” of diverse 
information into a single coherent percept.  Gamma, high beta and beta waves seem to be 
associated with selective attention, transient binding of cognitive features, and conscious 
perception of visual objects (Hughes, 2008).  Increased gamma power has also been linked 
to working memory maintenance (Tallon-Baudry et al., 1998; Lutzenberger et al., 2002; 
Kaiser et al., 2003; Jokisch & Jensen, 2007).  Selective attention, transient binding of 
cognitive features, conscious perception of visual objects and working memory 
maintenance are important aspects in performance improvement while performing a 
visuomotor task such as video gaming. 
 
From the above the main findings (large changes) are summarised in Table 44 (below). 
 
Table 44    
Large changes in EEG power at high flow and peak performance 
 
Brain Site (s) EEG changes from low to high flow 
Pre-frontal cortex (F3) Decreased delta and increased lobeta and beta power 
Sensori-motor cortex (C3) Increased alpha, lobeta and beta power 
Parietal cortex (P3) Increased beta power 
Occipital cortex (O1) Increased alpha power 
 
 
In contrast with the predicted model, the fact that none of the null hypotheses regarding a 
shift in EEG power were rejected is probably due to the different nature of the activities 
upon which the previous research was based.  These activities included shooting, archery, 
golf putting, etc., which require stillness of movement, visualisation of outcome, and have 
a stationary target, compared to a video game where there is a moving target, continuously 
changing visual stimuli, dynamic decision making and complex dynamic bilateral (left and 
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right hands executing different functions simultaneously) hand-eye coordination.  
Furthermore, due to most subjects in the study being experienced video gamers they 
already have a certain level of pre-existing video game stimulus - response mappings and 
mental “circuitry” which caused an “elevated” EEG baseline that is not so different from 
their performance EEG profile.  In this study there was no expert versus novice group 
comparisons; the subjects’ first attempts were compared to their own best attempts/highest 
flow scores. 
 
7.2.2.2  Synchronisation and de-synchronisation patterns 
 
The proposed neurophysiological model for flow hypothesised that individuals performing 
at peak levels, and thus experiencing flow, exhibit increased alpha synchrony between the 
sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) regions along with beta rhythm de-synchronisation 
and phase lags between the various cortical areas.  
 
In terms of alpha synchrony, the two groups were no different.  All connections were 
synchronised.  However, there was a large difference in binding strength between the two 
conditions in the prefrontal-occipital (F3-O1) connection with the high flow condition 
showing a much stronger bind (79% versus 56%), albeit both bindings constituted 
synchrony. The null hypothesis (H8) that there was no alpha synchrony between C3 and P3 
in high flow was rejected.  Rowe et al. (2007) postulated that the alpha rhythm is a 
measure of the strength and delay of signal transfer in cortico-thalamocortical loops.  
Increased alpha activity (synchronisation) may increase the efficiency and accuracy of 
thalamocortical transfer. Consistent with this, alpha demonstrates positive correlations 
with information processing speed.  Alpha is also involved in anticipatory attention, which 
involves top-down interactions between higher-order and primary areas of the visual 
cortex.  These, in turn, have been linked to synchronisation in the alpha frequency band 
(von Stein & Sarnthein, 2000).  In this study the higher level of F3-O1synchrony in the 
high flow condition probably indicated higher efficiency in information processing speed 
and anticipatory attention between the frontal (F3) and visual (O1) cortices. 
 
The only differences in synchronisation/de-synchronisation patterns between the two flow 
conditions were in lobeta where, for the low flow group only, the C3 – P3, C3 – O1 and F3 
– O1 connections were de-synchronised compared to the high flow condition where these 
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connections were synchronised.  There were no hypotheses set for lobeta 
synchronisation/de-synchronisation.  See table 45 below for detail. 
 
Table 45 
Lobeta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
 
Note. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
The figure below illustrates the differences in strength of “binding” (correlation) between 
the various brain areas for the two conditions. 
 
 
 
Figure 70.  Lobeta synchrony across sites in high and low flow 
 
The above table and figure indicate moderate to high synchrony levels for the high flow 
condition at all brain sites.  There was no synchrony (de-synchronised) between C3-P3, 
F3-O1 and C3-O1 for the low flow condition.  For C3 in this condition there was only 
synchronisation with F3.  There was very strong synchrony between F3-O1, F3-C3, C3-O1 
Freq. Group F3 vs C3 C3 vs P3 F3 vs P3 C3 vs 01 P3 vs 01 F3 vs 01 
Lobeta 
Group  1 
High flow 0.80*** 0.54** 0.52** 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.78*** 
  
Group  2 
Low flow 0.65** 0.18 0.42** 0.27 0.52** 0.43 
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and P3-O1 for the high flow condition.  The F3-C3 synchrony was the strongest, while O1 
had strong bindings with all the other sites.   
 
Since lobeta is associated with motor functioning, it is suggested that in this study lobeta 
synchrony was probably associated with enhanced quality (smoothness and calmness) in 
motor functioning.  Synchronised lobeta connections between all cortical areas, as 
displayed in the high flow condition, was probably an indication of optimised flow of 
neural information through-out the network ensuring smooth, relaxed and accurate motor 
execution, which can probably be associated with the “effortless” and super-efficient 
characteristics of “zoning” in sport and flow.  De-synchronisation between C3-P3, C3-O1 
and F3-O1 for the low flow condition may have indicated that the sensori-motor cortex 
was still highly dependent on the pre-frontal cortex for motor input due to un-established 
skills and a high error rate.  Automotoric functioning was likely to occur only when all 
connections in Lobeta were synchronised. 
 
For the high flow group all frequencies but beta were synchronised across all scalp 
locations.  Beta remained synchronised only in the F3-C3 connection.  It was hypothesised 
that beta will de-synchronise between the frontal (F3), sensori-motor (C3) and parietal (P3) 
areas.  This implied that the null hypotheses, indicating a synchronised connection, for 
hypotheses 9 (C3-P3) and 10 (F3-P3) were rejected, but not for hypothesis 11 (F3-C3).  
However, the beta pattern was the same for both conditions. 
 
Figure 71 below illustrated the peculiar beta band synchronisation / de-synchronisation 
pattern for both groups. 
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Figure 71.  Pattern of synchronised connections in Beta for high flow group (de-
synchronised connections are not displayed) 
 
The above phenomenon of beta synchronisation/de-synchronisation is congruent with 
research by Gross, et al. (2004) who reported that changes in beta synchronisation reflect 
changes in the attentional demands of the task and are directly related to behavioural 
performance.  They concluded that synchronisation / de-synchronisation appears to be a 
candidate mechanism for enhancing target processing while at the same time avoiding 
interference by suppressing the processing of non-targets, respectively.  Pfurtscheller et al. 
(2003) suggested that beta synchronisation/de-synchronisation plays an important role in 
motor control.  Beta oscillatory synchrony operates as a spatiotemporal filter to sharpen 
action-selection by cortico-basal ganglia networks (Courtemanche et al., 2003).  Research 
indicated that beta-rhythm oscillations de-synchronise during automotoric movement and 
again become synchronised over a larger scale when attention to sensori-motor integration 
is required (Pfurtscheller & Andrew, 1999; Ivanitsky et al., 2001; Fingelkurts et al., 2005; 
Schnitzler & Gross, 2005).  Van Wijk, et al. (2009) reported that the role of beta 
synchrony in biasing response competition appears not only related to a biasing role of 
alpha activity in the selection of visual information, but also to the concept of ‘‘focal de-
synchronisation/surround synchronisation’’.   
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The above pattern of lobeta synchronisation and beta synchronisation/de-synchronisation 
during flow under conditions of peak performance seemed to have coincided with the 
notion of automaticity (automotoric movement) during which task execution was mainly 
controlled by posterior implicit processes whilst monitored by explicit frontal processes.  
The above lobeta/beta pattern seemed to have indicated that automotoric movement was in 
progress and that the frontal region was only partially involved the motor control loop.  
The synchronised frontal – sensori-motor connection in beta was probably an indication 
that the frontal lobes were still engaged with target (the moving car) tracking, cognitive 
processing and feedback monitoring by maintaining communication with the sensori-
motor area.  The beta de-synchronisation of the frontal cortex with the parietal and 
occipital cortices was probably an indication that the frontal region was externally 
focussed while the other cortices were internally oriented, i.e. the motor function was 
controlled by implicit processing.  The beta de-synchronisation between the sensori-motor, 
parietal and occipital areas was probably an indication that no explicit processes were 
operative and no external awareness was present.  This is probably associated with the 
“action-awareness merging” or “loss of self-awareness” characteristic of the flow 
condition.  Beta seems to be the pivotal frequency associated with the shift in conscious 
(explicit) attentional resources by means of inhibition / non-inhibition through the process 
of synchronisation / de-synchronisation between cortical areas. 
 
No hypotheses were set for hibeta and gamma synchronisation / de-synchronisation.  Both 
frequencies remained synchronised for all scalp positions for both conditions.   
 
7.2.2.3  Linking the results to the proposed neurophysiological model for flow 
 
With regard to the proposed neurophysiological model for flow, synchronous gamma 
activity was expected across all cortical areas.  In this study, synchronised gamma 
occurred across all cortical areas in both high and low flow conditions.  Research suggests 
that functionally gamma contribute to the coordination between sensory and motor 
activity.  It is activated when the brain needs to be active and idle when no specialised task 
is at hand (Hammond, 2000).  Gamma functions to bind the brain into a single coordinated 
unit (Hughes, 2008).  Synchronised delta occurred across all cortical areas suggesting 
involvement in inhibition of irrelevant external stimuli (Harmony et al., 2009). Theta, 
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alpha and lobeta were all synchronised across all cortical areas.  Research suggests that 
theta is involved in mediating information flow between the cortical- and sub-cortical 
structures, probably associated with increased selective attention, working memory 
maintenance, and error detection (Engel & Singer, 2001).  Alpha synchronisation seems to 
be associated with inhibition of local irrelevant neuronal processing interference, i.e. 
blocking “noise” from surrounding neural processing unrelated to the task under attention 
(Babiloni et al.; 2008), probably associated with control of visual attention (concentration).  
Synchronised lobeta is probably involved in smoothing information flow to the sensori-
motor area to assure smooth, relaxed and accurate motor execution, which can probably be 
associated with the “effortless” and super-efficient characteristics of “zoning” in sport and 
flow.  As discussed above, synchronised beta between the pre-frontal and sensori-motor 
cortices seems to indicate that conscious attention (executive/explicit processing) to 
sensori-motor integration is maintained, while the de-synchronisation between all other 
areas probably indicate a break in top-down (executive) processing and reliance on 
bottom-up functioning, which signifies automotoric functioning and a perception of 
automaticity (being in “auto-pilot” mode).  Beta de-synchronisation in the parietal and 
occipital circuits indicates that motor skill is internalised and unconsciously controlled by 
the basal ganglia circuit.  Synchronised hibeta in all areas is probably related to 
maintenance of long range cognitive information processing between regions. 
 
7.2.2.4  Re-configuration in brain processes and flow 
 
The critical question was whether the system (neural network) underwent a significant 
reconfiguration when flow was assumed.  Even more critical was whether there was 
evidence of a neurological pattern suggesting a shift between the “explicit and implicit” 
systems, or a shift from the frontal networks to the posterior networks during flow under 
condition of peak performance.  The above results did not answer this question clearly.  
There was a clear shift in neurological pattern represented by the high flow group and not 
the low flow group, indicating a refinement in sensori-motor integration (lobeta 
synchronisation of all cortical areas), but the shift in motor control away from the frontal 
networks (beta de-synchronisation of the pre-frontal cortex with the parietal and occipital 
areas) and away from explicit processing (beta de-synchronisation between sensori-motor, 
parietal and occipital areas) towards automotoric or implicit processing was evident for 
both high and low flow conditions. 
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As mentioned earlier, a possible explanation for the lack of discrimination between the two 
conditions in beta may be due to most subjects in the study being experienced video 
gamers which already have a certain level of re-existing video game stimulus - response 
mappings and mental “circuitry” which causes an “elevated” EEG baseline that is not so 
different from their performance EEG profile.  In this study there was no expert versus 
novice group comparisons; the subjects’ first attempts were compared to their own best 
attempts/highest flow scores.  
 
7.2.2.5  A possible EEG marker for flow 
 
The above arguments and supporting data provide a basis for establishing an identifiable 
marker in EEG that represents flow.  When the various connections (neural pathways) 
were plotted over the frequency bands a unique EEG pattern or “signature” was created 
that can serve as marker for flow under conditions of peak performance.  This EEG pattern 
is illustrated in Figure 72 (below).   
 
 
 
Figure 72.  Illustration of marker for flow.  Inter-connecting lines indicate synchronised 
connections.  Thick lines indicate highly correlated connections. 
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It is proposed that the above correlates be considered an EEG marker for flow under 
conditions of peak performance during the execution of a visuomotor task, especially in a 
video/simulation based driving context.   
 
The neurophysiological model for flow proposes that flow is a product of neurological 
productivity during which the brain attempts to optimise processing efficiency by using the 
least amount of resources necessary to achieve maximum task performance.   
 
7.2.3  Integration of the findings with existing knowledge 
 
Although the flow phenomenon has been extensively researched as a subjective perception 
of experienced happiness, total engagement and self-reward during the performance of a 
large variety of activities, it has not been much researched in terms of its physiological 
properties or -origin.   
 
According to Chalmers (1995), ‘the hard problem' is ‘the question of how physical 
processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience' - that is, how physical and mental 
interact.  He argues that there is an explanatory gap between matter and sensation that has 
not yet been satisfactorily bridged.   
 
According to Wilber (1997), an attempt to solve this dilemma of an explanatory gap by 
any sort of reductionism, is doomed to failure.  He argued that consciousness is not located 
merely in the physical brain, nor in the physical organism, nor in the ecological system, 
nor in the cultural context, nor does it emerge from any one of those domains.  Rather, it is 
anchored in, and distributed across, all of those domains with all of their available levels.   
According to his Four Quadrants Model of existence, based on the premise that holons 
evolve along four dimensions (the four quadrants, i.e. intentional, behavioural, cultural and 
social) to increasing levels of development or complexity, the most important aspect is that 
these four dimensions have a very specific correlation with all the others.  Each quadrant 
causes, and is caused by, the others, in a circular and non-reducible fashion.  
 
With reference to the above model, peak performance, as high quality outcome of a 
particular activity, can be regarded as a social requirement of a larger collective (society, 
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organisation, structure, etc.).  Peak performance is easily measurable and recognisable and 
can be classified according to a socially determined standard of usefulness or competence.  
At the same time, peak performance is associated with an optimal state of mind which in 
sporting terms is better known as the “zone” or the “groove”; or “magical” period during 
performance where body and mind work together in a super-efficient manner.  This 
phenomenon is called flow.  It is for this reason that flow is an important aspect of 
coaching, training, self-development, and consulting. 
 
From a flow point of view, the learning point from Wilber’s line of argument is that the 
flow phenomenon as a state of consciousness should be researched covering all four 
domains (intentional, behavioural, cultural, and social), using all four validity claims and 
following the three strands of valid knowledge acquisition: injunction, apprehension, 
confirmation/rejection (or exemplar, evidence, falsifiability) relevant to each facet.  This 
study has made some contribution towards “reconciling” the intentional and behavioural 
dimensions.  However, there is truth in Chalmer’s argument that an explanatory gap exists 
between the physical and behavioural aspects of experience.  It is evident that both neuro-
anatomy and behaviour is much too complex to be able to account for all variables 
(electrical, chemical, cognitive, emotive, conative, etc.) using only a few measuring 
instruments and at the same time accurately isolate specific neurological processes and 
behaviours in order to bridge the “gap” at a satisfactory level of confidence.  This study 
made some attempt to provide “hard problem” answers to the question of how physical 
processes in the brain give rise to a subjective experience such as flow.   
 
Flow theory, as reported by Csikszentmihalyi and associated researchers, mainly focus on 
the left hand (subjective, individual and collective) dimensions of the Wilber model.  
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) formulated a flow model (exemplar) that interprets people’s 
subjective experiences as a mental state where there is order in consciousness, a match 
between challenge and skill, concentration on the task at hand, action-awareness merging, 
sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, transformation of time and autotelic 
experience, during which they experienced happiness, total engagement and self-reward.  
As far as research on the right hand dimensions (objective, individual and collective) of the 
flow state is concerned, many questions are still unanswered.  One of those questions, i.e. 
whether there is an identifiable neurological pattern in the brain that is representative of 
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the flow state and which can be used as objective evidence of being in flow, was targeted 
by this study, using EEG.   
 
Linking the research findings of this study to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1997) nine dimensions 
or general conditions that purportedly facilitate flow experiences, the following 
explanations, from a neuropsychological viewpoint, are put forward: 
 
(1) Clear goal. A clear goal of achieving a fastest time in ten attempts at the same task was 
set.  From an observational perspective it was evident that the goal was an important 
intrinsic motivator, which inspired the subjects to improve their performance.  Goal 
achievement is conscious confirmation of the quality of skill execution (skill/challenge 
match) with consequent unconscious elevation in confidence level regarding the task 
and feelings of enjoyment and satisfaction.  Goals serve as a conscious and 
unconscious threshold or baseline for flow to occur.  Flow will only re-occur once the 
threshold has been upwardly adjusted following the superseding of the threshold 
during a prior flow experience. 
 
(2) Concentrating and focusing requires attention to the task at hand, which is 
predominantly a function of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulated cortex 
(ACC).   According to Luu et al. (2009), the prefrontal lobes and anterior cingulate 
have been observed to be strongly engaged early in the learning cycle when stimulus-
response mappings are actively being established (Chein & Schneider, 2005; Luu et al., 
2007; Toni et al, 1998).  When contingency mappings are internalised by the implicit 
information system with little or no error correction required, it triggers the beta 
rhythm to de-synchronise; switching off conscious attention to the implicit system and 
shifting conscious attention to the explicit system focussing on executive functioning 
involving skill application.  Concentration (selective attention) on the task is enhanced 
by synchronised delta blocking task irrelevant external information from distracting 
attention, while synchronised alpha blocking local unrelated neural activity from 
interfering, allowing the frontal structures to focus attention on conscious executive 
functions and posterior structures to focus attention on unconscious implicit 
information processing.   
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(3) A loss of the feeling of self-consciousness, the merging of action and awareness.  This 
will appear as the performance is nearing its peak and the posterior driven 
“automatisation” state is entered by virtue of beta rhythm de-synchronisation and 
lobeta synchronisation.  Skill execution then becomes unconscious, since conscious 
attention is externally focussed by executive functions in the PFC.  Synchronised 
gamma probably also plays a role in that it serves to coordinate sensory and motor 
activity and binds the brain into one functional unit. 
 
(4) Distorted sense of time.  This is a by-product of the “automatisation” state, probably 
because of beta rhythm “disengagement” of the PFC from posterior regions, separating 
conscious and unconscious attention.  
 
(5) Direct and immediate feedback.  This is necessary for error detection and correction in 
order to progress up the learning-curve and entering the “automatisation” state.  Beta 
de-synchronisation and phase switching is involved in error correction and motor 
control during the latter state.  When no error correction is required “consistently”, it 
paves the way for automotoric functioning (synchronous bindings in all areas and 
frequencies except beta) and frontal attentional shift to proceed, allowing flow to 
occur. Synchronised oscillations have been found to be a neural correlate of integration 
processes during conscious perception (Engel & Singer, 2001), attention (Niebur, 
2002), working memory (Sarnthein et al., 1998) and recollection of episodic 
information (Klimesch et al., 2001). 
 
(6) Balance between ability level and challenge.  This is necessary to produce calmness 
and confidence and prevent the brain from engaging a stress (fight-or-flight) reaction, 
which will cause heightened activation of the limbic system.  Rather, skill acquisition 
or motor performance occur as a function of practice so that the details of a motor task 
become gradually controlled by the basal ganglia circuit (Mishkin et al., 1984) until 
little or no pre-frontal top-down activity is required, freeing up working memory and 
allowing executive attention to fill its premium computational space with content that 
requires higher order processing. 
 
(7) A sense of personal control over the situation or activity.  In the “automatisation” state 
the PFC receives unconscious feedback (especially through theta and alpha) from the 
occipital- and parietal cortices that no errors are made and peak performance is in 
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progress.  In the absence of error, stress reactions and therefore anxiety is eliminated 
and confidence levels increase.  Attention is consciously allocated to executive 
functioning (beta synchronisation F3-C3), which through direct feedback confirms that 
no errors are made and that skill execution is successfully managed by the posterior 
networks. 
 
(8) The activity is intrinsically rewarding, so there is an effortlessness of action. During 
flow, both emotional- (such as self-discipline, achievement, self-esteem and 
confidence) and cognitive information (such as space, time and logic) converge back 
on the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex, confirming that plans and strategies are efficient 
and leading to goal achievement, causing joy and satisfaction to follow (LeDoux, 
1996; Fuster, 2000). 
 
(9) When in the flow state, people become absorbed in their activity, and focus of 
awareness is narrowed down to the activity itself, action awareness merging.  This is 
the “proof” of being in “automatisation” state, i.e., being in flow and driven by the 
same processes as loss of the feeling of self-consciousness. 
 
In this study, an EEG marker for flow under conditions of peak performance during the 
execution of a visuomotor task was established, especially in a video/simulation based 
driving context. 
 
Figure 73 (below) is an illustrated summary of synchronised and desynchronised 
connections across all frequencies and locations during flow under conditions of peak 
performance.  Dotted arrows indicate de-synchronised connections and solid arrows 
indicate synchronised connections.   
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Figure 73.  Illustrative summary of research findings for the high-flow group in terms of 
frequency and location. Delta (D), Theta (T), Alpha (A), Lobeta (L) and Gamma (G) are significantly 
synchronised across all localities.  Beta (B) is synchronised only in the PFC – SMC connection and has de-
synchronised in all other connections. 
 
Figure 73 indicates that when in flow all frequencies, but Beta, are significantly 
synchronised across all localities.  Beta is synchronised only in the PFC – SMC connection 
and has de-synchronised in all other connections. 
 
In summary, the current study, within the context of its limitations, has succeeded in 
suggesting a recognisable set of neural correlates for flow under conditions of peak 
performance, as well as a crude neuropsychological model to explain flow.  
 
7.3  VALIDITY OF FINDINGS EMANATING FROM THE STUDY 
 
With regards to internal validity, threats such as maturation, regression to the mean and 
experimental mortality were not applicable in this research.   
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Relevant measures to enhance internal validity in the study are discussed below. 
 
7.3.1  Sample characteristics 
 
Bias due to factors such as age, gender and brain laterality that could moderate responses 
and prove to be contaminating variables were controlled.  Twenty subjects were selected 
from a volunteer group and only right handed males over the age of 16 years who are 
familiar with computer gaming were chosen.  Of the 20 participants, 10 rated their 
computer gaming skills as “good”, while 8 rated themselves as “moderate” and only 2 
rated themselves as “basic”.  Although the sample was skewed in terms of age, with 75% 
of the subjects being between the ages of 16 and 24 years, there was no correlation 
between performance and age (r = 0.023; p= 0.53956).  The correlation between their 
fastest race times and their reported gaming skill levels was r = -0.62 and highly 
significant at the 0.01 level.  Variation in the results that could be caused by age, 
handedness, gender and widely varying levels of experience at the experimental task was, 
therefore, limited. 
 
7.3.2  Standardising the data  
 
Subjects were given ten trials each to produce a best performance. Along with each 
performance (recorded in seconds) a flow score (a score out of twenty) was obtained and a 
set of EEG data (in microvolts) were recorded.  Because of the different skill levels 
amongst subjects, some subjects’ peak performances were slower than the poorest 
performances of other subjects. It was, therefore, necessary to standardise the data so that, 
for every individual subject, each score is represented in terms of standard deviations from 
their individual means.  Another reason for standardising the data was to transform all the 
data to a common scale and to bring all of the variables into proportion with one another in 
order to eliminate unequal weights.  Additionally, although not a normalising technique, 
by standardising the data it became more normally distributed with the added advantage 
that it allowed using a MANOVA that is based on the assumption that the data is normally 
distributed. 
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7.3.3  Instrument validity 
 
The EEG data collected from the BrainMaster instrumentation has high validity as the 
equipment is specifically designed for the purpose of collecting the electrical output of the 
brain for clinical purposes. Impedance for each electrode placement was kept under 5000 
ohms (Ω) in order to conform to the accepted standard for scientific research. 
 
With regards to the behavioural questionnaires, the GFI (Game Flow Inventory) was 
considered a validated questionnaire since it was an adapted form of the WOrk-reLated 
Flow inventory (WOLF) developed by Bakker (2008), that measures employees’ flow in 
the workplace.  Bakker (2008) reported that “the internal consistency or reliability of the 
scales for absorption, work enjoyment and intrinsic work motivation have been proved to 
be acceptable.  In seven samples, the coefficients ranged between 0.75 and 0.85 for 
absorption, 0.88 and 0.95 for work enjoyment, and 0.53 and 0.82 for intrinsic work 
motivation.  Only the scale for the assessment of intrinsic work motivation performed 
somewhat unsatisfactorily in one of the seven samples (the agency for temporary work), 
with a coefficient of 0.53.  Nevertheless, the test–retest reliability in this sample was very 
good for each of the scales, with stability coefficients of about 0.75.  This means that flow 
can be measured reliably and that the answers of employees to questions about flow 
correlate strongly with their responses six weeks later”. Construct validity and predictive 
validity of the WOLF were also satisfactory, however, in terms of the latter, absorption 
proved to be an unreliable predictor of performance during flow (Bakker, 2008).   
 
In this study, the GFI as instrument presented with a Standardised Cronbach’s Alpha of 
0.91, showing very high internal consistency.  The GFI factors were all highly 
significantly inter-correlated.  Enjoyment and Motivation and Enjoyment and Absorption 
were strongly correlated, both at r = 0.73 and both highly significant at the 0.001 level.  
Absorption and Motivation was also highly significant but slightly lower as a correlation (r 
= 0.64; p = 0.002). 
 
The AFQ (Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire) is not a validated questionnaire.  The items 
have not been formally tested on a larger sample and validated statistically against relevant 
criteria but it was constructed specifically to serve the needs of this research after a 
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thorough research of the literature.  The questionnaire is based on the dimensions that are 
labelled by Csikszentmihalyi as flow characteristics.  The five test items were selected to 
provide immediate feedback after each race to indicate if, and how strongly, attributes of 
flow were experienced according to a 5-point rating scale.  Because of the once-off nature 
and duration of the test sessions it was impractical to pre-validate the test.  Therefore the 
validation was done afterwards. 
 
The questionnaire was administered 200 times.  Initially there were five items, but one was 
discarded during the analysis, hence the reference to AFQ4.  The AFQ4 presented with a 
Standardised Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.756059 when all 4 questions were inter-correlated 
showing adequate internal consistency, and therefore reliability, amongst the separate 
items.  Bear in mind that there are only four questions since the Cronbach’s Alpha is 
sensitive to the number of items and tends to increase with larger number of test items.  All 
four test items were moderately correlated and highly significant.  Engagement was 
correlated with Challenge (r = 0.42), Control (r = 0.41) and Accomplishment (r = 0.39), all 
at the 0.001 level of significance.  Challenge was correlated with Control (r = 0.42) and 
Accomplishment (r = 0.37), both at the 0.001 level of significance, while Control and 
Accomplishment was correlated at r = 0.61 at 0.001 level of significance. 
 
The relationship between the GFI and AFQ for the total sample of 20 subjects was very 
low (r = 0.03) and insignificant (p = 0.88) and suggested that they each measure different 
interpretations of flow.  The GFI presented with strong within-item inter-correlations, as 
already noted, but the AFQ items were relatively independent items.  None of the GFI and 
AFQ4 individual items inter-correlated, yet highly significant inter-item agreement was 
found within both the GFI and AFQ4, except for Time, which was discarded in any event 
as mentioned earlier.  The low correlation of Time with the other four AFQ items was 
another reason to justify its exclusion.  These high levels of internal consistency suggest 
that both instruments are reliable measures of flow and valid for the different purposes 
they served.  A factor analysis of the results from the total sample showed even more 
precisely that the two instruments were measuring different aspects of flow.  The GFI 
loaded more heavily on factor 1 and the AFQ on factor 2.  The reliability of the measures 
over time could not be assessed since no repeat testing were conducted but it is clear from 
the information presented that, on the whole, the two questionnaires measured different 
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aspects of flow.  The GFI seemed more behaviourally orientated (flow experience) while 
the AFQ seemed more performance oriented (flow characteristics). 
 
The GFI and AFQ results were used separately and for different analytical purposes.  The 
AFQ provided feedback as a measure of flow per race, specifically for identifying those 
races where stronger versus weaker flow was experienced.  The GFI provided further 
insight into the total but less directly related experience of flow after all races were 
completed.   
 
7.3.4  External validity 
 
Controls used to enhance internal validity often restrict the generalisability of the research 
results.  In the present study, the sample was restricted to a group of right-handed, male 
computer gamers over the age of 16 years.  As this was pioneering research and the 
intention was to determine an EEG marker for flow under conditions of peak performance, 
it was important to trade higher internal validity for a lesser degree of external validity. 
Once the EEG marker was established, future research can expand the generalisability and 
external validity of this initial research to a larger variety of tasks and populations.   
 
Sample size is also a factor that influences generalisability of the research results. An 
adequate sample size reduces potential sources of random error and enhances 
generalisability.  In this study both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to 
determine an EEG marker for flow.  In quantitative studies a sample of at least 30 subjects 
is required to reduce random error.  Qualitative studies require smaller samples (around 
10) and are based on the principle of level of saturation.  It was decided to settle on a 
sample of 20 subjects in order to strike a balance between practical limitations (logistical 
issues relating to EEG recordings and time taken to conclude one assessment) and 
satisfying minimum requirements for inferential statistical tests which were required in 
order to arrive at the qualities to be analysed.  Also the composition of the sample reduced 
variance. 
 
The bias of individual differences was limited by a repeated measures design.  In this 
research the 20 gamers were required to complete 10 races, each one under instruction to 
produce a best performance.  The nature of flow is that it occurs when a peak performance 
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is reached.  Once this occurs the standard has raised and flow will only re-occur when a 
new peak performance is achieved. The way in which the gamers managed their own 
behaviour included individual differences which cannot all be controlled.  Likewise, their 
exposure to other sources of random error is unknown.  The single sample repeated 
measures design reduced the influence of individual differences since the bias of inter-
participant correspondence was limited. 
 
Ecological validity was reduced by the laboratory type setting in which the assessment was 
performed, however it was enhanced by the selection of established video gamers and the 
repeated measures design allowing the subjects to acclimatise to the testing condition.  The 
design also allowed learning to take place and reduced test anxiety.  From an observational 
point of view the subjects were visibly at ease and exited by the time they produced their 
best performances.  Therefore the ecological validity of the study is considered satisfactory 
and adequate. 
 
7.3.5  Measures taken to enhance reliability of the data 
 
In order to ensure that the findings (results) of the study were replicable, the following 
research protocols were applied: 
 
(1) Careful sample selection to limit mediating and confounding variables. 
(2) Strict protocols were followed so that the test conditions may be repeated in future 
studies.  
(3) Standardised test conditions applied. The experimental task was administered in the 
same consistent way for all subjects, in the same physical conditions, with the same 
instructions, using the same EEG equipment (with known reliability) and performing 
the same task.  
(4) Potential bias caused by electrical interference with the BrainMaster equipment was 
controlled by removing all possible sources of interference from the test 
environment.   
(5) EEG sampling consistency was obtained by using the same equipment.  Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT) separated the raw data into individual frequency bands.  
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Importantly, impedance for each electrode placement was kept under 5000 ohms (Ω) 
in order to eliminate interference and optimise sensor sensitivity.   
(6) Standardised instructions, instruments and procedures were followed and rapport 
established with the subjects prior to the commencement of the tasks. 
(7) Experimenter bias was reduced by having a suitably skilled and experienced 
psychologist (the author of this thesis) administer the test sessions.   
(8) All data records were checked for accuracy and completeness before and after being 
transferred to excel spreadsheets. 
(9) Analyses were conducted using recognised data processing packages, in this case 
Excel and NCSS. 
(10) The choice of statistical analyses was appropriate for the types of data being 
analysed.   
(11) Standardising the data within each subject’s own personal repertoire of results was 
required to compare data collected from each subject’s personal best and first race.  
 
7.4   VALUE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study was undertaken to establish an objective measure to monitor flow under 
conditions of peak performance.  This was done in order to expand the use of flow into the 
domains of coaching, training, and self-development for application in the workplace, 
sports field and leisure activities.  Non-invasive technology, such as EEG, is regarded as 
suitable technology to measure flow since it produces reliable and credible feedback.  It 
was therefore decided to use EEG equipment that was available to the researcher, which 
was BrainMaster 3.0 software using Atlantis I “4+4” (4 EEG and 4 Bio-potential channels) 
link to laptop computer.   
 
The results obtained in the study were produced by a purposive sample consisting of 
experienced computer gamers.  A PC video game was chosen as conduit to induce flow 
since computers are common and critical working instruments in a very large portion of 
the semi-skilled and skilled working environment. Although computyping as skill in a 
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generalised work setting is different from using a game controller in a video game, it is 
still similar in that both activities require visuomotor coordination while performing a 
cognitive task in which the manual manipulation of the device is contributing to task 
efficiency.  Since computer gaming is known for inducing flow (by design), it is 
considered a comparable medium for producing a neurological pattern for flow that is 
generic to most computer based tasks involving manual dexterity.  Although the visuo-
motor activities required for the experimental task share a number of visuo-motor activities 
in using computers in the work environment this cannot be assumed. Therefore the study 
should be replicated using different visuo-motor tasks.  Also the sample was limited to age 
(above 16), handedness (right-handed), and gender (males), which will limit the 
generalisability of the protocol.  
 
This study has identified neurological correlates of flow under conditions of peak 
performance on a continuous visuomotor response task which can be used as input to the 
development of a EEG measuring and monitoring device for application during training, 
coaching, self-development or other performance feedback situations.   
 
The EEG correlates can be programmed into computer software that provides various 
forms of neurofeedback of being in the flow state.  It is important that output should not be 
perceived consciously since it will act as detractor and thus cause the operator to disengage 
the flow state.  Personal flow feedback has to be “disguised” as subtle background output 
only to be recognised unconsciously as reward for being in flow and further deepening the 
flow state.  Subtle changing of light or colours or music may be suitable forms of 
feedback.  The latter topic may require further research.  Ethical considerations need being 
applied when used in the work place.  Inducing flow under normal working conditions 
should lead to improved work performance, work enjoyment and work motivation.   
 
Using the EEG correlates of flow as a flow monitoring (no feedback training) device is 
less complex since there is no feedback to the operator, only to the coach or “monitor”.  As 
monitoring device it has the potential to act as input to research, i.e. how often does the 
operator enters the flow state, how long does he/she remains in flow, how does it correlate 
with level of performance, what caused the person to “fall” out of flow.  This research can 
be valuable input to the coach or consultant during performance reviews or for suggesting 
changes to the environment (work or otherwise) to facilitate more flow opportunities.  In 
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terms of future work environment designs it could result in doing away with open plan 
offices and serve as impetus to buffering/parking/batching of telephone calls.  In some 
work environments, such as flying an aircraft, performing surgery, monitoring CCTV, etc., 
duration of being in flow for a prolonged time period may become a future key 
performance indicator in terms of performance management.  However, there may be 
ethical considerations which will limit the use of such devices based on the premise of 
invasion of privacy or being inhuman.    
 
In summary, the value of this study is deemed the following : 
 
(1) Confirms that flow is an identifiable mind state under conditions of peak 
performance. 
(2) Provides crude neuropsychological- and neurophysiological models for flow. 
(3) Provides a set of correlates for marking flow during a visuomotor task. 
(4) Serves as a platform for further research. 
(5) Serves as input for future technological development, especially in the consulting 
environment. 
(6) Data can be used by neurofeedback practitioners. 
 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
A major limitation of the current study was the limited number of channels that were used 
due to the constraints of the technology available to the researcher.  Since only four 
channels (eight scalp positions) were used, no temporal data were collected, and because 
of the montage used, no lateralisation of data was possible.  The findings are thus limited 
to just four major source localisations, i.e. the Pre-frontal Cortex, the Sensori-motor area, 
the Parietal Cortex, and the Occipital area.  
 
More advanced EEG technology would have shed more light on specific localities, 
modalities, inter-site connectivity, functional networks, brain lateralisation, etc. related to 
flow under conditions of peak performance.  Because of the limitations of the 4-channel 
system used in this study, no temporal or lateralisation effects were explored.  Kramer 
(2007), studying the predictive power of lateralised cortico-electrical patterns on 
performance during a visuo-spatial motor-response task (a video game specifically 
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designed to induce flow), found that greater left temporal alpha activity, compared to that 
of the right temporal lobe, was a positive predictor of performance.  Performance was also 
aided by higher mid-range beta in the left hemisphere.  Haufler et al. (2000, 2002), 
contrasting EEG activity in novice and expert marksmen, reported that the experts 
exhibited higher levels of alpha power and lower levels of beta and gamma power at site 
T3.  Crews and Landers (1993) reported an inhibitory increase in alpha power over the 
right hemisphere during skilled golf performance.  None of the above research results 
could be tested’ as a result of the mentioned limitations and were thus excluded in terms of 
the neurophysiological model for flow.  The above research findings should be expanded 
by including EEG power and synchrony results related to inter- and intra-hemispheric and 
temporal differences. 
 
Another limitation to the current study was the generalisability of the sample.  The study 
was designed to minimise additional variance in an attempt to establish whether an EEG 
marker could be observed, therefore inter-subject variance was limited as far as possible. 
However, this feature has limited the generalisability of the results to over 16 year-old 
right-handed males.   
 
The findings of this study have to be interpreted within the context of these limitations. 
 
7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In order to address the limitations of the current study it is recommended that this study be 
expanded to include more EEG channels.  It is proposed that a 19-channel system should 
provide the necessary coverage and data types since it is still based on the international 
10/20 electrode placement system and the associated software is able to provide all the 
required statistical and topographic information necessary to fill the gaps left by this study.  
Dense array systems use a different referencing system which is not directly translatable to 
the 10/20 system used in this study.  It is equally important that the study be expanded in 
to include children, females and lefthanders into the sample.   
 
In order to establish how universal the above set of correlates is, it is recommended that 
the study be repeated using other visuomotor tasks, such as typing, active video 
tracking/monitoring, flight simulation, or air traffic control.  
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It is further recommended that other technologies such as fMRI, MEG, BOLD, etc. be 
included to provide additional information on flow and further enhance the 
neuropsychological model for flow.  Biofeedback measures such as heart rate monitoring, 
body temperature, etc. can also be included in conjunction with EEG as a broader basis for 
flow measurement. 
 
 273 
REFERENCES 
 
Abernathy, B. (2001). Attention. In R. N. Singer, H. A. Hausenblas &  C. M. Janelle 
(Eds.), Handbook of Sport Psychology (2
nd
 ed., pp. 53–58). New York: John Wiley 
& Sons.  
Alba, A., Marroquin, J.L., Arce-Santana, E., & Harmony, T. (2010). Classification and 
interactive segmentation of EEG synchrony patterns. Pattern Recognition, 43 (2), 
530–544. doi:10.1016/j.patcog.2009.03.005 
Allen, J.C. (1982). Learning About Statistics. Johannesburg: MacMillan  
Andrew, C., & Pfurtscheller, G. (1999). Lack of bilateral coherence of postmovement 
central beta oscillations in the human electroencephalogram. Neuroscience Letters, 
273(2), 89–92. 
Asakawa, K. (2004).  Flow experience and autotelic personality in Japanese college 
students: How do they experience challenges in daily life?  Journal of Happiness 
Studies, 5(2), 123–154. 
Ashby, G. F., & Casale, M. B. (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of implicit category 
learning. In L. Jime´nez (Ed.), Attention and implicit learning (pp. 109–141). 
Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.  
Ashe, J., Lungu, O. V., Basford, A. T., & Lu, X. (2006). Cortical control of motor 
sequences. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16(2), 213–221. 
Baars, B. J. (1997). In the theatre of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Cappa, S., Pasqualetti, P., Rossi, S., Miniussi, C., & Rossini, P. 
M. (2006). Functional frontoparietal connectivity during encoding and retrieval 
 274 
processes follows HERA model: A high-resolution study. Brain Research Bulletin, 
68(4), 203-212. Retrieved from 
www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03619230/68/4 
Babiloni, C., Del Percio, C., Iacoboni, M., Infarinato, F., Lizio, R., Marzano, N,. Crespi, 
G., Dassù, F., Pirritano, M., Gallamini, M. & Eusebi, F. (2008). Golf putt outcomes 
are predicted by sensorimotor cerebral EEG rhythms. The Journal of Physiology, 
586(1), 131–139. doi:10.1113/jphysiol.2007.141630 
Baddeley, A. (1996). Exploring the central executive. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Section A, 49(1), 5–28. Retrieved from 
http://www.psypress.co.uk/ek5/resources/pdf/21kn86nh2jptj492.pdf 
Badre, D., Poldrack, R. A., Paré-Blagoev, J., Insler, R. Z., & Wagner, A. D. (2005). 
Dissociable controlled retrieval and generalized selection mechanisms in 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Neuron, 47(6), 907–918. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/08966273/47 
Bakker, A. B. (2005). Flow among music teachers and their students: The crossover of 
peak experiences. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 66, 26–44. Retrieved from 
http:// dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/10711 
Bakker, A. B. (2008).  The work-related flow inventory: Construction and initial validation 
of the WOLF. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 72(3), 400–414.  
Barlow, G. W. (1977). Modal action patterns. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), How animals 
communicate (pp. 98–134). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Bastiaansen, M. C., Posthuma, D., Groot, P.F., & de Geus, E. J. (2002). Event-related 
alpha and theta responses in a visuo-spatial working memory task. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 113(12), 1882–1893. doi:10.1016/S1388-2457(02)00303-6 
Bates, J. F., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1993).  Prefrontal connections of medial - motor 
areas in the rhesus monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 336(2), 211–228. 
doi:10.1002/cne.903360205 
 275 
Baumeister, J., Reinecke, K., & Weiss, M. (2008). Changed cortical activity after anterior 
cruciate ligament reconstruction in a joint position paradigm: an EEG study. 
Scandinavian Journal of Medicine and Science in Sports, 18(4), 473–484. 
doi:10.1111/j.1600-0838.2007.00702.x 
Baumeister, J., Reinecke, K., Liesen, H., & Weiss, M. (2008).  Cortical activity of skilled 
performance in a complex sports related motor task.  European Journal of Applied 
Physiology, 104, 625–631. doi:10.1007/s00421-008-0811-x 
Bear, M. F., Conners, B. W., & Paradiso, M. A. (2001). Neuroscience: Exploring the brain 
(2
nd
 ed.). Baltimore, MD: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. 
Berlyne, D. (1960). Conflict, arousal and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Best, J. B. (1999). Cognitive Psychology. Belmont, CA : Brooks/Cole Wadsworth.  
Blume, W. T., & Kaibara, M. (1995). Atlas of adult electroencephalography. New York: 
Raven Press.  
Blumenfeld, H. (2002).  Neuroanatomy through Clinical Cases. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer 
Associates. 
Bridgeman, B. (1991). Complementary cognitive and motor image processing. In G. 
Obrecht & L. W. Stark (Eds.), Presbyopia research: From molecular biology to 
visual adaptation (pp. 189–198). NewYork: Plenum Press. 
Bridgeman, B., Peery, S., & Anand, S. (1997). Interaction of cognitive and sensorimotor 
maps in visual space. Perception & Psychophysics, 59(3), 456–469. 
Brinkman, C. (1984). Supplementary motor area of the monkey's cerebral cortex: short- 
and long-term deficits after unilateral ablation and the effects of subsequent 
callosal section. The Journal of Neuroscience, 4(4), 918–928. Retrieved from 
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/4/4/918.short 
Broadbent, D. A. (1958). Perception and communication. New York: Pergamon. 
 276 
Brovelli, A., Laksiri, N.,  Nazarian, B., Meunier, M., & Boussaoud, D. (2007). 
Understanding the neural computations of arbitrary visuomotor learning through 
fMRI and associative learning theory. Cerebral Cortex, 18(7), 1485–1495. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhm198 
Brunia, C. H. (1999) Neural aspects of anticipatory behavior. Acta Psychologica, 101(2–
3), 213–242. 
Bryce, J., & Rutter,  J. (2001). In the game – in the flow: Presence in public computer 
gaming. Poster presented at the computer games and digital textualities, 
Copenhagen, Denmark. Retrieved from 
http://www.cric.ac.uk/cric/staff/Jason_Rutter/presence.htm 
Bunge, S. A., Kahn, I., Wallis, J. ., Miller, E. K,. & Wagner, A.D. (2003). Neural circuits 
sub-serving the retrieval and maintenance of abstract rules. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 90(5), 3419–3428. doi:10.1152/jn.00910.2002 
Busk, J., & Galbraith, G. C. (1975). EEG correlates of visual-motor practice in man. 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 38(4), 415–422. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0013-4694(75)90265-5 
Buzsáki, G. & Draguhn, A. (2004). Neuronal oscillations in cortical networks. Science, 
304(5679), 1926–1929. 
Calhoun, V. D., Pekar, J. J., McGinty, V. B., Adali, T., Watson, T. D., & Pearlson, G. D. 
(2002).  Different activation dynamics in multiple neural systems during simulated 
driving. Brain Mapping, 16(3), 158–167. 
Canter, D., Rivers, R., & Storrs, G. (1985). Characterizing user navigation through 
complex data structures, Behaviour and Information Technology, 4(2), 93–102. 
Carli, M., Delle Fave, A., & Massimini, F. (1988). The quality of experience in the flow 
channels: comparison of Italian and U.S. students. In M. Csikszentmihalyi, & I. S. 
Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), Optimal experience: Psychological studies of flow in 
Consciousness (pp. 288–306). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 277 
Carruthers, P.  (2000).  Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Carter, G. C. (1987). Coherence and time delay estimation. Proceedings of the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineering, 75(2), 236–255. 
Carter, R. (1998). MaPPing the mind. Los Angeles: University of California Press.  
Castiello, U., Paulignan, Y., & Jeannerod, M. (1991). Temporal dissociation of motor 
responses and subjective awareness. Brain, 114(6), 2639–2655. 
doi:10.1093/brain/114.6.2639 
Catley, D., & Duda, J. L. (1997). Psychological antecedents of the frequency and intensity 
of flow in golfers. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 28(4), 309–322. 
Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219. Retrieved from 
http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html 
Chein, J. M., & Schneider, W. (2005). Neuroimaging studies of practice-related change: 
fMRI and meta-analytic evidence of a domain general control network for learning. 
Cognitive Brain Research, 25(3), 607–623. 
Chen, H., Wigand, R. T., & Nilan, M. S. (1999). Optimal experience of web activities. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 15(5), 585–608. Retrieved from 
http://cm.nsysu.edu.tw/~hschen/human.pdf 
Chen, J. (2007). Flow in games (and everything else). Communications of the ACM, 50(4), 
31–34. doi:10.1145/1232743.1232769 
Chen, J., Hung, T.,  Lin, J., Lo, L., Kao, J., Hung, C., … Lai, Z. (August, 2005). Effects of 
anxiety on EEG coherence during dart throw. Paper presented at the International 
Society of Sport Psychology, Sydney, Australia. Abstract retrieved from 
http://student.tpec.edu.tw/tmhlab/issp/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Tsung-
Min%20Hung.pdf 
 278 
Cherbuin, N., & Brinkman, C. (2006). Hemispheric interactions are different in left-
handed individuals. Neuropsycology, 20(6), 700–707. doi:10.1037/0894-
4105.20.6.700 
Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the 
structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Churchland, P. M. (2006). Inner space and outer spaces: the new Epistemology. In: S. S. 
Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology Futures (pp. 48–70). Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Churchland, P. S. (2002).  Brain-wise.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Clarke, S. G., & Haworth, J. T. (1994). ‘‘Flow’’ experience in the daily lives of sixth-form 
college students. British Journal of Psychology, 85(4), 511–523. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1994.tb02538.x 
Classen, J., Gerloff, C., Honda, M., & Hallet, M. (1998). Integrative visuomotor behaviour 
is associated with interregionally coherent oscilations in the human brain. Journal 
of Neurophysiology, 79(3), 1567–1573. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioural sciences (2
nd
 ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Collins, D., Powell, G., & Davies, I. (1990). An electroenphalographic study of 
hemispheric processing patterns during karate performance. Journal of Exercise 
and Sport Psychology, 12, 223–243. 
Collura, T. F. (2008).  Towards a Coherent View of Brain Connectivity. Journal of 
Neurotherapy, 12(2–3), 99–110. 
Courtemanche, R., Fujii, N., & Graybiel, A. M. (2003). Synchronous, Focally Modulated 
β-Band Oscillations Characterize Local Field Potential Activity in the Striatum of 
Awake Behaving Monkeys. The Journal of Neuroscience, 23(37), 11741–11752. 
Retrieved from http://www.jneurosci.org/content/23/37/11741.long 
 279 
Courtney, S. M., Petit, L., Haxby, J. V., & Ungerleider, L. G. (1998). The role of 
prefrontal cortex in working memory: examining on the contents of consciousness. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological 
Sciences, 353(1377), 1819–1828. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1692423/pdf/9854254.pdf 
Courtney, S. M., Petit, L., Maisog, J. M., Ungerleider, L. G., & Haxby, J. V. (1998).  An 
area specialized for spatial working memory in human frontal cortex. Science, 
279(5355), 1347–1351. doi:10.1126/science.279.5355.1347 
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of 
mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 87–185. 
Cowley, B., Charles, D., Black, M., & Hickey, R. (2008). Toward an understanding of 
flow in video games. ACM Computers in Entertainment, 6(2), 1–27. 
doi:10.1145/1371216.1371223 
Crews, D. J., & Landers, D. (1993).  Electroencephalographic measures of attentional 
patterns prior to the golf putt. Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise, 25(1), 
116–126. 
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1990). Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. 
Seminars in Neuroscience, 2, 263–275. Retrieved from 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/SCBCFD.pdf 
Csikszentmihalyi,  M. (1975). Beyond boredom and anxiety. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York, 
NY: Harper Perennial. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self: A psychology for the third millennium. 
New York, NY: Harper Perennial.  
 280 
Csikszentmihalyi,  M. (1997).  Finding Flow: The Psychology of Engagement with 
Everyday Life. New York: HarperCollins. 
Csikszentmihalyi,  M. (2000). Beyond boredom and anxiety. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass Publishers.  
Csikszentmihalyi,  M. (2002). Flow – The classic work on how to achieve happiness. 
London: Rider Books.  
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Csikszentmihalyi, I. S. (Eds.). (1988). Optimal experience: 
Psychological studies of flow in consciousness. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & LeFevre, J. (1989). Optimal experience in work and leisure. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(5), 815–822. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.56.5.815 
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Rathunde, K. (1993). The measurement of flow in everyday life: 
toward a theory of emergent motivation. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 40, 
57–97. 
Cunningham, W. A., Johnson, M. K., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., & Banaji, M. R. (2003).  
Neural components of social evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85(4), 639–649. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.639 
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New 
York: G. P. Putnam. 
Davidson, R. J. (2002). Anxiety and affective style: Role of prefrontal cortex and 
amygdala. Biological Psychiatry, 51(1), 68–80. 
Davidson, R. J. (2004). What does the prefrontal cortex “do” in affect: Perspectives on 
EEG frontal asymmetry research. Biological Psychology, 67, 219–233. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2004.03.008 
 281 
Davidson, R. J., Abercrombie, H., Nitschke, J. B., & Putnam, K. (1999). Regional brain 
function, emotion and disorders of emotion. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 
9(2), 228–234.  
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human 
behavior. New York: Plenum Press. 
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2002). Handbook of self-determination theory. Rochester, 
NY: University of Rochester Press. 
Deeny, S., Hillman, C. H., Janelle, C. M., & Hatfield, B. D. (2003). Cortico-cortical 
communication and superior performance in skilled marksman: An EEG coherence 
analysis. Journal of Exercise and Sport Psychology, 25, 188–204. Retrieved from 
http://kch.illinois.edu/research/labs/neurocognitive-
kinesiology/files/Articles/Deeny_2003_CorticocorticalCommunicationAndSuperio
r.pdf 
Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive science of consciousness: basic 
evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79(1–2), 1–37. 
doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2. 
Deiber, M.P., Passingham, R.E., Colebatch, J.G., Friston, K.J., Nixon, P.D., & 
Frackowiak, R.S. (1991). Cortical areas and the selection of movement: a study 
with positron emission tomography. Experimental Brain Research, 842(2), 393–
402. doi:10.1007/BF00231461 
Del Parcio, C., Marzona, N., Tilgher, S., Fiore, A., Di Ciolo, E., Aschieri, P., Lino, A., 
Toran, G., Babiloni, C., & Eusebi, F. (2007). Pre-stimulus alpha rhythms are 
correlated with post-stimulus sensorimotor performance in athletes and non-
athletes : a high-resolution EEG study. Clinical Neurophysiology, 118(8), 1711–
1720. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2007.04.029 
 282 
Delaney, P. F., Reder, L. M., Staszewski, J. J., & Ritter, F. E. (1998). The strategy specific 
nature of improvement: The power law applies by strategy within task. 
Psychological Science, 9(1), 1-8. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00001 
Delle Fave, A., & Massimini, F. (1988). The changing contexts of flow in work and 
leisure. In M. Csikszentmihalyi & I. S. Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), Optimal 
experience: Psychological studies of flow in consciousness (pp. 193–214). New 
York:  Cambridge University Press  
Demos, J. N. (2005).  Getting started with Neurofeedback. New York, NY: W.W. Norton 
& Co. 
Destrebecqz, A., & Cleeremans, A. (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New 
evidence with the process dissociation procedure.  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
8(2), 343–350. doi:10.3758/BF03196171 
Destrebecqz, A.,  Peigneux, P.,  Laureys, S., Degueldre, C., Del Fiore, G., Aerts, J., Luxen, 
A., Van Der Linden, M., Cleeremans,  A., & Maquet P.  (2005). The neural 
correlates of implicit and explicit sequence learning: interacting networks revealed 
by the process dissociation procedure. Learning Memory, 12(5), 480–490. 
Di Russo, F., Pitzalis, S., Aprile, T., & Spinelli, D. (2005). Effect of practice on brain 
activity: an investigation in top-level rifle shooters. Medicine & Science in Sports 
& Exercise, 37(9), 1586–1593. doi:10.1249/01.mss.0000177458.71676.0d 
Dickinson, A. (1985). Actions and habits: The development of behavioural autonomy. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 308(1135), 67–78. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.1985.0010 
Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (1999). A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge. Behavioural 
and Brain Sciences, 22(5), 735–808. 
Dienes, Z., & Perner,  J. (2002). A theory of the implicit nature of implicit learning. In R. 
M. French & A. Cleeremans (Eds.), Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An 
 283 
Empirical, Philosophical, and Computational Consensus in the Making? (pp. 68–
92). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 
Dietrich, A. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The 
transient hypofrontality hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(2), 231–256. 
doi:10.1016/S1053-8100(02)00046-6 
Dietrich, A. (2004). Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 13(4), 746–761. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.002 
Dolce, G., & Waldeier, H. (1974). Spectral and multivariate analysis of EEG changes 
during mental activity in man. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 36(6), 577-584. doi:10.1016/0013-4694(74)90224-7 
Donaldson, T. S. (1966).  Power of the F-Test for Nonnormal Distributions and Unequal 
Error Variances.  Memorandum submitted for publication. 
Donchin, E., & Coles, M. G. H. (1988). Is the p300 component a manifestation of context 
updating? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11(3), 357–374. 
doi:10.1017/s0140525x00058246 
Duncan, J., & Owen, A. M. (2000). Common regions of the human frontal lobe recruited 
by diverse cognitive demands. Trends in Neuroscience, 23(10), 475–483. Retrieved 
from http://psych.colorado.edu/~munakata/teaching/prosem07/DuncanOwen00.pdf 
Eccles, J. S., & Wigfield, A. (2000). Adolescence: Social patterns, achievement, and 
problems. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology (Vol 1, pp. 46–52). 
Londen: Oxford University Press.  
Edin, F., Klingberg, T., Stödberg, T., & Tegnér, J. (2007). Fronto-Parietal connection 
Asymmetry regulates Working Memory Distractibility. Journal of Integrative 
Neuroscience, 6(4), 567–596. doi:10.1142/S0219635207001702 
 284 
Eisenberger, J., Jones, J., Stinglhamber, F., Shanock, L., & Randall, A. (2005).  Flow 
experiences at work: for high need achievers alone? Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 26(7), 755–775. doi:10.1002/job.337 
Emerson, H. (1998). Flow and occupation: a review of the literature. Canadian Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 65(1), 37–44. doi:10.1177/000841749906600102 
Engel, A. K., & Singer, W. (2001). Temporal binding and the neural correlates of sensory 
awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(1), 16–25. 
doi:10.1177/000841749806500105 
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., & Singer, W. (2001). Dynamic predictions: oscillations and 
synchrony in top-down processing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2(10), 704–716. 
doi:10.1038/35094565 
Engeser, S., & Rheinberg, F. (2008). Flow, performance and moderators of challenge-skill 
balance. Motivation and Emotion, 32(3), 158–172. doi:10.1007/s11031-008-9102-4 
Eoh, H. J., Chung, M. K., & Kim, S. (2005). “Electroencephalographic study of 
drowsiness in simulated driving with sleep deprivation. International Journal of 
Industrial Ergonomics, 35(5), 307–320. doi:10.1016/j.ergon.2004.09.006 
Farmer, D. (1999, March 18). “Flow” & Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. Retrieved from 
http://www.austega.com/education/articles/flow.htm 
Fell, J., Dietl, T., Grunwald, T., Kurthen, M., Klaver, P., Trautner ,P.,  … Fernandez, G. 
(2004). Neural bases of cognitive ERPs: more than phase reset. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(9), 1595–1604. doi:10.1162/0898929042568514 
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., & Kähkönen, S. (2005). Functional connectivity in 
the brain – is it an elusive concept? Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 28(8), 
827–836. 
Fitts, P. M., & Posner, M. I. (1967). Learning and skilled performance in human 
performance. Belmont CA: Brock-Cole.  
 285 
Florian, G.,  Andrew, C., & Pfurtscheller,  G. (1998). Do changes in coherence always 
reflect changes in functional coupling? Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 106(1), 87–91. doi.org/10.1016/S0013-4694(97)00105-3 
Fogelson, N., Williams, D., Tijssen, M., van Bruggen, G., Speelman, H., & Brown, P. 
(2006). Different functional loops between cerebral cortex and the subthalmic area 
in Parkinson’s disease. Cerebral Cortex, 16(1), 64 – 75. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhi084 
Fournier, L. R., Wilson, G. F., & Swain, C. R. (1999). Electrophysiological, behavioural 
and subjective indexes of workload when performing multiple tasks: manipulations 
of task difficulty and training. International. Journal of Psychophysiology, 31(2), 
129–145. doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(98)00049-X 
Frederick-Recascino, C. M. (2002). Self-determination theory and participation motivation 
research in the sport and exercise domain. In E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), 
Handbook of self-determination theory (pp. 277–296). Rochester, NY: University 
of Rochester Press. 
Frederick-Recascino, C. M., & Morris, T. (2004). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in 
sport and exercise. In T. Morris & J. Summers (Eds.), Sport psychology: Theory, 
applications and issues (2
nd
 ed., pp. 121–151). Brisbane, Australia: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Fries, P. (2005). A mechanism for cognitive dynamics: neuronal communication through 
neuronal coherence. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9(10), 474–480. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.011 
Frith, C. D., & Dolan, R. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in higher cognitive 
functions. Cognitive Brain Research, 5(1-2), 175–181. 
Fuster, J. M. (1995). Temporal processing. Structure and function of the human prefrontal 
cortex. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 769, 173–181. 
doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1995.tb38138.x 
 286 
Fuster, J. M. (2000). Executive frontal functions. Experimental Brain Research, 133, 66–
70. doi:10.1007/s002210000401 
Gabriel, M., Burhans, L., Talk, A., & Scalf, P. (2002). Cingulate cortex. In V. S. 
Ramachandran (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Human Brain (Vol 1–4, pp. 775–791). 
Elsevier Science, ISBN: 978-0-12-227210-3 
Gennaro, R. (Ed.). (2004). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.  
Gentile, A. M. (2000). Skill acquisition: Action, movement, and neuromotor processes. In: 
J. H. Carr, & R. B. Shephard (Eds.), Movement science: Foundations for physical 
therapy in rehabilitation (2
nd
 ed., pp. 111–187). Rockville, MD: Aspen.  
Gervasoni, D., Lin, S. H., Ribeirao, S., Soares, E. S., Pantoja, J., & Nicolelis, M. A. L. 
(2004). Global Forebrain dynamics predict rat behavioral states and their 
transitions. Journal of Neuroscience, 24(49), 11137–1147. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3524-04.2004 
Gevins, A., Smith, M. E., McEvoy, L., & Yu, D. (1997).  High-resolution EEG mapping of 
cortical activation related to working memory: effects of task difficulty, type of 
processing, and practice. Cerebral Cortex, 7(4), 374–385. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/7.4.374 
Ghani, J. A., & Deshpande, S. P. (1994). Task characteristics and the experience of 
optimal flow in human–computer interaction. The Journal of Psychology, 128(4), 
381–391. doi:10.1080/00223980.1994.9712742 
Gilbert, P. F. C. (2001). An outline of brain function. Cognitive Brain Research, 12(1), 
61–74. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0926-6410(01)00035-0 
Goldman, P. S., & Nauta, W. J. (1976).  Autoradiographic demonstration of a projection 
from prefrontal association cortex to the superior colliculus in the rhesus monkey. 
Brain Research, 116(1), 145–149. doi:10.1016/0006-8993(76)90256-0 
 287 
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1992). Working memory and the mind. Scientific American, 
267(3), 111–117. 
Gonsalvez, C. J., Gordon, E., Grayson, S., Barry, R. J., Lazzaro, I., & Bahramali, H. 
(1999). Is the target-to-target interval a critical determinant of P3 amplitude? 
Psychophysiology, 36(5), 643–654. doi:10.1111/1469-8986.3650643 
Graef, R., Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Gianinno, S. M. (1983). Measuring intrinsic motivation 
in everyday life. Leisure Studies, 2(2), 155–168. doi:10.1080/02614368300390121 
Grantham, S., & Vieira, E. T., Jr. (2008). The motivational roles of perceived task 
competence, need for achievement, and goal-setting on task intensity & 
involvement.  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association, New York, NY. Retrieved from 
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/1/4/1/6/p1416
8_index.html 
Gross, J., Schmitz, F., Schnitzler, I., Kessler, K., Shapiro, K., Hommel, B., & Schnitzler, 
A. (2004). Modulation of long-range neural synchrony reflects temporal limitations 
of visual attention in humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of  Science of 
the  USA, 101(35), 13050–13055. doi:10.1073/pnas.0404944101 
Grunwald, M., Weiss, T., Krause, W., Beyer, L., Rost, R., Gutberlet, I., & Gertz, H. J. 
(2001).  Theta power in the EEG of humans during ongoing processing in a haptic 
object recognition task. Brain Research Cognitive Brain Reviews, 11(1), 33–37. 
doi:10.1016/S0926-6410(00)00061-6 
Gruzelier, J. H. (2000). Redefining hypnosis: Theory, methods and integration. 
Contemporary Hypnosis, 17(2), 51–70. doi:10.1002/ch.193 
Gruzelier, J. H. (2006). Frontal functions, connectivity and neural efficiency underpinning 
hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility. Contemporary Hypnosis, 23(1), 15–32. 
doi:10.1002/ch.35 
 288 
Hald, L. A.,  Bastiaansen,  M. C., & Hagoort, P. (2006). EEG theta and gamma responses 
to semantic violations in online sentence processing. Brain and Language, 96(1), 
90–105. doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2005.06.007 
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips,  S. (1998). Processing capacity defined by 
relational complexity: Implications for comparative, developmental, and cognitive 
psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(6), 803–864. Retrieved from 
http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~billw/reprints/HalfordWilsonPhillips1998.pdf 
Hammond, D. C. (2000). Clinical corner: The role of 40 hertz activity and training. The 
Journal of Neurotherapy, 4(2), 95–100.  
Harmony, T., Alba, A.,  Marroquín, J. L., & González-Frankenberger, B. (2009). Time-
frequency topographic analysis of induced power and synchrony of EEG signals 
during a Go/No Go task. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 71(1), 9–16. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2008.07.020 
Harmony, T., Fernandez, T., Silva, J., Bernal, J., Diaz-Comas, L., Reyes, A., … 
Rodriguez, M. (1996). EEG delta activity : An indicator of attention to internal 
processing during performance of mental tasks. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 24(1–2), 161–171. doi:10.1016/S0167-8760(96)00053-0 
Hatfield, B. D., & Hillman, C. H. (2001). The psychophysiology of sport: A mechanistic 
understanding of the psychology of superior performance. In R. N. Singer, C. H. 
Hausenblas, & C. M. Janelle (Eds.), Handbook of sport psychology (2
nd
 ed., pp. 
362–386). New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Hatfield, B. D., Landers, D. M., & Ray, W. J. (1984). Cognitive processes during self-
paced motor performance: An electroencephalographic profile of skilled 
marksmen. Journal of Sport Psychology, 6, 42–59. 
Haufler, A. J., Spalding, T. W., Santa Maria, D. L., & Hatfield, B. D. (2000). Neuro-
cognitive activity during a self-paced visuospatial task: Comparative EEG profiles 
 289 
in marksmen and novice shooters. Biological Psychology, 53(2-3), 131–160. 
doi:10.1016/S0301-0511(00)00047-8 
Haufler, A. J., Spalding, T. W., Santa Maria, D. L., & Hatfield, B. D. (2002). Erratum to 
Neuro-cognitive activity during a self-paced visuospatial task: Comparative EEG 
profiles in marksmen and novice shooters. Biological Psychology, 59(1), 87–88. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0301-0511(01)00122-3 
Heinzel, A., Bermpohl, F., Niese, R., Pfennig, A., Pascual-Leone, A., Schlaug, G., & 
Northoff, G. (2005).  How do we modulate our emotions? Parametric fMRI reveals 
cortical midline structures as regions specifically involved in the processing of 
emotional valences. Cognitive Brain Research, 25(1), 348–358. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.06.009 
Hintz, J. L. (2007). NCSS Manual – user’s guide IV. Kaysville, Utah: NCSS. Retrieved 
from http://ncss.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/NCSSUG4.pdf 
Hobson, J. A., & Pace-Schott, E, F. (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal 
systems, consciousness and learning. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(9), 676–693. 
doi:10.1038/nrn915 
Hobson, J. A., Pace-Schott, E. F., & Stickhold, R. (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward 
a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. The Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 
23(6), 793–866. 
Hoffman, D. L., & Novak, T. P. (1996). Marketing in hypermedia computer-mediated 
environments: Conceptual foundations. Journal of Marketing, 60(3), 50–68. 
Retreived from 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/pgs/index?id=10.2307/1251841&img=dtc.56.tif.gif 
Holcomb, J. A. (1976). Attention and intrinsic rewards in the control of psychophysiologic 
states. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 27(1), 54–61. doi:10.1159/000286996 
 290 
Holt, R. (2000). Examining Video Game Immersion as a Flow State (Bachelor of Arts 
thesis). Retrieved from  
http://www.academia.edu/1466850/Examining_video_game_immersion_as_a_flow
_state 
Hopfield, J. J. (1995). Pattern recognition computation using action potential timing for 
stimulus representation. Nature, 376(6535), 33–36. doi:10.1038/376033a0 
Horan, R. (2009). The neuropsychological connection between creativity and meditation. 
Creativity Research Journal, 21(2–3), 199–222. doi:10.1080/10 
Hughes, J. R., (2008).  Gamma, fast, and ultrafast waves of the brain: Their relationships 
with epilepsy and behavior.  Epilepsy & Behavior, 13(1), 25–31. 
doi:10.1016/j.yebeh.2008.01.011. 
IBM Software Group. (2013). IBM SPSS statistics 22 core system user's guide (22
nd
 ed.). 
United States of America: Author. Retrieved from 
ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss/documentation/statistics/22.0/en/c
lient/Manuals/IBM_SPSS_Statistics_Core_System_User_Guide.pdf 
Inanaga, K. (1998). Frontal midline theta rhythm and mental activity. Psychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences, 52(6),  555–566. doi:10.1046/j.1440-1819.1998.00452.x 
Inouye, T., Shinosaki, K., Iyama, A., Matsumoto, Y., Toi, S.,&  Ishihara, T. (1994). 
Potential flow of frontal midline theta-activity during a mental task in the human 
electroencephalogram. Neuroscience Letters, 169(1–2), 145–148. 
Ishii, R., Shinosaki, K., Ukai, S., Inouye, T., Ishihara, T., Yoshimine, T., …Takeda, M. 
(1999). Medial prefrontal cortex generates frontal midline theta rhythm. 
Neuroreport, 10(4), 675–679. doi:10.1097/00001756-199903170-00003 
Ivanitsky, A. M., Nikolaev, A. R., & Ivanitsky, G. A. (2001). Cortical connectivity during 
word association search. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 42(1), 35–53. 
doi:10.1016/s0167-8760(01)00140-4  
 291 
Jackson, S. A. (1992). Athletes in flow: a qualitative investigation of flow states in elite 
figure skaters. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 4(2), 161–180. 
doi:10.1080/10413209208406459 
Jackson, S. A. (1996). Towards a conceptual understanding of the flow experience in elite 
athletes. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 67(1), 76–90. 
doi:10.1080/02701367.1996.10607928 
Jackson, S. A., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999). Flow in sports. Champaign, IL: Human 
Kinetics.  
Jackson, S. A., & Eklund, R. C. (2002). Assessing flow in physical activity: the flow state 
scale-2 and dispositional flow scale-2. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 
24(1), 133–150. 
Jackson, S. A., & Marsh, H. W. (1996). Development and validation of a scale to measure 
optimal experience: the flow state scale. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 
18(1), 17–35. 
Jackson, S. A., & Roberts, G. C. (1992). Positive performance states of athletes: toward a 
conceptual understanding of peak performance. The Sport Psychologist, 6(2), 156–
171. 
Jackson, S. A., Thomas, P. R., Marsh, H. W., & Smethurst, C. J. (2001). Relationship 
between flow, self-concept, psychological skills, and performance. Journal of 
Applied Sport Psychology, 13(2), 129–153. doi:10.1080/104132001753149865 
Jackson, S. A., & Wrigley, W. J. (2004). Optimal experience in sport: Current issues & 
future directions. In T. Morris & J. Summers (Eds.), Sport Psychology: Theory, 
Applications and Issues (2
nd
 ed., pp. 423–451). Brisbane, Australia: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Jacobs, K. (1994). Flow and the occupational therapy practitioner. American Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 48(11), 989–996. doi:10.5014/ajot.48.11.989 
 292 
Janelle, C. M., Hillman, C. H., Apparies, R. J., & Hatfield, B. D. (2000). Concurrent 
measurement of EEG and visual indices of attention during rifle shooting: An 
exploratory case study. International Journal of Sports Vision, 6, 21–29. 
Janelle, C. M., Hillman, C. H., Apparies, R., Murray, N. P., Meili, L., Fallon, E. A., … 
Bradley, D. (2000). Expertise differences in cortical activation and gaze behavior 
during rifle shooting. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 22(2), 167–182. 
Janelle, C. M., & Hatfield, B. D. (2008).  Visual attention and brain processes that underlie 
expert performance: Implications for sport and military psychology. Military 
Psychology, 20(1), S39–S69. doi:10.1080/08995600701804798 
Jap, B. T., Lal, S., Fischer, P., & Bekiaris, E. (2009). Using EEG spectral components to 
assess algorithms for detecting fatigue. Expert Systems with Applications, 36(2), 
2352–2359. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2007.12.043 
Jenkins, I. H., Brooks, D. J., Nixon, P. D., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Passingham, R. E. 
(1994). Motor sequence learning: A study with positron emission tomography. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 14(6), 3775–3790. Retrieved from 
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/14/6/3775.full.pdf+html 
Jensen, O., & Tesche, C.D. (2002). Frontal theta activity in humans increases with 
memory load in a working memory task. European Journal of Neuroscience, 15(8), 
1395–1399. doi:10.1046/j.1460-9568.2002.01975.x 
Jokisch, D., & Jensen, O. (2007). Modulation of gamma and alpha activity during a 
working memory task engaging the dorsal or ventral stream. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 27(12), 3244–3251. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5399-06.2007 
Kaiser, J., Ripper, B., Birbaumer, N., & Lutzenberger, W. (2003). Dynamics of gamma-
band activity in human magnetoencephalogram during auditory pattern working 
memory. Neuroimage, 20(2), 816–827. doi:10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00350-1 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive 
science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 293 
Kazennikov, O., Hyland, B., Wicki, U., Perrig, S., Rouiller, E. M., & Wiesendanger, M. 
(1998) Effects of lesions in the mesial frontal cortex on bimanual co-ordination in 
monkeys. Neuroscience, 85(3), 703–16. doi:10.1016/S0306-4522(97)00693-3 
Kelly, S. P., Lalor, E. C., Reilly, R. B., & Foxe, J. J. (2006). Increases in alpha oscillatory 
power reflect an active retinotopic mechanism for distracter suppression during 
sustained visuo-spatial attention. Journal of Neurophysiology, 95(6), 3844–3851. 
doi:10.1152/jn.01234.2005 
Keng, E., & Gabriel, M. (1998). Hippocampal modulation of cingulo-thalamic neuronal 
activity and discriminative avoidance learning in rabbits., 8(5), 491–510. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1098-1063(1998) 
Kerick, S. E., McDowell, K., Hung, T. M., Santa Maria, D. L., Spalding, T. W., & 
Hatfield, B. D. (2001). The role of the left temporal region under the cognitive 
motor demands of shooting in skilled marksmen. Biological Psychology, 58(3), 
263–77.  
Kerick, S. E., Douglass, L., & Hatfield, B. D. (2004). Cerebral cortical adaptations 
associated with visuomotor practice. Medicine & Science in Sport and Exercise, 
36(1), 118–129. doi:10.1249/01.MSS.0000106176.31784.D4 
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental 
causation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kimiecik, J. C., & Stein, G. L. (1992). Examining flow experiences in sport contexts: 
Conceptual issues and methodological concerns. Journal of Applied Sport 
Psychology, 4(2), 144–160. doi:10.1080/10413209208406458 
Klimesch, W., Doppelmayr, M., Russegger, H., Pachinger, T., & Schwaiger, J. (1998). 
Induced alpha band power changes in the human EEG and attention. Neuroscience 
Letters, 244(2), 73–76. doi:10.1016/S0304-3940(98)00122-0 
 294 
Klimesch, W. (1999).  EEG alpha and theta oscillations reflect cognitive and memory 
performance: a review and analysis. Brain Research Reviews. 29(2–3), 169–95. 
doi:10.1016/S0165-0173(98)00056-3 
Klimesch, W., Doppelmayr, M., Yonelinas, A., Kroll, N. E. A., Lazzara, M., Rohm, D., & 
Gruber, W. (2001). Theta synchronisation during episodic retrieval: neural 
correlates of conscious awareness. Cognitive Brain Research, 12(1), 33–38. 
doi:10.1016/S0926-6410(01)00024-6 
Klimesch, W., Sauseng, P., & Hanslmayr, S. (2007). EEG alpha oscillations : The 
inhibition-timing hypothesis. Brain Research Reviews, 53(1), 63–88. 
doi:10.1016/j.brainresrev.2006.06.003 
Klimesch, W. (1996). Memory processes, brain oscillations and EEG synchronization. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 24(1–2), 61–100. doi:10.1016/S0167-
8760(96)00057-8. 
Knight, R.T., & Grabowecky, M. (1999). Prefrontal cortex, time, and consciousness. In M. 
S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences (2
nd
 ed., pp. 1319–1337). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Koechlin, E., Corrado, G., Pietrini, P., & Grafman, J. (2000).  Dissociating the role of the 
medial and lateral anterior prefrontal cortex in human planning. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 97(13), 7651–7656. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.130177397 
Koechlin, E., Danek, A., Burnod, Y., & Grafman, J. (2002).  Medial prefrontal and 
subcortical mechanisms underlying the acquisition of motor and cognitive action 
sequences in humans. Neuron, 35(2), 371–381. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(02)00742-0 
Koeneke, S., Lutz, K., Esslen, M., & Jäncke, L. (2006). How finger tapping practice 
enhances efficiency of motor control. Neuroreport, 17(15), 1565–1569. 
doi:10.1097/01.wnr.0000234748.80936.1d 
 295 
Kowal, J., & Fortier, M. S. (1999). Motivational determinants of flow: contributions from 
self-determination theory. The Journal of Social Psychology, 139(3), 355–368. 
doi:10.1080/00224549909598391 
Kramer, D. (2007). Predictions of performance by EEG and skin conductance. Indiana 
Undergraduate Journal of Cognitive Science, 2, 3–13. 
Kraus, B. N. (2003). Musicians in flow: Optimal experience in the wind ensemble 
rehearsal. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section A. Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 64(3–A), 839.  
Krause, C. M., Sillanmäki, L., Koivisto, M., Saarela, C., Häggqvist, A,, Laine, M., & 
Hämäläinen, H. (2000). The effects of memory load on event-related EEG 
desynchronization and synchronization. Clinical Neurophysiology, 111(11), 2071–
2078. doi:10.1016/S1388-2457(00)00429-6 
Kruse, K., & Jülicher, F. (2005). Oscillations in Cell Biology. Current Opinion in Cell 
Biology, 17(1), 20–26. doi:10.1016/j.ceb.2004.12.007 
Landers, D. M., Han, M. W., Salazar, W., Petruzzello, S. J., Kubitz, K. A., & Gannon, T. 
L. (1994). Effects of learning on electroencephalographic and electrocardiographic 
patterns in novice archers. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 25(3), 313–
330. 
Landers, D. M., Petruzzello, S. J., Salazar, W., Kubitz, K. A., Gannon, T. L., & Han, M. 
(1991). The influence of electrocortical biofeedback on performance in pre-elite 
archers. Medicine & Science in Sports and Exercise, 23(1), 123–129. 
Lang, A. (2000). The limited capacity model of mediated message processing. Journal  of 
Communication, 50(1), 46–70. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02833.x 
Langer, E. J. (1997). The power of mindful learning. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Laughlin, S.B., & Sejnowski, T. J. (2003). Communication in neuronal networks. Science, 
301(5641), 1870–1874. doi:10.1126/science.1089662  
 296 
Lazarev, V. V. (1998). On the intercorrelation of some frequency and amplitude 
parameters of the human EEG and its functional significance. Communication I: 
Multidimensional neurodynamic organization of functional states of the brain 
during intellectual, perceptive and motor activity in normal subjects. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 28(1), 77–98. doi:10.1016/S0167-8760(97)00068-8 
LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain. New York: Touchstone. 
Lepper, M. R., & Green, D. (1978). Overjustification research and beyond: Toward a 
means-ends analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In M. R. Lepper & D. 
Green (Eds.), The hidden costs of reward: New perspectives on the psychology of 
human motivation (pp. 109-148). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Lezak, M. D., Howieson, D. B., & Loring, D. W. (2004). Neuropsychological Assessment. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lhermitte, F., Pillon, B., & Serdaru, M. (1986). Human autonomy and the frontal lobes. 
Part I: Imitation and utilization behavior: a neuropsychological study of 75 
patients. Annals of Neurology, 19(4), 326–334. doi:10.1002/ana.410190404 
Lim, S. H., Dinner, D. S., Pillay, P. K., Lunders, H., Morris, H. H., Klem, G., … Awad, I. 
A. (1994). Functional anatomy of the human supplementary  sensorimotor area: 
results of extraoperative electrical stimulation. Electroencephalography and 
Clinical Neurophysiology, 91(3), 179–193. doi:10.1016/0013-4694(94)90068-X 
Lindsay, P., Maynard, I., & Thomas, O. (2005). Effects of hypnosis on flow states and 
cycling performance. The Sport Psychologist, 19(2), 164–177. 
Locke, E. A., Shaw, K. N., Saari, L. M., & Latham, G. P. (1981). Goal setting and task 
performance: 1969-1980. Psychological Bulletin, 90(1), 125–152. 
Loehr, J. (1995). The new toughness training for aports. New York, NY: Plume/Penguin.  
 297 
Logar, V., Belič, A., Koritnik, B., Brežan, S., Zidar, J., Karba, R., & Matko, D. (2008). 
Using ANNs to predict a subject’s response based on EEG traces. Neural 
Networks, 21(7), 881–887. 
Lu, M. T., Preston, J. B., & Strick, P. L. (1994).  Interconnections between the prefrontal 
cortex and the premotor areas in the frontal lobe. The Journal of Comparative 
Neurology, 341(3), 375–392. doi:10.1002/cne.903410308 
Lubar, J. F., Angelakis, E., Frederick, J., & Stathopoulou, S. (2001). The role of slow-
wave electroencephalographic activity in reading. Journal of Neurotherapy, 5(3), 
5–25.  
Luria, A. R. (1973). The working brain: An introduction to neuropsychology. New York: 
Basic.  
Lutzenberger, W., Ripper, B., Busse, L., Birbaumer, N., & Kaiser, J. (2002). Dynamics of 
gamma-band activity during an audiospatial working memory task in humans. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 22(13), 5630–5638. Retrieved from 
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/22/13/5630.full.pdf 
Luu, P., & Tucker, D. M. (2003). Self-regulation and the executive functions: 
electrophysiological clues. In A. Zani & A.M. Preverbio (Eds.), The Cognitive 
Electrophysiology of Mind and Brain (pp. 199–223).  San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press. 
Luu, P., Tucker, D. M., & Makeig, S. (2004). Frontal midline theta and the error-related 
negativity: neurophysiological mechanisms of action regulation. Clinical 
Neurophysiology,  115(8), 1821–1835. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2004.03.031 
Luu, P., Tucker, D. M., & Stripling, R. (2007). Neural mechanisms for learning actions in 
context. Brain Research, 1179, 89–105. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2007.03.092 
Luu, T. M., Ment, L. R., Schneider, K. C., Katz, K. H., Allan, W. C., & Vohr, B. R. 
(2009). Lasting effects of preterm birth and neonatal brain hemorrhage at 12 years 
of age. Pediatrics, 123(3), 1037–1044. doi:10.1542/peds.2008-1162 
 298 
Lynn, R. (1966). Attention, arousal, and the orienting reaction. Oxford, UK: Pergamon. 
Marieb, E. N. (1995).  Human Anatomy and Physiology (3
rd
 ed.). Redwood City, CA: 
Benjamin/Cummings. 
Maslow, A. H. (1962). Toward a psychology of being (1
st
 ed.). Princeton, NJ: Van 
Nostrand. 
Maslow, A. H. (1968). Toward a psychology of being (2
nd
 ed.). New York, NY: Van 
Nostrand. 
Metzinger, T. (Ed.). (2000). Neural correlates of consciousness—empirical and 
conceptual questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mishkin, M., Malamut, B., & Bachevalier, J. (1984). Memories and habits: Two neural 
systems. In G. Lynch, J. L. McGaugh & N. M. Weinberger (Eds.), Neurobiology of 
learning and memory (pp. 6577). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Mizuki, Y., Tanaka, M., Isozaki, H., Nishijima, H., & Inanaga, K. (1980). Periodic 
appearance of theta rhythm in the frontal midline area during performance of a 
mental task. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 49(3–4), 345–
351. doi:10.1016/0013-4694(80)90229-1 
Moneta, G. B., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). The effect of perceived challenges and 
skills on the quality of subjective experience. Journal of Personality, 64(2), 275–
310. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1996.tb00512.x 
Moran, A. P. (1996). The psychology of concentration in sport performers: A cognitive 
analysis. East Sussex, UK: Taylor & Francis. 
Murphy, M., & White, R. A. (1995). In the zone: Transcendent experience in sports. New 
York, NY: Penguin Books. 
Murthy, V. N., & Fetz, E. E. (1996). Oscillatory activity in sensorimotor cortex of awake 
monkeys: synchronisation of local field potentials and relation to behavior. Journal 
 299 
of Neurophysiology, 76(6), 3949–3967. Retrieved from  
http://jn.physiology.org/content/76/6/3949 
Naghavi, H. R., & Nyberg, L. (2005).  Common fronto-parietal activity in attention, 
memory, and consciousness: shared demands on integration?  Consciousness and 
Cognition, 14(2), 390–425. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.003 
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Nerb, J., Ritter, F. E., & Krems, J. F. (1999). Knowledge level learning and the power law: 
A soar model of skill acquisition in scheduling. Kognitionswissenschaft, 8(1), 20–
29. Retrieved from http://acs.ist.psu.edu/papers/nerbRK99.pdf  
Neubauer, A. C., Freudenthaler, H. H., & Pfurtscheller, G. (1995). Intelligence and spatio-
temporal patterns of event-related desynchronization. Intelligence, 20, 249–267. 
Retrieved from http://www.uni-graz.at/dips/freudenthaler/KS_intra-
interpersonell_ss12/Neubauer%20et%20al%20%20(1995).pdf 
Neumann, O. (1984). Automatic processing: A review of recent findings and a plea for an 
old theory. In W. Prinz and A. F. Sanders (Eds.), Cognition and Motor Processes 
(pp. 255–293). Berlin: Springer. 
Newell, A., & Rosenbloom, P. S. (1981). Mechanisms of skill acquisition and the law of 
practice. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition (pp. 1–51). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Nideffer, R. M. (1993). Attention control training. In R. N. Singer, M. Murphey & L. K. 
Tennant (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Sport Psychology (pp. 542–556). New 
York, NY: Macmillan. 
Niebur, E. (2002). Electrophysiological correlates of synchronous neural activity and 
attention: A short review. Biosystems, 67(1–3), 157–166. 
 300 
Nunez, P. L. (2000).  Toward a quantitative description of large-scale neocortical dynamic 
function and EEG.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(3), 371–437. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00003253 
O’Brien, R. G., & Kaiser, M. K. (1985). MANOVA method for analyzing repeated 
measures designs: an extensive primer. Psychological Bulletin, 97(2), 316–333. 
Ohlsson, S. (1996). Learning from performance errors. Psychological Review, 103(2), 
241–262. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.2.241 
Olejniczak, P. (2006). Neurophysiologic basis of EEG. Journal of Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 23(3), 186–189. doi:10.1097/01.wnp.0000220079.61973.6c 
Olesen, P. J., Macoveanu, J., Tegner, J., & Klingberg, T. (2007). Brain activity related to 
working memory and distraction in children and adults. Cerebral Cortex, 17(5), 
1047–1054. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhl014. 
Onton, J., Delorme, A., & Makeig, S. (2005).  Frontal midline EEG dynamics during 
working memory. NeuroImage, 27(2), 341–356. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.04.014 
Othmer, S.,  Othmer, S. F., & Kaiser, D. A. (1999). EEG biofeedback: an emerging model 
for its global efficacy. In J. R. Evans & A. Arbarbanel (Eds.), Introduction to 
quantitative EEG and neurofeedback (pp. 243-310). San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press.  
Pace, S. (2004). A grounded theory of the flow experiences of Web users. International 
Journal of Human–Computer Studies, 60(3), 327–363. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2003.08.005 
Palva, S., & Palva, J. M. (2007). New vistas for alpha-frequency band oscillations. Trends 
in Neuroscience, 30(4), 150–158. doi:10.1016/j.tins.2007.02.001 
 301 
Pare, D., Quirk, G. J., & LeDoux, J. E. (2004). New vistas on amygdala networks in 
conditioned fear. Journal of Neurophysiology, 92(1), 1–9. 
doi:10.1152/jn.00153.2004 
Park, A. (2006).  Staying sharp: Getting and staying in the zone. Time Magazine, 167(3). 
Retrieved from http://content.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601060116,00.html 
Pascual-Leone, A., Grafman, J., Clark, K., Stewart, M., Massaquoi, S., Lou, J. S., & 
Hallett, M. (1993). Procedural learning in Parkinson's disease and cerebellar 
degeneration. Annals of Neurology, 34(4), 594-602. doi:10.1002/ana.410340414 
Pascual-Leone, A., Grafman, J., & Hallett, M. (1995).  Procedural learning and prefrontal 
cortex.  Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 769(1), 61-70. 
doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1995.tb38131.x 
Pascual-Leone, A., Wassermann, E. M., Grafman, J., & Hallett, M. (1996).  The role of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in implicit procedu-ral learning.  Experimental Brain 
Research, 107(3), 479–485. doi:10.1007/BF00230427 
Passingham, R. E., Toni, I., & Rushworth, M. F. (2000). Specialisation within the 
prefrontal cortex: the ventral prefrontal cortex and associative learning. 
Experimental Brain Research, 133(1), 103–113. doi:10.1007/s002210000405 
Pates, J., & Maynard, I. (2000). Effects of hypnosis on flow states and golf performance. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 91(6), 1057–1075. doi:10.2466/PMS.91.7.1057-1075 
Paul, R. H., Lawrence, J., Williams, L. M., Clark, C. R, Cooper, N., & Gordon, E.  (2005). 
Preliminary validity of “IntegNeuro”: A new computerized battery of 
neurocognitive tests. International Journal of Neuroscience, 115(11), 1549–1567. 
doi:10.1080/00207450590957890 
Pease, B., & Pease, A. (2000).  Why men don't listen and women can't read maps. New 
York: Broadway.  
 302 
Penfield, W., & Welch, K. (1949). Instability of response to stimulation of the 
sensorimotor cortex of man. Journal of Physiology, 109(3–4), 358–365. Retrieved 
from http://jp.physoc.org/content/109/3-4/358.full.pdf 
Pfurtscheller, G., & Berghold, A. (1989). Pattern of cortical activation during planning of 
voluntary movement. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 
72(3), 250–258. doi:10.1016/0013-4694(89)90250-2 
Pfurtscheller, G., & Andrew, C. (1999). Event-related changes of band power and 
coherence: methodology and interpretation.  Journal of Clinical Neurophysiology, 
16(6), 512–519. doi:10.1097/00004691-199911000-00003 
Pfurtscheller, G., & Lopes da Silva, F. H. (1999). Event-related EEG/MEG 
synchronization and desynchronization: basic principles. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 110(11), 1842–1857. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1388-2457(99)00141-8 
Pfurtscheller, G., Woertz, M., Supp, G., & Lopes da Silva, F. H. (2003). Early onset of 
post-movement beta electroencephalogram synchronisation in the supplementary 
motor area during self-paced finger movement in man. Neuroscience Letters, 
339(2), 111–114.  doi:10.1016/s0304-3940(02)01479-9 
Phan, K. L., Wage, R. T., Taylor, S. F., & Liberzon, I. (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of 
emotion: A meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI, 
NeuroImage, 16(2), 331–348. doi:10.1006/nimg.2002.1087 
Piaget, J. (1952).  The origins of intelligence in children. New York: International 
Universities Press.  
Pinel, J. P. J., & Edwards, M. (1998).  A colorful introduction to the anatomy of the brain. 
Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Posner, M. (1994). Attention: The mechanism of consciousness. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 91(16), 7398–7403. doi:10.1073/pnas.91.16.7398 
 303 
Posner, M. I., Inhoff, A. W., Friedrich, F. J., & Cohen, A. (1987). Isolating attentional 
systems: A cognitive-anatomical analysis. Psychobiology, 15(2), 107–121. 
doi:10.3758/BF03333099 
Prabhakaran, V., Narayanan, K., Zhao, Z., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1999).  Integration of 
diverse information in working memory within the frontal lobe. Nature 
Neuroscience, 3(1), 85–90.  
Price, J. L. (1999). Prefrontal cortical networks related to visceral function and mood. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 877(3), 383–396. 
doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1999.tb09278.x 
Privette, G. (1981). The phenomenology of peak performance in sports. International 
Journal of Sport Psychology, 12, 51–60.  
Privette, G. (1982). Peak performance in sports: A factorial topology. International 
Journal of Sport Psychology, 13(4), 242–249. 
Privette, G. (1983). Peak experience, peak performance, and flow: A comparative analysis 
of positive human experience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
45(6), 1361–1368. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.6.1361 
Privette, G. (1984). Experience questionnaire. Pensacola, FL: University of West Florida. 
Privette, G., & Bundrick, C. M. (1987). Measurement of experience: Construct and content 
validity of the Experience Questionnaire. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 65(1), 315–
332. doi:10.2466/pms.1987.65.1.315 
Privette, G., & Bundrick, C. M. (1997). Psychological processes of peak, average, and 
failing performance in sport. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 28(4), 
323–334. 
Rabbit, P., & Banerji, N. (1989). How does very prolonged practice improve decision 
speed? Journal of Experimental Psychology General, 118(4), 338–345. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.118.4.338 
 304 
Radlo, S. J., Janelle, C. M., Barba, D. A., & Frehlich, S. G. (2001). Perceptual decision 
making for baseball pitch recognition: Using P300 latency and amplitude to index 
attentional processing. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 72(1), 22–31. 
doi:10.1080/02701367.2001.10608928 
Ratey, J. J. (2001). A user’s guide to the brain: Perception, attention and the four theaters 
of the brain. New York: Vintage.  
Raz, A., & Buhle, J. (2006). Typologies of attentional networks. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 7, 367–379. doi:10.1038/nrn1903 
Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rheinberg, F., & Vollmeyer, R. (2003). Flow-Erleben in einem computerspiel unter 
experimentell variierten bedingungen [Flow experience in a computer game under 
experimentally manipulated conditions]. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 211(4), 161–
170. 
Rihs, T. A., Michel, C. M., & Thut, G. (2007). Mechanisms of selective inhibition in 
visual spatial attention are indexed by alpha-band EEG synchronization. European 
Journal of  Neuroscience, 25(2), 603–610. doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2007.05278.x 
Rosenbaum, D. A., Meulenbroek, R. J., Vaughan, J. & Jansen, C. (2001). Posture-based 
motion planning: applications to grasping. Psychological Review 108(4), 709 – 
734.  
Rosenbaum, D. A., Vaughan, J., Barnes, H. J., & Jorgensen, M. J. (1992). Time course of 
movement planning: selection of handgrips for object manipulation. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology-learning Memory and Cognitio, 18(5), 1058–1073. 
doi:10.1037//0278-7393.18.5.1058  
Rosenthal, D. (1986).  Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49(3), 329–
359.  
 305 
Rotter, J. (1972).  Applications of a social learning theory of personality. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston. 
Roullier, E. M., Liang, F., Babalian, A., Moret, V,, & Wiesendanger, M. (1994). 
Cerebellothalamocortical and pallidothalamocortical projections to the primary and 
supplementary motor cortical areas: a multiple tracing study in macaque monkeys. 
Journal of Comparative Neurology, 345(2), 185–213. doi:10.1002/cne.903450204  
Rowe, D. L., Cooper, N. J., Liddell, B. J., Clark, C. R., Gordon, E., & Williams, L. M. 
(2007).  Brain structure and function correlates of general and social cognition. 
Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, 6(1), 35–74. 
doi:10.1142/S021963520700143X 
Rowe, J. B., Toni, I., Josephs, O., Frackowiak, R. S., & Passingham, R. E. (2000).  The 
prefrontal cortex: Response selection or maintenance within working memory? 
Science, 288, 1656–1660. Retrieved from 
www.researchgate.net/...The_prefrontal_cortex_response_selection_or_... 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of 
intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 
55(1), 68–78. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68 
Sakai, K., Rowe, J. B., & Passingham, R. E. (2002). Active maintenance in prefrontal area 
46 creates distractor-resistant memory. Nature Neuroscience, 5(5), 479–484. 
doi:10.1038/nn846 
Salazar, W., Landers, D. M., Petruzzello, S. J., Han, M., Crews, D. J., & Kubitz, K. A.  
(1990). Hemispheric asymmetry, cardiac response, and performance in elite 
archers. Research Quarterly for Exercise & Sport, 61(4), 351–359. 
doi:10.1080/02701367.1990.10607499 
Salinas, E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (2001).  Gain Modulation in the Central Nervous System: 
Where Behavior, Neurophysiology, and Computation Meet.  The Neuroscientist, 
7(5),  430–440.  
 306 
Sarnthein, J., Petsche, H., Rappelsberger, P., Shaw, G. L., & von Stein, A. (1998). 
Synchronisation between prefrontal and posterior association cortex during human 
working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 95(12), 7092–7096.  doi:10.1177/107385840100700512 
Sarter, M., Givens, B., & Bruno, J.P. (2001). The cognitive neuroscience of sustained 
attention: where top–down meets bottom–up. Brain Research Reviews, 35(2), 146–
160. doi:10.1016/S0165-0173(01) 
Sasaki, K., Tsujimoto, T., Nishikawa, S., Nishitani, N., & Ishihara, T. (1996). Frontal 
mental theta wave recorded simultaneously with magnetoencephalography and 
electroencephalography. Neuroscience Research, 26(1), 79–81. 
doi:10.1016/S0168-0102(96)01082-6 
Sauseng, P., Klimesch, W., Schabus, M., & Doppelmayr, M. (2005). Fronto-parietal EEG 
coherence in theta and upper alpha reflect central executive functions of working 
memory. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 57(2), 97–103. 
doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.03.018 
Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: History and current status. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 113(3), 501–518. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.94.4.439 
Schmahmann, J. D.,  & Pandya, D. N. (1997).  Anatomic Organization of the Basilar 
Pontine Projections from Prefrontal Cortices in Rhesus Monkey. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 17(1), 438-458. Retrieved from 
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/17/1/438.full.pdf+html 
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information 
processing: I. Detection, search and attention. Psychological Review, 84(1), 1–66. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.84.1.1 
 307 
Schneider, W., & Chein, J. M. (2003). Controlled and automatic processing: Behavior, 
theory, and biological mechanisms. Cognitive Science, 27(3), 525–559. 
doi:10.1016/S0364-0213(03)00011-9 
Schnitzler, A., & Gross, J. (2005). Normal and pathological oscillatory communication in 
the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(4), 285–296. doi:10.1038/nrn1650 
Sejnowski, T. J., & Paulsen, O. (2006). Network oscillations : emerging computational 
principal. Journal of Neuroscience, 26(6), 1673–1676. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3737-05d.2006 
Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. 
American Psychologist, 55(1), 5–14. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.5 
Sharafi, P., Hedman, L., & Montgomery, H. (2006). Using information technology: 
Engagement modes, flow experience, and personality orientations. Computers in 
Human Behavior, 22, 899–916. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2004.03.022 
Shaw, J. C. (2003). The Brain’s Alpha Rhythms and the Mind. New York: Elsevier. 
Sherry, J. L. (2004). Flow and media enjoyment. Communication Theory, 14(4), 328–347. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00318.x 
Simons, J. S., & Spiers, H. J. (2003). Prefrontal and medial temporal lobeinteractions in 
long-termmemory. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 637–648. 
doi:10.1038/nrn1178 
Slobounov, S. M., Fukada, K., Simon, R., Rearick, M., & Ray, W. (2000). 
Neurophysiological and behavioral indices of time pressure effects on visuomotor 
task performance. Cognitive Brain Research, 9(3), 287–298. doi:10.1016/S0926-
6410(00)00009-4 
Smith, M. E., McEvoy, L. K., & Gevins, A. (1999). Neurophysiological indices of strategy 
development and skill acquisition. Cognitive Brain Research, 7(3), 389–404. 
Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09266410/7/3 
 308 
Spiers, H. J., & Maguire, E. A. (2007).  Neural substrates of driving behaviour. 
NeuroImage,   36(1–3), 245–255. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.02.032 
Springer, S., & Deutsch, G. (1998). Left brain, right brain: Perspectives from cognitive 
neuroscience. New York: W. H. Freeman.  
Stein, G. L., Kimiecik, J. C., Daniels, J., & Jackson, S. A. (1995). Psychological 
antecedents of flow in recreational sport. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 21(2), 125–135. doi:10.1177/0146167295212003 
Steriade, M., & Llinas, R. R. (1988). The functional states of the thalamus and the 
associated neuronal interplay. Physiological Reviews, 68(3), 649–742. Retrieved 
from http://physrev.physiology.org/content/68/3/649 
Sterman, M. B., Mann, C. A., Kaiser, D. A., & Suyenobu, B. Y. (1994). Multiband 
topographic EEG analysis of a simulated visuomotor aviation task. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 16(1), 49–56. doi:10.1016/0167-8760(94)90041-8 
Stern,  J. M., & Engel, J., Jr. (2005). Breach effect. In J. M. Stern & J. Engel Jr (Eds.), 
Atlas of EEG patterns (pp. 101–103). Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. 
Sutton-Smith, B. (1997). The ambiguity of play. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Tallon-Baudry, C., Bertrand, O., Peronnet, F., & Pernier, J. (1998). Induced gamma-band 
activity during the delay of a visual short-term memory task in humans. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 18(11), 4244–4254. Retrieved from 
www.jneurosci.org/content/18/11/4244.full.pdf 
Taylor, I., & Taylor, M. M. (1990). Psycholinguistics: learning and using language. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall International.  
Taylor, C. M., Schepers, J. M., & Crous, F. (2006).  Locus of Control in relation to Flow. 
SA Journal of Industrial Psychology, 32(3), 63–71.  
 309 
Taylor, J. G. (2001). The central role of the parietal lobes in consciousness. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 10(3), 379–417. doi:10.1006/ccog.2000.0495 
Thierry, A. M., Gioanni, Y., Degenetais, E., & Glowinski, J. (2000).  Hippocampo-
prefrontal cortex pathway: anatomical and electrophysiological characteristics.  
Hippocampus, 10(4), 411–419. doi:10.1002/1098-1063(2000)10:4<411::AID-
HIPO7>3.0.CO;2-A 
Thut, G., Nietzel, A., Brandt, S.A., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2006). Alpha-band 
electroencephalographic activity over occipital cortex indexes visuospatial 
attention bias and predicts visual target detection. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
26(37), 9494–9502. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0875-06.2006 
Toates, F. (2006). A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition, and consciousness. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 15(1), 75-118. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.008 
Todd, J. J., & Marois, R. (2004). Capacity limit of visual short-term memory in human 
posterior parietal cortex. Nature, 428(6984), 751–754. 
Tolson, J. (2000, July 3). Into the zone. U.S. News & World Report, 129(1), 38–45.  
Toni, I., Krams, M., Turner, R., & Passingham, R. E. (1998). The time course of changes 
during motor sequence learning: a whole-brain fMRI study. NeuroImage, 8(1), 50–
61. 
Toni, I., & Passingham, R.E. (1999). Prefrontal-basal ganglia pathways are involved in the 
learning of arbitrary visumotor associations: a PET study. Experimental Brain 
Research, 127(1), 19–32. doi:10.1007/s002210050770 
Toni, I., Ramnani, N., Josephs, O., Ashburner, J., & Passingham, R. E. (2001). Learning 
arbitrary visuomotor associations: temporal dynamic of brain activity. NeuroImage, 
14(5), 1048–1057. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0894 
 310 
Tononi, G., Sporns, O., & Edelman, G. M. (1992). Re-entry and the problem of integrating 
multiple cortical areas: Simulation of dynamic integration in the visual system. 
Cerebral Cortex, 2(4), 310–35. doi:10.1093/cercor/2.4.310 
Tredoux, C. & Durrheim, K. (2013). Number, hypotheses & conclusions: A course in 
statistics for the social sciences. Cape Town, South Africa: UCT Press.  
Trevino, L. K., & Webster, J. (1992). Flow in computer-mediated communication: 
electronic mail and voice mail evaluation and impacts. Communication Research, 
19(5), 539–573. doi:10.1177/009365092019005001 
Tyner, F. S., Knott, J. R., & Mayer, W. B. (1983). Fundamentals of EEG technology. New 
York: Raven Press. 
Van der Kolk, B. A., McFarlane, A. C., & Weisaeth, L. (1996). Traumatic stress: The 
effects of overwhelming experience on mind, body, and society. New York: 
Guilford Press.  
Van Wijk, B. C. M., Daffertshofer, A., Roach, N., & Praamstra, P. (2009). A role of beta 
oscillatory synchrony in biasing response competition? Cerebral Cortex, 19(6), 
1294–1302. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn174 
Varela, F.,  Lachaux, J. P.,  Rodriguez, E., & Martinerie, J. (2001). The brainweb: phase 
synchronization and large-scale integration. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2(4), 
229 – 239.  
Vernon, D. (2005). Can neurofeedback training enhance performance? An evaluation of 
the evidence with implications for future research. Applied Psychophysiology and 
Biofeedback, 30(4), 347–364.  
Vieira, E. T. (2003). The effects of emotional and nonemotional content on children’s 
(ages: 10-12) cognitive motivation & involvement in web content (Doctoral 
dissertation). Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/AAI3123471 
 311 
Vogel, W., Broverman, D. M., & Klaiber, E. L. (1968). EEG and mental abilities. 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 24(2), 166–175. Retrieved 
from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0013-4694(68)90122-3 
Vogt, B. A,, Finch, D. M., & Olson, C. R. (1992). Functional heterogeneity in cingulate 
cortex: the anterior executive and posterior evaluative regions. Cerebral Cortex, 
2(6), 435–443. doi:10.1093/cercor/2.6.435-a 
Voiskounsky, A. E., Mitina, O. V., & Avetisova, A. A. (2004). Playing online games: 
Flow experience. PsychoNology Journal, 2(3), 259–281. 
Von Stein, A., & Sarnthein, J. (2000). Different frequencies for different scales of cortical 
integration: from local gamma to long range alpha/theta synchronisation. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 38(3), 301–313. Retrieved from 
http://www.ini.uzh.ch/ johannes/vonstein ijp2000.pdf 
Wackermann, J. (1999). Towards a quantitative characterization of functional states of the 
brain: from non-linear methodology to the global linear description. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 34, 65–80. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(99)00038-0 
Wan, C. S., & Chiou, W. B. (2006). Psychological motives and online games addiction: a 
test of flow theory and humanistic needs theory for Taiwanese adolescents. 
CyberPsychology & Behavior, 9(3), 317–324. doi:10.1089/cpb.2006.9.317. 
Weber, R. (2009). Theorizing flow and media enjoyment as cognitive synchronization of 
attentional and reward networks. Communication Theory, 19(4), 397–422. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2009.01352.x 
Webster, J. & Martocchio, J. J. (1992). Microcomputer playfulness: development of a 
measure with workplace implications, MIS Quarterly, 16(2), 201–226. 
doi:10.2307/249576 
 312 
Webster, J., Trevino, L. K., & Ryan, L. (1993). The dimensionality and correlates of flow 
in human-computer interactions. Computers in Human Behavior, 9(4), 411–26. 
doi:10.1016/0747-5632(93)90032-N 
Werner, G. (2008). Consciousness related neural events viewed as brain state space 
transitions. Cognitive Neurodynamics, 3(1), 83–95. doi:10.1007/s11571-008-9040-6 
Werner, G. (2012). From brain states to mental phenomena via phase space transitions and 
renormalization group transformation: proposal of a theory. Cognitive 
Neurodynamics, 6(2), pp 199-202. Doi:10.1007/s11571-011-9187-4 
Wertheim, A. H. (1981). Occipital alpha activity as a measure of retinal involvement in 
oculomotor control. Psychophysiology, 18(4), 432–439. doi:10.1111/j.1469-
8986.1981.tb02468.x. 
Whitton, J. L., Modolfsky, H., & Lue, F. (1978). EEG frequency patterns associated with 
hallucinations in schizophrenia and ‘creativity’ in normals. Biological psychiatry, 
13(1), 123–133.  
Wiesendanger, M., Roullier, E.  M., Kazennikov, O., & Perrig, S. (1996). Is the 
supplementary area a bilaterally organized system? Advances in Neurology, 70, 
85–93. 
Wilber, K. (1997). An Integral Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 4(1), 71 – 92. 
Williams, J. M., & Krane, V. (1998). Psychological characteristics of peak performance. In 
J.M. Williams (Ed.), Applied sport psychology: Personal growth to peak 
performance (pp. 158–170). Mountain View, CA: Mayfield. 
Williams, L. M., Liddell, B. J., Kemp, A. H., Bryant, R. A., Meares, R. A., Peduto, A. S., 
& Gordon, E. (2006).  Amygdala-prefrontal dissociation of subliminal and 
supraliminal fear. Human Brain Mapping, 27(8), 652–661. doi:10.1002/hbm.20208 
 313 
Worden, M. S., Foxe, J. J., Wang, N., & Simpson, G. V. (2000). Anticipatory biasing of 
visuospatial attention indexed by retinotopically specific alpha-band 
electroencephalography increases over occipital cortex. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 20(RC63), 1–6. Retrieved from 
www.jneurosci.org/content/20/6/RC63.full.pdf+html 
Wrisberg, C. A. (2001). Handbook of sports psychology. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Young, J. A. (2000). Professional tennis players in the zone. In S. J. Haake & A. Coe 
(Eds.), Tennis science & technology (pp. 417–422). Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Science. 
Young, J. A., & Pain, M. D. (1999). The Zone: Evidence of a Universal Phenomenon for 
Athletes Across Sports. Athletic Insight, 1(3), 21–30. Retrieved from 
http://www.athleticinsight.com/Vol1Iss3/Empirical_Zone.htm 
Zalla, T., Koechlin, E., Pietrini, P., Basso, G., Aquino, P., Sirigu, A., & Grafman, J. 
(2000).  Differential amygdala responses to winning and losing: a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging study in humans. European Journal of Neuroscience, 
12(5), 1764–1770. doi:10.1046/j.1460-9568.2000.00064.x 
 314 
APPENDIX A  
 
Participant consent form  
 
Participant  
I have been asked to take part in a research study which also includes the use of EEG 
recordings. I hereby confirm that the researcher has informed me to my satisfaction about 
the nature, purpose, and benefits of the research study, including the use of EEG 
recordings. The researcher has also informed me that I can terminate my participation at 
any time. I was also made aware that my responses will be treated as completely 
confidential.  Responses will be summarised so that individuals cannot be identified.  Only 
summaries of findings will be reported. I therefore participate in this research study 
willingly.  
Name and Surname of participant:  __________________________________________ 
 
Signature of participant:  __________________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________  
Researcher  
I hereby confirm that I have informed the above participant about the nature, purpose and 
benefits of the research study. I also acknowledge that the participant is free to terminate 
his participation at any time.  
Name and Surname of researcher: ___________________________________________ 
 
Signature of researcher: ___________________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________ 
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APPENDIX B  
 
Permission to Participation consent form  
 
Parent/Guardian 
I confirm that my child has been asked to take part in a research study which also includes 
the use of EEG recordings. I acknowledge that my child’s participation in this study is 
voluntary and I can stop his participation at any time.  I hereby confirm that the researcher 
has informed me to my satisfaction about the nature, purpose, and benefits of the research 
study, including the use of EEG recordings. I was also made aware that my child’s 
responses will be treated as completely confidential.  I hereby agree to allow my child to 
participate in this research study.  
Name and Surname of Parent/Guardian: ______________________________________ 
 
Signature of participant: __________________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________  
Researcher  
I hereby confirm that I have informed the above parent/guardian about the nature, purpose 
and benefits of the research study. I also acknowledge that the participant is free to 
terminate his participation at any time.  
Name and Surname of researcher: ___________________________________________ 
 
Signature of researcher: ___________________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________ 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Biographical Data 
       
                    
Name :         Date :       
 
         
 
 
A. Age : 16 -19 20 - 24 25 - 29 30 - 34 35 - 39 40 - 44 45 - 49 50+ 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          B. Gender  Male 1 
      
  
Female 2 
      
          C. Population Group  White Coloured Black Indian Other 
  
   
1 2 3 4 5 
  
          D. Dominant Hand Right 1 
     
   
Left 2 
     
          E. Gaming Skill Level Poor Basic Moderate Good Excellent 
  
   
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Game Flow Inventory (GFI) 
 
The following 13 statements are about how you felt during the last activity.  
 
Please read each statement carefully and decide how you felt.  
Use the accompanied answer sheet and rating scale. 
 
1. When I was racing, I thought about nothing else  
2. I got carried away by the race  
3. When I was racing, I forgot everything else around me  
4. I was totally immersed in the race   
5. The race gave me a good feeling  
6. I was racing with a lot of enjoyment  
7. I felt happy during the race  
8. I felt cheerful during the race   
9. I would still do this activity, even if I received less reward  
10. I would like to continue racing, just for the fun of it  
11. I raced because I enjoyed it  
12. When I was racing, I was doing it for myself  
13. I got my motivation from the race / activity itself, and not from the reward for it. 
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GFI Answer Sheet 
 
Mark your response by placing a cross (X) in the appropriate box. 
Quest. No. Answers 
 
Admin 
  Never Almost Never Sometimes Regularly Often Very Often Always 
 
  
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
  Never Almost Never Sometimes Regularly Often Very Often Always 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire (AFQ) 
 
Introduction 
 
This questionnaire will serve as a quick, inter-activity survey regarding your experience 
during the preceding activity.  You will be required to complete this short questionnaire, 
only five questions, every time you have completed an activity.  When responding to the 
questions think about your experience during the just completed activity. 
 
Instructions 
 
 Answer each question by rating it according to the scale provided.  Mark your response 
with a cross (X) on the provided answer sheet. 
 This is a survey about your experience during and after the activity. 
 There are no right or wrong answers. 
 Do not make any marks on the questionnaire. 
 There is no time limit. 
 If you have any questions, please ask the administrator. 
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Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire : Racing (Need for Speed) 
 
 
Question 1 
 
During the race my perception of time was : 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
It was a drag It felt longer than 
what it really was 
I kept track of time It felt shorter than 
what it really was 
I lost track of time 
 
Question 2 
 
During the race my level of engagement was : 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I felt totally 
disengaged 
I felt distracted and 
not fully engaged 
I felt engaged but 
not immersed 
I felt immersed but 
distracted at times 
I felt totally 
immersed 
 
Question 3 
 
During the race my level of skill-challenge was : 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
My skill is good, I 
am just not 
motivated  
The challenge is 
OK, I am still 
learning 
The challenge 
exceeded my skill 
level 
My skill far 
exceeded the 
challenge  
A perfect match 
 
Question 4 
 
During the race my perception of control was : 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I never felt in 
control  
I seldom felt in 
control 
Occasionally  I felt 
in control 
I felt in control 
most of the time 
I felt in control the 
whole time 
 
Question 5 
 
After the race my level of accomplishment (intrinsic reward) was : 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I felt unsuccessful 
and disappointed 
I felt unsuccessful 
but not 
disappointed 
I felt that I had not 
entirely succeeded  
I felt somewhat 
accomplished but 
not satisfied 
I felt highly 
accomplished and 
satisfied 
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ANSWER SHEET : Abbreviated Flow Questionnaire 
          
          
NAME : ________________________________ DATE : _______________ 
          AGE :  _____________ 
   
MALE / FEMALE 
  
          
          Mark your responses with a cross (X) using the sheet below. 
          
          
Run 1 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
          
          
Run 2 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
          
          
Run 3 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
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Run 4 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
          
Run 5 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
 
Run 6 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
          
Run 7 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
          
Run 8 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
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Run 9 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
          
          
Run 10 Quest Responses 
   Time 1 1 2 3 4 5 
   Engagement 2 1 2 3 4 5 
   Challenge 3 1 2 3 4 5 
   Control 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total % Run Time 
Accomplish 5 1 2 3 4 5       
          
          Notes 
    
File Numbers :  
   
          
           
 
